PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GUILLERMO LAYUSO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 153, convicting the accused,
Guillermo Layuso of the crime of ROBBERY with
HOMICIDE and imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.

The information reads:

“That on or about the 14th day of October 1980, in the
municipality of Pateros, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
that is by then and there entering the residence of one Cesar C. Avila, thru an
opening not intended for egress or ingress, thru which he gained entrance, and
once inside, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following articles,
to wit:

“One (1) Radio Digital Alarm Clock
valued ————————————————P2,310.00

“One (1) JVC brand Portable
Radio/Tape recorder cassette valued —————–  1,500.00

“One Plated Unisex wrist watch valued
—————————————————–     500.00

“One (1) set of collector’s silver
coin (CBP)
———————————————–     500.00

P4,810.00

all in the total
amount of P4,810.00 belonging to said Cesar C. Avila, to the damage and pre­judice
of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P4,810.00.

“That on the said occasion, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one Lucresia R. Dagsaan with bladed weapons (knives), thereby inflicting
upon the latter stab wounds which directly caused her death.

“Contrary to law.” (Rollo. p. 5)

Upon arraignment on April
22, 1981, the accused assisted by a counsel-de-oficio,
pleaded “NOT GUILTY.” Trial on the merits ensued and a decision was
subsequently rendered on September 12,
1984.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered and it appearing that the
commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, lack of respect due the victim on
account of her sex and that the accused took advantage of his superior
strength, without having been off-set by any mitigating circumstance, the Court
hereby sentences the accused Guillermo M. Layuso to
suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the heirs of Lucresia
Dagsaan in the sum of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00)
Pesos; to return to Cesar C. Avila the things robbed and/or their value, as
follows:

“1.  One (1) Radio Digital Alarm

Clock worth                                . . . . .P2,310.00

“2.  One (1) JVC Brand Portable

Radio/Tape Recorder

cassette worth                           . . .
. .P1,500.00

“3.  One (1) plated
unisex wrist

watch worth                                  .
. . . .500.00

“4.  One (1) set of collector’s

silver coin worth                            .
. . . 500.00

P4,810.00

without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

“Pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, let the records of the above-entitled
case be forwarded to the Supreme Court of the Philippines
for review as law and justice shall
dictate.” (Rollo, p. 35)

The facts of the case are summarized by the trial court as follows:

“From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it
has been duly established that the accused Guillermo Layuso
was one of the carpenters, who worked in the construction of Cesar C. Avila’s
house, located at Agujo St., Pateros, Metro
Manila.  After completion of the house,
Cesar Avila used to hire Guillermo Layuso to do
carpentry work in said house.  The last
work done by Guillermo Layuso was the construction of
the garage.

“At about noontime of October
14, 1980, somebody entered into the house of Cesar Avila and killed
his maid named Lucresia Dagsaan.  The injuries sustained by Lucresia
Dagsaan, who was pronounced dead on arrival by the
doctors at the Rizal
Provincial Hospital,
were established thru the testimony of Dr. Ruben M. Angobung,
who conducted the autopsy, post portem examination.

xxx                                        xxx                               xxx

“In a follow-up investigation, the police found out that the
culprit is Guillermo Layuso.  Upon physical investigation and examination
of the house by the police investigators
accom­panied by Cesar Avila, they found the following articles or things
missing from the house:  ‘A digital alarm
clock worth P2,310.00; a unisex watch worth P500.00; a
radio tape recorder worth P1,500.00, and silver coin collection of P500.00.  They also found bloodstains in the sala; in the kitchen; in the master’s bedroom, particularly
on the carpets; on the handle of the door knob to the office on the ground
floor of the house; and in the carpet inside the bedroom at the second
floor.  A kitchen knife was found in the sala and another was found in the kitchen.  There were broken bottles in front of the bar
and a broken bottle of catsup was also found in the kitchen.

