ROBINSON LOMO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GARISON G. MABELIN, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.

Lomo versus Mabelin

The Case

This is a petition filed with the Supreme Court by Robinson Lomo against Judge Garison Mabelin of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City and the officers of the Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, known as MOELCI II. Lomo asked the Court to annul the trial judge's order denying his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, which would have stopped J. Antonio Lim from assuming the position of director representing the Jimenez-Panaon District, and to compel the election committees to proclaim Lomo as the duly elected director. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it is a clean illustration of the rule that courts will not decide a question that has become moot, and it shows how a supervening event, here the petitioner's assumption of another public office, can forfeit the very right he came to court to protect.

Procedural History

Lomo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, presided over by Judge Mabelin, praying that J. Antonio Lim be prohibited from taking his oath of office as director, that the Board of Directors be enjoined from allowing him to sit, and that after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction issue commanding the election committees to proclaim Lomo as the duly elected director. On March 2, 1984, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On March 23, 1984, however, the court denied the application for injunction, finding that Lomo would not suffer great and irreparable injury if Lim were allowed to take his oath. Lim then took his oath of office on March 25, 1984. On September 20, 1984, Lomo instituted the present petition before the Supreme Court, contending that his verified petition below showed the damage he suffered and continues to suffer from the respondents' wrongful acts if they were not enjoined.

Facts

On January 21, 1984, the Board of Directors of MOELCI II passed a resolution calling for an election on February 18, 1984, at the Jimenez Central School and the Panaon Central School, to elect a director to represent the Jimenez-Panaon District. On February 3, 1984, or fifteen days before the scheduled election, J. Antonio Lim filed his certificate of candidacy. The next day, the Chairman of the Nomination Committee submitted Lim's name to the Board as the lone candidate for the district.

On February 13, 1984, Robinson Lomo filed his own certificate of candidacy, which the Nomination Committee received the same day. The following day, the committee chairman informed Lomo by letter that his certificate was ruled disqualified because it did not meet the deadline fixed in the Rules and Regulations for MOELCI II district elections, which required the filing of a certificate of candidacy not later than fifteen days before election day. On the morning of February 18, 1984, a general assembly of one hundred forty-six members was held. During the meeting, twenty-two members presented a nomination endorsing Lomo's candidacy pursuant to the By-Laws, and after deliberating on its legality, the majority resolved to give due course to the petition of the twenty-two members. The election then followed.

Lomo obtained six hundred fifty-five votes against Lim's five hundred fifty-four, a margin of one hundred one votes. But the election committees declared all votes cast for Lomo stray, on the ground that he was not an official candidate. Lomo nonetheless took his oath of office as director on February 20, 1984. On February 22, 1984, the election committees proclaimed Lim as the winner, and on February 25, 1984, the Board of Directors confirmed and recognized Lim's election. While the case was pending, on April 23, 1986, Lomo was designated Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, effective May 1, 1986, and on May 5, 1986, he took his oath of office as such.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition has been rendered moot and academic by supervening events.
• Whether or not the petitioner's assumption of the office of Vice-Mayor precludes him from serving as a director of the cooperative.
• Whether or not the courts may still determine the question of who was the duly elected director despite the supervening events.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of the By-Laws of the Cooperative provides:

SECTION 3. Qualifications. - x x x No person shall be eligible to become or to remain a Board Member of the Cooperative who: x x x c] holds an elective office in the government above the level of a Barangay Captain;

This provision is decisive because the petitioner's oath-taking as Vice-Mayor placed him squarely within its disqualification, forfeiting whatever right he had to the contested seat.

Section 6, Article IV of the By-Laws provides in part:

SECTION 6. Nominations. x x x Other nominations may be made by the petition of fifteen or more members of the district and such nomination shall be posted at the same place where the list of nomination by the committee is posted.

This provision is the basis of the petitioner's claim that his nomination by twenty-two members at the general assembly was valid despite the committee's rejection of his certificate of candidacy.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it was unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised because supervening events had rendered them moot and academic. The petitioner had been designated Vice-Mayor effective May 1, 1986, and had taken his oath of office on May 5, 1986.

On the second issue, the Court held that by assuming an elective office above the level of a barangay captain, the petitioner is precluded from serving as a director of MOELCI II by virtue of Section 3 of the Cooperative's By-Laws. The Court quoted the disqualification in full and concluded that the petitioner's alleged right to the controverted office had been forfeited by his assumption as Vice-Mayor.

On the third issue, the Court held that it would not determine a moot question or abstract proposition. It stated the settled rule:

It is a well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.

Since the purpose of the petition was to have the petitioner installed as director-elect, and that relief could no longer be granted, the petition had to be dismissed.

Doctrine

First, courts will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition, nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. When supervening events render the relief prayed for impossible, dismissal follows as a matter of course.

Second, a member of a cooperative who holds an elective office in the government above the level of a barangay captain is disqualified to become or to remain a board member under a by-law in the terms quoted above. The disqualification operates by the fact of holding such office, and it forfeits any claim to the contested seat, even one founded on a plurality of votes.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for being moot and academic, with no costs; the respondents prevailed, and the petitioner was not installed as director.

Remember This

Memorize the line that courts will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. Examiners use this case to test mootness and supervening events, and to show that a by-law disqualifying holders of elective office above the barangay level can forfeit an election protest even before it is decided.