PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN ESPERA, ALIAS OGOY, AND FRANCISCO TOLITOL, ALIAS KIKO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Samar^[1]
in Criminal Case No. C-414 (C-1438), the decretal
portion whereof reads:

“Viewed from all the foregoing, the Court therefore, declares
both accused Juan Espera and Francisco Tolitol GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and
SENTENCES Juan Espera to suffer the extreme penalty
of DEATH, the crime having been attended by the aggravating circumstance (sic) of treachery and recidivism
and evident premeditation as generic
aggravating circumstance (sic); without any mitigating circumstances to offset
the aggravating circumstances, and both accused to indemnify (sic) P6,000.00
each to the heirs of Virgilio Camacho, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 
They are credited in full (sic) their preventive imprisonment, with
costs against the accused and to pay the value of the Seiko Watch in the amount
of P550.00 and P234.00 cash robbed share and share alike.”^[2]

Both accused and three others, namely, Tito Espera,
Pepe Espera, alias Epe, and Danilo de Guia, alias Danny, were charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide in an information of the following textual content:

“That on or about the 22nd day of December 1981, at around 9:30 o’clock
in the evening in Brgy. San Agustin, municipality of Mondragon, province of Northern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, helping one another, together with Atilo
Ubaldo who is still at large, armed with deadly
weapons, with intent to gain and benefit and by means of force, violence
against and intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one Virgilio
Camacho and his family by destroying the window of the dining room through
which they gained entrance, and once inside said accused, did then and there wilfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away therefrom the following, to wit:

all belonging to spouses Virgillo Camacho and Teresita
Camacho and valued in the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR PESOS
(P784.00), Philippine Currency, against the will and consent of the owners, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforestated amount; that on the occasion of
the robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and assault one Virgilio Camacho,
with said weapon (sic) which the herein accused had conveniently provided
themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Virgilio
Camacho, Sr. various serious wounds on different parts of his body which
directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[3]

The factual findings of the trial court established that in the
afternoon of December 22, 1981 Teresita Camacho,
together with her five children, were in their house in Barangay
San Agustin, Mondragon, Northern Samar.  At about 6:00 o’clock that afternoon, some
persons whom Teresita recognized to be Pepe Espera and Danilo de Guia went to their
house, sat there for a while and left. 
Later, while she and her children were eating supper, she again saw said
two persons near the door of their house.

At about 7:30 o’clock
that evening, her husband, Virgilio Camacho, arrived,
and since he was very tired, went directly to bed.  Later that night, while the family was
asleep, Teresita was roused from her sleep when her husband stood up and went out of the
room.  Shortly thereafter, she heard a
commotion and the cry of her husband saying that he was hit.  Immediately, Teresita
stood up, got her flashlight and went out of the room.  When she beamed her flashlight, she saw
appellant Juan Espera holding a piece of wood about
thirty-six (36) inches long, Atilo Ubaldo carrying a bolo around eight (8) inches in length and called a “depang,”
and appellant Francisco Tolitol.  When the three were illumined and revealed by
the light coming from the flashlight, they ran toward the kitchen and
fled.  Thereafter, she saw her husband
leaning against the door of their store with his face towards the wall and his
mouth profusely bleeding.  She
immediately called her children to summon help from an uncle who lived nearby
but it was her brother who subsequently brought Virgilio
to the hospital.

On that same evening, Teresita
discovered that the amount of two hundred thirty-four pesos (P234.00)
representing the store’s earnings that day was no longer in the drawer of a
table near the shelves of the store and her Seiko watch worth five hundred
fifty pesos (P550.00) which was kept in the same drawer was missing.  She also found out that the three, Juan, Atilo and Francisco, were able to enter the house through
the window shutter which had been destroyed. 
Teresita immediately reported the incident to
the Chief of Police of Mondragon who made an ocular
inspection that very evening.

Four days thereafter, Virgilio died in   the hospital, the cause of his death being
severe cranio?cerebral injury secondary to
trauma.  Dr. Lydia Quilatan,
senior resident physician of the Northern
Samar General
Hospital and who performed the
post-mortem examination, testified that the victim suffered five (5)
wounds.  Testifying on the medico-legal
certificate on the wounds of the victim which are numerically referred to
herein for facility, she explained that the first wound could have been
inflicted by a hard object, such as a piece of wood:  the second wound, by a hard object or a
fistic blow; the third wound, with the use of a sharp-bladed instrument; and
the fourth and fifth wounds could likewise have been inflicted by a hard
object.  The most serious injuries,
according to her, were the first, second, fourth and fifth wounds because they
were fractures which involved the brain.^[4]