“Sometime after the incident, Cesar Avila received a letter
from the accused.  This letter although
previously marked as Exhibit “A”, could not be found in the record of
the case.  Neither was the same turned
over to the Minutes Clerk when the Prosecuting Fiscal made an oral offer of
evidence on April 9, 1984.

“Through the testimony of tricycle drivers Lorenzo S. Bagang and Restituto Castillo, it
has been established that the accused Guillermo Layuso,
stripped of clothes from the waist up, with blood on the left shoulder and
wound on the hand, boarded the tricycle, first of Lorenzo Bagang,
at the place near the house of Cesar Avila
at about noontime of October 14,
1980.  He was bringing something in a
plastic bag, the height of which was demonstrated to be about twenty-four
inches.  The contents of the plastic bag
were not seen by these witnesses because it was closed and the accused placed
the same between his legs.  The accused
asked Lorenzo Bagang to take him to Rosario but the latter refused because he had to
fetch a passenger from the Municipal Hall. 
The accused disembarked from the tricycle of Lorenzo Bagang
at Morcilla Street.

“The accused, who was described by wit­ness Restituto Castillo as ‘sporting a long hair’ with ‘a high
bridged nose’ and ‘bringing along a plastic bag’, boarded the latter’s
(witness) tricycle at P. Herrera Street and alighted near a basketball court,
near the river, in Buting.  The plastic bag, according to this witness,
has blood all over it.

“Both Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto Castillo categorically identified the accused in
open court as the person who boarded their respective tricycles on October 14, 1980.” (Rollo, pp. 74-78)

The appellant admits he is guilty of homicide but assigns the
following errors:

1.  THAT THE LOWER COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE HEREIN APPELLANT FOR A SERIOUS CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE.

2.  THAT THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF SIMPLE HOMICIDE.  (Rollo, p. 103; Appellee’s Brief, p. 5)

The only issue raised in the case at bar
is whether or not the appellant should be convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide instead of the crime of
simple homicide.

The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution has failed to
prove that the articles allegedly stolen were in fact in the house of Cesar
Avila and it was the appellant who took them. 
He states that the finding was based on his extra-judicial statement
which he claims was extracted through
the use of force and
intimidation.

The appellant admits that the confession was taken in the
presence of counsel, a certain Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr.  However,
he states that the counsel was not present during the custodial interrogation
which preceded the taking down of his statement.  He also questions the sufficiency of the
lawyer’s representation.  He states in his appeal that the lawyer should have
participated by also asking him questions.

The alleged coercion and maltreatment are not sus­tained by the
records.  There was a lawyer present
while the statement was being taken.  The
appellant did not complain to the Fiscal before whom the oath was
administered.  In fact, the allegations
are in the form of general conclusions. 
There is no specific statement as to what constituted the coercion and
maltreatment.  (People
v. Canete, 129 SCRA 451 [1984]; People v. Villanueva,
128 SCRA 488 [1984]; and People v. Dejaresco, 129
SCRA 576 [1984]).

We
rule that the constitutional requirement on assistance of counsel was
fulfilled.  There is no claim or showing
that the accused asked for a lawyer from the moment he was apprehended or that
he was not informed of his right to
counsel from the time that the warning or information should have been given to
him or that the alleged earlier questioning was already part of his confession. 
The appeal is hazy on these points.

What is established was the presence of counsel during the taking
of the confession.  The attempt to now
discredit him has no merit.  If the
lawyer decided against advising the accused not to admit the
crime, he was only complying with his oath as a lawyer to abide by the truth
and with the expressed desire of the accused to unburden his conscience of the
load it was carrying.

This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the
widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the “right to
counsel” provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him. 
The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false.  The lawyer, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.  Whether it is an extra-judicial statement or
testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.

Moreover, the judgment of conviction was not made solely on the
basis of the disputed extra-judicial confession.  Layuso admits the
killing.  The physical evidence such as
the ten stab wounds and three lacerated wounds; the bloodied plastic bag and
the testimonies of Cesar Avila and two other disinterested persons, namely
Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto
Castillo are all consistent with robbery with homicide.  In fact, even if an extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the accused may
still be convicted if there is enough evidence aside from the confes­sion
itself.  (People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 [1984]).

