DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA AND THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court rendered on December 29, 1983 which modified the
decision dated December 8, 1976 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The controversy arose from an application
for registration of five (5) parcels of land on the basis of an alleged
possessory information title. The
application was opposed by the government on the ground that the parcels of
land are part of the inalienable land of the public domain.

The subject property is situated in Barrio Butanyog, Mulanay,
Quezon, and consists of about 7.4343 hectares alleged to have been originally
acquired by Maria Rosita Lorenzo under a possessory information title dated May
20, 1896 under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. Maria Rosita Lorenzo was married to Felipe Lizada. Maria Rosita begot two (2) sons, Laureano
and Cipriano. Cipriano died a bachelor
and without any issue. Upon the death
of the spouses, Laureano inherited the land. Laureano Lizada married Baldomera Roces and the couple had two (2)
children, Andres and Magdalena. Andres
died a bachelor and without any issue, so upon the death of Laureano, Magdalena
inherited the land. Magdalena married
Nerio Tesalona and they had three (3) daughters, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia,
applicants herein.

On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia Tesalona filed an
application for registration of five (5) parcels of land denominated as Lot
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu 215382 with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Gumaca Branch.^[1] Lot
No. 1 has an area of 7,583 square meters; Lot No. 2 has 36,319 square meters;
Lot No. 3 has 24,347 square meters; Lot No. 4 has 5,388 square meters; and Lot.
No. 5 has 706 square meters^[2] or a total of 74,343 square meters. The possessory information title covers only
an area of 10,481 square meters.^[3]

The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Quezon filed his opposition to the application alleging that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title of the land
applied for nor had they been in
possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application and that the same is public land.^[4]

On December 8, 1971, the applicants filed a reply to the
government’s opposition claiming that the land in question is private property
covered by a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896.^[5]

At the initial hearing on the same date, the applicants presented
proof of compliance of jurisdictional requirements. On motion of applicants’ counsel, the court issued an order of
general default with the exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry.^[6]

During the hearing on January 18, 1972, the Fiscal moved to
withdraw the opposition of the Director of Forestry and the same was granted.^[7]
On May 3, 1972, Assistant Fiscal Antonio Robles likewise moved for the
withdrawal of the opposition of the Director of Lands and the same was again
granted.^[8]

Reception of evidence was thereafter delegated to a commissioner.^[9]

Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition even as he
supported the government’s contention that the lands applied for are part of
the public domain. Tan averred that he
had possessed the land as lessee for a period of more than thirty five (35)
years. Records reveal that Demetria
dela Pena, mother of herein private oppositor occupied Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
and 6 of plan Psu 217134 which are identical to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu
215382, applied for registration, by virtue of a fishpond lease granted by the
Bureau of Fisheries sometime in 1953.^[10] Said
lands were converted into fishponds and had been subject of a sales application
sometime in 1963.^[11] The
application to purchase filed by Constancio is still pending before the Bureau
of Lands.

Pending the resolution of whether or not the opposition of
Constancio dela Pena Tan should be admitted, the lower court learned that the special
counsel who had withdrawn the government’s opposition was not authorized to do
so. Acting accordingly, the court
reinstated the opposition of the Director of Lands and directed that the
opposition of the private oppositor be considered as evidence in support of the
claim of the government that the land applied for is part of the public domain.^[12]

After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot
Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants and declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as
owned by the government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constancio dela
Pena Tan, pending the approval of his sales application. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the
application insofar as Lots 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu-215382 are concerned and
hereby adjudicates these properties in favor of the applicants Heirs of Isabel
Tesalona namely: Lilia, Rebecca, Sonia,
Emma, Imelda, Antonio, Minda, Luisa, Buenafe and Carmencita, all surnamed
Pobeda; Consuelo L. Tesalona and Serapia L. Tesalona, together with all the
improvements existing thereon and confirms their title thereto as their
exclusive properties. The Court hereby
declares Lots 1 and 2 as owned by the Government subject to the right of the
lessee pending the approval of the sales application of private oppositor
Constancio de la Pena.

