ANTONIO L. TOTTOC, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SATURNINO DOCTOR, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
former Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 00034,^[1]
reversing in toto the decision in Civil
Case No. 2212 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Nueva Vizcaya, the disposition of
respondent court being as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from not consistent
with the facts and the law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another
entered ?

1.  Declaring Patent No.
124175 and Original Certificate of Title No. 3428 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Nueva Vizcaya in the
name of plaintiff Saturnino Doctor valid and
existing;

2. Ordering the defendant-appellee to
restore possession of the subject property unto the plaintiff-appellant and to
respect such possessions;

3.  Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 annually from the filing of the complaint until
possession is fully restored as actual damages.

4.  Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the sums of P2,000.00
as exemplary damages and P1,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.

Costs against the defendant-appellee.

“SO ORDERED.

“REVERSED.”^[2]

The antecedental facts which led to the
filing of the original action below are undisputed and are hereinunder
set forth as synthesized by the court a quo and adopted by
respondent court.^[3]

On April 9, 1949,
petitioner applied for the lease of a pasture land consisting of 78.6 hectares,
situated at Lacangan, Barrio Madiangat,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
before the Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
thru the office of the Provincial Forester at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya.  By virtue of said application, petitioner was
granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993 after a survey of the area
involved.  Thereafter, petitioner
occupied said 78.6 hectares of pasture land and fenced the same, without
anybody disturbing his possession thereof. 
Private respondent, being a neighbor of petitioner, was aware of such
occupation of the land by petitioner since 1949.

On September 21, 1951,
petitioner was again granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993 Extension by
Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis,
authorizing the former to occupy the same area, the first permit having expired
on June 30, 1952.  Finally, on August 6, 1958, petitioner entered into a lease agreement
with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Juan de G. Rodriguez,
under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228 covering the identical area for a period
of 11 years.

Meanwhile, private respondent, upon verification from the Bureau
of Forestry supposedly before 1963 that the pasture land in question was
reportedly untouched and outside the pasture land of petitioner, filed his
application for a homestead with the Bureau of Lands and entered the northern
portion of the land, clearing and cultivating an area of less than 4 hectares
in 1963.

On January 7, 1965,
private respondent secured a certification from Assistant Chief Maximo A. Abuan of the Bureau of
Forestry office in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, certifying to the fact that the land in
question is alienable and disposable.  Private
respondent further claims to have secured another certification from an
employee of the Bureau of Lands who based the same on a certification on file
in the Bureau of Lands office as furnished by the Bureau of Forestry.

On February 25, 1966,
petitioner caused the relocation survey of his pasture land in the presence of
Bureau of Lands Inspector Marcelino Hernaez and private respondent.  It was found in said survey that a portion of
the land subject of private respondent’s application was within the pasture
land of petitioner and within the so-called Forest Zone.  In view thereof, petitioner requested
Inspector Hernaez to send a telegram to the Director
of Lands in Manila reading:  “Lands Director Jorge, Manila.  Please hold action homestead application Saturnino Doctor and Luis Carub,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.  Re-investigation in
progress.  Land claimed by Mayor Tottoc. Investigator Hernaez.”

Aside from this survey, petitioner requested in a letter to the
office of the Bureau of Forestry at Nueva Vizcaya the relocation survey of his pasture land pursuant
to which the district forester sent Forester Nicasio Pascua to relocate the same on April 26, 1966.  A cartographer of the Bureau of Lands, Eladio Miranda, herein petitioner and private respondent,
as well as several laborers, were present during said relocation survey.  Thereafter, Forester Pascua
submitted his memorandum, dated May 3,
1966, to the bureau director indicating the different positions of
the lots that had encroached on the pasture land of petitioner.  Consequent to such findings, Forester Pascua recommended that all certifications and/or patents
issued in favor of the lot owners or claimants of said encroaching lots be
nullified for the good of the public service.

