G.R. No. 68898. March 31, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CRISTOTO LAPAZ ALIAS TOTONG, JOHNSON BARLESO AND PAULINO LAPAZ, JR., DEFENDANTS, CRISTOTO LAPAZ ALIAS TOTONG, DEFENDANT-APPELL…
GANCAYCO, J.:
In the evening of April
14, 1984, Eulalia Cabunag,
a 70-year old woman who was living alone, was beaten to death by three men at Barangay Katipunan, Carmen, Bohol.
One of them was discharged as a state witness; the second pleaded guilty
and the third pleaded not guilty so he underwent a trial. Thereafter, both were found guilty and
sentenced to death. Said verdict is now
before this Court on appeal.
Appellant Johnson Barleso used to stay
in the house of said victim, Eulalia Cabunag as his common-law wife was the niece of the latter. They transferred to the house of Aurelio Gaudicos, son-in-law of Eulalia,
when Eulalia called Barleso
a thief in the presence of many people.
Apparently, Barleso resented the remark.
Paulino Lapaz,
Jr. was then in his parent’s house in the same barangay
when he was fetched by his uncle, herein appellant Cristoto
Lapaz, to go to the house of Barleso. Thereat, Barleso
proposed to Cristoto in the presence of Paulino that they kill Eulalia. Cristoto
agreed. He asked Paulino
to buy a bottle of “kulafu” wine which he
drank to embolden himself. Thereafter
the three proceeded to the house of the victim who was living alone. Cristoto carried a
rounded piece of wood[1]
which was given to him by Barleso, while Barleso also carried another piece of wood[2]
and a bolo.
Upon their arrival in the house of the victim, Barleso left the bolo behind a post beneath the house. He then removed a plywood covering an opening
on the wall beneath the victim’s stove.
The three then entered the house, one after the other through said
opening. Paulino
stayed in the kitchen, while Barleso and Cristoto proceeded to the sala
where they helped one another in beating the victim with the pieces of wood
they brought with them until the latter slumped on the floor.
Barleso ordered Paulino
to get the bolo which he left beneath the house. When Paulino handed
the bolo to Barleso, the victim suddenly shouted for help even as she was already lying on the floor. Frightened, the three panicked and jumped one
after the other through the same
opening through which they entered the house, leaving behind the two pieces of
wood which Barleso and Cristoto
used. Paulino
and Barleso proceeded to the latter’s house while Cristoto proceeded to the house of Paulino’s
parents.
As Aurelio Gaudicos heard a thudding sound and a shout for help coming from the direction of
the victim’s house, he ran towards said
house and hid behind the coconut tree near the kitchen. From there he saw the three men, Paulino, Barleso, and Cristoto
hurriedly leaving the house of the victim.
Gaudicos immediately returned
home and ordered someone to fetch the police.
When the policemen led by the
Integrated National Police station commander of Carmen, Bohol arrived, they were met by Gaudicos who led them to the house of the victim. There they
saw the victim bathed in her own blood at the sala
still alive but she could no longer talk. She was brought to the Simeon
Toribio Memorial
Hospital at the poblacion. Gaudicos confided
to the police investigating team the identity of the three persons he saw
leaving the victim’s house immediately after the incident.
Paulino was spotted by the policeman
mixing with the crowd in the vicinity of the victim’s house so he was invited
for questioning in the house of his father where Cristoto
Lapaz was found.
In the course of the questioning, the station commander noticed the
blood stains on the t-shirt of Cristoto. The two suspects were brought to the police
station where the station commander also noticed bloodstains on the pants of Paulino.[3]
Upon initial inquiry, Paulino readily admitted his
participation in the commission of the crime.
Cristoto also admitted his complicity but he
pointed to Barleso as the one who struck the victim
with the piece of wood. Barleso was picked up at dawn the following day at the
hospital where he accompanied the victim.
At the initial stage of the investigation, he denied any
participation. However, he eventually
admitted his guilt.
On April 14, 1984,
the police conducted a thorough investigation.
