PETRA DUENAS-ADMINISTRATRIX, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. PELAGIO S. MANDI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESID­ING JUDGE OF BRANCH I, RE­GIONAL TRIAL COURT, BASI­LAN PROVINCE; AND EMERITO DU…

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari, petitioner praying
that this Court:

1)  Declare
the Writ of Execution, dated July 26,
1983 issued by the respondent Judge in S.P. No. R-6 (234) as well
as the Order, dated September 30, 1983,
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration as null and void and of no
effect;

2)  Order
the return of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Flaviana
Maningo and Adriano Duenas
to the administration of the petitioner so that she could proceed, pursuant to
law with the closure of the same;

3)  Order
private respondents, jointly and severally, to render an accounting of the
proceeds of the intestate estate, which they unwarrantedly and unlawfully
appropriated unto themselves;

4)  Restrain
the Provincial Sheriff of Basi­lan from taking any
further action relative to the said estate; and,

5)  Grant
petitioner such other and further relief which petitioner may be entitled to
under the premises.

This petition emanated from a joint petition for partition of the
intestate estate of the late spouses Adriano Duenas
and Flaviana Maningo by the
heirs of said spouses filed before the court a quo in Special Proceed­ing
No. R-6 (234).  The court was asked to
appoint Petra Duenas as administratrix
upon a petition supported by her three younger sisters.  However, in view of the Oppo­sition of Petra Duena’s elder brother Emerito Duenas supported by four of their sisters and brother
(private respondents herein) said court appointed Emerito
Duenas instead as the administrator of the intestate
estate of their deceased parents. 
Subsequently, due to neglect in the performance of his duties as
administrator, the court relieved Emerito Duenas of his rights and duties as administrator and
directed him to turn over the admi­nistration of the properties to the newly
appointed admi­nistratrix, Petra Duenas.  He was also ordered to deliver the cash
balance of P6,029.12 (as reflected in the accoun­ting submitted to and approved
by the court) with legal interest from 1978 until delivery to the administratrix for equal distribution among the heirs
within a week from the turn-over to her. 
In the special matter of partition of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses the court a quo made the following ruling:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and in order to put
an end to indivision or family disunity, and in the
furtherance of law and justice, this Court hereby assigns, confirms,
partitions, declares that:

“1.     A parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-75-(0-1552) in the name of
Adriano Duenas, situated at San Roque,
Isabela, Basilan Province,
with an area of 13 hectares, 75 ares and 98 centares, to be owned in common by all the nine heirs,
namely:  Victoria Duenas,
married to Teofilo Pagal; Emerito Duenas, married to Concepcion Camance; Aproniana Duenas, married to Quiterio Cumayao; Laureano Duenas, married to
Carmelita Torres; Petra Duenas, married to Florencio Hugo; Julia Duenas,
married to Silverio Tabada;
Maxima Duenas, married to Arnulfo
Bacut; Cleotilde Duenas, married to Ramon Ikang;
and Bernardita Duenas,
married to Luis Manuel, in equal share or that the said nine heirs who are now
pronounced co?owners, to be entitled to equal share, may either decide to
manage the same as co-owners or to sell the property and the proceeds thereof
be divided equally among them;

“2.     A portion of a
residential lot sold by Felipe Ikang in favor of
Adriano Duenas with an area of 300 square meters and
already a subject of a free patent in the name of Maxima Duenas,
be likewise owned in common by all.  The Administratrix may officially inform the Bureau of Lands,
with a copy of this decision and file an amended free patent application in the
name of all the nine heirs and that the property or its interest over it may be
sold to any interested party and its fruits or proceeds to be divided among the
nine heirs;

“3.     The parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6907, marked as Exhibit “B”, now
divided into three tax declarations, namely, Tax Declaration No. 10255, with an
assessed value of P1,200.00, and with an area of 2.3956 hectares, marked
Exhibit ‘C’; Tax Declaration No. 10256 with an area of 2.3956 and assessed at
P1,200.00, marked as Exhibit ‘D’; Tax Declaration No. 10257, with an area of
4.3957, valued at P2,110.00, in the names of Cleotilde
Duenas, Bernardita Duenas and Maxima Duenas, are
hereby assigned to them respectively, since they have already been in
possession of the same, and this Court hereby confirms said interest;

