PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PABLO MANGULABNAN, MAJOR ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, GUIAMIL BARI @ BRAVO, ABDULLAH MASIRI @ GUERRERO, RADZAK ABAS @ JACK, ARSAD UGALIN…

This is an appeal from the decision* of the
then Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Cotabato City in Criminal Case No. 860 (778) which
convicted herein appellants Pablo
Mangulabnan, Arsad Ugalingan, Kadir Solaiman, Abdullah Masiri and Guiamil Bari of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.

Senior State Prosecutor Tirso D.C.
Velasco filed an information for Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal
Detention on October 15, 1982
which reads as follows:

“That at about 7:30 in the evening of March 24, 1982 in the City of
Cotabato, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused PABLO MANGULABNAN, MAJOR ROLANDO
DE GUZMAN, GUIAMIL BARI @ ‘Bravo’, ABDULLAH MASIRI @ ‘Guerrero’, RADZAK ABAS @
‘Jack’, ARSAD UGALINGAN @ ‘Ustadz Arsad’,
KADIR SOLAIMAN @ ‘Mimang’, GUIARAL ANDANG @ ‘Lucas’,
ABDUL MANABILANG @ ‘Ting’, MINANDANG ALI @ ‘Tikbalang’,
PENDA MAGKA @ ‘Budoy’, JOHN DOE @ ‘Sammy’, RICHARD
DOE @ ‘Kilab Lawe’, (the
full name and address of the last two are still unknown), BIRU (full name
unknown) @ ‘Paquito’, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, some of them armed with different caliber of illegally
possessed firearms, with the purpose of extorting ransom from the parents of
the victim, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
DEBORAH SIMON, a 16 year old girl, from her house at Datu
Piang St., Cotabato City,
and forcibly drag her to a waiting motor cab and brought to different places in
the City of Cotabato and the nearby province of Maguindanao and once in their custody, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another to achieve their
purpose, did then and there willfully unlawflly and
feloniously detain the said victim, DEBORAH SIMON, under restraint and against
her will for a period of twenty-five (25) days or up to April 18, 1982 when she
was rescued by the elements of the PC, CIS and CHDF.

“That accused ZAINUDIN WARNA @ ‘Purit’,
RAMPATAN WARNA, KUSAIN WARNA, GUIAMARODIN DEGAN, SUMAEL SALIK, Peter Doe, Paul
Doe and Jane Doe, whose full names, identities and addresses of the last three
are still unknown are being charged as accessories-after-the-fact because,
having knowledge of the crime and without having participated therein as
principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by assisting
the principal accused above-mentioned to profit by the effects of the crime and
conceal the body of the crime and its effects in order to prevent its
discovery.

“That in the
commission of the crime of kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention, the following aggravating
circumstances were present, namely:  that
the act was committed:

‘(a) in disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of her age and sex, she being
a girl of 16 years of age;

‘(b) at night time;

‘(c) by a band;

‘(d) with the use of motor vehicle; and

‘(e) superior strength.’

“ CONTRARY TO LAW.”

(Information, Rollo, pp. 42-53)

In their separate extrajudicial confessions taken before PC Major
Renato C. Santos and PC Sgt. Ricarte
R. Marquez, accused Guiamil Bari
and Abdul Manabilang pointed to Pablo Mangulabnan and Major de Guzman as the masterminds of the
kidnapping plot and negotiators for the payment of ransom.  Dominic Simon, father of the victim, Esteban Doruelo and Ram Buxani likewise
gave their separate statements to the Philippine Constabulary narrating how
both accused acted as negotiators for payment of ransom in exchange for the
victim’s release (Appellee’s Brief, p. 20).

Upon the motion of the prosecution (Original Records, p. 313),
the trial court, on December 9, 1982,
ordered the dismissal of the case against accused Abdul Manabilang
@ “Ting” and he was allowed to become a state witness for the prosecution (Ibid.,
pp. 332-­333).  However, said accused
failed to testify in court prompting the prosecution to petition for his reinclusion in the information (Ibid., pp.
373-374).  On January 17, 1983, the court a quo
ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Abdul Manabilang
(Ibid., p. 434).  Upon his arrest,
he signified his intention to testify for the state, hence the prosecution
filed a motion to lift the order of reinclusion and
arrest of Abdul Manabilang (Ibid., pp.
570-571).  Said motion was acted upon in
open court on March 16, 1983
(TSN, March 16, 1983, p. 205).