Barleso executed a sworn statement admitting
his participation in the commission of the crime.[4]
During the preliminary examination conducted by Judge Francisco Escano of the Municipal Circuit Court of Carmen, Butuan on April
27, 1984, he admitted having inflicted the injuries on the victim.[5]
The victim died of the injuries the following day in the
hospital. Aside from the certificate of
death that was issued,[6] a
post-mortem certificate was also issued by Dr. Elizabeth Cabagnot. The said physician stated her findings in
connection with the autopsy conducted of the victim, as follows:
” x x x ” Cardio-respiratory arrest sec. to multiple
lacerated wounds, Face, Frontal; Parietal and occipital areas Multiple
contusions, Face, lateral side of neck (left) and shoulder area (left).”[7]
Thus, an information for murder was filed by the provincial
fiscal of Bohol against said
three suspects in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Upon arraignment of the three accused on July 3, 1984, they entered a plea of not
guilty. They were assisted by their
respective counsels. When the case was
set for trial on the merits on July
25, 1984, counsel for the accused Cristoto
Lapaz informed the trial court that he would like to
change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty. The trial court inquired from the accused if
he confirms the manifestation of his counsel and he answered in the
affirmative. Thereafter, said accused
was re-arraigned whereupon he pleaded guilty to the crime charged against him. The trial court again asked the accused
whether he confirms the manifestation of his lawyer that he was changing his
previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty considering that the crime
charged is a capital offense and the answer of the accused was still in the
affirmative. The trial court also asked
him whether he understood fully well the explanation of his lawyer as to the
nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea of guilty to
the crime charged. The answer of the
accused was also in the affirmative. At
this juncture, his counsel invoked two mitigating circumstances in favor of the
accused, to wit: (1) voluntary plea of guilty; and (2) voluntary
surrender. The fiscal did not offer any
objection to the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty but he submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court the
appreciation of the second mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He informed the trial court that the accused
was apprehended a few minutes after the commission of the offense and was in
the custody of the police before the filing of the complaint.
The trial court required the prosecution to present Dr. Elizabeth
Cabagnot in order to determine the extent of injuries
suffered by the victim. On August 17, 1984 a decision was
promulgated by the trial court convicting the accused Cristoto
Lapaz alias “Toto” of the crime of
murder. Considering the two aggravating
circumstances charged in the information, namely: (1) disregard of the respect
due to the offended party on account of her age and sex and (2) the crime
having been committed in the dwelling place of the offended party without the
latter having given provocation, and which is offset by one mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, the accused was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of Eulalia
Cabunag in the amount of P12,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Meanwhile, the trial proceeded as against appellant Barleso and Paulino Lapaz, Jr. The
fiscal filed a motion to discharge the accused Paulino
as a state witness with the conformity of the said accused. This was granted by the trial court. After the trial on the merits, a decision was
rendered by the trial court on February 28, 1985 finding the accused Barleso guilty of the crime of murder, with three
aggravating circumstances, namely: (a) disregard of sex and age of the victim;
(b) committed at the dwelling place of the victim; and (c) committed at
nighttime and by gaining access to the victim’s dwelling through an opening not
intended for egress; i.e., through a hole made by the accused,
without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same. The trial court imposed on him the penalty of
death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00, and
required him to pay the heirs of the victim the actual damage of P10,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of
the proceedings.
Both cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
The accused Johnson Barleso with the
assistance of counsel de oficio asked
for a reversal or modification of the judgment based on the following
assignment of errors:
“I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
CRISTOTO LAPAZ WAS ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF EULALIA CABUNAG.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
APPELLANT JOHNSON BARLESO WAS, IF AT ALL, MERELY AN ACCOMPLICE OF CRISTOTO
LAPAZ.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISREGARDING
THE SELF-EXCULPATORY TESTIMONY OF PAULINO LAPAZ, JR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE RESPECTIVE SWORN STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT JOHNSON
BARLESO EXECUTED AT THE POLICE STATION AND DURING HIS PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
(EXHIBITS “B” AND “F”), FOR VIOLATION OF THIS APPELLANT’S MIRANDA
RIGHTS.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION ATTENDED THE KILLING OF
EULALIA CABUNAG.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
KILLING OF EULALIA CABUNAG WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF –
(A) DISREGARD OF SEX AND AGE, AND (8) NIGHTTIME.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING
APPELLANT JOHNSON BARLESO WITH THE ALTERNATIVE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK
OF INSTRUCTION.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT BARLESO.”[8]
Likewise, with the assistance of his counsel, the accused Cristoto Lapaz filed a brief
assailing his conviction on the following grounds:
“I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO OBSERVE THE DEGREE OF CARE WHICH THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT HAS PRESCRIBED FOR A VALID ADMISSION OF A PLEA OF
GUILTY BY AN ACCUSED, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE COMMISSION OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE IS
CHARGED AS IN THE PRESENT CASE AND IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT TAKING
EVIDENCE INDEPENDENT OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, TREACHERY AND SUPERIOR
STRENGTH AND THE RECORDS ALSO DO NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF THESE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE GENERIC
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES TO WIT: (1) DISREGARD RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY
ON ACCOUNT OF HER SEX AND AGE; AND (2) THE CRIME HAVING BEEN COMMITTED IN THE DWELLING
PLACE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY WITHOUT THE LATTER HAVING GIVEN PROVOCATION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF INSTRUCTION.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CRISTOTO LAPAZ.”[9]
With the abolition of the death penalty under the present
Constitution,[10]
there is no more automatic review of cases of this nature. These cases are thus treated as on ordinary
appeal.