Upon this decision becoming final, let decree of confirmation and
registration be entered and thereafter, upon payment of the fees required by
law, let the corresponding certificate of title issue in the names of Heirs of
Isabel Tesalona namely: LILIA POBEDA,
married to Salvador Magtibay; REBECCA POBEDA, married to Jose Pineda; SONIA
POBEDA, married to Ildefonso Avellano; EMMA POBEDA, married to Raul Capesano;
IMELDA POBEDA, married to Ceferino Jimenez; MINDA POBEDA, married to Rolando
Nagar; LUISA POBEDA, single; BUENAFE POBEDA, married to Tomasito Javate; and
CARMENCITA POBEDA, single; CONSUELO L. TESALONA, married to Eleuterio Luna; and
SERAPIA L. TESALONA, single, all Filipino citizens and residents of Mulanay,
Quezon as their exclusive properties, free from all liens and encumbrances.

SO ORDERED.^[13]

Not satisfied with the trial court’s ruling, herein applicants
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals seeking confirmation of title over
Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as well.

On December 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court through
its First Civil Cases Division^[14]
rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED but modified declaring the confirmation of the title of
applicants-appellants over Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan PSU-215382, and
ordering the registration of said Lots in their
names, along with Lots 3, 4 and 5 of the same PSU Plan already adjudicated to
them in said appealed decision.

SO ORDERED.^[15]

The instant petition seeks to set aside the aforequoted decision
on the basis of the following grounds, to wit: (a) the respondent court acted contrary to law in confirming private
respondents’ alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of a mere blue
print copy of plan Psu 215382; and (b) the respondent court acted contrary to
law in confirming private respondents’ alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 on the
basis of a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 which covers only an
area of 1.0481 hectares.^[16]

The petition is impressed with merit.

At the outset, we note
that private respondents’ application for registration of five (5) parcels of
land denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Plan Psu 215382 ought to have
been struck down at its inception for the reasons which we will discuss
hereinafter. However, since the trial
court ruled for confirmation of title over Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of Plan Psu
215382 in favor of the applicants (herein private respondents) and no appeal
thereon was brought by the government to the Court of Appeals^[17],
we cannot pass upon the validity of the registration of the other three (3)
lots, the same was not put in issue in this petition. Suffice it to state that we deny the application for registration
of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 without prejudice to the right of the government to pursue
whatever means appropriate with respect to Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5.

To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for was not submitted in evidence by private respondents. Such omission is fatal to their application
as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement
of mandatory character.^[18]
While a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382^[19] as
surveyed for the Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented before the trial
court, the same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law.

Private respondents contend that they are in possession of the
original tracing cloth plan but they did not submit it in evidence for fear
that it may be lost or misplaced while in possession of the court.^[20]

This contention spurs disbelief.

The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate copy
of their application for registration of land title were under the custody of
the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at that time. But such does not relieve the private respondents of their duty
to retrieve the said tracing cloth plan and submit it before the court. In the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes,^[21] this Court clearly declared that if
the original tracing plan was forwarded to the LRC, “the applicants may easily
retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence.”^[22]
This was not done. Assuming that the
same was in their possession during the trial, private respondents should have
made it available to the trial court for verification.

Private respondents further claim that petitioner failed to
object to the submission of the blue print copy of the survey plan when the
same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving objection to said evidence.

We are not persuaded.

Given the mandatory character of the requirement for the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, said
requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. Besides, Rule 143 of the Rules of Court
clearly provides that the rules do not apply to land registration, cadastral
and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not provided therein,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. In the case at bench, there
appears no reason to apply the exception to the aforesaid rule.

The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein private
respondents, is a Spanish title,^[23] a
possessory information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo
pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares. But private respondents did not submit the
original of the possessory information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish document
purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of
the original document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the said secondary evidence
questionable and dubious.

