BARTOLOME ALONZO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Upon an information which reads:

“That on or about this 30th day of October, 1974, in the City
of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, (petitioner herein) being
then the personnel officer of the Fire Department of Olongapo
City and entrusted with the preparation, follow up and payments of payrolls,
vouchers, and other papers and documents relative to the salary of the
personnel and members of the Olongapo City Fire
Department, with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously prepare or cause the preparation of an official
voucher which is a public document pertaining to the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the period
covering from October 1-31, 1974, for a total of P166.67 and wrote, imitated,
forged, falsified the signature and
signed for Wilfredo Cadua
without the latter’s knowledge, permission and consent, and thereafter
presented the said voucher for payment and received the amount of P166.67 thus
making it appear and attributing that the complaining witness Wilfredo Cadua had signed the
said voucher and received the amount stated therein when in fact and in truth,
as said accused well knew that he forged and falsified the signature of Wilfredo Cadua and once in
possession of the said amount (P166.67), did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite repeated demands, the
accused refused and continue to refuse to remit the above-mentioned amount, to
the damage and prejudice of Wilfredo Cadua in the aforementioned amount, Philippine Currency.
However, the above-named accused subsequently remitted to the complaining
witness, Wilfredo Cadua the
amount of P100.00, Philippine Currency.” (p. 12, Rollo).

the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Third Judicial District, Branch XXX, Olongapo City found the petitioner guilty of estafa through falsification of public document.

The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information and
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from Four (4)
Years, Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of prision
correccional as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One
(1) Day of prision mayor as maximum, to pay a fine of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law.

“Costs against accused.” (p. 7, Rollo).

From this judgment, the petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with a
recommendation for executive clemency with respect to the duration of the
penalty, considering that the amount involved is only P166.67. The petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition was filed on
the submission that:

“(a) The former Court of Appeals decided the case contrary to
law, the evidence end the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court (Rule 45,
Sec. 4a, Rules of Court).

“(b) Granting but without admitting that the accused Bartolome Alonzo, signed the name of the complainant Wilfredo Cadua in the voucher,
the crime committed is simple Estafa under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code and not a complex crime under Art.
171 as ruled by the trial court and the respondent Court.

“(c) The respondent Court (Intermediate Appellate Court)
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused, the herein petitioner of the crime charged in the information when the
prosecution failed to prove any crime against the accused, the herein
petitioner.” (p. 11, Rollo).

The following constitute the facts of the case from the viewpoint
of the accused:

“The accused Bartolome G. Alonzo, was appointed as Clerk-typist in the Fire Department
of Olongapo City, designated as Personnel Officer in
charge of Finance. Some of his duties was (sic) to
prepare payrolls, vouchers and others which are relevant to his position.
Sometime on October, 1974, the accused prepared the voucher for the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the month of
October, 1974, who was employed as Firefighter in the Olongapo
City Fire Department. After preparing said voucher, the accused placed the same
on his table in the outgoing box as a usual practice in his office. It is the
duty of the messenger-clerk Rogelio Pangilinan to see
to it that all the vouchers prepared by the accused Bartolome
G. Alonzo and placed in the outgoing box will be signed by those concerned and
to follow it up until the vouchers will be paid.

“In the afternoon of October 30, 1974, Rogelio Pangilinan informed the accused that he has already
converted the voucher into cash and handed to the accused Bartolome
G. Alonzo the amount of P166.67 appearing in the voucher of Wilfredo
Cadua informing him (Alonzo) that he was in a hurry.
Some of his (Alonzo) officemates including the Administrative Officer was (sic)
present when Rogelio Pangilinan handed to him the
P166.67 and because Wilfredo Cadua
was not around at the time, he looked for him in the office and when he saw Cadua, he handed to him the full amount appearing in the
voucher in the amount of P166.67. The accused informed Wilfredo
Cadua that he is badly in need for money for his X-ray
and asked a loan of P66.00 from Cadua which the
latter consented. No receipt was signed for the loan since they worked in the
office ‘through trust and confidence’.

