GEORGE MCKEE AND ARACELI KOH MCKEE, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG AND ROSALINDA MANALO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April
1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing
the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners’ complaints in
Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled “Carmen Dayrit Koh,
Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs.
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda
Manalo”, and “George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and
Rosalinda Manalo”, respectively, and granted the private respondents’
counterclaim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident
which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh
McKee.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her
co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively,
of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are
the owners of the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Between nine and ten o’clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in
Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San
Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International
cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines ‘76 owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate
No. S2-850 Pampanga ‘76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and
Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the
mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the
baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc
who was at the front passenger’s seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2)
sons were seated at the car’s back seat.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was
loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was
traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound
for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about ten (10)
meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure
of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved
to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to
his lane. Before he could do so, his
car collided with the truck. The
collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on
the said bridge.

The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City; consequently,
a team of police officers was forthwith
dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch^[1]
prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be
sixty (60) “footsteps” long and fourteen (14) “footsteps”
wide — seven (7) “footsteps” from the center line to the inner edge
of the sidewalk on both sides.^[2]
Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders
and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.

The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right
rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2) “footsteps” from the edge
of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center
line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front
bumper. The truck was about sixteen
(16) “footsteps” away from the northern end of the bridge while the
car was about thirty-six (36) “footsteps” from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire
of the truck measured nine (9) “footsteps”,
while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5)
“footsteps”. The two (2) rear
tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.

In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately
after the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles
(48 kilometers) per hour.

As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No.
4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First
Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said
court, respectively. In the first,
herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00
as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial
expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus
attorney’s fees.^[3]
In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the
following: (a) in connection with the
death of Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for
funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as
miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with
the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings,
P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the
complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the
serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center,
P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the
Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney’s fees
amounting to 25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with
costs.^[4]

On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the
crime of “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property” was filed with the trial
court. It was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil
Case No. 4478 was assigned.^[5]

In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private
respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which “invaded and
bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang” and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P20,000.00
as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00
as business losses.^[6]
In Civil Case No. 4478, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to
implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed
a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch
III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs.^[7] Both
motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio
Capulong. Thereupon, private
respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim^[8]
wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person “at fault having approached
the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, x x x which was on the right lane
going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and
regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;” in their
counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be determined by the court
after due hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00
as expenses of litigation.

Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both
cases.

To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses
taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private respondents
opposed and which the court denied.^[9]
Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the motion for
consolidation,^[10]
which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed
that Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III
of the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.

Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No.
3751.

In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli
Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio
Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh,^[11] and
offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben
Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit.^[12]

In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs.
Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert
Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina
Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and
offered several documentary exhibits.^[13] Upon
the other hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano
Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits.^[14]

On 1 October 1980,
Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the
aforesaid criminal case. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the information and after applying the provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code and indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said accused
Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and
indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for
her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00
representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount
of P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to indemnify and pay the heirs
of the deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and
to pay the costs.”^[15]

The aforecited decision was promulgated
only on 17 November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with
Branch III of the court — where the two (2) civil cases were pending — a
manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision.^[16]

Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two
(2) civil cases on 12 November
1980 and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.^[17]
The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding the
preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the
plaintiffs. The defendants had proven
their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney’s fee of
P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissed for lack
of proof to that effect (sic).”^[18]

A copy of the decision was sent by
registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2
December 1980.^[19]

Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court’s Third
Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision
to the appellate court. The appeals
were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively,
and were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.

On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision^[20]
in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang.^[21]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay
Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang
kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang
pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol. “

A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November 1982.^[22]
A petition for its review^[23] was
filed with this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied
with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983.^[24]

On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in
A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041,^[25] the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is
rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as
follows:

For the death of Jose Koh:

P50,000.00 as moral damages

P12,000.00
as death indemnity

P16,000.00 for the
lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)

P4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)

P950.00
for the casket (Exh. M)

P375.00
for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)

For the death of Kim Koh McKee:

P50,000.00 as moral damages

P12,000.00 as death
indemnity

P1,000.00 for the
purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)

P950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)

P375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)

For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:

P25,000.00 as moral damages

P672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)

P4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D­-1 and D-2)

P1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)

For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:

P25,000.00 as moral damages

P1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and G-1)

P75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)

P428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)

P114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)

For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:

P10,000.00 as moral
damages

P1,231.10 to St.
Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)

P321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)

In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil
Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No.
4478.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”^[26]

The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court’s
findings that it was Ruben Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate
court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did
not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.^[27]
This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the following findings of
fact:

“In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial
positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth
assigned error as follows:

‘IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK
STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE
TO THE RIGHT.’

