G.R. No. 67610. July 31, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANGELINA MENDOZA Y RAMOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 31, 1989 THIRD DIVISION FERNAN, C.J.:
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FERNAN, C.J.:


To a parent, the anguish of losing a child under any circumstance
is indescribable.  If death, or any other
disastrous event which a parent cannot foresee or control be the cause of such loss, the pain may
be assuaged by the thought that fate’s overpowering hand intervened.

But if such loss be brought about by anyone with the sinister
intent of taking away the child from his or her parents against the latter’s
will to derive personal gain by selling the child like a commodity in callous
disregard of the child’s well-being, it is not the parents alone but society as
a whole
that bears the anguish and the outrage caused by such evil deed.  The perpetration of this evil deserves severe
punishment.

Angelina Mendoza y Ramos alias “Rosalinda Quintos” was convicted of the crime of kidnapping a
minor as defined in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XVI.[1]
She now appeals from said conviction on a lone assignment of error, to wit:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR UNDER ARTICLE 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.[2]

The Information dated October
19, 1982 charged Angelina Mendoza y Ramos with the crime of
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about September 28, 1982, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused:  being a
private individual and without authority of law did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap and
carry away EDWARD POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old baby boy, for the
purpose of selling him and separating him from his mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T.
POLICARPIO, by then and there, befriending the said child and his parents at
the Luneta Park, this City, carrying him away without
the knowledge and consent of his
said parents, and deliberately failing to return him to said Eugenia T. Policarpio, his mother.[3]

A plea of “not guilty” having been entered by
accused-appellant on arraignment,[4]
trial ensued.

The prosecution version is summarized in the appealed decision,
thus:

“x  x
 x   At 8:00
o’clock in the morning of September 28, 1982 spouses Ernesto and Eugenia Policarpio along with their two children, Ferdinand and
Edward, seven years old and one year and three months old respectively, were at
the Luneta Park near the Rizal
Monument in Manila.  Having just arrived
from Nueva Ecija, the
family was resting at the park.  Then and
there, a woman who turned out
to be accused Angelina Mendoza, but who had introduced herself as ‘Rosalinda Quintos‘ accosted them. 
She struck a conversation with the spouses and even offered them food
particularly to Edward.  Mr. Policarpio, a Pampango,
recognized the accused.  He recalled
having seen her at a club in Angeles
City.  During their conversation, the accused gave
the spouses her address at 2526
Dallas Street, Makati,
Metro Manila.  At one point, she even
half-seriously asked the spouses to give the boy Edward to her.  They of course did not take the request
seriously.  Then while Mr. Policarpio had apparently gone somewhere away from the
group and while Mrs. Policarpio was not looking, the
accused began playing with Edward and, offering him food, lured him away from
his mother.  Shortly, the accused carried
Edward and took him away with her.

“The spouses lost no time in reporting the incident to the
police at the station in Luneta
Park.  The police officers there showed them
photographs from among which they were able to identify the accused.  Police records also disclose that the accused
had been arrested a number of
times for vagrancy and that her
occupation
appeared to be that of a
hooker.

“It developed that from the Luneta
the accused brought the child to Tramo
Street, Pasay
City where she claimed before some residents that the child was that of a hostess friend of hers
who being gravely ill of leprosy was in dire need of money, and that she was
asked to sell the child for P250.00. 
This unusual sales offer happened to take place in front of the house of
Mrs. Delia Navarette, a barangay councilwoman whose attention
was attracted by the number of people who had gathered outside her house.  The accused offered to sell the child to Mrs.
Navarette.  The
latter felt the proposition distasteful, saying that it was not right that a
child should be sold and that what accused was doing was illegal.  Nonetheless, the accused insisted on
momentarily leaving the child with Mrs. Navarette.  Intending to have the child returned to his
mother, Mrs. Navarette
asked her sister to go with the accused to the National
Orthopedic Hospital
where according to the accused the boy’s mother was confined.  But when Mrs. Navarette’s sister and the accused
were on their way to the hospital, the latter changed her story.  She said that the boy’s mother was at the
Philippine General Hospital instead.  So
they proceeded to the PGH and went up to the third floor where the accused said
the boy’s mother was.  But it turned out that all the
patients on that floor were males.  To
make the long story short, the accused had given Mrs. Navarette’s
sister the run around.  And when the latter finally got fed up she
phoned Mrs. Navarette to
report what had
happened.  Mrs. Navarette
instructed her sister to bring the accused to her as she had now decided to
report the matter to the police.  While
the accused and Mrs. Navarette’s sister were waiting
for a taxi at PGH, the former disappeared. 
Since the child had been left with her, Mrs. Navarette
felt obliged to take care of him.  She
also made it a point to report the incident to the police to alert them in case
there should be reports of a missing
child.