Major Rolando de Guzman questioned the jurisdiction of the lower
court over his person invoking the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 1882,
1822-A and 1850 (CFI Decision, Rollo, p. 49).  Subsequently, on February 14, 1983, in G.R.
No. 62798 entitled Rolando A. de Guzman vs. Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando, etc., the Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining “respondent Judge from further proceeding with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner-accused Maj. Rolando de Guzman and from
enforcing and/or implementing all orders and processes issued in Criminal Case
No. 860 entitled ‘People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Maj. Rolando de
Guzman, et al., accused’, of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
Branch II, now Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City
relating to said petitioner-accused.” (Original Records, pp. 486-490).

Because of said restraining order, the trial court was unable to
take cognizance of the case with respect to Major de Guzman.*

Meanwhile, the civilian accused during the hearing verbally moved
for separate trial of their case from the military accused Major Rolando de
Guzman on the ground of their constitutional right for speedy trial (Rollo, p. 57).

Hence, trial proceeded as to movants.

Pablo Mangulabnan, Arsad
Ugalingan, Kadir Solaiman, Abdullah Masiri, Guiamil Bari, Guiamarodin
Degan and Sumael Salik stood trial while Zainodin Warna @ “Puri”, Rampatan Warna, Kusain Warna and Radsak Abas @ “Jack” escaped from
their detention at the P.C. Stockade at Camp Parang Maguindanao (CFI Decision, Rollo,
p. 141).  The escapees remained at large
and no trial could be conducted insofar as they are concerned because the Court
under the circumstances, could not hold a hearing in absencia
(Rollo, p. 142).

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:  Assemblyman Esteban Doruelo,
Dominador Simon, Lt. Col. Limon, Col. Rodrigo Gutang, Major Renato Santos, Sgt.
Andronico B. Prochina,
Abdul Manabilang, Sgt. Ricarte
R. Marquez, Ram R. Buxani, Atty. Nenita
Grijaldo, Capt. Benjamin Lascuna,
CIC Ledy Bayona, Capt. Usop Casoyo and Capt. Jeffry Sodusta, Deborrah Simon and Datu Gila Ampatuan (Rollo, p. 57).

But appellant Mangulabnan’s conviction
was anchored primarily on the testimony of the state witness Abdul Manabilang @ “Ting” who testified that he was an escort of
Pablo Mangulabnan. 
That at about 10:00 in the
morning of March 22, 1982,
appellant Mangulabnan asked him to look for someone
who knows how to kidnap and he recommended Commander Arsad.  Pablo Mangulabnan
stated that any of the children of Dominic Simon will be kidnapped and a ransom
of P500,000.00 will be asked from the parents. 
In the evening of the same day, he brought Commander Arsad,
Mimang and Commander Sumakwel
to appellant’s house (TSN, March 16, 1983, pp. 219-223).  It was agreed during said meeting that Major
de Guzman and appellant Mangulabnan would act as
negotiators for the ransom money while Arsad and Mimang would act as guides who knew many officers in the
military.  Ting Manabilang
was to act as an errand boy to Commander Arsad.  On March
24, 1982, at 7:00 o’clock
in the evening, per agreement of the group, Commander Sumakwel
kidnapped Deborah Simon and she was brought to Malagapas
(CFI Decision, Rollo, p. 90).

In the afternoon of March
28, 1982, he saw appellant Mangulabnan at
his house and he was asked to deliver a bag containing things for Deborah Simon
to Arsad Ugalingan.  However, he found out that he was being
followed so he went back to appellant’s house and left the bag there (TSN,
March 17, 1983, pp. 3402-3406).

On March 29, 1982, he met Major de Guzman at appellant’s house
where he was informed that appellant will not anymore help in Deborah’s rescue because it was doing him harm
and that Major de Guzman will take over appellant’s role in the
negotiation.  He was further instructed
to look for Arsad. 
He was able to get in touch with Arsad at Mabini
Street and the meeting was arranged at 5:00 in the afternoon at Pagagawan
Esteros (Ibid., pp. 3434-3438).