“The following morning, Cadua and
the accused had a confrontation in the presence of the Fire Chief. The Fire
Chief inquired from Alonzo why Cadua received less
than what he expected to receive and after the accused explained the
circumstances about the loan, the Fire Chief advised the accused to return the
amount loaned (t.s.n., pp. 2-12, hearing of December
7, 1977; Decision, Crim. Case No. 2526, p. 35
hereof).

“A week after or on November
10, 1974, the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo
returned the amount of P66.00 which he loaned from Wilfredo
Cadua in the presence of their Fire Chief but the accused
did not ask Cadua to issue receipt for the return of
his loan since it was in the presence of their Fire Chief. (t.s.n.,
p. 114, id.)

“Sometime on March 1975, or four months after payment of the
loan of P66.00, Wilfredo Cadua
filed a criminal complaint against Bartolome G.
Alonzo as a consequence of the loan of P66.00 but which was already paid on
November 10, 1974. And as a result, an Information for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents was
filed against the accused, and the lower court convicted the accused of the
crime charged in the information.

“In short, these were in synthesis, the basic facts of this
unfortunate case of the herein accused Bartolome G.
Alonzo which were clearly and conclusively established during the brief trial
of this criminal case. And this Honorable Court shall have that opportunity now
to fathom the noble dignity of our proofs tested in this regard for we are
confident that there is no room to hold the memory of ‘Wrong Judgment’ in the
hall of this Honorable Court, presided by jurists whose appointments were a
real credit to the Philippine Judiciary.” (Appellant’s
brief in the Court of Appeals, pp. 4-8; Rollo, pp.
31-33).

On the other hand, the prosecution’s version is as follows:

“Appellant was a clerk-typist in the Olongapo
Fire Department. He was designated as its finance officer. Among his duties was
the preparation of Vouchers and payrolls. Complainant Wilfredo
Cadua was employed as a fireman from March 1, 1973 to
July 31, 1975 with a monthly salary of P250.00.

“Sometime in October 1974, appellant prepared a voucher (Exh. A) for the salary of
complainant for that month. He gave it to the office messenger, Rogelio Pangilinan, for the signature of those whose approval of
the voucher is required. When Pangilinan first
received the voucher from appellant, Certification No. 1 bore a signature (Exh. A-6), purportedly that of
complainant. Certification No. 2 also was already signed by the Fire
Department Chief and was correspondingly initialed by complainant. After taking
the voucher to the city treasurer and city auditor for their signatures, Pangilinan returned the voucher to appellant. A few minutes
later, appellant called for Pangilinan, gave him back
the voucher and told him to get the money at the treasurer’s office. This time, a signature (Exh. A-8)
purportedly that of complainant appeared on the receipt of payment portion of
the voucher.

“On October 30, 1974, Pangilinan
presented the voucher to the treasurer’s office. The paymaster, Aida
Clark-Pineda, upon noting the signatures of the auditor and the complainant,
gave the proceeds of P166.67 to Pangilinan, whom she
knew to be a messenger in the fire department. Pangilinan
signed the voucher as a witness. Pangilinan returned
to the fire department and gave the amount to appellant.

“At about 4:45 p.m., that same day, appellant gave complainant
only P100.00. Complainant inquired about his
voucher and appellant showed him a voucher which amounted only to P100.00.
Wondering how appellant was able to cash his voucher without his signing it, complainant immediately went to the treasurer’s office.
He discovered that his signature had been forged on the voucher and that the
amount he was entitled to receive was P166.67, not P100.00.He then realized
that the voucher showed him by appellant was different.

“Complainant then demanded the return of the balance. Since
appellant refused, complainant reported the matter to the fire department chief
who formed a fact-finding committee to look into the case. However, the
committee failed to render any report. Appellant paid back the amount he
withheld from complainant three weeks later. He had used the money to pay for
his x-ray.