On March 8, 1967,
petitioner was granted another ordinary pasture permit by Acting Director of
Forestry Antonio Quejado to occupy and use for
pasture another 42 hectares of public forest land situated in Inatub, Lacangan, Carolet and Buliwao, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya
which made a total of 120.6 hectares of land granted to petitioner for pasture
purposes.  Said additional area was
likewise fenced by petitioner.

On June 17, 1968,
Original Certificate of Title No. P-­3428 under Homestead Patent No.
124175 was issued to private respondent over a parcel of land situated in Inatub, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya, containing an area
of approximately 20 hectares. 
Thereafter, private respondent and one Luis Carub
requested the Bureau of Forestry to relocate the pasture land of petitioner to
determine any encroachment on his land.

Forester Buenaventura Caguioa, on the
instructions of the Director of Forestry dated November 25, 1971 thru District Forester Geronimo Falloran, conducted the relocation survey.  On March
1, 1972, Forester Caguioa submitted his memorandum
to the district forester indicating that the area in the title granted to
private respondent traversed a portion of the pasture land of petitioner and
that only 3.5 hectares, more or less, was verified to be within the alienable
and disposable area.  In view thereof, a
recommendation was made that the application filed by petitioner for the
renewal of the pasture lease agreement, which expired on June 30, 1969, be approved and that only 3.5
hectares of land be retained by private respondent.

On March 23, 1972, said memorandum report of District Forester Falloran, was forwarded to the Director of Forestry,
Manila, through the Regional Director of the Bureau of Forestry, Region No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, who in turn
indorsed the same on June 23, 1972.  On November 29, 1972, Mr. Aniceto Bueno, Officer-in-Charge
of the Parks, Range and Wildlife Division of the Bureau of Forest Development,
furnished petitioner a copy of the renewed Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228,
dated November 9, 1972,
entered into by the petitioner with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Jose D. Drilon, Jr.  The lease was for a period of 25 years, to
expire on June 30, 1994,
and covered the 120 hectares of pasture land in Lacangan,
Inatub, Carolet, Madiangat and Buliwao, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya.

With these documents in favor of petitioner, private respondent
was prevented from occupying and cultivating the disputed portion of 16.5459
hectares.  As a consequence, private respondent, filed an action for recovery of possession with
damages.  After trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment on May 28, 1981 in favor of therein defendant and
against the plaintiff, and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the
amount of P1,400.00 as actual and litigation expenses, P3,000.00 for attorney’s
fees, and to pay the costs of the suit.^[4]

On a “Partial Motion for Reconsideration” filed by
petitioner, and a “Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial” of
private respondent, as defendant and plaintiff, respectively, said decision was
amended by a resolution issued on January 7, 1982, the decretal
portion whereof reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby:

1.  Denies the plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, dated June 29, 1981, for lack of
merit; and

2. Grants the defendant’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration, dated
May 29, 1981.  The dispositive
portion of the decision is, therefore, amended to read as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, this Court:

1.  Declaring Patent No.
124175 and Original Certificate of Title No. 3428 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya, in
favor of the plaintiff, covering the land in dispute which is within the Forest
Zone as null and void ab initio
for lack of jurisdiction;

2. Ordering the plaintiff not to molest the defendant in his
peaceful and public occupation in the land in dispute the same being still a
part of the Forest Zone and a part of his pasture land; and

3. Condemning the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the amounts of P1,400.00 as actual and litigation expenses and P3,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of the suit.’”^[5]

As stated at the outset, said decision and resolution were
appealed to respondent court which reversed and set aside the same.  A motion for reconsideration, dated October 15, 1984, was filed by
petitioner with respondent court with a supplemental memorandum in support
thereof, but the same was denied in respondent court’s resolution of January 28, 1985.

