DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ANGELINA SARMIENTO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner urges this Court to review and set aside the decision
of 12 October 1984 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court^[1] (now
Court of Appeals) in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 which affirmed the decision of 2
June 1982 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Land Registration Case No.
(SM) N-167 granting the registration of a parcel of land with an area of
376,397 square meters, located in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, in favor of
private respondent.

After the filing of private respondent’s Comment, this Court, in
its resolution of 27 February 1985,^[2] gave
due course to the petition, considered the Comment as the Answer and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The petitioner moved for leave to adopt the petition as his
Memorandum^[3]
which this Court noted in its resolution of 17 April 1985.^[4]
Private respondent filed her Memorandum only on 8 December 1986,^[5]
after her attorneys were held in contempt of court and fined in the amount of P300.00.

The pleadings of the parties disclose the following factual
antecedents in this case:

On 13 August 1970, private respondent and the spouses Placer A.
Velasco and Socorro Busuego filed with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, Branch V, at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an
application for the registration of title over Lot No. 1005 of the Cadastral
Survey of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 376,397 square meters.

On 18 January 1971, private oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador
filed their opposition on the ground that the land belongs to them.

On 19 January 1971, an Order of special default against the whole
world, with the exception of oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador and the
municipal mayor of San Jose del Monte, was issued by the trial court.

Upon the filing of an Opposition by the petitioner and upon
motion by the Provincial Fiscal for the lifting of the order of special default
and for the admission of the
Opposition, the trial court issued an Order on 24 August 1971 granting the
motion and admitting said Opposition.^[6]
Separate oppositions filed by Feliciano Santos, Ciriaco Maningas and Simeon
Albarico were also admitted by the court after the lifting of the order of
special default.^[7]

Subsequently, private respondent moved to drop as co-applicants
spouses Placer Velasco and Socorro Busuego on the ground that they were made
co-applicants because of a contract of services^[8]
between her and the spouses under which the latter agreed to shoulder all the
litigation expenses and the cost of survey and attorney’s fees in this case;
the spouses failed to comply with their commitment. The trial court deemed said agreement validly rescinded by
private respondent and considered her as “the only applicant in this
case.”^[9]

After hearing the application on its merits, the trial court
handed down on 2 June 1982 a decision in favor of private respondent granting
the registration of the lot in question, together with all the improvements
thereon, in her name:

“x x x with the exception of the three (3) houses erected
therein owned and possessed by her predecessors-in-interest, who are claimed
(sic) to be tenants of the property, namely: Macario Cruz, Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo. x x x subject, however, to the payment of real property taxes in
arrears since 1971 as well as to the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 65
and 296, with respect to those portions of the perimeter bounded by the river,
barrio and provincial roads, respectively.”

The decision is based on the trial court’s findings of fact, to
wit:

“x x x That the
subject parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Angelina
Sarmiento as early as 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 8388 (Exhibit J), with an
assessed value of P10,350.00. That the real property taxes from 1965 to 1970 were paid in full
(Exhibit K). That a small portion of
the subject parcel of land consisting of 94,000 sq. m. is devoted to
agriculture while the rest is cogonland. That the subject parcel of land was acquired by applicant Angelina
Sarmiento from:

1) Juan Reyes, married to Avelina Emocling,
who had been in possession of a portion of the subject land consisting of
168,000 sq. m. for 41 years prior to the transfer of their rights, interests,
and participation over the same in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, which
transfer was made through a deed of absolute sale (Bilihang Lampasan at Patuluyan
— Exhibits G and G?1), executed on April 7, 1969, for and in
consideration of P42,000.00.

2) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila
Robes, who had been in possession of a portion of the subject land, consisting
of 14 hectares since 1948, until on August 16, 1965 said spouses transferred
their rights, interests and participation over the eastern ½ portion of said
14-hectare property, in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in
consideration of P1,500.00 (Exhibits I and I-1 — Bilihang Lampasan
at Patuluyan).

3) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila
Robes, who, by virtue of a deed if (sic) absolute sale executed by them on
November 15, 1965, sold the remaining 7-hectare property covered by Exhibits I
and I-1, to applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration of P21,000.00;
which deed of absolute sale, having been lost, was confirmed by vendor Mariano
Castillo thru a Confirmatory Deed of Sale executed on April 18, 1969 (Exhibits
H and H-1).