“On August 4, 1975,
complainant submitted an Affidavit (Exh. D) as basis for his charge of estafa through
falsification of a public document against appellant. After preliminary
investigation was conducted, a prima
facie case was established, and so
an information was filed on February 20, 1976 charging appellant of the
aforementioned offense (tsn., pp. 4-28, October 11,
1976; pp. 2-12, November 9, 1977; p. 13, December 7, 1977; pp. 12-13, May 17,
1978)” (Emphasis supplied; pp. 26-28, Rollo).

The question is whether or not the petitioner misappropriated
P66.67 by forging another person’s signature on the salary voucher.

The information alleges that accused Bartolome
G. Alonzo – (1) with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously prepare or cause the preparation of an official
voucher pertaining to the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for a total of P166.67; (2) that he wrote, imitated,
forged, falsified the signature, and signed for Wilfredo
Cadua without the latter’s knowledge, permission and
consent; (3) that he presented the said voucher for payment and received the
amount of P166.67; (4) once in possession of the said amount (P166.67), that he
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
said amount; and (5) that, despite repeated demands, the accused refused and
continued to refuse to remit the above-mentioned amount.

On the other hand, the prosecution evidence tends to show that –
(1) the accused was designated as finance officer of the Olongapo
City Fire Department and among his duties was the preparation of vouchers and
payrolls; (2) on a date not specified in the records, the accused gave their
office messenger, Rogelio Pangilinan, a voucher for
the salary of Wilfredo Cadua
for the month of October, 1974 so that the messenger could have it signed by
all those having a hand in the approval of vouchers; (3) after the voucher was
approved, Pangilinan returned the voucher to the
accused who instructed him to encash the voucher; (4)
Paymaster Aida Pineda of Olongapo City paid the
proceeds of the voucher to Pangilinan who presented
the voucher for payment after she required Pangilinan
to sign as witness to the payment; (6) Aida Pineda gave Pangilinan
the full amount of P166.67; (7) after he received the proceeds of the voucher
from the paymaster, Pangilinan gave the entire amount
of P166.67 to the accused in the presence of his co-employees in the afternoon
of October 30, 1974 (Decision of the trial court, pp. 30-32, appellant’s
brief).

From the above, it can be seen that the petitioner could not
possibly be guilty of wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously preparing the complainant’s voucher, considering that it was his
official duty to do so. He prepared the voucher of Wilfredo
Cadua in the amount of P166.67 for the month of
October. There was no alteration made in the amount stated in the voucher
because the stated amount is the correct salary of the complainant for that
period. It was not the petitioner who presented the voucher for payment but
their office messenger, Pangilinan. The appellant did
not misappropriate the full amount of P166.67 nor did he refuse or continue to
refuse to remit the amount. In fact, he handed to Wilfredo
Cadua the amount of P100.00 on that same day while,
at the same time informing Cadua that he was
borrowing the amount of P66.67 for his x-ray expense. On November 10, 1974, the appellant paid the
complaining witness the amount of P66.67 upon the advise
of the chief of the Olongapo City Fire Department.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution is, therefore, entirely
different from what the information alleges.

In the instant case, there is no direct evidence showing that Bartolome G. Alonzo himself forged Cadua’s
signature on the original voucher. Nobody actually saw him affix the alleged
signature (See Ranon v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
495; and Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA 105). Even
Rogelio Pangilinan, who was responsible for routing
the voucher to all those who had a hand in approving the same could not
categorically state that he saw the accused forged complainant’s signature. We
quote Pangilinan’s testimony:

“Q        When
he gave this voucher, was Exhibit A-6 already present?

“A         Yes, sir.

“Q        How
about Exhibit A-8? (Fiscal referring to the signature of Wilfredo Cadua)?

“A         None yet sir, because this voucher
cannot be released if that is already signed. (t.s.n., page 4, hearing of Nov. 9, 1977).

