LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the
Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of a
criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a “contract or transact­ion”
so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The factual background is as follows:

Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged
with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then
an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the
case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation
which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the
required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had
to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandinganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393
which reads as follows:

“The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO
SORIANO, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an
Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal’s Office, detailed as
the Investigating Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus
THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft, taking
advantage of his official position and with grave abuse of authority,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and
request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00)
Philippine Currency, and actually received from said Thomas N. Tan the
amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) Philip­pine Currency, in
consideration for a favorable resolution by dismissing the
above-mentioned case, wherein said accused has to intervene in his
official capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.

(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA


Special Prosecutor”
         

After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal, in the Information, for Violation
of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum, to NINE (9)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to suffer perpetual disqualification
from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.

“Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the
entrapment operations, and which was fully recovered from the accused.
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) shall be returned to private complainant
Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the National Bureau of
Investigation, National Capital Region.”

A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.

The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual
question. The latter is to the effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted
him on the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence. This claim is not meritorious not only because
it is riot for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but
also because a reading of its decision shows that it explicitly stated
the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the competence of
the witnesses who testified against him.

As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation
conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a “contract or
transaction” within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this
issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.

The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:

“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) x x x

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.”

The petitioner states:

“Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner’s guilt, the facts make
out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision
of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section
3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.

“The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support,
if at all, the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense
charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in
the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph
(b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the
accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was
allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the
petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending
preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a
crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before
petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office.
Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at
all, is Direct Bribery.” (Petition, p. 5.).

Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

“A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term
‘transaction’ as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a
commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of
transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would
have so stated in the ‘Definition of Terms’, Section 2 thereof. But it
did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the
expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction
between the government and other party wherein the public officer would
intervene under the law.” (Comment, p. 8)

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction
because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
considera­tion as in credit transactions and this element
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner.

In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was
error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3
(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under
the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has
been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is
modified in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined
and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The
rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De
la Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.