4) Macario Cruz, married to Antonia Guilalas,
who had been in possession of a portion of the subject land, consisting of
73,000 sq. m. more or less prior to the transfer of their rights, interest and
participation in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento on March 31, 1969, for
and in consideration of P18,750.00.

x x x

The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was
originally owned and possessed by Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina
Emocling, and spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two latter sets
of spouses having been in possession as early as 1928 and 1948, respectively,
during which time they possessed, occupied and cultivated their respective
portions unmolested, openly, continuously, and in the concept of owners. That by virtue of the aforesaid deeds of
sale (Exhibits G, G-1, H-1, I and I-1), possessions over the same were
transferred to the herein applicant. That, thereafter, said spouses remained in the same property,
maintaining their houses and acting as tenants for the new owner, applicant Angelina
Sarmiento. That applicant likewise
introduced improvements on the property by fencing the same with barbed wire,
planting crops and other fruit trees, and by constructing there a house of her
own. The oral testimony of applicant
Angelina Sarmiento, insofar as location, possession and ownership over the said
parcel of land is concerned, was corroborated by the testimony (sic) of Victor
Jarvinia and Enrique Buco, both claiming that they were with the group who
conducted the survey of the subject property; and said Enrique Buco also
declaring that he had known the subject land since 1932, he being the owner of
an adjoining titled property. Witness
Enrique Buco likewise claimed that the subject land is way beyond the perimeter
of the titled property of oppositor 2nd Manila Newtown City Development
Corporation, the latter’s land being situated far from the subject land.

x x x

The subject parcel of land appears not to be within any military,
naval, civil or government reservation; nor is it traversed by any road, river
or creek, except that it is bounded on the North and East, along lines 4 to 33
by the Katitinga River; and on the Southeast, along lines 34 to 40 by Dean
Kabayo Barrio Road; on the South by Igay Provincial Road, along lines 40 to
44.”^[10]

The Director of Lands,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, seasonably appealed from said
decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the appeal as
A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126. The Director
raised before it the following assignment of error:

“The lower court gravely erred in holding that the applicant
and her predecessors-in­-interest have been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of the land applied for more than 30 years
prior to the filing of the application.”^[11]

In its decision promulgated on 12 October 1984, the Intermediate
Appellate Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed the same. It held as follows:

“We find no merit in the appeal. While it may be true that the vendors of the portion of the land
in question to the herein applicant did not show tax declaration, it has been
clearly established that Macario Cruz and spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina
Sarmiento (sic) and also spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes were in
possession of the land in 1928 and 1948, respectively in concept of owners,
without anybody molesting them. They
introduced improvements by planting different kinds of trees and constructing
houses thereon. When a person occupied
(sic) a parcel of land under a claim of ownership making improvements and
generally held (sic) himself out as owner of the land, it is only upon the most
convincing testimony, in the absence of any competent documentary evidence,
that the courts would be justified in declaring him to be the real owner
thereof.

A person in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of a certain lands (sic) for more than thirty years,
in the concept of owner, is entitled to a confirmation of his title to said
land. (Molina vs. De Bacud, L-20195,
April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 956).

Accordingly, herein applicant continued the possession in concept
of owner from her predecessors-in-interest.

Moreover, the land in question was surveyed as Lot 1005 for the
herein applicant for the cadastral survey of San Joe del Monte, without anybody
else claiming ownership of said land.

It further appears that the land in question is within the
alienable and disposable land as certified to by the officials of the Bureau of
Forest Development. It is for this
reason that the oppositor Director of Lands did not introduce any evidence
opposition (sic) and merely submitted the case for decision.

We reiterate what we have said in previous decisions in similar
cases that unless the government has serious grounds of opposition such as the
fact that the land applied for is within a forest zone or government
reservation, registration of agricultural lands within the alienable or
disposable area should be encouraged to give more value to the land and this
promotes their development rather than remain as idle lands.”^[12]

Undaunted by this second defeat, the Director filed on 5 December
1984 this petition asserting that the respondent Court has decided a question
of substance in a way not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of
this Court.^[13]

The petition is impressed with merit. This Court will have to overturn the challenged decision, as well
as that of the trial court.