Supportive of plaintiffs’ version, principal witness Araceli Koh
McKee testified thus:

‘Q. What happened after that, as you
approached the bridge?

A. When we were approaching the bridge,
two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the highway
going to San Fernando. My father, who
is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were
crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2)
boys. We noticed the truck, he switched
on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right
of way to come back to our right lane.

Q. Did the truck slow down?

A. No, sir, it did not, just (sic)
continued on its way.

Q. What happened after that?

A.  After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried
to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped
on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir.’ (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit ‘O’ in these Civil Cases).

x x x

Q:
Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben
Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of collision (sic) as
you narrated in this Exhibit ‘1’, how did you know (sic)?

A. ‘It just kept on coming, sir. If only
he reduced his speed, we could
have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir.’ (tsn.
pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit ‘O’ in these Civil Cases)’ (pp. 30­-31,
Appellants’ Brief).

Plaintiffs’ version was successfully corroborated to Our
satisfaction by the following facts and circumstances:

1. An impartial
eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped
only when it had already collided with the car:

x x x

Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the
criminal case:

x x x

Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness
because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the
injured passengers to the hospital.

We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants’ witnesses, Zenaiada
Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived
across the street.

Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course
of events people usually take the side of the person with whom they are
associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule, they do not
wish to be identified with the person who was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several
persons within the same group
(People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).

With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is
an accommodation witness. He did not go
to the succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the mishap, but
his phone had no dial tone. Be this
(sic) as it may, the trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in
refusing to believe Dayrit.

2. Exhibit 2, the
statement of Galang, does not include the claim that Galang stopped his truck
at a safe distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants’
Brief). This contention of appellants
was completely passed sub-silencio
or was not refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record. According to the Table of Contents submitted
by the court below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by
defendants-appellees. In this light, it
is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang’s claim that he stopped was an
eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and
damages.

3. Galang divulged
that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters away:

‘ATTY. SOTTO:

Q. Do I understand from your testimony
that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road is straight and you
may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first
saw that car only about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time?

x x x

A.    I
noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.

ATTY. SOTTO:

Q. So, for clarification, you clarify
and state under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it before that ten
(10) meters? (Tsn, 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979).’ (p. 16, Appellants’ Brief)’

Galang’s testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco’s statement that
Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as
revealed in Galang’s affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants’ Brief), it is
well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.

5. Galang’s truck
stopped because of the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper
lane. The police investigator, Pfc.
Fernando L. Nunag, stated that he found skid marks under the truck but there
were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3,
1978). The presence of skid marks show
(sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the truck and none were found at
the rear of the truck, the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under
the truck were caused by the truck’s front wheels when the trucks (sic)
suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the
same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the
car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and
in his futile endeavor to avoid the collision
he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just the
same.

For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection of their
driver or in the supervision
over him. Appellees did not allege such
defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees in their answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they
did in fact have methods of selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang
was the proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang’s attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car
earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic)
10 meters. He proceeded to cross
the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision was already inevitable, because
at the time that he entered the bridge his attention was not riveted to the
road in front of him.

On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply
proven, but the items must be reduced.”^[28]

A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of
the facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which
the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984^[29],
reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court’s judgment
of 12 November 1980. A motion to
reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984.^[30]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners allege that respondent Court:

“I

x x x COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE ‘PRESUMPTION,’
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER’S ADMISSIONS AND
CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT’S
RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON
SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.

II

x x x GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, ‘IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT
THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK
INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.’

III

x x x PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MADE A
MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: ‘IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY
MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.’

IV

x x x COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO
THESE CASES.

V

x x x COMMITTED A
PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN
THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.

VI

x x x EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS
NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

VII

x x x EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION
AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.”^[31]

In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private
respondents to Comment on the petition.^[32]
After the said Comment^[33] was
filed, petitioners submitted a Reply^[34]
thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required
petitioners to file their Brief,^[35]
which they accordingly complied with.

There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the arguments and
counter-arguments, some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these
cases are in order.

Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of
civil liability arising from a quasi-delict
under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
were filed ahead of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477
for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the
parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to
consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and
understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law or ruling of this
Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil action,
authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such
as the civil cases in this case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal
case. Indeed, such consolidation could
have been farthest from their minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides
that the “civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.” Be that
as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and
abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the
trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense to the parties
litigants,^[36]
would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming,
if not ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their
respective orientation, perception
and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter
rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs.
Court of Appeals,^[37] this Court held that the present
provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of
an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized
under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action
subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in
that criminal case.

Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case
No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final
by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt to set
aside the respondent Court’s affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no
relevance or importance to this case.

As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia,^[38]
the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. And, as more concretely stated in
the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of
independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal
case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the
civil action.”^[39] In Salta
vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima,^[40] this
Court stated:

“x x x It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the
civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed
separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the
result of the criminal case.

Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal
case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during the
pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the court’s
disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil
case. This must be so because the
offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses
not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action
because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or
basis of action x x x.”

What remains to be the most important consideration
as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this
appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the
petitioners’ cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in
which case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the
criminal case against Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases for
the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.^[41]

And now to the
merits of the petition.

It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is whether
or not respondent Court’s findings in its challenged resolution are supported
by evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.

The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier
of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding
on this Court.^[42]

The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and
the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by
the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts
which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its
judgment.^[43]
The same is true where the appellate court’s conclusions are grounded entirely
on conjectures, speculations and surmises^[44] or
where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of
facts.^[45]

It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case
qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged
resolution are not supported by the evidence, are based on a misapprehension of
facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent Court’s decision of 29
November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact.

In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the
fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of
the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On
the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision. This
is an unwarranted deduction as
the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into
the truck’s lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two
(2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the
car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:

“Q. What happened after that, as
you approached the bridge?

A.
When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane
on the right side of the highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the
car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the
headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to
come back to our right lane.

Q. Did the truck slow down?

A.  No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.

Q. What happened after that?

A.
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane
since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what
(sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir.”^[46]

Her credibility and testimony remained
intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh’s entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to
avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death or injury to
the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly
be classified as negligent.

Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,^[47] thus:

“x x x Negligence
is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it,
‘(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’ (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3,
265)

In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy
years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in
the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. x x x”

In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,^[48]
We held:

“x x x ‘Negligence
is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of
care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care
under the circumstances. (citing Ahern
v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894)’.”

On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence
and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could
be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable
and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril
would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move
to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.”^[49]

Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the
lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty
of negligence.

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is
negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision. Proximate cause has been
defined as:

“x x x ‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.”^[50]

Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the
act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act
of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the
truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which
was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck
driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes more apparent in view of the
fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This
would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of
3.661 meters to spare.^[51]
Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially
accommodated the truck. Any reasonable
man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car
instead of meeting it head-on.

The truck driver’s negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running
at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge^[52]
is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent
if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private
respondents’ claim that there was an error in the translation by the
investigating officer of the truck driver’s response in Pampango as to whether
the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been
regularly performed;^[53]
unless there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents’
claim is based on mere conjecture.

The truck driver’s negligence was likewise duly established
through the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was
duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness
to the mishap.

Araceli Koh Mckee testified further, thus:

x x x

“Q. Mrs. how did you know that the
truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed
before the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit ‘1’, how
did you know?

A.
It just kept on coming, sir. If
only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on
side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit ‘O’
in these Civil Cases) (pp.
30-31, Appellants’ Brief)”^[54]

while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:

“Q. When you saw the truck, how was
it moving?

A. It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.

Q. Immediately after you saw this
truck, do you know what happened?

A. I saw the truck and a car collided
(sic) sir, and I went to the place to help the victims.’ (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)

x x x.

Q. From the time you saw the truck to
the time of the impact, will you
tell us if the said truck ever stopped?

A. I saw it stopped
(sic) when it has
(sic) already collided with the car
and it was already motionless.’ (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979;
Underlining supplied). (p. 27, Appellants’ Brief).”^[55]

Clearly, therefore, it
was the truck driver’s
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision
which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.

Even if Jose Koh
was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application
here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who
had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof.^[56]

In Bustamante
vs. Court of Appeals,^[57] We held:

“The respondent court adopted the doctrine of ‘last clear
chance.’ The doctrine, stated broadly,
is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though
a person’s own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury
results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a person
who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts
and Damages, 4th Ed.,
1986, p. 165).

The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant
is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff’s peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an
accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).”

