THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PRUDENCIO NULLA, ALBERTO JIMENEZ, BEMBO CUNAG, AND EFREN VELASCO (AT LARGE), ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

On or about March 20, 1981 Agustin Mecaral,
a merchant of some means, and the owner of a pump boat named “Two
Brothers,” caused the loading of 56 sacks of rice on the boat at barangay Agpangi, Naval, Leyte, and thereafter set sail to sell the rice at some nearby
islands.  With him on board were four
crew members, namely:  Prudencio Nulla, Bembo Cunag, Efren
Velasco, and William Sanchez.  They sold
the rice at P160.00 per sack at the islands of Maripipi
(Leyte), Sto.
Nino (Samar), and Almagro (Samar).  This done, they sailed back for home, with
only 1 1/2 sacks left of their original cargo. 
The evening of March 22, 1981
found them near Maripipi
Island (Leyte).

At about 7 o’clock that
night, Mecaral was struck on the head twice with a bolo
wielded by Prudencio Nulla,
causing him to drop to the deck, senseless. 
The boat’s anchor and a trailer (push cart) were then tied to Mecaral’s body, after which he was thrown overboard.  Mecaral slowly sank
into the dark waters, never to be seen again. 
His money, that proceeds from the sale of the rice, was taken from him
before he was cast into the sea.

Mecaral’s crewmen continued on their
voyage back to Naval, Leyte.  They beached at barangay
Aslom, Naval, at around 11
o’clock that same night. 
Here they met Alberto Jimenez; and here, too, were brought, on Nulla’s instructions, his wife and their three
children.  Then Nulla
and his family set sail for Cebu.  With Nulla were
Sanchez and Cunag, but not Velasco, who opted to part
with the group at that point.  Jimenez
followed in another pump boat, but only up to Bigatangan Island.

Nulla and his companions landed the
following day at Bito-on, Cebu. 
From there they proceeded to Cebu City
on a Pantranco bus. 
After two days they boarded an inter-island vessel for Tagum, Davao
where they stayed for a month, after which they returned to Cebu. 
They were arrested shortly upon their arrival at Cebu by P.C. soldiers, and brought to Leyte on the same pump boat belonging to their
deceased employer, the “Two Brothers.”

Velasco, after leaving his companions at Naval, went, to Tacloban City,
and then to Calbayog
City.  From Calbayog, he
sent a telegram to Mecaral’s widow, Lourdes,
advising of her husband’s slaying.

Upon being investigated by PC officers at Naval, Leyte on September 24, 1981, Cunag, Nulla and Sanchez gave written statements, identified at
the trial as Exhibits C, D, and 1, respectively.  The statements were signed and sworn to
before Judger Jose Patino, of the Municipal Trial
Court of Naval, after the latter had apprised the trio of their constitutional
rights and translated the contents of their statements to them in the
vernacular.  The Judge also conducted a
preliminary investigation as regards Nulla and
Velasco.^[1]

The foregoing narrative is not subject of dispute.  Indeed, it conforms substantially to the
appellants’ own versions of the occurrences.^[2]
It is as regards the manner in which the killing of Mecaral
was done, and the immediately attendant circumstances, that the accused
mainly take issue with the State.

In early December, 1981, the Provincial Fiscal filed with the
Regional Trial Court an information charging Nulla, Cunag, Jimenez and Velasco with robbery with homicide, for having killed
Agustin Mecaral and robbed him of P10,000.00,
Philippine Currency.  The indictment also
alleged that the crime was aggravated by the following circumstances, to wit:

1. That the act was committed with treachery and evident
premeditation;

2. That the act was committed by outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the deceased Agustin Mecaral;

3. That the crime was committed during nighttime and in an
uninhabited place;

4. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission,
that is, by tying the cadaver of the deceased ** to an iron trailer and anchor
and then dumped (sic) the cadaver into the sea to prevent discovery.”

Nulla pleaded guilty on arraignment,
but later took the witness stand in an attempt to establish the justifying
circumstance of self-defense.  Cunag and Jimenez entered pleas of not guilty.  Velasco was never arraigned and is at large
to this day.  Separate trials were held
at the instance of the accused.

