G.R. No. 69803. January 30, 1987
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE AND WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY; HON. ANTONIO P. SAN…
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution are petitioners’ and public respondents’ respective
Motions for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of October 8, 1985, which decreed
that:
“WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984
by respondent Executive Judge Ernari Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive
Documents Case hereby made permanent, the personalties
seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible
introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special
Military Commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said
Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.”
(Rollo, p. 154; 139 SCRA
165).
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration public respondents
maintain that the subject Search Warrant meets the standards for validity and
that it should be considered in the context of the criminal offense
of Rebellion for which the Warrant was issued, the documents to establish which
are less susceptible of particularization since the offense does not involve an
isolated act or transaction.
In their own Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners
assail that portion of the Decision holding that, in so far as petitioner Mila
Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search
made in her premises was incident to her arrest and could be made without a
search warrant. Petitioners submit that a warrantless search can be justified only if it is an
incident to a lawful arrest and that since Mila Aguilar was not lawfully
arrested a search without warrant could not be made.
On April 10, 1986, we required the parties to MOVE in the premises
considering the supervening events, including the change of administration that
have transpired, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Rule 3 in so
far as the public respondents are concerned (which requires the successor
official to state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by
his predecessor-in-office).
In their Compliance, petitioners maintain that the arrest of
petitioners and the search of their premises thereafter are both illegal and
that the personalties seized should be ordered
returned to their owners.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of public
respondents, “in deference to the dissenting opinion of then
Supreme Court Justice (now Chief Justice) Claudio Teehankee,” now offer no further objection to a declaration
that the subject search is illegal and to the return of the seized items to the
petitioners. Respondents state, however, that they cannot
agree to having the arrest of petitioners
declared illegal.
The pertinent portion of the dissenting opinion referred
to reads:
“x x x The
questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the
Court’s decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the
constitutional mandate that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated’ (Bill of Rights,
sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all
illegally obtained evidence: ‘Any evidence obtained in
violation of this … section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding’ (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly
adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally
seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police
officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language
of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to
change or modify.
“All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule
totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of
the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case
of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos.
71208-09, August 30, 1985). x x x“
ACCORDINGLY, considering the respective positions now taken
by the parties, petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s
Decision of October 8, 1985
is GRANTED, and the dispositive portion thereof is
hereby revised to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent
Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained
pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby made
permanent. The personalties seized by
virtue of the illegal Search Warrant are hereby ordered returned to
petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., concur and file a separate
opinion.
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CONCURRING
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
I felicitate my colleagues for granting petitioners’
motion for reconsideration and now totally applying the exclusionary rule by
declaring that the search and seizure of the personalties at petitioner Mila Aguilar Roque’s dwelling at Mayon Street,
Quezon City was illegal and could not be deemed as
incident to her arrest earlier on board a public vehicle on the road away from
and outside of her dwelling. Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez’ stand in support hereof signifies one
more great step in fulfillment of the pledge of the present government of
granting full recognition and restoration of the civil and political liberties
of the people and rejecting the oppressive and repressive measures of the past
authoritarian regime.
The original majority decision citing sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court[1] had held
that said Rule states “a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a
search warrant. In this latter case, ‘the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances,
and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some
confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or
premises which may be searched.’ ‘What must be considered is the balancing of
the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s interest in the prevention of
crime and the apprehension of criminals.'”
This pronouncement had the support of a majority of
nine (9) Justices of the Court at the time. Three (3) members had
dissented,[2] while two (2) other members
took no part or reserved their vote.[3]
As the petitioners stressed in their motion for
reconsideration, “(I)f the majority opinion becomes settled law, the
constitutional protection would become meaningless. The military
or police would no longer apply for search warrants. All that they
would do is procure a search (sic)[4]
warrant or better still, a PDA, for the person whose house they would want to
search. Armed with a warrant of arrest or a PDA, the military or
police would simply wait for the person to reach his house, then arrest
him. Even if the person arrested does not resist and
has in fact been taken away already from his house, under the majority ruling,
the arresting party would still have the right to search the house of the
arrestee and cart away all his things and use them as evidence against him in
court.
“In such a situation, what then happens to that
stringent constitutional requirement that ‘no search warrant …. shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized’
and the constitutional injunction that ‘any evidence obtained in violation of
this …. shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.'”[5]
The better and established rule is a strict
application of the exception provided in Rule 126, sec. 12 and that is to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who
is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or
her arrest and to “dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.” Such warrantless
search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.[6]
Applying the aforestated
rule to this case, the undisputed fact is that petitioner Mila Aguilar Roque was arrested at 11:30
a.m. aboard a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margal Sts.).
The pronouncement by the majority at that time, that as an incident to
her arrest, her dwelling at 239-B Mayon Street could be searched
even without a warrant for evidence of the charges of rebellion filed against
her was contrary to the constitutional proscription, as defined by law and
jurisprudence. It was tantamount to sanctioning an untenable
violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
With the Court now unanimously upholding the
exclusionary rule, in toto, the constitutional mandate is given full
force and effect. This constitutional mandate expressly adopting
the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby
removing the incentive on the part of the military and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. This is of special public importance
and serves as a shield in the remote provinces and rural areas to the people who
have no access to courts for prompt and immediate relief from violations of
their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In this case, the arresting CSG group of the
military themselves knew that they needed a search warrant but they obtained the
void general warrant in question. Necessarily, the seizure of
documents and personal effects with such a void warrant could not be justified
“as an incident of an arrest” outside petitioner’s dwelling and the Constitution
bars their admissibility as evidence and ordains their return to
petitioners.
12. Search without warrant of person arrested. — A
person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.”
[2] Claudio Teehankee, Vicente Abad Santos
and Serafin
Cuevas, JJ.
[3] Ramon Aquino and Hermogenes Concepcion Jr., JJ.
[4] A manifest error:
This clearly refers to arrest
warrant, from the thrust of the argument.
[5] Record, page 201.
[6] The 1985 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly clarifies this through a change in the
caption, as follows: “Sec. 12 Search incident to lawful
arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.” (Rule
126)