G.R. No. 66207. May 18, 1992
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., REPRESENTED BY HIS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH LXI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT O…
FELICIANO, J.:
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint
for damages against private respondent Republic Central Colleges
(“Colleges”), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy Solomon, a
security guard, as defendants. The
complaint alleged that:
“x x x on 13 August 1982, in the morning
thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises of the defendant,
REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular
enrolled student of said school taking
his morning classes, the
defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the premises of
said school performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed
security guard under the employment,
supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill,
attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a
.38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon,
which ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused plaintiff’s death were
it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated and confined at
Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor’s opinion, the
plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three
to four months before his wounds would be completely healed.”[1]
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending
that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from
any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason
that private respondent school was not the employer of the security guard
charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of
Solomon. Private respondent school
further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not
apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts
and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the school.
In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted
private respondent school’s motion to dismiss, holding that security guard
Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the school which accordingly could not be
held liable for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, without success.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is
contended that respondent trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of
Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil Code and granted the school’s motion to
dismiss.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond
for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not
only for one’s own act or
omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law
responsible. Among the persons held
vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the
following:
“xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
xxx xxx xxx”
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the
Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B.
Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or
watchmen.[2]
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.[3]
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in
selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the
agency shall be assigned to it, the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary
course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. The
fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security
guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions. Those instructions or
directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being no employer-employee
relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot
impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard
Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or
student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the
R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the
Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code
invoked by petitioner are as follows:
“Art. 349. The
following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
x x x x
x x x
x x
(2) Teachers and
professors;
x x x x
x x x
x x
(4) Directors of trade
establishments with regard to apprentices;
x x x x
x x x
x x
Art. 350. The persons named
in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the child.
x x x x
x x x
x x
Art. 352. The relations
between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student.”
In Palisoc v.
Brillantes,[4]
invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and president of a school of
arts and trades known as the “Manila Technical Institute,” Quezon
Blvd., Manila, responsible in damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a
student of that Institute, which resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio
L. Daffon, another student of the
Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes
brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted
above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the
instant case.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made
responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person
subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed
allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil,
student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no
substitute parental authority over Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating
the petitioner’s claim as one based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent
Colleges could not be held liable upon any other basis in law, for or in
respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle respondent
school to dismissal of petitioner’s complaint in respect of itself?
The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of Appeals,[5] requires us to give a negative answer
to that question.
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of
the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who
was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or
control or supervision. At the same
time, however, the Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be
established between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one
hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties:
“When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or ‘built-in’
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts
and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.”[6]
In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:
“In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. Using the
test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school’s liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for
conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
against all risks. This is
especially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called ‘university belt’ in Manila where there have been
reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable
to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon
their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same
may still fail against an individual or
group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and place.”[7]
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school’s
motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and
this Court affirmed the trial court’s order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner’s cause of
action was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. As PSBA, however, states,
acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error
when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but
rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove
acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent
Colleges.
In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this
Court, and in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and
putting aside technical considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge
committed serious error correctible by this Court in the instant case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the
Petition, to TREAT the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29 November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo
for further proceedings consistent with this Resolution.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10.
[2]
American President Lines v. Clave, 114 SCRA 829 (1982).
[3]
Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 629 (1971).
[4]
41 SCRA 548 (1971).
[5]
G.R. No. 84698, 4 February 1992.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.