PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF APPELLEE, VS. HERMOGENES MAGDUENO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
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People versus Magdueno
The Case
This is People versus Magdueno, an automatic review by the Supreme Court of a conviction for murder. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Hermogenes Magdueno, together with several others, for the killing of Fiscal Fernando Dilig, the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa, who was shot to death in his own jeep in the morning of October 15, 1980. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it shows how treachery is established when a hired gun fires on a seated, defenseless victim; it shows how an extrajudicial confession is tested against the constitutional rights to silence and to counsel; and it shows how the Supreme Court corrects a trial court that misapplied an aggravating circumstance even while affirming the death sentence.
Procedural History
The case began in the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. Six persons were charged in an amended information with murder. After trial, the court convicted Hermogenes Magdueno alone, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, aggravated by price or reward and by the crime being committed in contempt of or with insult to public authority. It sentenced him to death, with all accessory penalties, to pay the costs, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of 130,000 pesos as actual damages and 20,000 pesos as moral damages. All the other accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review. The appellant assigned two errors: that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder, and that it erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession in evidence.
Facts
A few minutes past eight in the morning of October 15, 1980, Fiscal Fernando Dilig had just seated himself at the driver's seat of his jeep, parked near his house at the corner of Roxas and D. Mendoza Streets in Puerto Princesa City. Suddenly two successive gunshots rang out. The gunman, coming from the victim's left side, aimed and poured both shots into his body, inflicting two fatal wounds that caused his death almost instantly. The autopsy showed one wound entering the neck and another entering the lumbar region, both fatal.
Three eyewitnesses positively identified Hermogenes Magdueno as the gunman. Elena Adion Lim, seated at the gate of her fence some twenty to thirty meters away, saw him pass by her house holding a short gun in his right hand and a clutch bag, hurrying toward Liwanag Street. Ernesto Mari Gonzales, a security guard riding a tricycle, heard the shots, ordered the driver to stop, and saw the gunman in a white polo shirt, blue pants and a hat, still holding the gun pointed at the Fiscal; when the man turned, Mari saw a scar on his left temple below his left eyebrow, and he walked away limping. Cynthia Canto, a taxi dancer waiting for a tricycle near the Fiscal's house, saw the gunman stand by for a while, approach the victim seated in his jeep, fire two successive shots, and leave toward Mendoza Street. All three identified him upon confrontation, although he had been a stranger to them before the incident.
Magdueno also executed an extrajudicial confession in which he admitted killing Fiscal Dilig for a price or reward and implicated others. He claimed instead that on the day of the killing he was at the house of Leonardo Senas in Aborlan, Palawan, and learned of the killing only from the radio. The trial court found that he had been contacted in Manila and agreed to kill the Fiscal for a fee, receiving an advance payment, and that he traveled to Palawan to do the job. The widow, Gloria Dilig, testified on the civil damages.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of murder, considering his defense of alibi and his challenge to the identification made by the eyewitnesses.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the appellant's extrajudicial confession.
- Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of committing the crime in contempt of or with insult to public authority was properly appreciated.
Applicable Provisions
Section 20, Article IV of the Bill of Rights, as quoted by the trial court, governs the taking of the confession:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision bears on the case because the appellant attacked the admissibility of his confession, and the Court had to test whether he was informed of his rights and assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court found no error. The three eyewitnesses had a clear view of the appellant in broad daylight and positively identified him upon confrontation, and one of them described a scar on his left temple that matched the scar the trial court itself observed on the appellant. No motive was shown for the witnesses to falsely accuse him, and his claim that one witness testified to claim a reward was unsupported by any evidence. In the light of the positive identification, his defense of alibi necessarily fell, since he did not show that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene, and a bus ride from Aborlan to the city took only a little more than two hours.
On treachery, the Court held it clearly established. The appellant fired two successive shots at the defenseless Fiscal while the latter was still seated in his jeep, hitting him in the neck and lumbar region, and then fled still holding his firearm. The manner of execution showed that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted means of committing the crime that insured its execution without risk to himself from any defense the victim might make. The Court added that the appellant's calling out "Fiscal" before shooting did not negate treachery, since as a hired killer he wanted to insure he was shooting the correct person, and when Dilig turned his face, the appellant fired immediately, giving him no opportunity to defend himself.
On the second issue, the Court upheld the admission of the extrajudicial confession. The trial court had found that the appellant was properly informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he was allowed to communicate with a lawyer from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office who assisted him and was present from the start of the investigation until it was finished, and that the confession was presumed voluntary and corroborated by other evidence. The Court found no error in the lower court's finding that the appellant committed murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and aggravated by price and reward.
On the third issue, the Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority was not borne by the records. For this circumstance to be considered, it must not only be shown that the crime was committed in the presence of the public authority, but also that the crime was not committed against the public authority himself. Here, Fiscal Dilig, the public authority involved, was the victim. Hence the trial court erred in including that circumstance. Nevertheless, considering the presence of an aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the trial court imposed the proper penalty.
Doctrine
First, treachery exists where the offender deliberately and consciously adopts means of committing the crime that insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim might make; firing successive shots at a defenseless victim seated in a vehicle, then fleeing, satisfies it. Second, a positive identification by eyewitnesses who had a clear view in daylight, with no showing of improper motive, prevails over the defense of alibi, which must fail unless the accused shows it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene. Third, an extrajudicial confession is admissible where the accused was informed of his rights to silence and to counsel and was assisted by counsel throughout the custodial investigation, and it is presumed voluntary absent contrary evidence. Fourth, the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority requires that the crime not be committed against the public authority himself; where the public authority is the victim, the circumstance cannot be appreciated.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Hermogenes Magdueno of murder and sentencing him to death, with the accessory penalties, costs, and the award of actual and moral damages to the heirs of Fiscal Dilig, while correcting the trial court's error on the aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing: treachery is present when the killer deliberately adopts means that insure the crime's execution without risk from any defense the victim might make, and insult to public authority cannot be appreciated when the public authority is himself the victim. Examiners like to use this case on the requisites of treachery in a shooting of a seated, defenseless victim, and on the requirements for a valid waiver and assistance of counsel in custodial investigation.