In Pantranco
North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa,^[58] We
ruled:

“The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court
in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan
Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for
all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff [Picart v Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s Lumber and
Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de
Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate
cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff
[Picart v. Smith, supra].

Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat
claim (sic) for damages.”

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as
We now rule, that it was the truck driver’s negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of
the collision. As employers of the
truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et
de jure.^[59]
Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:

“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.”

The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.^[60] The
answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not
interpose this defense. Neither did
they attempt to prove it.

The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29
November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed
Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.

In the light of recent decisions of this Court,^[61]
the indemnity for death must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity
for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, and Romero, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., no part; participated in the appealed decision.

---

^[1]
Exhibit “S”.

^[2]
In the sketch plan prepared by Geodetic Engr. Benito J. Caraan [Exhibit
“Y”], the bridge is estimated to be 42.15 meters in length and 7.5
meters in width.

^[3]
Record on Appeal, 220.

^[4]
Id., 16-18.

^[5]
Record on Appeal, 121-124.

^[6]
Id., 226-227.

^[7]
Id., 22-25; 26-28; 28-32; 34-36.

^[8]
Id., 39-43.

^[9]
Record on Appeal, 45-48; 49-52;
52-53.

^[10]
Id. 53-57.

^[11]
Id., 91, 92, 100, 101, 103, 104 and 105.

^[12]
Record on Appeal, 107, 109, 111 and 112.

^[13]
Id., 124, et seq.

^[14]
Id., 138, et. seq.

^[15]
Id., 160-161.

^[16]
Record on Appeal, 120-121.

^[17]
Id., 86-120.

^[18]
Id., 119-120.

^[19]
Id., 6.

^[20]
Per Associate Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, concurred in by Associate Justices
Crisolito Pascual and Guillermo P. Villasor.

^[21]
Annex “C” of Petition;
Rollo, 69-77.

^[22]
Annex “C-1”, Id.; Id., 78.

^[23]
G.R. No. 62713.

^[24]
Annex “D”, Petition, op. cit.; Rollo, op. cit., 79.

^[25]
Per Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, concurred in by Associate Justices
Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Marcelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado.

^[26]
Rollo, 88-89.

^[27]
Id., 88.

^[28]
Rollo, 83-88.

^[29]
Rollo, 61-65.

^[30]
Id., 67.

^[31]
Rollo, 213-214.

^[32]
Rollo, 150.

^[33]
Id., 157-175.

^[34]
Id., 185-198.

^[35]
Id., 199.

^[36]
Caños vs. Peralta, 115 SCRA 843 [1982], citing 1 C.J.S. 1342-1343.

^[37]
203 SCRA 619 [1991].

^[38]
102 Phil. 443 [1957].

^[39]
At page 447.

^[40]
117 SCRA 212, 218-219 [1982]; see also Castillo vs. Court of Appeals,
176 SCRA 591 [1989]; Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA
195 [1990].

^[41]
Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1 [1948]; Miranda vs. Malate
Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99
Phil. 670 [1956]; Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Co., Inc., 99 Phil.
729 [1956].

^[42]
FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, 192 SCRA 514 [1990]; Reñeses vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 397 [1990]; Remalante vs. Tibe,
158 SCRA 138 [1988].

^[43]
Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561 [1990].

^[44]
Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission, 190 SCRA 815 [1990]; Tupue vs.
Urgel, 161 SCRA 417 [1988]; Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167 [1974].

^[45]
Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 464 [1989]; Sese vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585 [1987].

^[46]
TSN, 22 July 1977, 5-6; Exhibit “O”, Rollo, 83.

^[47]
167 SCRA 363 [1988].

^[48]
27 SCRA 674 [1969].

^[49]
Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 [1988], citing Siegl vs.
Watson, 195 NW 867 and others.

^[50]
Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 [1957], citing 38 Am. Jur.
695-696.

^[51]
Rollo, 148.

^[52]
Section 53, Motor Vehicle Law.

^[53]
Section 2 (m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.

^[54]
Rollo, 83-84.

^[55]
Id., 84.

^[56]
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 405 [1958]; Del Prado vs.
Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. 900 [1929]; Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809
[1918].

^[57]
193 SCRA 603 [1991].

^[58]
179 SCRA 384 [1989].

^[59]
Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289 [1967], citing Bahia vs.
Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624 [1915].

^[60]
Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., supra.

^[61]
People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1989]; People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA
334 [1991]; People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs.
Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 [1991]; Dangwa Trans. Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 202 SCRA 574 [1991].