Both accused denied any participation in the commission of the
offense and interposed the defense of alibi. 
Appellant Juan Espera alleged that he was at
the house of one Mariano Gularez when the crime took
place.  Gularez
was then having a party to celebrate the birth of his son and Espera was hired to cook the “lechon”
or roast pig and to thereafter serve as kitchen helper and dishwasher.  He claimed that he did not go home that whole
evening and slept at Gularez’ house until the
following day.  This alibi was
substantially corroborated by Mariano Gularez.  The other appellant, Francisco Tolitol, also alleged that on the same evening he came home
from the field very tired and slept very early, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening. 
He was then sleeping at the house of Teresita
de Guia for whom he worked as a hired hand.  He claimed that he did not go out of
the house until the next day when he woke up
at 6:00 o’clock in the
morning.^[5]

On July 23, 1983,
the trial court rendered a partial advance decision acquitting the three
accused, Tito Espera, Pepe Espera and Danilo de Guia of the offense charged for lack of sufficient evidence
to prove their participation beyond reasonable doubt.^[6]

On October 8, 1983,
the lower court rendered its main decision, hereinbefore mentioned, finding
Juan Espera and Francisco Tolitol
guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide and imposing the
death penalty on Juan Espera and the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua on Francisco Tolitol.

In a resolution en banc, dated May 23, 1985, the
Court appointed counsel de oficio
for both accused in this automatic review of the decision of the court a
quo, noting therein that although Francisco Tolitol
did not appeal from his sentence
of reclusion perpetua, he “was
apparently of the impression that as an alleged co-conspirator of Espera, who was sentenced to death, his case is also
subject to automatic review.”^[7]

We commend said counsel de oficio
for the zealous efforts in presenting the case for the appellants and the arguments in their brief faulting the
court below with the following errors:

1.  The lower court erred in
according undue weight and credence to the testimony of witness Teresita Camacho and in finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt;

2.  The lower court erred in
finding the existence of the
crime of robbery with homicide and in finding appellants guilty thereof;

3.  The lower court erred in
finding the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation;

4.  The lower court erred in finding appellant Tolitol principally guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide; and

5.  The lower court erred in not giving weight to
the evidence of the defense.^[8]

We have scrupulously reviewed the records and calibrated the
evidence of the parties, and We find no reason to reject the testimony of
prosecution witness Teresita Camacho.  That she is the widow of the deceased victim
does not on that score alone affect her credibility.  It is an established and conceded rule that
the mere fact that the witness is a relative of a victim is not a valid or
sufficient ground to disregard the former’s testimony
nor does it render the same less worthy of credit, in the absence of any
ill-motive.^[9]
The utter failure of the appellants in this case to show any evil reason or
motive on the part of the witness that could have made her testify as she did
and to implicate them in such a serious crime as robbery with homicide makes
the testimony of Teresita Camacho all the more worthy
of full faith and credit.  There is,
thus, nothing in the record which would contradict this observation of the
court a quo:  “Witness
Teresita Camacho indeed testified serenely and with
composure which the Court observed keenly. 
Her testimony was natural and flawless. 
The court gives full credence to her testimony.”^[10]

Consequently, We cite the well-settled rule that the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are respected by the appellate
courts, the former having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless it has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case.^[11]
We are not persuaded by appellants’ arguments that their case falls under the
exception, hence the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of facts of
the lower court.

There is also no basis to doubt the positive identification of
the appellants by Teresita Camacho.  The beam of light from her flashlight was
sufficient to enable her to see and readily recognize the three intruders,
especially because they were her neighbors of relatively long standing.  In fact, one of the appellants, Francisco Tolitol, worked for the Camacho spouses as an errand boy
for some time and even slept in their house. 
There is no call either for the defense to denigrate the testimony of Teresita Camacho that she saw and recognized the weapons
held by Espera and Ubaldo,
that is, a piece of wood and a short bolo.  Physical
evidence, reflected by the medical findings, confirm that the wounds sustained
by the victim could definitely have been inflicted by the said weapons seen and
testified to by Teresita.  There being an absence of any motive on her
part to prevaricate, it would be unnatural for said witness, as the wife of the
deceased victim and who is necessarily interested in seeing retribution exacted
for the crime, to impute the same to any person other than those responsible therefor.^[12]

With respect to the charge of robbery, however, there is warrant
for an honest difference of opinion. 
While, as earlier stated, Teresita’s testimony
is deserving of credit, her declaration thereon was limited to the fact that,
after having gone to the hospital and on her return therefrom,
she discovered the loss of the money and the watch alleged in the
information.  No conclusive evidence
proving the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused themselves has been
presented by the prosecution.

It is true that, under similar facts wherein the complainant
arrived home a few hours after his family was killed by the accused and he
found the money and jewelry missing, this Court declared:  “In the absence of any other known
motive for the crime it would be, in our judgment, to reject the universal
teaching of experience to refuse to
draw the inference that the same person who killed the occupants of the house
also committed the robbery.”^[13]
In said case, however, the stolen items were recovered from a third person who
implicated the accused therein as the author of the crime and the latter
supposedly confessed, although the competence and weight of such evidence would
now be of dubious validity and value under the present rules of evidence.