“Sometime later, the accused reappeared at the Luneta Police Station obstensibly
to visit a detainee thereat.  It was then
that the police officer on duty recognized her. 
She was questioned regarding the whereabouts of the boy.  Threatened with arrest, she revealed that she
had left the boy with Mrs. Navarette in Pasay City.  That led to the recovery of Edward Policarpio and his eventual return to his parents twenty
days after the accused took him away.”[5]

The defense version, on
the other hand, is capsulized in the
Brief for
the Accused-Appellant as follows:

“The defense presented the accused, ANGELINA MENDOZA, 36 years
old, single, store keeper, and
residing at 2526 Dalin, Makati, Metro-Manila, who testified
that she did not kidnap a minor named Edward and failed to return (sic) to his
parents.  After arriving from Angeles
City, she went to Luneta to eat and rest. 
She was approached by the couple
and asked if they could share in her food. 
She asked them where they come from and the couple replied that they
slept there at Luneta because
they have been
robbed.  She also gave P54.00 to the
husband who told her that he was hungry. 
Subsequently, she was told by the man to take care of the child
considering that said child is sickly and it is drizzling.  She then went to her aunt’s place in Pulang Lupa.  Finding no persons, she went to the place of a friend in Tramo
and left the child.  She told her friend
that she will come back after her operation. 
Later she found herself confined at San Lazaro
Hospital for at least two months.  While
in the hospital she was informed by a friend who visited her that she is wanted
by the police.  She escaped from the
hospital and went to Precinct 5 and two policemen arrested her.  She was informed of having kidnapped a child
but she denied (sic).  She informed Pat. Bacobo where to get the child and the latter said that she
will be charged only for vagrancy.  When the child was recovered, she was instead
jailed.  (TSN, pp. 1 to 8, August 17,
1983, TSN, pp. 2 to 4, September 7, 1983).”
[6]

Giving full credence to
the prosecution version and rejecting as incredible and unacceptable the
defense of accused-appellant that the minor child Edward was voluntarily given
to her by his parents to take care of, the trial court, as earlier stated,
convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Kidnapping of a Minor in violation
of Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. 
The dispositive portion of
the decision reads thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding that the
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of kidnapping of a minor in violation of Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code.  Accordingly, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua as well as to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.”[7]

Hence, this appeal.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
convicting her of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as
defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as it was
not proven that the custody of the minor victim Edward Policarpio
had been entrusted to her and that she deliberately failed to return or restore
said minor to his parents or guardians.[8]
She alleges that on the contrary, based on the Information, sworn statement and
testimony of the complainant-witness, Mrs. Eugenia Policarpio,
the crime committed was Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under par. 4
of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. 
She, however, argued that she cannot be convicted of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 because said crime is not included
in the crime charged (Art. 270).  She
cites Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court in support of her
contention, to wit:

“Sec. 4.  Judgment in
case of variance between allegation and proof. 
– When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of
the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged
included
in that which is proved.

“Sec. 5.  When an
offense includes or is included in another. 
– An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential element or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged
in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter.  And an offense
charged is necessarily included
in the
offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.”

She further invokes
Section 19, Article
IV[9]
of the 1973 Constitution which gives an
accused
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him as barring her conviction under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.  Accused-appellant
would likewise
insist on her innocence, arguing that it was highly improbable that she could have taken the child
without the
knowledge and consent of the father, Ernesto Policarpio, who was then taking care of the child.

After a careful review of
the evidence on record, we
are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.  It has been
established by
the clear, strong and positive evidence of the
prosecution that the taking of the minor child Edward was without the the knowledge
and consent of his parents.  Said
criminal act was perpetrated while Mrs. Policarpio
had her back turned to the child and accused-appellant and while Mr. Policarpio was temporarily away from the group.  The contention of the defense that the child
was taken with the consent of the father is unworthy of belief for the same is
inconsistent with the immediate reaction of Mr. and Mrs. Policarpio
of reporting the incident to the police as soon as they realized that Edward
was missing.  Furthermore, it is incredible
that a parent would entrust his child to a person not very well known to him
and with no visible means of livelihood. 
The seeming lack of protest from Mr. Policarpio
did not signify consent to the taking of the child but was due to the lack of opportunity to do so.  As testified to by Mrs. Policarpio:

Q     When you first noticed that you — when you
were informed by your other son that Edward was no longer there did you notice
where your husband was at that time?