The meeting took place as scheduled.  Major de Guzman brought Arsad,
Mimang and the state witness, to a restaurant at Awang where they talked. 
However, he was seated at a distance that is why he does not know the
topic of their conversation (Ibid., pp. 3455-3457).  From the restaurant, they proceeded to the
house of Ram Buxani.  He and Mimang were
left in the car while Major de Guzman and Arsad went
inside the house.  In the meantime, Mr.
Dominic Simon and his wife arrived (Ibid. pp. 3467-3481).

He met Arsad and Mimang
the following day at the stairway near the tailoring shop called Stewart.  Arsad informed him
that he was thankful to Mr. Dominic Simon as
the latter promised to accompany him to Malacanang
to help him surrender and to give him one sack of rice every month if he will
help in rescuing Deborah (Ibid., pp. 3497-3500).  In the evening, they went to the house of
appellant Mangulabnan then proceeded to the house of
Ram Buxani with Major de Guzman (Ibid., pp.
3505-3512).

On cross examination, he
testified that Arsad was not really interested in the
ransom money but rather in Deborah’s rescue so that Mr. Dominic Simon would
help him in his surrender to the authorities (TSN, March 18, 1983, p.
294).  When he informed appellant Mangulabnan of such desire of Arsad,
he was told that they would take care of the matter after Deborah’s rescue,
that is, after they receive the ransom money (TSN, March 23, 1983, p. 309).

Upon the advice of appellant Mangulabnan,
he proceeded to Davao
after giving his testimony on April 8,
1982 (Ibid., p. 312). 
Appellant further informed him that if he is the one caught, there is possibility that he will divulge
everything (Ibid., p. 313).

The testimony of Abdul Manabilang that
appellant Mangulabnan acted as negotiator was
collaborated by Assemblyman Esteban Doruelo and Mr.
Dominic Simon, the father of the victim. 
The latter testified that in the morning of March 28, 1982, appellant Mangulabnan was at his house when Assemblyman Doruelo arrived and that he left ahead of the latter (TSN,
November 19, 1982, pp. 2959-2962).  He
further testified that Mangulabnan talked with him
about the ransom money and when he said that he can afford only P10,000.00, the
former answered “Ang liit naman” and “Wala na ba?”.  He then volunteered another P10,000.00 a week
after as he had to make more ice drops.  Mangulabnan replied that they would talk again (Ibid.,
pp. 2979-2980).  He also testified that,
upon the instructions of Mangulabnan, Assemblyman Doruelo asked him to prepare some clothes for his daughter
which the former would get from his place at about 2:00 in the afternoon (Ibid., p. 3023).

Assemblyman Doruelo testified that he
learned about the incident from his friends Mr. Celso
Ramos, Mr. Buxani, Dr. Uson
and Atty. Buenaflor on March 25, 1982 (TSN, November 17, 1982, pp.
5096-5097).  On March 28, 1982, he visited Mr. Dominic Simon to
check on the progress of the rescue operation. 
There were a lot of people at the latter’s house but he was able to
identify appellant Mangulabnan among the crowd.  He approached Mr. Simon with whom he talked
for about thirty minutes at the conference room.  Appellant Mangulabnan
was not around anymore when he went out of the conference room with Mr.
Simon.  He then left with the latter for
the office of Chairman Datumanong where another
conference was held for twenty minutes (Ibid., pp. 5100-5113).  Upon their return at the Simon residence, he
was informed by Angela, Mr. Dominic Simon’s daughter, that Mangulabnan’s
companion that morning was Mr. Arsad, one of the
rumored kidnappers of Deborah.  He left
for appellant’s residence to confirm the information (Ibid., pp.
5115-5119).