First, the Court takes into account the appeal of appellant
Johnson Barleso.
Barleso stresses the fact that his co-accused Cristoto Lapaz, who took the
witness stand as his witness, admitted having killed the victim Eulalia Cabunag on the evening of
April 14, 1984 and that
Although Barleso and Paulino
Lapaz Jr. were with him then, he did not see Barleso participate in the beating of the victim. Barleso testified
that at that critical moment, he was at the kitchen of the victim’s house and
that he went with Cristoto and Paulino
because Cristoto threatened him with a hunting
knife. While Barleso
admitted that his relationship with the victim was not cordial, he alleges that
his anger never developed into such hatred as to inspire him to kill the
victim. He contends that his mere
presence on the occasion of the killing does not prove conspiracy inasmuch as
he did not take a direct part in the beating of the victim and that he did not
directly force or induce Cristoto to commit the
same. He argues that if at all, his
participation was merely that of an accomplice in that knowing of the criminal
design of Cristoto he still accompanied said
assailant to the place of the victim and that his presence at the scene of the
crime was not indispensable to the commission of the same.[11]
The Court is not persuaded.
Paulino Lapaz, Jr.,
who was discharged as a state witness, categorically testified that he was
present when Barleso and Cristoto
Lapaz agreed on that evening to the victim; that he
was asked by Cristoto to buy “kulafu” wine which Cristoto
drank; that Cristoto brought a piece of wood, while Barleso brought a piece of wood and a bolo with him; that Barleso left his bolo underneath the house of the victim;
that Cristoto entered through an opening in the house
followed by Barleso and himself; that Cristoto and Barleso beat the
victim, who was then alone, by using the pieces of wood they had brought along;
that after the victim slumped down to the floor, Barleso
commanded him to get his bolo, and so he got it and handed it to Barleso; that the victim shouted for help; that they were
frightened; and that the all got out of the house and fled.
The testimony of Cristoto Lapaz tending to exculpate appellant Barleso
is not worthy of any credence. Barleso does not deny that he had a standing grudge against
the victim for calling him a thief in the presence of many persons. He felt so disgraced that he and his wife
moved out of the house of the victim. It
must be because of such hatred that he persuaded Cristoto
to join him in killing the victim.
Barleso assailed the discharge of Paulino as a state witness on the ground that such
discharge is improvident. Barleso alleges that Paulino was
more guilty than himself. The evidence
does not support the stance of appellant.
Be that as it may, the discharge of Paulino as
state witness cannot be faulted as long as he is not the most guilty.[12]
The admission in evidence of the sworn statements of appellant Barleso executed at the police station and during his
preliminary examination is also questioned by appellant. The Court finds it unnecessary to dwell on
the issue considering that the evidence on record is more than adequate to
generate appellant’s conviction of the offense charged against him without
considering the said sworn statements.[13]
Contrary to the allegation of the appellant Barleso,
the commission of the offense with treachery and evident premeditation has been
established by the prosecution. The
appellant nurtured a grudge and planned the killing of the victim. He invited his two companions to help him
execute his plan to beat the victim to death with pieces of wood in the middle
of the night insuring the killing of the victim without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The presence of treachery is clear.[14]
It was also established that previous to the incident, the victim
called appellant Barleso a thief in the presence of
other people, and that appellant and his family transferred to another house
inasmuch as he could no longer bear the insults hurled at him by the
victim. The appellant’s resentment
culminated in the evening of April 14, 1984 when as above-related he persuaded
his two co-accused to join him in killing the victim, which they
accomplished. Sufficient time,
therefore, had elapsed from the time the appellant conceived the commission of
the crime until the execution thereof.
Obviously, evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.[15]
By the same token, the assigned error as to the two aggravating
circumstances is not well taken. While it
may be true that nighttime is absorbed in the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex and age cannot be
similarly absorbed. Treachery refers to
the manner of the commission of the crime.
Disregard of sex and age pertains to the relationship of the victim, who
is a 70-year old woman, and the appellant who is young man, 27 years old, at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The Court also takes note of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling and that the crime was committed after an unlawful
entry.
The mere lack of instruction or illiteracy of the appellant
cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance. One does not have to be educated or
intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another
person even if it is to redress a wrong committed against him.
