DOMICIANO CABIGAO, NESTOR DOMACENA, ROLANDO DOBLADO, ERNESTO PAMPUAN, EDGARDO PRADO, ROMEO DOMINICO, RODOLFO ERESE, RAMON GARCIA, AND CARLOS PACHECO, APPELLANTS-PETITIONERS, VS.…

This petition for review
on certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment of conviction rendered by
the respondent Sandiganbayan on October
10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. 4219 for the crime of murder with multiple frustrated and attempted
murder.

The petitioners were each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties attached thereto; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of the deceased victim in the
amount of P30,000.00 and the other victims themselves in the amount of
P5,000.00 each; and to pay actual damages plus the costs of the suit.

The information charging
the petitioners with other civilians who were later excluded by the respon­dent
court pursuant to Section 4, paragraph 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, reads as follows:

“That on or about February 26, 1980, at sitio Aluag, Barangay
Sta. Barbara, in
the Municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Domiciano Cabigao, Nestor
Domacena, Ernesto Pampaun, Edgardo Prado, Rolando Doblado, all public officers
having been appointed as members of the Integrated National Police, Zambales,
and accused Romeo Dominico, Rodolfo Erese, Ramon Garcia and Carlos Pacheco, all
civilians, conspiring and confederating with no less than four (4) PC soldiers and mutually helping one
another, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable motive, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with known premeditation
and abuse of superior strength,
assault, attack and fire indiscriminately with their high-powered firearms and deadly weapons Teofilo R. Payumo,
Sr., and (those) aboard (Teofilo’s jeep) were (sic) Amante C. Payumo, Edgar
Payumo, Reynaldo Ruanto, Crisanto Ruanto, Apolinario Ruanto and Exequiel Bonde,
thereby causing the immediate death of Amante C. Payumo, and inflicting
physical injuries to the others, as follows:

TEOFILO R. PAYUMO:

–    Gunshot wound, numbering three, right
anterior axillary line along the level, fourth ICS, fifth ICS and seventh ICS
with metallic foreign body;

EDGAR PAYUMO:

–    Multiple
lacerated wound, temporo­parietal area right;

–    lacerated wound,
upper portion of right pinna;

–    Multiple gunshot wound, right foot, with multiple metallic
foreign body;

–    Metallic
foreign body, right eye, with subconjuactival hemorrhage;

REYNALDO RUANTO:

–    Multiple
gunshot wound, forehead with metallic foreign body;

–    Abrasion
one half (1/2) cm. in length,
medial aspect right knee;

–    Fracture,
anterior aspect, distal third, thigh, right;

CRISANTO RUANTO:

–    Compound fracture of the calcaneus, third,
fourth, and fifth metatarsal bone, first, right-foot;

–    Compound fracture, distal third, radius; carpal
bones, first second metacarpal bones, left wrist;

–    Multiple
foreign bodies left facial region;

APOLINARIO RUANTO:

–    Gunshot
wound, right lateral aspect P3rd leg;

–    Multiple
linear abrasion anterior aspect right leg;

–    Fracture,
incomplete;

EXEQUIEL BONDE:

–    Multiple
abrasion forehead;

–    Abrasion one half (1/2) cm. in length, supra-clavicular area, along mid-clavicular
line, left;

thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have caused the deaths of the aforenamed injured passengers, as consequence, but nevertheless were
not produced by reason of some cause independent
of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical
intervention preventing their deaths, which offense was committed in relation
to their office.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

From the adverse decision of the respondent court, the
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution
dated December 10, 1984.

A December 24,
1984 motion for extension of time to file petition for review was granted on
January 8, 1985.

On January 11, 1985, the petitioners filed with the respondent
court a motion for new trial based on: (a) newly discovered evidence under section 2(b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court; and (b)
denial of procedural due process. This motion
was denied on January 31, 1985 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On January 21, 1985, a petition for certiorari docketed as
G.R. No. 69960 was filed
assailing the resolution denying the petitioners’ motion for new trial. While awaiting the outcome of their petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 69960, the petitioners, on February 21, 1985,
filed before us a manifestation praying that the period for filing their
petition for review in G.R. No. 69422 be suspended until final resolution of
their subsequent certiorari case considering that prejudicial questions
have been raised therein with a direct bearing on the petition for review.

On April 30, 1985, we denied the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
69960 and on June 4, 1985 we denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition
for review was filed on July 1, 1985 and later supplemented on November 19,
1985. On November 7, 1985, the petitioners included a motion for
new trial in this petition which we
shall now resolve.

In their brief, the
petitioners made, among others, the following assignments of errors:

I

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETI­TIONER-APPELLANTS’
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF THE CASE OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANTS AND SENTENCING THEM TO RECLUSION
PERPETUA THUS DEPRIVING THEM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF EQUAL
PROTECTION.