“4.     A parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 6901 and subsequently cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 10122, dated November
8, 1972, then ultimately covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2939 consisting of 2 hectares with a total value of P1,200.00, is hereby
assigned to Petra Duenas and therefore this Court
confirms this arrangement;

“5.     A parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 6911 in the name of Adriano Duenas
covering 2.1862 hectares with a total value of P1,160.00 situated at Calvario, Isabela, is hereby
assigned to Julia Duenas since this has been already
in her possession before the Administratrix Petra Duenas took over by virtue of the Order of this Court, as Administratrix;

“6.     All the coconut
plantation covered by three tax declarations, namely:  Tax Decla­ration No. 920, situated at Matarling (formerly Isabela) now Lantawan, Basilan, with an area
of 1.3269 hectares and valued at P1,760.00, marked as Exhibit ‘Q’; a parcel of
land situated at San Roque covered by Tax Declaration
No. 2069, with an area of 1.8313 hectares and valued at P2,200.00; and, parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2012, situated at Palma Grava, Isabela, Basilan, with an area of 1.5000 hectares and valued at
P1,000.00, are hereby assigned to Emerito Duenas, Victoria Duenas, Aproniana Duenas and Laureano Duenas, to be owned in
common or they may sell any or all of these properties and the proceeds thereof
be equally divided among the four heirs on a fair and amicable basis.

“The relieved administrator, Emerito
Duenas, based upon the annual report of ac­counting
which was approved by this Court for the purpose of turning over the
administration of the properties and cash to Petra Duenas,
is hereby ordered to deliver the cash amount of P6,029.12, with legal interest
from 1978 until delivered to the administratrix for
equal distribution within a week from delivery to her.  If the relieved admi­nistrator refuse, his
properties shall answer for it, in accordance with law and in order to finally
adjudicate this case, once and for all.

“SO ORDERED.”^[1]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Emerito
Duenas and his co-appellants (Victoria, Aproniana, Laureana and Julia)
assigned the following errors:

I

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT AN ORAL PARTITION WAS MADE BY THE LATE ADRIA­NO
DUENAS DURING HIS LIFETIME BUT AFTER THE DEATH OF FLAVIANA MANINGO, WITH THE
CONSENT OF ALL HIS CHILDREN, COVERING FIVE (5) OUT OF THE TOTAL EIGHT (8)
PARCELS OF LAND, BE­LONGING TO THE SPOUSES, THE LATE ADRIANO DUENAS AND
FLAVIANA MANINGO.

II

THERE BEING AN ORAL PARTITION, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN ASSIGNING THE ONLY TITLED REAL
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF ALL THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ADRIANO DUENAS AND FLAVIANA
MANINGO.

III

EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ORAL PARTITION,
THE LOWER COURT STILL ERRED
IN THE DISTRIBU­TION AND ASSIGNMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTIES COMPRISING THE
ESTATES OF THE LATE ADRIANO DUENAS AND FLAVIANA MANINGO IN FAVOR OF THE
HEIRS-THE PARTIES IN THIS CASE.

Petra Duenas and her co-appellees (Maxima, Cleotilde and Bernardita) did not appeal the lower court’s judgment but
instead filed with the court a quo a new complaint for quieting
of title which was dismissed by said court as it was “barred by the final
judgment of this Court in Special Proceedings No. R-6 (234).” This Order
of Dismissal was brought by Petra Duenas, et al., to
Us on a Petition for Review by Certiorari in G.R. No. 56548, which We
denied as per Our resolution, dated November
25, 1981 (Annex “I”, p. 117)

The appellate court rendered a decision affirming the ruling of
the court a quo with slight modification, with its pertinent
provisions quoted hereunder:

“For its factual background, we shall adopt, by way of
reference, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court as spread in
its decision, except its find­ings and conclusions on the land declared under
Tax Dec. No. 6901, and now covered by OCT No. P-2939 in the name of Petra Duenas, which it ruled to be completely collated to the
mass of property hereditable from the deceased parents.

“We take note that on December
25, 1972, Adriano Duenas sold the whole
land to Petra Duenas, as shown by a notarial deed of absolute sale, marked Exh.
L, for P500.00.  The vali­dity of this
sale is not challenged by the parties, and so, its validity is to be sus­tained
insofar, however, as it pertains only to the undivided one-half of this
property, it being deemed to be a conjugal property of the deceased Adriano Duenas and his wife. 
And since the wife was already dead at the time Adriano Duenas sold the whole land to Petra Duenas,
he could have not validly sold the shares of his children on the property which
was transmitted to them, by operation of law, upon the death of their
mother.  Consequently, what should be
collated into the mass of the hereditary estate is one-half or one hectare of
the land covered by OCT No. P-2939.