While the rule is well settled that findings of fact of the
appellate court are conclusive upon this Court,^[14]
there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the findings of
fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion.^[15] This
exception is present in this case insofar as the findings of the respondent
Court and the trial court on the character of possession are concerned.

It is not disputed that private respondent seeks registration of
the questioned lot on the basis of paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land
Act, ^[16]
as amended by R.A. No.1942,^[17]
which reads as follows:

“SECTION 48. The
following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

(b) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.”^[18]

This section is the law on judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. By its very nature,
the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he has an imperfect or
incomplete title. Such is the duty of
one who holds the affirmative side of an issue. In Heirs of Jose
Amunategui vs. Director
of Forestry,^[19] this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., held:

“In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. x x x”

Specifically, under paragraph (b)
thereof, the applicant must prove that: (a) he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an agricultural land of
the public domain; (b) such possession and occupation must be for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of the application; and (c) such
possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership.

It must be underscored that the law speaks of “possession
and occupation.” Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation,
it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify
under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must
not be mere fiction. As this Court
stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:^[20]

“x x x Counsel for the
applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands
(39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Roales
vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the application of the doctrine of
constructive possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and
this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is ‘one
particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to
the portion actually in possession of the claimant.’ While, therefore,
‘possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession’, possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or
symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
immense tract of territory. Possession
as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere
fiction. x x x”

Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands,^[21]
this Court noted:

“x x x The mere fact
of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it every once
in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession.”

In the case of The Director of Lands vs. Reyes,^[22]
this Court also stated:

“A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State.”

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine.^[23] It
is continuous, when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;^[24]
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;^[25]
and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked
of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.^[26]

Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.^[27]

Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not
affect the continuity of possession is that caused by war or force majeure.

Private respondent does not pretend to be the original possessor
of the property in question. She relies
on the alleged possession of her predecessors-in-interest, namely: Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz
and Feliciano Santos. From Juan Reyes,
she acquired a parcel of land located in Karahumi, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
with an area of 168,000 square meters as evidenced in a deed of sale executed
on 7 April 1969.^[28]
From Mariano Castillo, she first acquired a portion, consisting of 7 hectares,
of a parcel of land located in Licau-licau, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, per a
deed of sale executed on 16 August 1965.^[29] She
purchased the remaining portion thereof, with an area of 7 hectares, allegedly
on 15 November 1965, but she lost the deed of sale; however, Mariano Castillo
subsequently executed a so-called Confirmatory Deed of Sale on 8 April 1969.^[30]
Per the findings of the trial court, the property purchased from Cruz on 31
March 1969 for P18,750.00 consists of 73,000 square meters.^[31]
No deed of sale was presented to prove this acquisition. There, is no proof as to the area of the
property allegedly purchased from Santos.

None of private respondent’s predecessors-in-interest declared
for taxation purposes their alleged landholdings. Accordingly, they had never paid taxes thereon. It was only the private respondent who
declared them in one (1) tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 8388, on 18
September 1969.^[32]
Per this tax declaration, the land covered is located at Gaya-gaya, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 37.6 hectares, of which 9.4 hectares are
ricelands while the remaining 28.2 hectares are cogonal.

Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos
were not presented by private respondent as witnesses during the hearing of her
application. There can be no question
that they were the best witnesses to identify the parcels they sold to the
private respondent and prove the character of their possession thereof. Instead, she presented Victor Jarvina and
Enrique Buco, whose testimonies on direct and cross examinations are partly
summarized by the petitioner as follows:

“Victor Jarvina testified that he knew the applicant (p. 4,
tsn, June 20, 1977) who bought a parcel of land with an area of more than 37
hectares, located in Licau-Licau, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, from Macario
Castillo and Juan Reyes (pp. 5-6, ibid); that he was with the surveyor when the
survey was done; no person contested the survey; he identified the survey plan,
Exhibit “F”, the deed of sale executed by Juan Reyes, Exhibits
“G” and “G­-1”, the deeds of sale executed by Mariano
Castillo, Exhibits “H” and “H-1” and Exhibits “I”
and “I-1” (pp. 7-11, ibid); the land was declared for taxation
purposes by Angelina Sarmiento and the taxes were paid; he identified Exhibit
“J”, the tax declaration, and Exhibit “K”, the tax receipt
(pp. 12-13, ibid); after the properties were purchased by the applicant,
her possession was never disturbed by any other person (pp. 4-7, tsn, July 29,
1977). On cross-examination, Victor
Jarvina stated that he could no longer recall the date when the survey was made
(pp. 14-19, ibid); the land was bought by the applicant from different
persons, including Mariano Castillo, Juan Reyes, Macario Cruz and Feliciano
Santos; he was present when the sales were made, and the vendors did not show
any written document to prove that they owned the property, but they claimed to
have been in possession of the same for ten (10) years (pp. 14-16, tsn, Sept.
16, 1977); the property is hilly and rolling and full of cogon, but a portion
was planted with camote, corn and seasonal crops by the vendors; he came to
know the (sic) property three (3) years before Angelina Sarmiento bought it in
1969 (pp. 20­-22, ibid); Castillo had a house on the land but it was
wrecked by a storn (sic), so that there was no more house existing on the land
(p. 25, ibid).

Enrique Buco testified that he had known the land subject of the
case since 1932 because he owned a parcel of land adjoining it; he had known
Angelina Sarmiento since 1950; since 1932, the land was in the possession of
the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos,
Mariano Castillo, and a certain Arsenio, whose family name he did not know; the
possession by the parents of Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes was never disturbed by anyone; Mariano Castillo
and his parents planted bananas, mango trees, palay and sweet potatoes, but he did not know how many
hectares were cultivated (pp. 2-7, tsn, October 24, 1977); Juan Reyes and his
parents planted two (2) hectares with palay, and the rest of the area with
mango, caimito, avocado and langka trees, some of which were already fruit bearing;
Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes sold their rights over the land to Angelina
Sarmiento; the land was surveyed by the cadastral team, and Mariano Castillo
and Juan Reyes were present during the survey; and Castillo and Reyes remained in possession of the land
as tenants of Angelina Sarmiento (pp. 7-13, ibid). On cross-examination, he admitted that in
1932, he and the parents of Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were just starting
to clear up the area, and that only around three (3) hectares were cleared up
by the parents of Castillo and Reyes (pp. 13-16, ibid); that Feliciano
Santos was still in possession of a
small portion of the land in
question; they were not able to take possession of the land in question because
it was already occupied by the Japanese forces; they returned to the land only
after liberation (pp. 16-18, ibid); that his land adjoined the land in
question on the east, adjoining the property of Isidro Cabacang and Roman
Reyes, who were the ones appearing as adjoining owners in Exhibit
“F”, the plan of lot 1005; that he left his land and stayed in Quezon
City in 1973 because the security men of Puyat Enterprises were mauling many
persons in the community; to avoid trouble he transferred his family to Quezon
City (pp. 19-23, ibid); that the parents of Juan Reyes and Mariano
Castillo cleared up a portion of the wooded area in 1932 and that was how they
came into possession of their respective portions of the property; that he did
not know the extent, in terms of square meters, of the land possessed by
Castillo and Reyes; that the subject land was no longer occupied since two
years ago because the people ran away (pp. 27-30, ibid). On redirect examination, Enrique Buco stated
that at present only Mariano Castillo is staying on the land in question as an
overseer of Angelina Sarmiento; and that the last time he went there was in
April, 1978 (pp. 3-5, tsn, August 18, 1978). On re-cross-examination, he admitted that when he went to the land in
question in April, 1978, he did not see anyone cultivating the property, and
that Puyat Enterprises had built a factory near the property (pp. 6-7, ibid).”^[33]

It was further established that from the Land Classification
Report dated 8 August 1971,^[34] only
one-half (.5) of a hectare is planted with banana and fruit trees, while 36
hectares are “grass land.”