On September 12, 1984 the Trial Court1 promulgated judgment declaring Nulla, Cunag and Jimenez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex felony of robbery with homicide under
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing them as follows:

“Prudencio Nulla
as principal has to pay his debt to society. 
His plea of guilty is offset by treachery, nocturnity,
uninhabited place and cruelty.  May the
Lord have mercy on his soul.  He is given
the death penalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Agustin Mecaral the sum of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay half the costs.  In the event that he is not executed he is
credited with four-fifths of his preventive imprisonment.

Bembo Cunag as
accomplice is sentenced to suffer and undergo reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs of Agustin Mecaral P10,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay half the
costs.  He is credited with the full term
of his preventive detention.

Alberto Jimenez as accessory is sentenced to suffer and undergo
imprisonment of from six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, to indemnify the
heirs of Agustin Mecaral the sum of P2,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.”

All three have appealed to this Court.  They ascribe several errors to the Court a
quo.  The central issue that they
raise, as might be expected, is one of credibility:  they contend that their version of the
material occurrences should have been accepted by the Trial Court as reflective
of the truth.  They also contend that the
resolution of this basic question –

1) their extra-judicial confessions should be disregarded because
taken in violation of their constitutional rights; and

2) the testimony of the State’s “star witness,” William
Sanchez, one of the crew of the pump boat, “Two Brothers,” should be
disbelieved and discarded.

The appellants do not disclaim the killing of Agustin Mecaral or the taking of his money, from which they
benefited.  They assert however that Mecaral was killed by Nulla in
legitimate defense of his person; and the taking of his money was merely an
afterthought, having been done so that it would not be “wasted” by
being thrown into the sea together with Mecaral.

The correctness of the claim for the exclusion of the
extra-judicial confessions of Nulla and Cunag must at the outset be declared.  Quite apart from the confessants’ affirmation
that the confessions were wrung from them by violence and intimidation, an
affirmation that the Trial Court rejected in the light of the testimony of MTC
Judge Patino,1
it is clear from the record that these confessions were made during their
custodial interrogation by the P.C. officers without the assistance of
counsel.  As much is conceded by the
Solicitor General.2
Those two (2) confessions must therefore be rejected and disregarded, as this
Court has rejected and disregarded similar confessions in People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465, 472, and other subsequent cases.3

The elimination of the extra-judicial confessions leaves the testimony
of William Sanchez, one of the crew members of the victim’s pump boat,
“Two Brothers”, as the sole foundation for the verdict of guilt
against the appellants.  But Sanchez’
testimony is not to be spurned out of hand merely because it stands alone
against evidence by three other witnesses4 asseverating the contrary with
respect to the actual killing.  It is
axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a
single witness may suffice for conviction if otherwise trustworthy and
reliable.5

Sanchez’ testimony negates any notion of self-defense in the
killing of Agustin Mecaral.  He describes the slaying as follows:1

At that time, he and Mecaral were lying
on top (the roof) of the boat’s cabin.  Prudencio Nulla came “from
the rear portion of the motor launch (and) went up to the cabin, carrying ** a
bolo” in his right hand, measuring “about eighteen inches including
the handle”.  Nulla
“went towards the back of Agustin Mecaral, **
suddenly raised his bolo and ** hacked Agustin” who was hit in the head
twice.  Mecaral
“fell to the hull” (deck).  Nulla then “ordered Boy Velasco by saying:  ‘Boy, you get the money.”‘ Velasco
obeyed.  He “got the money from the
person of Agustin Mecaral” and “gave the
money to Prudencio Nulla.”

Nulla next “ordered Bimbo Cunag by saying: 
‘Bo, you get the trailer and the anchor.'” Cunag
did so, bringing over the anchor and the trailer, both “made of iron”
with a combined weight of 65 kilos.  The
trailer and anchor were tied to Mecaral’s body by Nulla and Cunag with the
“rope ** attached to the anchor.” When this was finished, Nulla “ordered Efren Velasco
to slow down the engine because they will drop the dead body.” Nulla and Cunag then “threw
the dead body to the sea,” which “slowly sank.”