The present recourse is before us as a consequence.  Succinctly reduced to salient terms,
petitioner’s submissions are that respondent court committed errors of law (1)
in concluding that the land in dispute is alienable by relying on the
certification issued by District Forester Abuan and
in disregarding the contrary testimonies and certifications of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa; (2) in
concluding that petitioner, a pasture lease permittee,
has no legal personality to question the patent and title of private respondent
Doctor over the disputed area; and (3) when it ruled that private respondent is
entitled to the award of damages.^[6]

On the first assignment of error, petitioner maintains that
respondent court should not have relied on the certification issued by District
Forester Abuan, it being hearsay evidence by reason
of Abuan’s failure to testify thereon.  Moreover, petitioner assails respondent
court’s disregard of the testimonies of Foresters Pascua
and Caguioa who certified that the land was within
the Forest Zone after having conducted an actual verification survey of the
area.

We agree with petitioner, but not only for the reason that the
evidence-in-chief of private respondent may, in point of strict law, be
constitutive of hearsay.  The question as
to whether a particular portion of land is forestal
or any other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case.^[7]
Thus, the mere classification or certification made by the Bureau of Forestry
that a part of the public domain is timberland is not controlling in all cases.^[8]

We have reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses for private
respondent and nowhere do we find any cogent basis for the certification made
by District Forester Abuan.  The testimony of Sabino
Delizo, District Land Officer of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, which could
possibly have energized private respondent’s case, is itself plagued with not a
few vacuities.  Aside from his assertion
and admission that the sole basis for his certification was merely an office
copy of the certification also of Forester Abuan
himself, Delizo further admitted that he had not made
any actual verification of the subject area.^[9]
Neither could he even conclusively establish that the lot mentioned in his
certification was identical to the lot in question.^[10]

In diametrical contrast, the pasture lease permit granted to
petitioner was issued after a series of actual investigations, ocular and
technical, of the subject area by Foresters Pascua
and Caguioa conducted in the presence of all the
interested parties, including private respondent.  While private respondent denies having
received any copy of the memoranda executed by the foresters despite his
admitted presence during the surveys and investigations,^[11]
the same does not relieve him of the consequences of imputed knowledge of the
findings therein considering the facility in obtaining copies of the same.  Besides, it is an affront to credulity that a
person like private respondent who, despite his zeal and desire to possess and
own the land in controversy, would prefer to remain in deliberate ignorance of
the results of said surveys through his unexplained inaction and inexplicable
indifference.

Notably, even before the relocation survey made by Forester Caguioa, Bureau of Lands Inspector Hernaez
conducted his own survey and found that the land subject of private
respondent’s application for a homestead patent was within the pasture land of
petitioner and within the Forest Zone. 
Precisely, an advice to hold said application was sent to the Director
of Lands in Manila upon
petitioner’s request.^[12]

It will also be recalled that consequent to Forester Pascua’s survey and findings, a further recommendation was
made to the Director of Forestry for the nullification of all certifications
and/or patents issued in favor of the owners and/or claimants whose lots had
intruded upon petitioner’s land area, including private respondent himself,
such invalidation being necessitated for the good of the public service.^[13]
All these on-the-spot surveys, the findings wherefrom are unassailed
and uncontradicted, more than preponderate over and
definitely override the enervated evidentiary value of the certification of Abuan and Delizo.

While we admit an exception to the rule that the Bureau of
Forestry has the power to set aside for forestry or mineral purposes a
particular land in question,^[14]
and that is when there was prior intervention of private interests, said
exception cannot find application in private respondent’s favor since
petitioner’s interests commenced and vested very much earlier than any claim
thereon by the former.

Petitioner had open, uninterrupted and peaceful possession and
occupation of the disputed land since 1949, being a grantee of pasture lease
permits which expired in 1969.  Private
respondent, on the other hand, started his controversial cultivation of the lot
only in 1963 and secured the questioned certification in 1965.^[15]
The long period of time from 1949 to 1969 during which the land was under
pasture lease permits granted to petitioner all the more lends credence to the
fact that said land was within the Forest Zone as only lands of the category of
public forest land can be the subject of such permits.^[16]

The Court neither loses sight of the presumption, in lieu of
contrary proof, that the land is agricultural in character, rather than forestal, as it is for the good of the country to have the
large public domain come under private ownership.^[17]
It is to be emphasized, however, that such presumption obtains only when the
conflict of interest is between a private citizen and the Government, not when
it involves opposing rights of private citizens against each other.