From the foregoing, serious doubts are cast on the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. As earlier stated, none of them even thought of declaring their
respective areas for taxation purposes. While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property.^[35]
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Added to this, as certified to by Jarvina,
who claimed to have been present when the sales were made to private
respondent, none of the vendors could show any written document to prove their
ownership of the land; they merely alleged that they have been in possession of
the same for ten (10) years. In the
case of the 73,000 square meters (7.3 hectares) purportedly purchased from
Macario Cruz, no deed of sale from the latter was presented. Interestingly enough, without this
acquisition, private respondent would only have more or less 308,000 square
meters, or 30.8 hectares, which she acquired from Juan Reyes and Mariano
Castillo, and not the 376,397 square meters, or 37.6 hectares which she,
applied for. No plausible explanation
was offered as to why Macario Cruz did not or could not execute a deed of
sale. There is as well no evidence
concerning the area of the property purchased from Feliciano Santos and no
explanation why no deed of sale was executed by him. Then too, there is absolutely no credible testimony describing
the boundaries and extent of the areas each vendor had allegedly occupied
before the sale to the private respondent. On the contrary, the testimony of Enrique Buco throws more doubts
thereon. He claims that the land
applied for was, since 1932, in the possession of the parents of Juan Reyes,
Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano Castillo and a certain
Arsenio. If that be so, then the
parents of Luis Pascual and Arsenio have a claim on portions of the property
applied for. Private respondent miserably
failed to show that she also acquired such portions or that they were earlier
sold to any of her vendors.

Respondent Court considered the year 1932 as the starting point
of the possession of the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. In the light of the aforesaid testimony of
Enrique Buco, such a conclusion has no basis. As a matter of fact, the trial court itself found and so held as
follows:

“The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of
land was originally owned and possessed by Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and
Avelina Emocling, and spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two
latter sets of spouses having been in possession as early as 1928 and 1948,
respectively, during which time they possessed, occupied and cultivated their
respective portions unmolested, openly continuously, and in the concept of
owners. x x x”^[36]

If the Castillo spouses’ possession actually commenced in 1948,
as found by the trial court, it goes without saying that their possession of
the 14-hectare portion was only for seventeen (17) years since they sold the
same to the private respondent in 1965. Tacking this possession to that of the latter as of the time the
application was filed on 13 August 1970, it is obvious that the 30-year
possession required by paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act was not
satisfied.

Further, if indeed private respondent has a genuine claim of
possession over the property in question, We find no reason why, as reflected
in the Land Classification Report dated 8 August 1971,^[37]
or barely a year after the filing of the application, only one-half (½) hectare
of the vast area applied for was in fact planted with nothing but banana and
fruit trees while thirty-six (36) hectares thereof are “grass land”. These fruit trees are not identified. If the testimony of private respondent is to
be believed, these could be kamias, santol and mangoes which, according to her,
were existing at the time she bought the property. Also, if the testimony of Enrique Buco is to be believed, these
fruit trees could be mango trees allegedly planted by Mariano Castillo and his
parents or, mango, kaimito, avocado and langka trees planted by Juan Reyes and
his parents. This Court can not accept
these testimonies at face value. The
respondent Court and the trial court should not have been credulous enough to
have given them full faith and credit. In her own Tax Declaration No. 8388 dated 18 September 1966 and which
she secured sometime after she allegedly purchased the property and almost a
year before she filed the application, private respondent merely declared that
the property is comprised of riceland with an area of 9.4 hectares and cogonal
land with an area of 28.2 hectares. The
existence of this 9.4-hectare riceland is even doubtful. Private respondent herself admitted that the
land is not conducive to the planting of palay,^[38] the
portions cultivated by her vendors Castillo, Reyes and Cruz were scattered in
different places and the area each cultivated could not be more than one (1) hectare.^[39]
Upon the other hand, as earlier mentioned, Enrique Buco only mentioned two (2)
hectares planted to palay by Juan Reyes and his parents.

Another factor which impairs the bona fides of private
respondent is her failure to pay the real estate taxes after the filing of the
application. She made a payment on 26
September 1969^[40]
after declaring the property for taxation purposes on 18 September 1969,^[41]
and only for the taxable years 1965 to 1969. Evidently, such payment was made only for purposes of the
application. A picayune amount was
involved annually. For the period
beginning in 1965 and ending in 1969, she paid P517.50 only. She did not want to part with any sum
thereafter until it would become certain that the court would award the
property to her. Such an attitude is an
execration of good faith.