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
CONSTANT AND SUCCESSIVE CHANGING OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND DIVISION
DURING THE HEARING OF PETITIONERS’ CASE THUS VIOLATING SECTION 3, RULE VIII OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN RULES AND SECTION 3, PARAGRAPH 2 OF PD 1606 MAKING THE
DECISION RENDERED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES NULL AND VOID.

The rest of the assigned
errors involve merely questions of fact. Considering our ruling in this petition, it would be premature to pass
upon them at this time.

The main thrust of the
above assigned errors hinges on the issue of whether or not a new trial is
warranted under the circumstances of this case.

The Sandiganbayan did not
pass upon the merits of the motion for a new trial. The dispositive portion of the pertinent resolution states that
“(W)ithout necessarily delving into the merits and demerits of the
accused’s Motion For New Trial, the
Court resolves to deny the aforesaid motion on the ground that this Court has
no more jurisdiction over the case.”

The petitioners’ motion
for a new trial was filed after judgment had been promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan but before the decision became final and executory. It was filed with the Sandiganbayan before a
petition for review was actually filed with the Supreme Court but after a
motion for extension of time to file such a petition had been filed and
granted. The Sandiganbayan ruled that
since this Court had already assumed jurisdiction over the case when the
extension of time to file a petition was granted, the lower court is deemed to have lost its jurisdiction.

The Sandiganbayan did not
act with grave abuse of
discretion when it declined action on a matter which the petitioners had already stated they were taking up
with the Supreme Court and after we had already granted a motion for
extension of time to file the petition.

Petitioners’ main
argument is that the trial of their case before the respondent court was
irregular because the frequent changing of the composition of its Second Division during the hearing
of the case was violative of section 3, Rule VIII of Presidential Decree 1606,
as amended.

The record shows that
Criminal Case No. 4219 was initially tried by justice Romeo M. Escareal as
Chairman and Justices Moises Kallos and Ramon V. Jabson as members. They
composed the Second Division of the respondent court then. On March 11 and 16 and on May 12 and
13, Justice Kallos was substituted by Justice
Conrado M. Molina. From August to
September 1982, Justice Kallos was back but Justice Francisco J. Consolacion
took the place of Justice Jabson. On
the 25th of October of the same year, although Justice Jabson was present, the
other Member, Justice Kallos, was not, and, therefore, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo
sat in to
complete the division. From February up
to December 1983, Justices Escareal, Kallos and Consolacion tried the
case. At the onset of the following
year, the original Members of the division under consideration were substituted
by Justices Consolacion and Quimbo. From February 21 up to April 1984, the division had Justice Jabson back
in the place of Justice Consolacion. In
September 1984, Justices Escareal, Molina, and Jabson sat in. When the decision was finally promulgated on
October 10, 1984, it was signed by Justices Escareal, Jabson and Quimbo. The petitioners
contend that there was a “rigodon de Juezes”, to use their
terminology, although it was Justice Escareal who consistently acted as
Chairman of the Second Division throughout the duration of the petitioners’
case before the respondent Court.

The Solicitor General submits that the frequent changing of the
respondent court’s justices during the trial of petitioners’ criminal case deprived
all the accused therein of their inherent right to have the same three justices
hear and decide the case against them
as much as possible.

Unlike in other courts, it is incumbent upon a Sandiganbayan justice
trying a case assigned to his division to, as much as possible, hear all the witnesses who testify before
it so that he
can personally observe their demeanor while they are so testifying. The appre­ciation of facts with respect to
cases brought before the Sandiganbayan is a more sensitive task considering
that the court’s present procedure does not admit of any intermediate appeal to
the Court of Appeals. Both the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Appeals have by law been given the same rank. Decisions of the Sandiganbayan are reviewed
only by the Supreme Court and the inquiry into factual findings looks only into
substantial error or abuse of discretion.

As a general rule, changes in the composition of a court’s
membership during the trial or conside­ration of a case do not warrant a new
trial. If the judge who conducted a
trial and heard the testimony of witnesses is promoted, retired, dies, or is
transfer­red or removed, it does not necessarily follow that the judge who
replaces him cannot validly pronounce judgment on the basis of the evidence already
adduced. The same is true of collegiate
courts. Changes in the membership of
the tribunal do not preclude the incumbent judges after a case is submitted for
decision from including evidence they did not personally hear, among the bases
for the court’s judgment.

There are, however, special circumstances of this case which
impelled the Solicitor General to manifest as he did and this Court to give
credit to his submission.

In the first place, the petitioners are assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan, in its capacity as
a trial court.

In the interest of justice, it would be preferable for every
decision of a
trial court in criminal
cases to pass through an intermediate appeal. The appellate inquiry into questions of fact is rather limited in petitions
for review on certiorari elevated directly to this Court. Only where there is palpable error as when a
factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence or when the finding
results in a denial of substantial justice do we set aside the lower court’s
findings of facts and determine what are the true facts of the case.

