PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO OLAPANI Y TAOPA, JOSE TAOPA Y OLAPANI, DOMINGO TARIN Y TRESMANIO AND NESTOR FRANCISCO (AT LARGE), ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Pedro Olapani, Jose Taopa,
Domingo Tarin and Nestor Francisco were charged with
the crime of robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet.^[1]
The indictment alleged that on or about November
6, 1980, in the City of Baguio,
and acting in conspiracy with one another, they had robbed a taxi driver, Crisanto Alamar, of his day’s
earnings and then stabbed and killed him. 
Only the first three were arrested and arraigned, and after entering a
plea of not guilty, stood trial.  Nestor
Francisco has not, it seems, been apprehended to this day.  The trial resulted in a verdict of
conviction, and the three (3) accused were each sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and solidarily,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the appeal seasonably taken by them to this Court the accused
attempt to make the single point that “the Court a quo had erred in
admitting and utilizing the extrajudicial confessions and statements of
accused-appellants ** (in violation) of their right to counsel guaranteed by
the constitution, and basing the judgment of conviction thereon.” The
point is well taken.

There is no dispute about the fact that Crisanto
Alamar was stabbed to death, and his money taken from
him.  There were however no eye­witnesses
either to his killing, or to the asportation of his
earnings.  Nobody was presented to
identify the appellants as the perpetrators of the felony.  Their conviction was anchored primarily on
the written statements given by them in the course of the investigation by
police investigators in which they admitted involvement in the crime,1
considered conjointly with admittedly adequate proof of the corpus delicti.2

The appellants’ confessions set forth the following facts, to
wit:

1)      in the evening of
November 6, 1980, at Baguio City, they (Domingo Tarin, Jose Taopa, and Pedro Olapani), together with Nestor Francisco, boarded the Rubi Rose taxi driven by Crisanto
Alamar and asked to be brought to Hillside, Baguio City;

2)      on the way, Olapani pointed a knife at the neck of Alamar
and announced:  “Hold-up ito;” Tarin thereupon took
over the steering wheel and the others forced Alamar
to move to the back seat;

3)      at this point, Alamar struggled and kicked Tarin’s
back; Tarin pulled out his nail cutter and with the
small knife attached to it, stabbed Alamar in the
abdomen;

4)      further down Kennon Road, Olapani ordered Tarin to stop the
taxi; then, with Jose Taopa and Nestor Francisco holding
Alamar, Olapani stabbed the
latter with a knife; Nestor Francisco also stabbed Alamar;

5)      they dumped Alamar’s lifeless body by the roadside and took his
earnings, after which they abandoned the taxi.

The police investigators took the witness stand to identify the
sworn statements, attest to the regularity of their taking, and narrate the
events leading to the appellants’ apprehension. 
The doctor who performed the autopsy deposed on Alamar’s
injuries and the cause of his death. 
But, to repeat, no eye-witness testified, and except for their
confessions, no other evidence was introduced to link the appellants to the
crime.

The appellants repudiated their confessions.  They denied having freely executed the
same.  The trial court nevertheless
convicted them as aforestated, on the strength of
their confessions.

In this appeal, appellants Olapani, Taopa and Tarin question their
conviction on the basis of the confessions given by them under custodial
interrogation.  They contend that the
same are inadmissible in evidence because obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights.  The Court agrees.

The Constitution,3 as every one knows, provides for
procedural safeguards to secure the right of a citizen against
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.  It grants the person under investigation for
the commission of an offense the rights: 
(1) to remain silent; (2) to counsel; (3) to be informed of such right
to silence and to counsel; and (4) against the use of force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and it declares
any confession obtained in violation of any of said rights, inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding.