Nulla, on the other hand, gives a quite
different story.  According to him2

” ** At past 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon the four of them,
namely, Agustin Mecaral, Cunag,
Sanchez and he (Nulla) were gathered on top of the
cabin eating supper.  They were seated in
a circle.  Cunag
and Sanchez reached/grabbed for the boiled (tinula)
fresh fish but Mecaral boxed them.  Mecaral stood up
and he also stood up and went around but Mecaral
boxed him twice in his abdomen.  He
writhed in pain.  His eyes went blurred
and when they cleared, he saw that Mecaral was about
to pick up his bolo so he beat Mecaral to it and
immediately hacked the latter once on the forehead.  Mecaral fell near
the mast pole while ho remained standing motionless and speechless for quite
some time.  Velasco came out of the
cabin, called for Sanchez to take over the steering wheel and asked Cunag whether Mecaral was still
breathing.  Velasco then ordered Cunag to get the rope and bring over the anchor and trailer
(push card) where they tied the body of Mecaral.  It was then that Velasco thought of getting
the money from the pocket of Mecaral saying that ‘I
get this money because if the body of Agustin Mecaral
will fall to the sea the money will be wasted’ (TSN, hearing of October 25,
1983, pp. 23).  Then they dumped the body
of Mecaral in the sea where it “slowly
sank.”

From Nulla’s account, which the other
appellants do not at all question, there is some indication that Agustin Mecaral might not have died from the single bolo
wound inflicted on him.  Velasco, for one,
felt impelled to ask if he was “still breathing”, as was not at all
improbable.  What is certain is that not
one of the three appellants, Nulla, Cunag and Velasco, even attempted to minister to the
wounded Mecaral. 
On the contrary, they were obviously all one in the intention that Mecaral should die one way or the other, that he should not
survive the bolo wound, and that they should try to prevent discovery of Mecaral’s body by weighing it down and dumping it into the
sea.  So, too, it is certain from an
examination of their testimony that they never entertained any thought of
turning over Mecaral’s money to his widow.  On the contrary, they immediately proceeded
to spend it by sojourning in different places for more than a month, and showed
no compunction whatever in using their employer’s pump boat to take them part
way on their journey, although vacation or junket might be the
more appropriate term.

Conduct such as this is utterly inconsistent with innocence, or
the justifiable infliction of injury upon another in legitimate self?defense.  On the contrary, it discloses on appellants’
part a willingness to kill, to appropriate and obtain illicit benefit and
gratification from property belonging to another, and to employ stratagems to
avoid or delay detection of their nefarious acts.

It does not furthermore appear to the Court to be credible that Mecaral would fly into a fit of uncontrollable rage and
start boxing three (3) of his crew men, simply because two of them had
“grabbed” some fish which they were all having for supper anyway.

This Court cannot therefore accept appellant Nulla’s
plea of justifiable self-defense, and sustains the findings of the Court a
quo on the matter as correct, not only because of the time-honored doctrine
that great respect shall be accorded to a trial court’s conclusions on the
credibility of witnesses because it is in a better position to observe directly
and at first hand the mien and demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony,1
but also because the veracity of those findings is confirmed by this Court’s
own review and assessment of the proofs.

In the first place, by Nulla’s own
testimony, he had foiled Mecaral’s attempt to get
hold of a bolo by getting ahead of Mecaral and
taking it.  There was thus no need at all
for him to use the bolo on Mecaral, as the
Trial Court has pointed out, citing People vs. Ciria,
106 SCRA 381; and as further observed by that Court, there was at the time no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and hence, in view of the absence
of this primordial element, there can be no “self-defense, complete or
incomplete.”1

Moreover, a person having no intention to kill anyone, with no
thought in mind except to protect himself from being boxed by another, and who
succeeds in preventing the latter from getting hold of a bolo by himself
taking it — this being the factual situation described by the appellants —
would surely, not immediately and unhesitatingly use the bolo to strike
a blow at so vital a part of a person’s body as the head, absent, as here, any
showing that the victim, on being frustrated in the attempt to get the bolo,
sought to obtain another weapon or otherwise to continue with his assault
against three full-grown, able-bodied men — an extremely unlikely assumption,
to be sure — and specially where, as here, those three (3) able-bodied men
could reasonably be expected to subdue their assailant should he persist in
trying to harm them.  Surely, after
having wounded and completely disabled an alleged assailant in lawful
self-defense, the first impulse of innocent men would have been to attend to
the injured assailant and give him such medical attention as was available at
the time, not forthwith to weigh down the hapless victim with heavy objects and
without waste of time drop him into the sea, thus effectively eliminating all
possible chance of survival the latter might otherwise have had.  Surely, the immediate decision of the
appellants to make free with the victim’s money and motor launch in order to go
on a trip, either for enjoyment or to escape the consequences of their acts of
the illegality of which they could not but be fully aware, is entirely and
irreconcilably inconsistent with a profession of innocence, and lack of
community of purpose or design.