On the second assigned error, private respondent makes the
riposte that petitioner cannot question the validity of the title registered in
the former’s name. 
If there is any party who can question his title on the ground that it
includes therein a forest land, private respondent posits that it should be the
Bureau of Forest Development.^[18]
This counter-argument is an effete pretension.

In the case of Gatchalian vs.
Pavilin, et al.,^[19]
the Court had the occasion to render the following ruling:

“As to the alleged lack of personality of
defendants-appellants to assail appellee’s land grant
and certificate of title for the reason that said appellants are mere
prospective homestead applicants, it is sufficient to remark that by reason of
their prior occupancy and cultivation, these parties have already acquired possessory rights that they may vindicate and defend
against intruders without better title. 
And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue
a patent in favor of appellee Francisco Gatchalian because the land involved was still inalienable
forest land when granted, then it may be plausibly contended that her patent
title would be ab initio
void subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected (Civil Code,
Arts. 1409, 1421; Vano vs. Insular Gov’t., 41 Phil. 161; Adorable vs. Dir. of Forestry,
L-13663, 25 March 1960).  x x x.”

Moreover, in Vallarta, et al. vs. Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,^[20]
where the original proceeding was also between private citizens, we held:

“It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. 
It is not registrable.  The adverse possession which can be the basis
of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence
until after forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.  Possession of forest land,
no matter how long cannot convert it into private property.  x x x If somehow forest land happens to have been included in a
Torrens Title, the title is null and void
insofar as the forest land is concerned. 
x x x.”

Ironically, it was private respondent himself who initiated the
original action below for recovery of possession with damages.  As a consequence, petitioner was virtually
compelled to litigate in order to protect his own right to possession which in
part hinged on the nature of the land in dispute.  Were we to uphold private respondent’s theory
that petitioner is devoid of personality to question the invalidity of the former’s patent and title, that would be a procedural
inequity since it would thereby prevent petitioner from fully protecting his
interests or, at the very least, divest him of valid defenses.

On the third supposed error, suffice it to state that the records
are bereft of any substantial evidence showing that private respondent was
deprived by petitioner of the possession of the land through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. 
On the contrary, the evidence convinces us that petitioner was well
within his rights in taking possession of the lot in question, a matter which
we need not belabor with any further disquisition.

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The decision of the trial court, dated
January 7, 1982, on the partial motion for reconsideration by herein petitioner
as defendant therein, except as to the award of attorney’s fees and the payment
of the costs of suit both of which have no legal bases and are consequently
ordered deleted, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1] Penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison with Justices Abdulwahid A.
Bidin and Marcelino R. Veloso concurring.

^[2] Rollo, 107-108.

^[3] Ibid., 98-106.

^[4] Ibid.,
43; Civil Case No. 2212, Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch II, Judge Cecilio
F. Balagot, presiding.

^[5] Ibid., 71.

^[6]
Petition, 12-13; Rollo, 13-14.

^[7] Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46048, November 29, 1988, citing Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40
Phil. 10, 16 (1919).

^[8] Peña, Philippine Law on Natural Resources, 4th Ed., 117.

^[9] TSN, July 25, 1975, 25.

^[10] Id.,
34-36.

^[11] Id., January 29, 1976, 29, 33.

^[12] Exh. 19, Folder of Exhibits, 39.

^[13] Exh. 7, ibid., 8.

^[14] Ankron vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, supra.

^[15] Rollo,
36.

^[16] Peña, op.
cit., 120, citing C.A. No. 452, Pasture Land Act.

^[17] Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).

^[18] Rollo, 131-132.

^[19] 6 SCRA 508 (1962).

^[20] 151 SCRA 679 (1987).