The issue on
absence of intermediate appeal in the Sandiganbayan as a denial of due process
was earlier resolved in the leading case of Nunez v. Sandiganbayan (111 SCRA 433). The circumstances of the instant petition do
not warrant a re-examination of the doctrine. The discussions in Nunez v.
Sandiganbayan, however,
especially in the dissenting opinions emphasize the need for more scrupulous
attention to the basic rules of fairness in Sandiganbayan procedure. The Sandiganbayan was created as part of the
program to restore public faith and confidence in the manner public officers perform
their duties. The Constitution is
unusually pre-occupied with problems of inefficiency, graft, corruption, and
irresponsibility in public office. There would be no need for
the various constitutional commissions and agencies dedicated to good
government had there been no negative image of the trustworthiness and
performance of public officers. For
this reason, it is, therefore, not enough to avoid irregularities in the course
of Sandiganbayan trials. The slightest
taint of unfairness should likewise be avoided.

We do not share the petitioners’ interpretation which would call
for a designation by the President every time a temporary vacancy in a Sandiganbayan decision is caused
by illness, inhibition, or similar causes.

Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree 1486 as amended by
Presidential Decree 1606 and Presidential Decree 1629 provides:

“Divisions of the Courts; Quorum. The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices
each. The three divisions may sit at
the same time.

“Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in
division; Provided, that when the required quorum cannot be had due to the
legal disqua­lification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy
occurring therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding
Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Judge of the Court of
First Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court of the judicial district
concerned to sit temporarily therein.”

The rules of the Sandiganbayan implementing the above provision
state:

“Sec. 3 Quorum. Five
Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc, and three Justices for
sessions in division: Provided, That
when a quorum and/or the votes required for a reso­lution or decision of the
Sandiganbayan, either en banc or in division, or the trial or hearing of cases cannot be had due to the legal
disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring
therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice,
designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Court of First
Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court to sit temporarily therein.”

Under the above provision
of P.D. 1486 as amended, the need for a presidential designation arises only
when there is no member of the Sandiganbayan who is available to make up a
quorum in another division. Temporary
vacancies in a division occasioned by sick­ness, inhibition, travel, or other
short-term reasons are quite frequent. The President’s designation is not legally necessary nor is it desirable
to secure her action everytime a two or three day vacancy is created. Pulling out a trial judge or a member of the
Court of Appeals from his heavy caseloads to listen for a few days to a
Sandiganbayan trial when there is another Sandiganbayan Justice available could
not have been contemplated by the law.

At the same time, the too
frequent rotation of Justices hearing this particular case borders on
unfairness. The Sandiganbayan should
devise a better system whereby, as
much as possible, the same
Justices who hear a case shall be the ones to decide it. The procedure in the Court of Appeals cannot
be used as a precedent. Except in some
isolated instances provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals
reviews and decides cases on the basis of the records and does not
conduct trials. In reducing temporary
changes in its divisions to the barest
minimum, the Sandiganbayan also reduces the possibility of one Justice who
hears all the witnesses, influencing the findings of the Justices who did not
have the same opportunity.

There is merit in the Solicitor General’s submission that a new
trial is warranted in this case. In
addition to the newly discovered evidence, there are serious allegations in the
petition which call for a more thorough examination. Among them are:

“(1)  The Philippine Constabulary soldiers who led
the team looking for NPA Kumander Marcelo Garcia and who fired at the group of
Teofilo Payumo, Sr. were never tried in court. Yet the policemen who were merely obeying orders from the PC officers
leading them, the civilians who claim they were not even there, and the
petitioners who allege they arrived four hours after the incident have
been convicted.

“(2)  The Fiscal who originally investigated the
case ruled that ‘the shooting incident was a result of military operations and
that there is no evidence on record that the shooting was otherwise.’ The
petitioners were charged with criminal conspiracy for premeditated murder
characterized by treachery and not for merely tagging along during routine
military operations against rebels.

“(3)  The petitioners allegedly arrived four hours
after the shooting as part of a reenforcement group under Major Orpilla.

“(4)  The statements of Narciso Boda, a relative of
NPA Kumander Marcelo Garcia and of Perlita de Leon, a resident of the late Payumo’s barangay surfaced only after
trial. The statements appear to be both
material and relevant.

The newly discovered
evidence is alleged to shed light on the truth or falsity of the above
allegations.

Considering all the
foregoing, we agree with the Solicitor General who recommends that the
petitioners’ motion for a new trial be granted and that the decision under
review be set aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision is set aside and the
case is remanded to the court a quo for new trial as prayed for in the
petitioners’ motion.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, C.J., in the result.