A     I did not notice my husband suddenly disappeared
and afterwards I asked him where my son was.

Q     And what did he say?

A     My husband informed me that he saw the
woman took (sic) my son and that he said also that the woman rode in a jeepney going towards Mabini.  I asked him why he was not able to ran after
her, he said the woman boarded the jeepney already.[10]

Indeed, the factual findings of the trial court is that
“(T)hen while Mr. Policarpio had apparently gone
somewhere away from the group and while Mrs. Policarpio
was not looking, the accused began playing with Edward and, offering him food,
lured him away from his mother.  Shortly,
the accused carried Edward and took him away with her.”[11]

Finally, the trial court
concluded that
whatever doubt as to the culpability of the accused is dissipated by her sworn statement,
Exhibit “D”, wherein she confessed having taken Edward away from his
parents without their knowledge and consent.
[12]

We
see
no cogent reason to deviate
from the well-settled rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the
factual findings of the trial court considering that it is in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and
manner of testifying
during the trial.
[13]

Counsel for
accused-appellant laid stress on the fact that the latter cannot be convicted
of “Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor” under Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code, there being no allegations to that effect in the
information much less evidence to support the conclusion that the elements of
said crime are present.

While the Information
against accused-appellant is captioned “Kidnapping and Failure
to Return a Minor”, the
allegations in the body thereof properly constitute the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal
Detention.  Thus,
instead of alleging the elements of Kidnapping
and Failure to Return a Minor that the offender had been entrusted with the
custody of
a minor person and that
said offender had deliberately
failed to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians, the text of the Information alleged the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:

“x x x did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and illegally
kidnap and carry away
EDWARD
POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old baby boy, for the purpose of
selling him and separating him from his mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T. POLICARPIO, x x x carrying him away without
the knowledge and consent of his said parents
and deliberately failing to return him x x x“.[14] (Underscoring supplied).

It is well-settled that
the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of
the Information nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[15]
Only recently, this principle was reiterated in People v. Torres & Salas, G.R. No. 76711, September 26, 1988, wherein this Court again
held that it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the Information that determines
the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.

Based on the foregoing,
it is evident that
accused-appellant can be convicted of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention instead of “Kidnapping and Failure to Return a
Minor”, and that there is no
variance between the crime charged and the crime proven, which would fall under
Sections 4 and 5 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.  Stated differently, said provisions relied
upon by accused-appellant have no application to the case at bar.

Finally, as to the
contention of the accused-appellant that she has been deprived of her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her, we re-emphasize the doctrine that where the information clearly
sets forth the essential elements of the crime charged as in the instant case,
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and
cause of his accusation is not violated.[16]

WHEREFORE, the accused-appellant Angelina Mendoza is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.  Accused-Appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.


[1]
Presided by then Judge, now CA Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo.

[2]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 1; Rollo,
p. 23.

[3]
Original Record, p. 1.

[4]
Ibid, p. 6.

[5]
Ibid, pp. 83-85.

[6]
Brief for Accused-Appellant, pp. 5-6; Rollo, p. 23.

[7]
Record on Appeal, p. 86.

[8]
Article 270, Revised Penal Code reads: 
“Art. 270.  Kidnapping and
failure to return a minor.  — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor
person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians.” (As amended by Republic Act No. 18).

[9]
Now Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

[10]
TSN, November 24, 1982, p.
22.

[11]
Rollo, p. 6.

[12]
Record on Appeal, pp. 85-86.

[13]
People v. Avero,
G.R. No. 76483, August 30,
1988;
People v. Grefiel; 125 SCRA 102; People v. Alison,
L-30612, May 3, 1983, 122 SCRA 9; People
v.
Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94; People v. Legones, 69 SCRA
210.

[14]
Supra, footnote 3.

[15]
Matilde v. Jabson,
68 SCRA 456; People v. Cosare, 95 Phil. 656;
People v. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252; People v.
Oliveria, 67 Phil. 427.

[16]
Inocencio Tan y Concepcion v.
People, L-25460, March 13, 1968,
22 SCRA 1020.