“When the whole property was titled exclusively in the name of
Petra Duenas, it shall be deemed to have been done so
in trust of their parents, or of the legal heirs of the deceased spouses
Adriano Duenas and Flaviana
M. Duenas.

“Consequently, the one-half of the lot covered by OCT No.
P-2939 is subject to a reconveyance to the heirs of
Adriano and Flaviana Duenas.

“Now, we come to the first assigned error.  It is the contention of appellants that the
lands covered by Exhibits A, B, I, O and T were orally partitioned and as­signed
by Adriano Duenas, during his lifetime but already
after the death of Flaviana Ma­ningo
Duenas, to certain children like Eme­rito,
Victoria, Aproniana, Laurena
and Julia as regards the property covered by Exh. A;
to Cleotilde, Bernardita,
and Maxima, as regards the property covered by Exh.
B; to Petra Duenas, as regards the property covered
by Exh. I; to Julia Duenas,
as regards the property covered by Exh. O; and to
Maxima Duenas, as regards the property covered by Exh. T.  And so they
say that this partition made by their father should be respected and the distributees should respectively hold their assigned shares
to the exclusion of the other heirs. 
This alleged oral parti­tion was denied and contested by the appellees.

“We rule that this oral partition could not have been valid,
even between the par­ties, because Adriano Duenas
could have not validly made such a partition without the consent and approval
of all the co-owners to the properties. 
If a deed of extra-judi­cial partition which did include the co-heirs
who had no knowledge of and consent to the same is considered fraudulent and
vicious (Villaluz, et al., vs. Nene,
et al, 7 SCRA 27), with more reason should we say that an alleged partition,
which has not been positively established, be considered non-­existent, and
being non-existent, it can not furnish a spring or source from which rights can
arise.

“While it is true that oral partition can be a valid
distribution of hereditary properties among the heirs (Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196); that in this jurisdic­tion, on
grounds of equity, it is competent for the heirs of an estate, where no rights
of creditors are involved, to enter into an oral agreement for distribution of
the estate among themselves (Barcelona, et al., vs. Barcelona, et al., 100
Phil. 251), yet such partition must be participated in by all the heirs in
order that it be binding on all.

“In the case at bar, it was not even an oral partition or
designation of properties by the father in favor of five children, without the
participation of the four others.  Under
what legal authority Adriano Duenas has assigned to
his five children the five properties we can not see.  Adriano Duenas was
only a co-owner to the undivided one-half of each of the five properties.  He did not execute a valid donation over his
undivided one-half interest on each of the properties to the recipient of the
assignment.  So, there was not even a
valid trans­mission of rights to any of his five children as regards his
undivided shares, in the five properties. 
Indeed, his undivided interest to each of the five properties were
transmit­ted upon his death to all of the nine child­ren.  Now, when, before the death of Adriano Duenas, he and his five children had executed an
Extra-judicial partition (Exh. P) of the properties,
where the other four children, the herein appellees,^[2]
had refused to consent and to sign the deed, then the appellees
are not bound by the said extra-judicial partition.  They retain their rights to every inch of
ground, or area, in each of every property that was the subject of the extra­judicial
partition.  The recipients of cer­tain
properties under the extra-judicial partition can not take exclusive interests
on the property to the exclusion of the co?heirs who did not participate
in the parti­tion.  And so, apelleess had a right to de­mand partition of each of the
eight parcels of land – the mass of property inherited from their
parents.” (Rollo, pp. 15-17)

In view of the aforementioned findings, the appellate court found
it necessary to revise the distribution of the estate made by the court a
quo by not including one-half (½) of the land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 6901 in the mass of collated hereditary property, the court ruling as
follows:

“There is available for partition 30.­8211 hectares, and each
of the nine heirs is entitled to an average of 3.4245 hectares.  We now make the distribution, giving and
granting unto each of the following heirs, as their share in the eight parcels
of lands, subject of this partition, thus:

A.  Cleotilde
Duenas

B.  Bernardita
Duenas

C.  Maxima Duenas

D.  Petra Duenas

The other half of the land covered by Tax Dec.
No. 6901 (Exh. I) is adjudged to be owned by Petra Duenas in her own right, hav­ing purchased this one-half
portion from her father, Amado Duenas,
in virtue of Exhibit L.

