LOURDES SORIANO, DOROTEA TAMACA, ASUNCION VERA, MARCIANA DE LOS REYES, EVELYN DACALLAS, YOLANDA VILLANUEVA, ANTONIO DABE, ZORAIDA DELANTAR, ANITA DANA, AND ANACURITA NAVARRO, PE…

The petitioners impugn for grave abuse of discretion the deletion
by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of the award of financial
assistance granted by the Labor Arbiter to them.

The antecedent facts, as found by the respondent NLRC, are as
follows:

* * *

Complainants Lourdes Soriano, Dorotea Tamaca, Asuncion Vera, Marciana de los Reyes, Evelyn Dacallos, Yolanda Villanueva, Antonio Dabe,
Zoraida Delantar, Anita
Dana and Anacurita Navarro filed this complaint for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and moral damages against the
respondent Shellwood Industries Phils.,
the employer of the complainants, Ramon
Panique, the president and owner of the company, and Concepcion Nuguid, former
president of the union, Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa
sa Shellwood Industries.

It appears that on February 5, 1981, the union, Samahan
ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Shellwood
Industries and the company entered into a compromise agreement wherein the
company agreed to give financial assistance amounting to P20,000.00 in
consideration for the union’s withdrawal of Case No. NCR-FSD-J­5-662-79.  As the union members became curious,
respondent Concepcion Nuguid
was asked to explain in a general meeting held on April 4, 1982 as to what
happened to the P20,000.00.  Instead of
making an explanation, Concepcion Nuguid
tendered her written resignation, the acceptance of which was made on April 5,
1982.  After Nuguid’s
resignation, the union became dormant for more than three (3) months.  The remaining officers then convened a
meeting on July 13, 1982, wherein three resolutions were passed and approved,
namely: 1) affiliating the union to a federation, the National Federation of
Labor; 2) giving the federation the authority to represent the union on all
matters concerning labor relation problems; and 3) creating a steering
committee to serve and act as union board of officers.  On August 5, 1982, the National Federation of
Labor informed the respondent company on the new union structure and the
affiliation of the local union with the federation.

On July 29, 1982, in a general union meeting conducted by Concepcion Nuguid, a resolution
was approved expelling the complainants from the union and asked (sic) the
company to terminate their services in accordance with the provision of the
collective bargaining agreement entered into between the union and the company.  On August 16, 1982, the ten (10) complainants
were dismissed from the service as per request of the union headed by Concepcion Nuguid.

* * *

[Rollo,
pp.29-30.]

On October 28, 1983, Labor Arbiter Pelagio
A. Carpio issued a decision in this case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, respondent Shellwood Industries Philippines, Incorporated should be,
as it is hereby, directed to reinstate complainants to their former positions
as regular workers/employees without Backwages within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision and under the same terms and conditions of employment and without loss
of seniority rights and privileges existing before their dismissal.

However, since complainants are not at fault, respondent Shellwood Industries, Incorporated should be as it is
hereby directed to extend financial assistance to the said complainants in an
amount equivalent to six (6) months of their respective salaries.

The complaint for unfair labor practice and moral damages is both
dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 27.]

On appeal to the NLRC, the aforesaid judgment was affirmed but
the award of financial assistance was deleted for having neither legal nor
factual basis (Rollo, p. 32.] Hence, the instant
petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
deleting the award of financial assistance.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the instant special
civil action limits the charge of grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC’s act of setting aside the grant of financial
assistance to petitioners.  Petitioners
do not assail the order for their reinstatement without backwages.  Hence, there is no need for the Court to
dwell on the order for their reinstatement without any backwages
which was sustained by the respondent NLRC. 
Consequently, the sole issue raised in this case is whether the
respondent Commissioners of the NLRC gravely abused their discretion in
deleting the award of financial assistance to the petitioners.

Petitioners stance is that the company had full knowledge of the
fact of resignation of respondent Nuguid and
therefore, of her lack of authority to act for and in behalf of the union.  Hence, when it dismissed the petitioners
pursuant to Nuguid’s request, it had participated in
their illegal dismissal through its negligence (Rollo,
p. 8.] Petitioners argue that the company is accordingly liable for financial
assistance to compensate the sufferings and damage sustained by them.

On the other hand, the public respondents justify their deletion
of the award of financial assistance on two grounds: 1) that the award has no
legal basis since there is no law which orders a grant of financial assistance
and furthermore, the order of the Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement of the
petitioners is inconsistent with an award of financial assistance; and 2) that
the award has no factual basis since the company acted in good faith in
acceding to the request of the union president for the termination of the
services of the petitioners.  Public
respondents claim that the company was compelled to dismiss the petitioners
upon request of the union president pursuant to the clear terms of the CBA
which is considered the law between the contracting parties.  According to the NLRC, the company was in no
position to question the statue of Nuguid as Union
president as the matter pertains exclusively to the Union and its members
[Memorandum for the Public Respondent, pp. 6-9; Rollo,
pp. 153-156.]