This Court is thus convinced not only that Nulla
had failed to discharge the burden reposed on him by the law to prove
self-defense in justification of the killing admitted by him,2
but also that the evidence does establish beyond doubt that Nulla
attacked Mecaral without warning, without the latter
having any intimation that such an attack was forthcoming, and without his
having any opportunity whatever to defend himself against the assault; that the
killing was not a senseless, or suddenly provoked act, but was deliberately
planned, the motive being to take the victim’s money amounting to what no doubt
seemed to the accused to be quite a tidy sum, the proceeds of sales of rice
which Nulla and his companions knew beforehand the
victim would vend in different places and in the sale of which they had in fact
assisted.  In other words, Nulla killed Mecaral by reason,
and as part of his plan to rob the latter. 
He has thus committed the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, defined and penalized by paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code.1

This Court is also in agreement with the Trial Court that the
crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, in
that the attack was sudden and unexpected, done in a manner tending directly
and specially to insure execution of the crime without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended person might make;2 of
nocturnity, in that the darkness of evening
was taken advantage of in the commission of the offense and in truth
facilitated it;3
and of uninhabited place, in that the felony was perpetrated in the open
sea, where it no help could be expected by the victim from other persons and
the offenders could easily escape punishment.4 There being no adequate proof of
whether or not Mecaral was still alive when he was
thrown into the sea, indeed, the constant reference is to his “dead
body” in the testimony of prosecution witness Sanchez, the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty will not be appreciated against Nulla.

Cunag’s participation in the crime is
also proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
Without hesitation or protestation of any sort, he immediately lent
assistance and cooperation to Nulla after the latter
had rendered the victim hors de combat. 
He fetched the anchor and the steel cart or trailer and helped Nulla attach this to Mecaral’s
unconscious and unresisting person and afterwards throw the unfortunate man
into the deep sea.  He willingly took
part in the taking and use of the victim’s pump boat, and in the use and
enjoyment of his money; and he accompanied Nulla on a
month-long sojourn in various places, no doubt spending the victim’s money in
the process.  These acts may not suffice
to adjudge him liable as a co-conspirator, or a co-principal, lacking proof of
a prior act or statement evincing his prior knowledge and approval of Nulla’s evil intent. 
They definitely suffice to make him responsible as an accomplice within
the contemplation of Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, as a person who, not
being a principal as defined in Article 17 of said Code, nonetheless cooperated
in the commission of the offense by simultaneous or contemporaneous acts.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court pronounces as
without merit the argument that the offenders should be found liable not for
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide but for the separate
felonies of homicide and robbery. 
There is no question in the Court’s mind that the prosecution has
satisfactorily proved that the killing of Mecaral was
done by reason or on occasion of the taking of his money.  Similarly, the Court declares as
unmeritorious the contention that William Sanchez, the State’s “star
witness” is biased, who succumbed by reason of his youth and illiteracy to
promises of immunity or other benefit in consideration of becoming a
prosecution witness.1 Nothing in the testimony of either Nulla or Cunag even remotely
reveals any act on his part in the commission of the offense.  There was hence no crime for which he could
be charged, and in relation to which he could be promised immunity.  And nothing in the record shows him to be
motivated by other than the desire to tell the truth in testifying against his
companions.

Respecting the third appellant, Alberto Jimenez, the Solicitor
General recommends acquittal.  The
evidence as to him is that when the motor launch of the murdered Mecaral ran aground at the shore
of Sto.
Nino, Naval, Leyte, Jimenez was there with a
flashlight and a bolo; that Jimenez asked Nulla,
“Is it through?” and Nulla had answered,
“Don’t worry, it is already finished”; that this was followed by
another question from Jimenez, “Where is my share?” in response to
which Nulla had said, “Don’t you worry about
your share, I have it here”; that Jimenez had given Nulla
and his companions a gallon of gasoline; and that when Nulla
and his companions sailed away, Jimenez followed in his own motor launch
“up to near Higatangan.” Nothing however
can be read into the fact that Jimenez met his co-acused
at the beach, considering that Jimenez’ house was only “five or 6 arms
length” (about 15 meters) from the spot where the boat stopped.  And his questions are, as the Solicitor
General argues, susceptible of two interpretations:  as an inquiry of whether the robbery and
killing had been accomplished, or as inquiring whether the sale of the rice had
been completed and whether his share in the proceeds was forthcoming.  Under the circumstances, this Court will
absolve Jimenez on reasonable doubt, in application of its earlier rulings,
invoked by the Solicitor General, viz:

“If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other
consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.”2

“It is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable
doubt, even though he may, in reality, be guilty than to confine in the
penitentiary a person who may be innocent.”3

The Trial Court sentenced appellant Nulla
to death, appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, uninhabited place, and treachery,4
offset only by the single mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilt.  It however ultimately reduced
that penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of
the abolition of the death penalty by the 1987 Constitution.1
This is correct.  The Solicitor General
opines that even without appreciating any aggravating circumstance against Nulla, the result would be the same since the imposable
penalty, on account of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt, would be
the minimum of that prescribed, reclusion perpetua
to death; in other words, reclusion perpetua.  just the same.

With respect to the penalty to be imposed on Bembo
Cunag, the Solicitor General makes the following
observations and recommendation:

“The penalty prescribed ** is reclusion perpetua
to death **.  Under Article 52 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices
in the commission of a consummated felony. 
Since the penalty next lower in degree to that of reclusion perpetua to death is reclusion temporal (12
years and 1 day to 20 years), then this penalty should be meted to appellant Bembo Cunag.  Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty shall be that within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, that is, prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12
years), and the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code (Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225, **).

“Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, we
therefore recommend that appellant Bembo Cunag be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.”

This Court accepts and approves the recommendation as a correct
application of the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Regional Trial
Court is affirmed in so far as appellant Prudencio Nulla is concerned; as regards Bembo
Cunag, it is modified so as to reduce the sentence of
imprisonment to an indeterminate term of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and affirmed in all
other respects; and with respect to appellant Alberto Jimenez, said judgment is
reversed and Jimenez is acquitted on reasonable doubt.  Costs are charged:  2/3 against appellants Nulla
and Cunag 1/3 de oficio.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1] Exh. E; pp. 8-9, original record

^[2]
See Jimenez’ brief:  rollo,
pp. 30-31; Nulla’s brief:  rollo, pp.
88-89

1
Branch XVI, RTC at Naval, Subprovince
of Biliran,
Leyte:  Judge Adriano R. Villamor,
presiding

1
See footnote 1 and related text at page 2, supra

2
Appellee’s Brief, p. 19

3
Peo. v. Sison, 142
SCRA 219; Peo. v. Navoa,
143 SCRA 513; Peo. v. Poyos,
143 SCRA 542; SEE Sec. 12, ART. III, 1987 Constitution

4
The appellants, of course

5
Peo. v. Nabaunag, 79
SCRA 33

1
TSN, June 2, 1983, pp. 28-37

2 At pp. 6 and 7, his brief:  pp. 88-89 of the rollo;
see also, Jimenez’ brief (pp. 30-31, rollo)

1 Peo. v. Payao, 68 SCRA 70, 73-74; Peo. v.
de Leon, 128 SCRA 121

1 Par. I, Art. 11, Revised Penal Code

2 Peo. v. Pay-an, 84
SCRA 353; Peo. v. Lebunfacil,
et al., 96 SCRA 573

1 See U.S.
v. Villorente, 30 Phil. 59; Peo. v. Pacala, 58 SCRA
370; Peo. v. Libre,
et al., 93 Phil. 5, cited in Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code (Criminal
Law), 1981 ed., Book II, pp. 606-607

2 Par. 16, ART. 14, Revised Penal Code

3 U.S.
v. Perez, 32 Phil., 163; Peo. v.
Pineda, 565 Phil. 641

4 Peo. v. Rubia, 52 Phil. 172

1 Nulla’s brief, p. 95, rollo; pp. 7-8, Cunag’s
brief

2 Peo. v. Pacana, et al., 47 Phil. 48, citing U.S.
v. Maano, 2 Phil. 718

3 Peo. v. Manoji, 68 Phil. 47, citing Peo. v.
Asinas, 53 Phil. 59, 71

4 Apart from cruelty

1 Sec. 19 [1], ART. III