This Court has time and again reiterated that caution and care
must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of secondary evidence of
alleged possessory information titles considering the number of fake titles
that have been discovered following their supposed reconstitution after the
last World War.^[24]
In fact, the rash of anomalies prompted the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 892 which outlawed all Spanish titles, including possessory information
titles, unless they were authenticated in appropriate registration proceedings
before August 16, 1976.^[25]

Another point to consider is the fact that there is a glaring and
irreconcilable discrepancy between the area of 1.0481 hectares covered by the
alleged possessory information title and the actual area of 7.4343 hectares
applied for. Law and jurisprudence
dictate that applicants have the burden of proving that the title justifies the
considerable increase in land area, failure in which results in the resolution
of the conflict in favor of the government and against them. Well-settled is the rule that land grants, being
gratuitous in nature, are always construed favorably in favor of the government
and strictly against the grantee,^[26] and
that possessory information titles, assuming them to be valid and legal, are grants from the State which cannot
extend beyond the terms thereof.^[27]

Finally, Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and were
as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees.^[28]
Lorenzo del Mundo, husband of Demetria del Mundo, lessee of the lots in
question, in his testimony declared that:

Q
       When you first came to know
these parcels of lands and possessed the same, what was the condition or nature
of these lands?

A         That
is (sic) a swampy land with bakawan trees, mangroves and some other swampy
trees.

Q
       Please name what ‘lalao’
trees or swampy trees were planted when you possessed the same?

A         Bacawan,
sasa, pipisik, tabigui, talisay, tingayos, langaray and bongalon. I forget (sic) the names of those other big
trees planted thereon.^[29]

This belies the contention of herein
private respondents that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and, thereafter,
to palay and other seasonal crops. Being swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like, these lots may
very well be considered and classified as forest lands. In the case of Heirs of Jose
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,^[30] we declared that:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way place. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa, palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.^[31]
(Emphasis ours)

Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.^[32]
Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime
or under the Torrens System, nullifies the title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Appellate Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration of the Heirs of Isabel Tesalona
of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and
Quaison, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on
official leave.

^[1]
Exhibit “A”; Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13.

^[2]
Exhibits “A-1”, “A-2”, “A-3”, “A-4” and
“A-5, respectively; Record on Appeal, pp. 2-6.

^[3]
Exhibit “G”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 15.

^[4]
Record on Appeal, pp. 6-7.

^[5]
Id., at pp. 8-9.

^[6]
Id., at pp. 10-11.

^[7]
Id., at pp. 11-12.

^[8]
Ibid.

^[9]
Id., at p. 12.

^[10]
TSN, August 26, 1975, pp. 5-6.

^[11]
Id., at p. 9

^[12]
Record on Appeal, p. 25.

^[13]
Rollo, pp. 28-29; Record on
Appeal, pp. 56-58.

^[14]
Per Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, J., ponente, with Ramon Gaviola, Jr. and Eduardo
Caguioa, JJ., concurring.

^[15]
Rollo, p. 80.

^[16]
Petition, pp. 4, 5; Rollo, pp. 14, 15.

^[17]
Then Intermediate Appellate Court.

^[18]
Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604; Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 705; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177;
Aguillon v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 506; See also Sections 1858 and
1864, Revised Administrative Code and Section 25, Act No. 496.

^[19]
Exhibit “A”.

^[20]
Rollo, p. 52; Comment, p. 2.

^[21]
Supra.

^[22]
Id., at p. 189.

^[23]
Exhibit “G”; Folio of Exhibits, pp. 14-20.

^[24]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 368.

^[25]
Section 1, par. 2, P.D. 892 dated
February 16, 1976.

^[26]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146, 150.

^[27]
Querol v. Querol, 48 Phil. 90,
98.

^[28]
Rollo, p. 33.

^[29]
TSN, July 11, 1974, pp. 11-12.

^[30]
126 SCRA 69.

^[31]
Id., at p. 75.

^[32]
Ibid.; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 428; Director of Lands v.
Rivas, 141 SCRA 329; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v.
Ansures, 56 SCRA 499; Director of
Forestry v. Munoz, 23
SCRA 1183.