The record supports the appellants’ submissions of infringement
of their rights.  To begin with, it is
doubtful whether appellants were indeed effectively informed of their
rights to silence and counsel.  A glance
at their individual confessions at once shows that the statements therein
purporting to demonstrate compliance with the constitutional requisites in
custodial investigations — said statements being identical in all three
confessions — fall short of the acceptable norms, viz.:

“Preliminary:  Mr. Domingo Taren y
Tresmanio, I am informing you that I am Pfc Gilbert T. Oasan who is assigned
to investigate you in connection with your involvement in a case of robbery
with homicide and robbery with intimidation. 
Before giving any statement in this investigation, I would like to
inform you that under the New Constitution, you have the right to remain
silent, and the right to be assisted by a lawyer at your own choice; if you
cannot afford to get a lawyer, we can refer you to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Baguio Chapter, Baguio
City; should you wish to give your statement in this investigation, it will be
under oath and can be used as evidence for or against you in any court
proceedings in the Philippines.

Q     Have you fully understood all your rights
mentioned above?

A:     Yes.

Q     I will investigate you in Tagalog language and I will translate all my questions and
your answers in English.  Do you fully
understand and speak Tagalog very well?

A:     Yes.

Q     You have the right to remain silent which
means you may not give your statement if you so desire, do you understand?

A:     Yes.

Q     Do you need the services of a lawyer who
will assist you in this investigation so we refer you to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,
Baguio Chapter if you cannot afford to secure a
lawyer?

A:     I do not need a lawyer to assist me in this
investigation.

Q     Are you then willing to give your free and
voluntary statement even without the assistance of a lawyer and even if it will
be used as evidence for or against you in any court proceedings?

A:     Yes.1

Now, about such a lengthy opening question, this Court has had
occasion to remark:2

“Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does
not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
rights under the Constitution and our laws. 
Instead, there should be several short and clear questions and every
right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under interrogation.”

The police interrogators knew, since the statements themselves so
disclose, that none of the appellants had gone beyond the elementary level of
education,1
and their limited education was therefore a handicap to a ready and effective
understanding of the meaning and purpose of their constitutional rights.  It was the duty of the investigating officers
under these circumstances to have exerted a little more effort to ensure that
information of their rights would be adequately transmitted to the appellants
and understood by them.  For, as we have
already also had occasion to rule:2

“When the Constitution requires a person under investigation ‘to
be informed’ of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.  * * * In other words, the right of a person
under interrogation ‘to be informed’ implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.  Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been ‘informed’ of his
rights.  Now, since the right ‘to be
informed’ implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily
vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person under investigation.  Suffice it to say that a simpler and more
lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.”

The manner by which, admittedly,
appellants were informed of their rights thus leaves much to be desired.

Even if we were to view the proceedings before the police in the
most favorable light, and assume that the appellants really came to understand
their rights, but waived them, and proceeded to answer the questions put to
them, their statements would nonetheless still be inadmissible in evidence
because the waiver had been made without assistance of counsel.  Admittedly, the rights of a person under
custodial interrogation are waivable.  However, the waiver must be made not only
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, but, in any case, in the presence and
with assistance of counsel.  If the
records do not show that the accused was assisted by counsel in making his waiver,
this defect nullifies and renders his confession inadmissible in evidence.3

The confessions of appellants being void and inadmissible in
evidence, and there being no other evidence to support the conviction of
appellants, the judgment appealed is hereby SET ASIDE and the appellants
ACQUITTED of the charge against them. 
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2590, and assigned to Branch III of
said Court, presided over by Hon. Leonardo M. Rivera.

1
Exhibits D, E, F and G.

2
Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that “An extrajudicial
confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

3
Section 20, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution; Section 12 pars. 1, 2 and 3, 1987
Constitution.

1
Exhibits D and D-4, statement of Domingo Tarin, Lower
Court Record, p. 135.

2
Peo. v. Galit, 135
SCRA 465

1
See Exhibits D, E and F, pp. 135, 137, 139, Lower Court Record.

2
Peo. v. Nicandro,
141 SCRA 289, 298, cited in Peo. v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100; Peo. v.
Pinlac, G.R. No. 74123-24, Sept. 26, 1988

3
Sec. 12 (1) and (3), ART. Ill,
Constitution; People v. Galit, supra;
People v. Newman, 163 SCRA 496; People v. Nolasco,
163 SCRA 623.