VICENTE GUASH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUANA ESPIRITU, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This action was instituted under the provisions of section 712 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, by the plaintiff, as administrator of the
estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares, deceased, to set aside a deed of sale
of certain personal property described in the complaint. The complaint
alleges that the estate of which plaintiff is administrator is
insolvent; that the property in question is claimed by the defendant by
virtue of an alleged sale made to her by plaintiff’s intestate on
February 19,1906; and that the deed of sale was executed without any
consideration in fraud of the vendor’s creditors, one of whom, the wife
of the deceased, had obtained judgment against him for support, prior
to the date of the alleged sale. Judgment was rendered in the court
below in favor of the plaintiff, the trial judge being of opinion that
“the document of sale was only made out for the purpose of attempting
to conceal the ownership of the property, to make it impossible for the
wife of the deceased to collect the judgment she had obtained against
him, and that no consideration was ever given by the defendant for the
bill of sale, and that she never became the owner of the property.”

This action is in all respects identical with a former action
between the same parties, except that in the present action it is
alleged and proven that the estate of which plaintiff is administrator
is insolvent, while in the former action that fact was not alleged in
the complaint nor proven at the trial. In the former action judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the trial judge on
substantially the same grounds upon which a like judgment is rendered
in this case, but upon appeal to this court, that judgment was
reversed, on the ground that “there was a failure to prove fraud,
vitiating the sale, the defendant having established the payment of an
apparently good consideration for the transfer;” and on the further
ground that even if the court were precluded from examining the
transcript of the evidence and reversing the findings of fact by the
trial judge, because of certain technical defects touching its
certification, nevertheless the facts disclosed by an examination of
the pleadings and the findings of the trial judge were not sufficient
to sustain his judgment, it not appearing there from that the
“plaintiff had no other remedy, or that there was a deficiency of
assets,” without proof of which the action could not be maintained.
(Guash vs. Espiritu, 11 Phil.Rep., 184.)

At the
trial of the case at bar, wherein the parties appear to have relied on
the same evidence as in the former case, except as to the new
allegations of insolvency, a plea of res adjudicata was submitted by the defendant, and as we think, improperly overruled by the court below.

The trial judge in his opinion says:

“It appears to me from the decision rendered in the
former action by the Supreme Court that all question with regard to the
transfer of this property has been definitely settled, and yet it may
be inferred from a portion of the decision that the transfer was in
fraud of creditors, but that the plaintiff could not recover for the
reason that he had not shown the estate which he was administering to
be insolvent: and thus considering the matter I conclude that the
plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares,
deceased, is entitled to the proceeds arising from the sale of the
property, made by order of the court, for the reason that the attempted
sale was in fraud of creditors and that no sale had ever really been
accomplished, but that the property in question belonged to the estate
of the deceased.”

We agree with the trial judge that “all question with regard to the
transfer of this property has been definitely settled” by the former
decision of this court, but we do not agree with him that any inference
which may fairly be drawn from the reasoning of the opinion in that
case sustains his action in reopening the question thus settled.

The judgment in the former case was based on two separate grounds.
First, the “failure to prove fraud vitiating the sale, the defendant
having established the payment of an apparently good consideration;”
second, that even if the court conceded (which it did not) a contention
that it was precluded from the examination and review of the testimony,
the judgment could not be sustained for lack of allegations in the
pleadings or findings of fact as to a deficiency in assets, and the
lack of another remedy. But an examination of the opinion clearly
discloses that the court squarely held that the evidence of record
“failed to prove fraud vitiating the sale,” and that holding is
manifestly conclusive of the present case, wherein, upon the identical
record of the evidence taken in the former case, the trial judge finds
the existence of fraud vitiating the sale.

It is true that in the former case the court pointed out that even
had the plaintiff made a showing of fraud he could not have recovered
in that action for lack of proof that there was no other legal
recourse, but nothing that was said in this connection can be construed
as reserving a right in the plaintiff to institute a new action wherein
he would be permitted to allege and prove that fact. On the contrary,
the discussion developed, at its conclusion, a reiteration of the
holding set forth at the opening of the opinion, to the effect that
“there was a failure to prove fraud, vitiating the sale, the defendant
having established the payment of an apparently good consideration for
the transfer.”

Let judgment be entered reversing the judgment entered in the court
below, and dismissing the complaint filed in this action without day,
without special condemnation of costs in this instance.

Arellano, C. J., Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.