“Q        When he gave it back to you, was the
receipt portion already signed, referring to Exhibit A-B, was this already
signed?

“A         Yes, sir.

“Q        Do you know who signed this particular
portion?

“A         No, sir. (t.s.n., page 5 id).

“Q        How
about A-8,  when
it was affixed, were you present?

“A         No, sir. (t.s.n., p. 8, id). (p. 40, Rollo).

More important, from the facts of the case as stated in the
People’s brief below, the forgery is supposed to be on a voucher showing the
amount of P100.00. It was this voucher which was allegedly shown to the
complainant. This second voucher had nothing to do with the original voucher
used to collect the salary. If there was such a second voucher, it was a
non-official voucher used to lull the complainant into believing his salary was
only P100.00. However, this story of a supposed forged document does not
explain how the complainant could have been hoodwinked because the original
voucher for P166.67 carried his correct salary.

The fact that the petitioner prepared the voucher, considering it
was his official duty to prepare the payroll, vouchers, and other documents
assigned to him is not a sufficient reason for the respondent court to conclude
that “there is no doubt that the forgery or falsification was effected by
the appellant”. Unfortunately, the respondent court mistakenly applied the
rule that: “one found in possession of and who used a forged document is
the forger or the one who caused the forgery and, therefore, is guilty of falsification
(See Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 688). The
accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence especially
where the evidence on the alleged forged voucher is extremely doubtful. As held
in the case of People v. Clores,
(125 SCRA 67):

XXX     XXX     XXX

“x x x Every circumstance against guilt, and in favor of innocence
must be considered. Suspicion no matter how strong should not sway judgment,
for well-established is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength
of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that appellants need
not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the presumption of
innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his innocence
is not only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced
to overcome the proof which the law has created — that is, his innocence; ‘that
conscience must be satisfied that defendant has been proven guilty of the
offense charged. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral
certainty, ‘a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience
of those who are to act upon it’ may the presumption of innocence be overcome.’
(People v. Inguito, 117 SCRA 641, 649).” (at p. 75).

Furthermore, Cadua’s intention in
filing a complaint against the petitioner was to get even against the chief of
their Fire Department.

The records disclose that at around 7 o’clock in the evening of
October 30, 1974, Wilfredo Cadua
approached the Fire Chief and complained that he received less than what
appeared in the voucher. He actually never complained why his signature was
falsified nor did he complain that the accused falsified his signature. Much
less was any mention made about another voucher with only P100.00
entered as the amount. The next morning, Cadua and the accused had a confrontation in the presence
of the Fire Chief. After explaining the circumstances of the loan, the Fire
Chief advised the accused to return the amount loaned. On November 10, 1974,
the accused returned the amount to Cadua in the
present of the Fire Chief. It was only four months after this incident that Wilfredo Cadua filed a complaint
against the accused. The reason why he filed the case is clearly manifested in
his cross-examination which we quote hereunder:

“ATTY. DANTE:

“Q        When
you filed this case in the Fiscal’s Office was the
P66.67 already paid?

“A         Yes, sir.

“Q        Why did you still file if you were
already paid?

“A         Because I wanted to file a case
against him.

“Q        Or you want to file a case because you were
dismissed and the accused is related to Chief Magbutay?

“A         Yes. (t.s.n., p. 39, testimony of Wilfredo
Cadua, hearing of October 11, 1976). Italics supplied.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 16).

With the above admission it is clear that the filing of the complaint
was merely an afterthought arising from the non-renewal of the
complainant’s appointment by the Fire Chief who is related to the accused. When
the accused informed the complainant that he had nothing to do with the
non-renewal of the latter’s appointment, the complainant executed an affidavit
of desistance. It is true that an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is
not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to the
liability of the accused (Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620).
In this particular case, it corroborates the appellant’s explanation about the
filing of the criminal charges.

Considering all the foregoing, we are constrained to rule that
the evidence on record cannot sustain a verdict of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., no
part, was
ponente of decision under review.