The narration of the appellant as to how he appropriated for
himself the items mentioned as well as the sequence of the struggle could not
have been supplied by any of those interviewed by police investigators and
neither by the police themselves because it is replete with details known only
to the appellant.  As held in People
v. Ribadajo (142 SCRA 637 [1986]),
confessions replete with details only the appellants could have known are
presumably voluntary.

In the accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession, he admitted
taking the things from Cesar Avila’s house. 
Avila, in turn, identified
these as the items which were lost.  Avila’s
testimony closely interlocks with the appellant’s statement on how he took the
missing items.  In his court testimony,
the appellant denied taking any­thing. 
This inconsistency cannot be given credence on account of the uncontradicted
testimonies of the two tricycle drivers who saw him bringing a bloodied plastic
bag containing items inside. (tsn., July 20, 1981,
p. 23).

There is no evidence on record which would show that Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto Castillo
were actuated by improper motives.  Their
testimonies should, therefore, be entitled to full faith and credit (People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429
[1986]; People v. Adones, 144 SCRA 364 [1986]).  Their testimonies were also corroborated by
the testimony of Cesar Avila and by Layuso
himself.  The credibility of the appellant
suffers when taken against the testimonies of the other witnesses.  The appellant merely resorts to denial as to
the robbery and a claim of self-defense as to the killing.

The fact that no one saw the accused take the items is of no
consequence.  There is credible testimony
regard­ing the loss.  It is established
that there were such articles of value. 
He ran away and boarded two tricycles carrying a plastic bag with items
inside it.  The extra­judicial confession
of the accused discloses that he took the missing items.

The appellant’s contention of self-defense must fail.  His narration of the sequence of events is
clearly illogi­cal and unconvincing primarily on account of its incon­sistency.  The testimony of the accused cited by the
trial judge in eleven (11) pages of his decision (Rollo,
pp. 325-336) clearly shows its lack of credibility.  In his testimony in court, Layuso claims that he and the victim were sweethearts and
that after telling her he was going abroad to work, she got mad, tore his shirt,
and the struggle ensued.  On the other
hand, he likewise claims in his extrajudicial confession that when he was on
his way down, he met the victim who must have suspected that he had stolen
something and that when he went near her to bid her goodbye, she suddenly
stabbed him.

Assuming that they were sweethearts, the victim’s alleged violent
objection to his trip to Saudi Arabia
was correctly held unbelievable.  Under
the same circums­tances, a sweetheart would normally have welcomed the idea for
the sake of a better future for both of them. 
Granting that the victim objected, the objection could not have taken such a violent form as to move
the victim to resort to stabbing the appellant to prevent him from
leaving.  It is likewise unbelievable
that the victim would suddenly stab him when he came near her only
to say goodbye. 
And it is even more inexplicable why he would inflict so many multiple
wounds on various parts of her body under the circumstances that he alleges.

In the case of People v. Pineda
and Garcia (157 SCRA 71, January 15, 1988), this Court once more recognized the necessity of resorting to
circumstantial evidence.  We
quote:

“Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions
where concealment is highly probable.  To
require direct testimony in all cases would result in the acquittal of guilty
parties leaving them free to once more wreak
havoc on society.

“We find the circumstantial evidence attending this case
sufficient to warrant a conviction.  Rule
134, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court states
that there is sufficiency in circumstantial evidence when:  1) there is more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.  The requirements are satisfied in
this case.”

The record further shows that not only dwelling aggravated the
commission of the crime, but there was also a very patent display of lack of
respect due the victim on account of her sex and the viciousness of the wounds
inflicted upon her.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is commuted to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the Constitution, Section 19, Article III.  The
indemnity to the heirs of Lucresia Dagsaan is also increased to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in
consonance with the latest rulings of
this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.