It should be stressed that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
were of the opinion that the company did not act in bad faith in terminating
the petitioners.  Thus, in directing the
reinstatement of petitioners without backwages but
ordering the company to extend financial assistance, the Labor Arbiter
explained:

* * *

The record shows that Concepcion Nuguid unconditionally resigned on April 4, 1982 (Annex
“A” to complainants’ position papers), which resignation was formally
and unconditionally accepted thru a board resolution on April 5, 1982 (Annex
“B”).  The National President
of the National Federation of Labor to
which the local union, Samahan ng
Malayang Manggagawa sa Shellwood Industries, is
affiliated wrote a letter to Concepcion Nuguid calling her attention to a letter dated July 30,
1982 addressed to the members of the local union and which she circulated,
purporting to expel from the union 12 ranking officers and members.  He informed her that she has been divested of
all authority to act as president of the local union so that she no longer has
authority to expel any union member.  The
present leadership of the local union is being exercised by a steering
committee, a collective body, the primary duty of which is to continue the work
which should have been exercised by competent union officers.  This committee was created by general
membership meeting.  It is crystal clear
from the foregoing that the dismissal of complainants has been requested by one
who no longer had the authority to do the same. 
However, respondent corporation may motu
proprio dismiss complainants if there is a
legal cause.

In this case, the respondent firm was influnced
(sic) by a former union president who misrepresented herself as still the union
president.  The respondent company,
therefore, cannot be deemed to have acted
in bad faith. 
However, the complainants, from the
foregoing facts, are entitled reinstatement because they were blamed for having
resigned from or were expelled by their union which is not true.  Since the respondent corporation
not in bad faith in dismissing them,
it should not shoulder the payment
the backwages of complainants and moral damages, but
should extend financial assistance to the
ten (10) complainants above–mentioned in
an amount equivalent to six months
of their respective salaries. [Rollo,
pp. 25-26; Underscoring supplied.]

The NLRC, on the other hand, was even more categorical in
declaring that the company acted in good faith in complying with the request of
the union president:

Under the collective bargaining agreement, any employee who resigns
from the union or is expelled therefrom in accordance
with the constitution and by-laws for non-payment
of union dues or for disloyalty to the union, shall be suspended and/or
dismissed by the company upon written request of the union and upon consent of
the company.

Under the circumstances mentioned above, we are inclined to believe
that the respondent, Shellwood Industries Phils., Inc. has acted in good faith
in terminating the services of the complainants.  Because of the union security provision of the collective bargaining agreement, said
respondent duty bound to dismiss them. 
Although the company had earlier received a letter from the National
Federation of Labor, informing about the affiliation of the local union with
that federation, there is also on record a petition signed by a majority of the workers in the company, rejecting
the resignation of Concepcion Nuguid
as president and giving her the authority to solve the workers’ problems in
the company (Exhibit “2-Cn”.) It is significant to note that neither the steering committee nor the
federation opposed the request of Concepcion Nuguid to terminate the services of the complainants.  On the basis of this lack of opposition,
respondent Shellwood Industries Phils.,
Inc. has reason to assume and/or to believe that Concepcion
Nuguid still represented the union or has the
authority to act for the union.  We
consider this as (sic) act of good
faith on the part of respondents, hence,
the award of financial assistance to the
complainants equivalent to six months salaries
has no basis, factual or legal and
is hereby deleted [Rollo, pp.
31- 32; Underscoring supplied.]

The labor officials’ findings on this factual matter are
conclusive upon the Court under the well-settled doctrine that factual findings
of quasi-judicial agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality if
supported by substantial evidence [Packaging Products Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 50383, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 210;
Edi-Staff Builders International, Inc. v. Leogardo,
Jr., G.R. No. 71907, July 30, 1987; Almoite v.
Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., G.R. No. 73680, July 10, 1986, 142
SCRA 623.]

In view of the aforestated finding of
good faith on the part of the company, the Court holds that there is no factual
or legal basis for an order against the company to grant either backwages or financial assistance in the form of separation
pay to petitioners.  This is because
under settled law and jurisprudence, the company is not considered guilty of
unfair labor practice if it merely complied in good faith with the request of
the certified union for the dismissal of employees expelled from the union
pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA)*
[Seno v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-20565, November 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1124.] To order Shellwood Industries Philippines, Inc.  to grant financial assistance to petitioners
would in effect be penalizing the company for its lawful compliance with the
CBA provisions.

In the light of the foregoing, the NLRC’s
decision can hardly be considered tainted by the arbitrariness or unfairness
that is the essence of grave abuse of discretion.

 . . . “(G]rave abuse of
discretion” means such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is
equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac,
67 Phil. 480; Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture, G.R.
No. L-13456, January 30, 1960, 106 Phil. 1046.) An error of judgment committed
by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as
“grave abuse of discretion”. 
As a matter of fact even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by
itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.  For that purpose, the abuse of discretion must
be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically . . . (Tavera Luna Inc.
v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340; Alafriz
v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278.) (Palma v. Q. & S., Inc.,
et al., G.R. No. L-20366, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 97.]

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of public respondents in deleting the award of financial assistance, the
petition must perforce fail.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant special civil action
for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

*
Section 2 of the CBA between Shellwood Industries
Phil. and Samahan Ng Malayang
Manggagawa sa Shellwood Industries provides that “any employee who
resigns from the Union or is expelled therefrom in
accordance with its constitution and by-laws for non-payment of union dues or
for disloyalty to the Union, shall be suspended and/or dismissed by the company
upon written request of the Union and upon consent of the Company”
(Original Records, p. 32.]