E.  Julia Duenas

F.  Victoria Duenas

G.  Laureano
Duenas

H.  Emerito
Duenas

I.  Aproniana
Duenas

­”As the residential lot, now identified as Lot No.
916-09-01-000002, has only an area of 300 sq. m. and it is now a subject of an
application for free patent (See Exh. V), filed by
Maxima Duenas (also known as Maxima D. Bacus), the latter may buy off the rights of her other
co-heir on the bas of its appraised value in the Inventory submitted by the
Administrator of the estate, which was approved by the court.

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and except as above modified, the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, and insofar as
consistent with the above modifications.

“Without pronouncement as to costs.

“SO ORDERED.”^[3] (Rollo, pp. 17-21)

After the rendition of the aforementioned judg­ment, administratrix Petra Duenas and
her group filed with the court a quo on February 14, 1983 a Constancia
with a Motion for Renovation of Judgment, attaching there­to copies of the
proposed Renovation of Judgment.  Parties
failed to reach an agreement.  Subsequently
Emerito Duenas and his
group filed a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution on the ground that
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory. 
Petitioner Petra Duenas interposed no object­ion
to said motion.  Respondent Judge issued
an order for the issuance of the Writ of Execution addressed to the Provincial
Sheriff.  Petra Duenas
filed her Motion for Reconsideration and supplemental pleadings to contest the
issuance of the Writ of Execution.  Said
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the present petition for certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the issuance of the Writ of Execution,
ordering the Provincial sheriff to execute the decision rendered by the
appellate court is contrary to law and the rules:

“(1)  That the intestate estate is still under the
administration of petitioner, who has still to submit her Final Report of
accounts in order to show that all taxes and obligations of the intestate
estate have been paid pursuant to Section I, Rule 19, of the Rules of Court,
specifically, the second paragraph thereof;

“(2)  That the partition of the estate has still to
be executed by the administra­trix as one of her
duties, prior to the closure of the intestacy, not by the Sheriff;

“(3)  That while the decision of the Honorable Court
of Appeals divided the intestate estate, strictly as to the area of the same
among the heirs thereof, the physical partition of the estate should first be
executed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 69, of the Rules of Court,
particularly taking into the consideration of last portion of Section 4, of the
said Rule;

“(4)  That the physical partition of the estate is
prerequisite to the delivery of the same to the heirs thereof;

“(5)  That finally, the approval of the Res­pondent
Court is necessary for the closure of the estate;
and

“(6)  That being a Special Proceeding, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court on Execution, has no application to it.” (Rollo, p. 7)

Petitioner’s contentions do not merit our consideration.

Undoubtedly, the project of partition of the intes­tate estate of
the late spouses Adriano and Flaviana Duenas was issued by the court a quo in its
decision in SP. No. R-6(231) and affirmed by the appellate court with slight
modification.  As already said earlier, petitioner
herein and company did not appeal the decision of the court a quo
and as to them, said decision has long been final.  The appellate court, upon the appeal made by
private respondents herein, modified the decision of the court a quo
in that the area of the parcel of coconut land covered by Tax Declaration No.
6901, now titled in the name of Petra Duenas, was
reduced by one (1) hectare so that, the total area of the 8 parcels of land
comprising the estate of the deceased spouses was also reduced from 31.8211
hectares to 30.8211 hecta­res.  Its
decision is now final, there being no appeal taken by private respondents from
said decision.

The rules cited by petitioner, namely:  Sec. 1, Rule 90 and Sec. 4, Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court, presupposes a situation where no partition is as yet
made, necessitating a project of partition for the appro­val of the court,
after the payment of the debts and other obligations of the estate and not to
situations similar to the case at bar, where the project of partition is
provided for by the courts in their judgments on the merits.

In view of the judgments of the trial court and the appellate
court which are both final judgments of partition of the estate of the late
spouses Adriano and Flaviana Duenas,
public respondent Judge is empowered to order the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the final decisions of the above-named courts as provided
for in Sec. 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court thus making it mandatory for the
Sheriff or other officers to whom the writ is directed to execute that which
was ordered in the decision of the court. 
Certainly, the administratrix is not the
person referred to in said rule.  While
this rule refers to civil actions, it may likewise be applied to special
proceedings (Sec. 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court).

