GEORGE M. SAUL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ENRIQUE DALTON HAWKINS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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Saul versus Dalton Hawkins
The Case
This is the early Philippine case of Saul versus Dalton Hawkins, decided in May 1902. George Saul bought a house on Aguilar Street in Iloilo from Canuto Rivera. Enrique Dalton Hawkins was occupying that house under a lease from Rivera. Saul wanted the whole monthly rent, and Dalton refused, claiming his lease was an encumbrance that Saul had to respect. Saul sued to have that alleged encumbrance declared void. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when a lease binds a purchaser of the leased property: an unrecorded lease does not bind the buyer, while a recorded lease becomes a real right and does.
Procedural History
The action began in the Court of First Instance. Saul asked that the gravamen or encumbrance Dalton claimed over the house be declared void, and that Dalton be ordered to turn over the total rent received from the date of Saul's purchase, with costs. Dalton answered, insisting that his lease was enforceable against Saul because it had been acknowledged by Rivera in an earlier case and preventively annotated in the property register, and because Saul knew of the lease when he bought. The trial court ruled against Saul, and Saul appealed. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal, and the Court, through Chief Justice Arellano, reversed the judgment below.
Facts
On the eighth of August 1900, Canuto Rivera sold a house and lot at Number 14 Aguilar Street, Iloilo, to George Saul by a deed recorded in the property register on the thirteenth of September of the same year. Dalton Hawkins held a lease over that house from Rivera, and had in turn subleased it to another person who was in actual possession.
On the twenty-ninth of August, in an act of conciliation, Saul told Dalton that he had bought the house and demanded that Dalton deliver to him each month the entire amount of the rental under the sublease. Dalton replied that he had a contract of lease with Rivera, so he owed Saul only what he had agreed to pay Rivera, not the whole rent.
On the thirtieth of October, Saul filed suit, invoking the owner's right to dispose of his property. Dalton defended on the ground that the lease had been acknowledged by Rivera in a justice court case and preventively annotated in the property register, and that Saul knew of it when he bought. The Court noted that the ratification before a notary was dated the twenty-eighth of September and the annotation the twenty-sixth of October, both after Saul's purchase on the eighth of August.
Issues
- Whether or not an unrecorded contract of lease executed by the vendor binds the purchaser of the leased property.
- Whether or not the preventive annotation of a judgment refusing to annul a sublease converts the lease into a real right enforceable against the purchaser.
- Whether or not an action to declare the alleged encumbrance null, rather than merely not enforceable, is the proper remedy.
- Whether or not Saul is entitled to recover the rents received by Dalton from the time of the act of conciliation.
Applicable Provisions
Article 445 of the Civil Code provides:
Possession de facto can not be recognized in two distinct persons, except in cases of tenancies in common.
This supports the Court's holding that the sublessee's physical possession could not continue in the name of Rivera once Rivera had conveyed away his dominion and civil possession.
Article 451 of the Civil Code provides:
The possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received until his possession is legally interrupted.
This fixes the point from which Dalton must account for the rents, namely the legal interruption of possession.
Article 1947 of the Civil Code provides:
The act of conciliation produces a civil interruption provided it is followed by a suit for the recovery of possession.
This makes the act of conciliation the starting point for the recovery of rents, because the complaint followed within two months.
Article 1571 of the Civil Code, paragraph 2, is cited by the Court as leaving the lessee, as against the purchaser, only the right to reap the fruits of the current agricultural year, and, as against the vendor, the right to recover damages.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that a lease executed by the vendor, unless recorded, ceases to have effect when the property is sold, in the absence of a contrary agreement. The right to use the house is inherent in the dominion transferred to the buyer. The lease does not cease to bind the lessor personally if its term has not expired, but those personal actions do not bind the purchaser as successor by singular title absent an express agreement that becomes his personal obligation. The Court stated the rule:
If the lease is recorded it is no longer merely a personal right on the part of the lessee to continue to enjoy the property leased, even after the same is sold. It is also a real right, made such by recordation, and constitutes an incumbrance upon the property, whoever may be its owner or possessor, and is therefore enforceable even against third persons.
On the second issue, the Court held that the lease did not constitute a real right. What was preventively annotated was a judgment refusing to declare the nullity of the sublease, not the lease itself. That is not the recordation that gives a lease publicity as an incumbrance. The Court applied the maxim that when the right of the grantor is extinguished, the right granted is extinguished: the civil possession of Rivera ended on the sale, and with it the physical possession of the lessee or sublessee ended by operation of law.
On the third issue, the Court held that an action for a declaration that the encumbrance was not enforceable would have been correct, but a prayer that it be declared null was not entirely incorrect given the precise terms of the issue, the allegations, and the evidence. A judgment that correctly passes on the relief prayed for is congruent with the complaint even if the action was improperly designated, since that does not change its nature.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the act of conciliation produced a civil interruption because it was followed by suit, and the complaint filed within two months was equivalent to a suit for possession. Saul was therefore entitled to recover the rents from the time of the act of conciliation.
Doctrine
A lease executed by the vendor, unless recorded, ceases to have effect upon the sale of the property, absent a contrary agreement. The lease remains a source of personal liability for the vendor, but it does not bind the purchaser as successor by singular title unless there is an express agreement making it the purchaser's personal obligation. Once the lease is recorded, it is no longer a mere personal right; it becomes a real right and an encumbrance enforceable against third persons, including the buyer. A preventive annotation of a judgment refusing to annul a sublease is not the recordation of the lease that creates such a real right. Finally, the misdesignation of an action does not change its nature where the judgment grants the relief actually prayed for.
Disposition
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment below, held that Dalton's lease could not be enforced against Saul, and ordered Dalton to pay Saul all rents received or which might have been received from the time of the act of conciliation, without special condemnation as to costs.
Remember This
Memorize the line: an unrecorded lease does not bind the purchaser, but a recorded lease becomes a real right and an encumbrance enforceable against the whole world. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between personal and real rights in leases, the effect of recordation and preventive annotation, and the rule that the buyer may terminate a lease existing at the time of sale.