The conviction of appellant Barleso by
the trial court must be upheld.
Now to the appeal of Cristoto Lapaz. The main
thrust of his appeal is that the trial court failed to observe the degree of
care prescribed in imposing the death penalty upon a plea of guilty by an
accused charged with the commission of a capital offense, citing People vs.
Padilla,[16]
The appellant contends that the trial court failed to explain to him the nature
of the charge against him, especially the aggravating circumstances attending
the commission of the offense and that the trial court did not propound any
question to him regarding said circumstances so as to leave no room for doubt as
to the possibility of his misunderstanding the nature and gravity of the charge
to which he was pleading guilty. He
argues that he was not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical
language in the information in qualifying the acts constituting the offense.[17]
The appellant also cites People vs. Formentera,[18]
where this Court observed that the casual remark of the trial judge that the
penalty to be imposed is “reclusion perpetua
to death” without specifically and categorically informing the accused of
the imposable penalty, and the averment of several aggravating circumstances in
the information, thus provide cogent reason to conclude that the accused did
not fully comprehend the consequences of his plea. He asserts that the trial court should have
called witnesses for the purpose of establishing his guilt and culpability not
only to satisfy the trial judge, but also to aid the Supreme Court in
determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended
the meaning and the full consequences of his plea.[19]
The record of the proceedings relevant to this issue is as
follows:
“ATTY BAGAIPO, JR.:
Your Honor, please,
one of the accused in this case Cristoto Lapaz alias Toto intimated to me that he is changing his
plea of not guilty, your Honor.
We therefore request that he be re-arraigned on the Information, your
Honor.
“COURT (to accused Cristoto Lapaz):
“Q Your lawyer, Cristoto Lapaz, Atty. Forturnato Bagaipo, Jr.
manifested to the Court that you are going to change your plea from your previous
plea of not guilty to that of guilty. Do
you confirm to this fact as manifested by your lawyer?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“Yes, your Honor,
that is correct.
“COURT (to Court Interpreter):
All right, re-arraign
accused Cristoto Lapaz
alias Totong.
(At this juncture, the
court interpreter is reading the information to accused Cristoto
Lapaz)
“COURT:
“Q Cristoto Lapaz, this is your
correct name?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“A: Yes,
your Honor.
“COURT:
“Q Do
you understand the Information read to you and translated to you in the Cebu Visayan dialect?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“A Yes,
your Honor.
“COURT:
“Q What
plea do you enter?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“A Guilty,
your Honor.
“COURT:
“Q You
are charged of a capital offense. Did
your lawyer explain to you the nature of the offense which is punishable from
life to death?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“A Yes,
your Honor.
“COURT:
“Q What
is your highest educational attainment?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“A: I
am an illiterate, your Honor.
“COURT:
“Q And
you understood the explanation of your lawyer very well about your change of
plea?
“ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
“A Yes,
your Honor, I was made to understand by my lawyer.
“COURT:
Order.
“When this case was called for trial this morning, Asst. Prov. Fiscal Pablo R. Magdoza
appeared for the prosecution, accused Cristoto Lapaz alias Totong and Paulino Lapaz Junior appeared
assisted by their counsel, Atty. Fortunato Bagaipo, Jr. while accused Johnson Barleso
appeared assisted by his counsel, Atty. Alexander H. Lim.
“Atty. Bagaipo, Jr. manifested to
the Court that his client Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong would like
to change his previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty and that is why
accused Cristoto Lapaz
(alias) Totong was called by the Court whether he
would confirm the manifestation of his counsel and the answer of accused Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong as (sic) in the affirmative. Thereafter, accused Cristoto
Lapaz (alias) Totong
pleaded guilty to the crime charged. The
Court asked again said accused whether he would confirm the manifestation of
his lawyer that he has to change his previous plea of not guilty to that of
guilty considering that the crime charged is a capital offense and the answer
was still in the affirmative. The Court
further asked said accused whether he understood very well the explanation of
his lawyer as to the consequences of his plea of guilty to the crime charged
and the answer of the accused was in the affirmative.
“At this juncture, Atty. Bagaipo,
Jr. invoked two (2) mitigating circumstances to be appreciated in favor of his
client-accused Cristoto Lapaz
(alias) Totong, namely: a) voluntary plea of guilty
and b) voluntary surrender. Fiscal Magdoza, on other hand, did not offer any objection to the
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in
favor of accused Cristoto Lapaz
(alias) Totong (inasmuch as he) was apprehended (a)
few minutes after he committed the crime and he was in the (sic) police custody
before the filing of the complaint.