Delivery of the respective shares of the parties set forth in the
judgment of partition is a necessary and indispensable incident to carry into
full effect the purpose of partition.  It
would be ridiculous and senseless to have a judgment of partition if the same
could not be carried out.  Considering
that the court a quo in the case for partition, found among other
things that the estate had no more debts to third persons that the estate and
inheritance taxes were already paid and that the parties are the only surviving
legitimate heirs of the deceased spouses Duenas, and
considering further, that said court was authorized by the parties to exercise
not only its limited jurisdiction but also its general jurisdiction as reflected
in the parties’ Joint Motion to Set Case for Hearing on the Merits dated June
16, 1978, it becomes inevitable and mandatory to place each heir in possession
of the respective parcel of land as­signed to him.  Hence the writ of execution is proper.  To follow what the petitioner wants would
only prolong her administration of the estate all to the prejudice of Emerito Duenas and the brother
and sisters who sided with him.  It is
not contended that the intestate estate consists of 8 parcels of land with a
total area of 30.8211 hectares.  Three
parcels of land, with a total area of 10.2169 hectares were and are still
occupied and their fruits enjoyed by Petra Duenas and
the three sisters who sided with her. 
They were never under administration either by Emerito
Duenas or by the incumbent administra­trix.  It follows that these three parcels of land
could not have been partitioned by the Sheriff for delivery to private
respondents because the sheriff merely deli­vered to the private respondents
the parcels of land assigned to them in the judgment of the appellate
court.  Only the titled real property
with an area of 13.7598 hectares, is under administration, assigned by the
appel­late court to all the parties in this case except Maxima Duenas.  The share of
Petra Duenas and two of the sisters who sided with
her is only 4.4724 hectares.  The
remaining area of the only titled real property, consisting of 9.2874 hectares,
is assigned to private respondents, who appropriated the fruits of said parcels
of land.  Petra Duenas
and company cannot be said to be prejudiced. 
On the other hand, the continued administration by peti­tioner Petra Duenas of the five parcels of land, namely those covered by
Tax Declaration Nos. 920, 2069, 2012 and 6911, and the only titled property,
would be most beneficial to her because the bulk of the properties is no longer
hers nor the three sisters who had sided with her.

It is an error to say that the Court of
Appeals took into consideration only the area of the parcels of land in rendering
its decision disregarding the productivity and probable value of the
parcels.  The court a quo
did not fail to consider these things in rendering its judgment whcih was eventually affirmed by the appellate court with
slight modification.

Likewise, it is incorrect to say that Petra Duenas
and company were reluctant to receive the unregistered land assigned to them
because these might be contested by others if applied for.  Petra Duenas was
never assigned an unregistered land. 
Private respondents invited Our attention to the fact that the coconut
land originally covered by Tax Declaration No. 6901 is now titled in her name
under OCT No. P-2939 and a portion of the land covered by OCT. No. 75-(0-1552)
assigned to her by the appellate court’s judgment of partition.  The other sisters who sided with Petra Duenas were given unregistered lands but the record reveals
that these sisters had al­ready filed their applications for free patents with
the Bureau of Lands which applications have been given due course.  If they are not yet titled in their names,
the reason is not because written oppositions were filed by others.

By and large the trial court and the appellate court may have
committed an error in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land
to the parties in this case, but considering that their judgments are now
final, the error, assuming that one was committed, can no longer be amended or
corrected.  We have consis­tently held
that one of the purposes for which courts are organized is to put an end to
controversy in the determination of the respective rights of the contending
parties.  With the full knowledge that
courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for
judgment and they have a right at sometime or another to have final judgment on
which they can rely as a final disposition of the issue or issues submitted,
and to know that there is an end to the litigation.  (Miranda vs. Court of Appeals 71 SCRA 295).  Likewise settled is the rule that after a
judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto, and nothing can be
done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no end to legal
processes (Fabular vs. Court of Ap­peals, 119 SCRA
329).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.  Let the records of the case be
remanded to the court of origin for the enforcement of the writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr.,
Padilla, Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex A for respondent Judge, pp. 87-90, Rollo,
penned by Hon. Judge Jainal D. Rasul

^[2] Petra,
Maxima, Cleotilde, Bernardita
all surnamed Duenas

^[3]
Penned by Hon. Justice Elias B. Asuncion, concurred in by Justice Porfirio V. Sison and Justice
Jose A. R. Melo, promulgated September 21, 1981.