At any rate, as cited by the defense, in the subsequent case of People vs. Labita, et al.,^[14]
where the wardrobe and the trunk in the house of the deceased were forcibly opened and the contents thereof were
scattered on the floor, but evidence was lacking as to when and by whom such acts were
committed and the loot not having been recovered, the Court held that the
robbery charged as the constituent element
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide has to be entirely
disregarded.  Thereafter, in People
vs. Moro Ambahang et al.,^[15]
the Court also held that the testimony of the witness that he found his personal
belongings gone when he returned to the scene of the killing, but he did not
see who stole said things, the crime of robbery cannot be imputed to the
accused since it is not based on substantial evidence but on mere presumptions.

To the same effect, as noted by Mr. Justice Padilla, is the doctrine in People vs. Pacala, et al.,^[16]
where it was held that absent conclusive evidence that robbery has actually
taken place, there can be no conviction for the composite crime of robbery with homicide, but
only for homicide which was duly proved. 
While this holding has been criticized as inaccurate.^[17]
We are persuaded to hold it as an applicable determinant for our present
purposes.  It observes fidelity to the
fundamental rule that criminal law should yield any reasonable doubt in favor
of the accused.  At least in the factual
milieu of the present case, the acceptance of the foregoing doctrines would not
constitute an exacting onus on the criminal justice system and the law
enforcement agencies by seemingly demanding that there be an eyewitness to
prove the actual apoderamiento in crimes like
robbery or theft.  For, further to what
has already been said, in the case at bar there is a paucity of evidence
showing that, other than the accused, no other person had or could have had
access to the premises where the money and the watch were allegedly kept,
either before or after the killing of the victim and until the loss was
supposedly discovered.  The possibility
that there could have been other intruders enhances the element of doubt in favor of
appellants on this score.

The defense of appellants is alibi.  It has been interminably repeated that this
defense can not prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution’s witness who has no motive to testify falsely against them.  To make alibi worthy of credit, the accused
must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at
the time of its commission.^[18]
This is not so in the case at bar.  The
places where appellants claimed to have been at the time of the incident and
the place of the crime are located within the same barrio and not far from the situs of the crime. 
In fact, as found by the trial court, appellant Tolitol
was supposed to be in the house of Jesusa de Guia which is just across the street from the Camacho
residence.

The lower court, however, erred in holding that the killing of
the victim was attended by treachery and evident premeditation.  For treachery to be appreciated, it is
necessary to prove that, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself and that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him to
ensure the accomplishment of his purpose with impunity.  The absence of evidence to show the means
employed by the assailants and the mode of attack negates the imputed
circumstance of treachery.  Treachery may
not be simply deduced from presumptions; it must be as clearly proven as the
crime itself in order to aggravate the liability of the culprit.^[19]

Neither may evident premeditation be considered against
appellants, in the absence of proof that they had a prior plan to kill the
victim, when that plan was agreed upon and the interval of time between such
agreement and its commission.  On the
other hand, the trial court also erred in not considering dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

WHEREFORE, the
judgment of the lower court is MODIFIED and both
appellants herein are sentenced
to serve an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of Virgilio Camacho in the sum of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), with costs in both instances.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., separate opinion.

^[1] Branch XX, Judge Andres S. Santos, Presiding.

^[2] Rollo, 011.

^[3] Ibid., 003-004.

^[4] Exh. A; TSN, Nov. 12, 1982, 3; Rollo,
103-104.

^[5]
Appellant’s Brief, 58-59; Rollo, 85.

^[6] Appendix A, Appellants’ Brief; Rollo, 85.

^[7] Rollo, 41.

^[8] Appellants’ Brief, i;
Rollo, 85.

^[9] People vs. Moises,
et al., 66 SCRA 151 (1975); People vs. Lopez, 132 SCRA 188 (1984);
People vs. Canada, et al., 144 SCRA 121 (1986).

^[10] Rollo, 010.

^[11] People vs. Bania,
134 SCRA 347 (1985); People vs. Baao, 142 SCRA
477 (1986); People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA
401 (1988).

^[12] People vs. Demeterio,
124 SCRA 914 (1983).

^[13] U.S. vs. Merin,
2 Phil. 88 (1903).

^[14]
99 Phil. 1068 [Unpublished] (1956).

^[15]
108 Phil. 325 (1960).

^[16]
58 SCRA 370 (1974).

^[17] Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book
Two, 1981 Ed., 606.

^[18] People vs. Urgel,
134 SCRA 483 (1985).

^[19] People vs. Soriano,
et al., 134 SCRA 542 (1985); People vs. Nabaluna,
142 SCRA 446 (1986).

Clean
Clean

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