“Promulgation of sentence upon accused Cristoto
Lapaz alias Totong is held
in abeyance until all prosecution witnesses shall have testified against the
rest of the accused.
“SO ORDERED.
“Given in open Court, Tagbilaran
City, July 25, 1984.
(SGD.) ANDRES S. NAMOCCATCAT
J u d g e”[20]
The first witness who testified for the prosecution was Dr.
Elizabeth Cabagnot, resident physician of Simeon Toribio Memorial Hospital.
After her testimony, the trial court ruled that it was satisfied with
the testimony of the doctor. The trial
court also considered the evidence against appellant sufficient. The proceedings were to continue only insofar
as the two other accused were concerned.
On August 17, 1984, the trial court rendered its decision finding
appellant Cristoto Lapaz
guilty of the crime of murder.
In disputing the argument of the appellant, the Solicitor General
states that the trial court did its duty of assuring that the appellant
understood his act, the nature of the charges filed against him and the
character of the punishment provided for by law before it is imposed,[21]
and that the information was read to him translated into the Visayan dialect which the appellant understood.
The record shows that appellant was informed by the trial court
that upon a plea of guilty he could be imposed the penalty of life imprisonment
to death. It is likewise true that the
trial court was informed that the appellant was illiterate. The presiding judge verified anew if he
understood the charges against him and if his lawyer explained the consequences
of the plea to him. The accused
confirmed his plea of guilty.
Thereafter, the trial court required the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution but after the doctor testified as to the multiple injuries
inflicted on the deceased with the use of a blunt instrument, the trial court
considered the case against appellant submitted and rendered its decision.
The Court agrees with the protestations of the appellant that the
trial court did not take pains in explaining to him the nature and character of
the offense charged against him, the consequences of the plea of guilty and the
meaning and effect of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances so as to
insure that the appellant fully understood the consequences of his plea of
guilty.
However, considering that in the same proceedings the trial
continued as against the two other accused, where one was discharged as a state
witness and the other remained for trial, and in the process the
accused-appellant Cristoto even testified as a witness
for his co-appellant Johnson Barleso, the Court is
not persuaded that the arraignment of said appellant on a plea of guilty was
improvidently undertaken. Appellant Cristoto Lapaz testified in court
and categorically admitted that he was the one who beat the victim to
death. He asserted that his two other
co-accused did not participate in the killing.
He admitted that he drank “kulafu” wine in
order to embolden himself to commit the offense. His admissions were made freely and
voluntarily even after he had been sentenced to death by the trial court. He related having committed the offense at
the dwelling of the offended party at night attended by treachery and qualified
by evident premeditation without regard to the sex and age of the offended
party. The Court can take judicial
notice of this testimony of the appellant in court and of the other evidence
adduced during the trial in the resolution of his appeal. It appears that the trial court committed no
error in accepting the voluntary plea of guilty of appellant in this case and
in imposing the corresponding penalty thereafter. Appellant fully understood the consequences
of his plea.
The guilt of both appellants Johnson Barleso
and Cristoto Lapaz is
sufficiently established. Accordingly,
this Court affirms the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. However, considering that the 1987
Constitution does not allow the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
which should be and is hereby imposed on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, and the indemnity that each of them should
be required to pay to the heirs of the deceased is set at P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty
and indemnity, the judgment appealed from in these cases is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respects, with costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[1]
Exhibit B.
[2]
Exhibit G.
[3]
Exhibits E and E-1.
[4]
Exhibit B.
[5]
Exhibit F; TSN, August 22, 1984,
pages 22 to 23.
[6]
Exhibit A.
[7] Page
170, Rollo, G.R. No. 70445.
[8]
Page 149, Rollo, G.R. No 70445.
[9]
Page 76, Rollo, G.R. No. 68898.
[10]
Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[11]
Citing People vs. Niera, 96 SCRA 1 (1980).
[12]
Section 9(d), Rule 190, Rules of Court.
[13]
Exhibits B and F.
[14]
Art. 14(16), Revised Penal Code.
[15]
Art. 14(13), Revised Penal Code; People vs. Carillo,
77 Phil. 572 (1946); People vs. Diva, G.R. No. L-22946, April 29, 1968.
[16]
138 SCRA 513 (1985).
[17]
Citing People vs. Duaban, 92 SCRA 743 (1979).
[18]
130 SCRA 114 (1984).
[19]
People vs. Serna, 130 SCRA 550 (1984), citing People vs.
Gonzalez, 92 SCRA 527 (1979).
[20]
TSN, July 25, 1984, pages 1
to 4.
[21]
Citing People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614
(1984).