One last point which bears heavily against the claim of private
respondent is the fact that she had the temerity to make it appear in the
application that she and the spouses Placer Velasco and Socorro Busuego are
co-owners of the property who have registerable title thereto and who must,
therefore, be awarded the property. This claim is of course a deliberate falsehood for, as private
respondent later revealed when she decided to drop the spouses as co-applicants,
the latter do not have any claim of either possession or ownership over the
property. They were made co-applicants
only because they agreed to shoulder all the expenses of litigation, including
the cost of survey and attorney’s fees. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that such an agreement was in
fact made with the spouses, it was not necessary that they be made
co-applicants. The interest of the
spouses could still be effectively protected without sacrificing the
truth. To this Court’s mind, there was
a clear attempt on the part of the private respondent and the spouses to
deceive the trial court. Unfortunately,
the trial court glossed over this point and impliedly declared as validly
rescinded the contract with the said spouses.

The foregoing disquisitions sufficiently prove that private
respondent is a smart land speculator who saw in the land applied for not just
the blades of cogon grass, the color of which changes from green during the
rainy season to brown during summer, but huge profits as business, industry and
the general population move outward from the metropolitan area. It is incumbent upon land registration
courts to exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding so-called
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles over lands of the
public domain; if they are lax in these proceedings, they may, wittingly or
unwittingly, be used by unscrupulous land speculators in their raid of the
public domain.

More deserving citizens should be given priority in the
acquisition of idle lands of the public domain. These could serve as relocation sites for the urban poor. They may be distributed to landless farm
workers. In so doing, the ends of
social justice, appropriately the centerpiece of the 1987 Constitution, could
be further enhanced.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent Court of 12 October 1984 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 is hereby
REVERSED. The decision of the trial
court of 2 June 1982 in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167, LRC Record No.
N-39192 is likewise REVERSED and said case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Per Appellate Justice Jorge R. Coquia,  concurred
in by Appellate Justices Mariano A. Zosa and Floreliana Castro-Bartolome.

^[2]
Rollo, 73.

^[3]
Rollo, 74.

^[4]
Id., 76.

^[5]
Id., 157.

^[6]
Rollo, 11-12.

^[7]
Id., 86.

^[8]
Exhibit “X”.

^[9]
Rollo, op. cit., 91.

^[10]
Rollo, 87-90.

^[11]
Brief for Oppositor-Appellant, Id., 45, et seq.

^[12]
Rollo, 35.

^[13]
Rollo, 9, et seq.

^[14]
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737 [1970], citing several cases.

^[15]
Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 194 [1986]; Republic vs.
IAC, 144 SCRA 705 [1986]; Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan vs IAC,
157 SCRA 640 [1988]; Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 307 [1988].

^[16]
Commonwealth Act No. 141.

^[17]
Approved on 22 June 1957 and took effect upon its approval.

^[18]
Per Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, promulgated on 25 January 1977, this paragraph
was amended to make it applicable only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945.

^[19]
126 SCRA 69 [1983].

^[20]
65 Phil. 367, 373 [1938].

^[21]
60 Phil. 114, 133 [1934].

^[22]
68 SCRA 177, 193 [1975].

^[23]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 983.

^[24]
Id., 291.

^[25]
Id., 507.

^[26]
Id., 859.

^[27]
Id., 49.

^[28]
Exhibits “G” and “G-1”; Rollo, 14.

^[29]
Exhibits “I” and “I-1”; Rollo, 15.

^[30]
Exhibits “H”; and “H-1”, Id.

^[31]
Id., 88.

^[32]
Exhibit “J”; Id., 15.

^[33]
Rollo, 18-21.

^[34]
Exhibit “Y-2”; Id., 17.

^[35]
Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA
177, 194 [1975].

^[36]
Rollo, 89.

^[37]
Exhibit “Y-2”, referred to on page 9 of the petition in this case; Id.,
17.

^[38]
Rollo, 22.

^[39]
Id., 24.

^[40]
Exhibit “K”.

^[41]
Exhibit “J”.