At Mangulabnan’s residence, there were
some people playing chess or mahjong that is why Mangulabnan
led him to the ground floor at the same time motioning to him to keep quiet (Ibid.,
pp. 5116-5121).  He asked Mangulabnan to help in the early release of Deborah.  In reply, Mangulabnan
asked him if Mr. Simon can produce P500,000.00. 
He answered that the sum is too big and that he thinks Mr. Simon does
not have that much money.  Mangulabnan then
answered back that then Deborah
would not be released.  In the course of
their conversation, the amount of ransom was lowered until finally Mangulabnan told him that for about P100,000.00, Deborah
might be released.  He then requested
witness to ask Mr. Simon to prepare some clothes for Deborah and a small amount
of money which he will pick up at about 2:00
in the afternoon at Mr. Simon’s house (Ibid., pp. 5123-5129).

The defense presented as witnesses:  Atty. Ali G. Bagundang,
accused Pablo Mangulabnan, Isagani
Lazaro, Dr. Romeo Magabilen,
Leo Palo, accused Guiamarodin Degan,
accused Sumael Salik,
accused Guiamel Bari, Dr.
Edwin Medansa, accused Abdullah Masiri,
Flordelita Mangulabnan,
accused Arsad Ugalingan,
accused Kadir Solaiman, and
Mindanao Cross Editor Patricio Diaz (Rollo, p. 57).

On his part, appellant Mangulabnan
admitted having worked as negotiator for the release of the victim but not for
personal monetary gains but because of the proddings
of Assemblyman John Hofer; to show gratitude to the victim’s father for past
favors and for his involvement in community affairs.  He, however, denied Abdul Manabilang’s
declaration that there was a meeting held in his house on March 22, 1982. 
He declared that at that time he was at the house of Dr. Magabilen attending the blow-out given by Isagani Lazaro (TSN, August 16,
1983, pp. 1442-1443).  He, however, did
not deny seeing Mr. Simon on March 28,
1982 but denied negotiating for the ransom money.  He testified that he may have inquired from
Mr. Simon how much he was willing to give as a reward for his daughter’s
release, but he did so only because he has not heard of any kidnapping where no
ransom was paid (Ibid., pp. 1386-1390).

The lower court rendered its decision on October 14, 1983, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

 “WHEREFORE, this Court
renders the following judgment as follows:

“1.  In connection with Guiamarodin
Degan and Sumael Salik they having been charged only as
accessories-after-the-fact, they
are therefore found not to have conspired in the commission of these crimes.

“It is a rule of law that if based on the evidence the accused can
either be convicted or acquitted, said accused should be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.

“They are therefore, both acquitted of the crime charged on ground
of reasonable doubt.

“2.  In the case of Pablo Mangulabnan,
Arsad Ugalingan, Kadir Solaiman, Abdullah Masiri and Guiamel Bari based on their individual participation as described
in the body of this decision, including the testimonies of all the prosecution’s witnesses which have been
incorporated as integral part of this dispositive
portion of the decision, they
are found to have conspired in the commission of this crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.

“They are therefore found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of said crimes and pursuant to Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, they are hereby sentenced to serve Life Imprisonment.*

“They are ordered to pay the costs of this case.

“SO ORDERED.”

(CFI Decision, Rollo,
pp. 169-170).

On October 24, 1983,
Mangulabnan filed a motion for new trial offering as
newly discovered evidence the alleged recantation statement of state witness
Abdul Manabilang given before the Presidential
Security Command, Malacanang
Palace.  The motion was however, denied by the lower
court (Appellee’s Brief, p. 21).

Thus, this appeal.

On July 9, 1984,
the Court granted the Motion of appellants Abdullah Masiri
and Guiamel Bari to
withdraw their appeal (Rollo, p. 242) and the Entry
of Judgment with respect to them was made on the same day (Ibid., p.
255).  The Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal of appellant Kadir Solaiman
was granted by the Court on November
19, 1984 (Ibid., p. 271) and the decision became final and executory with respect to him (Entry of Judgment, Rollo, p. 300). 
Appellant Arsad Ugalingan
likewise withdrew his appeal which this Court granted on May 7, 1990 (Ibid., p. 519).  Consequently, this appeal pertains to
appellant Pablo Mangulabnan only who was allowed to
post bail in the amount of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty on January 7,
1985 based on his counsel’s motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
July 30, 1984 which denied appellant’s petition for bail as well as the report
submitted by Dra. Carmen C. Valero, Chief of Clinics
of the Supreme Court Medical Clinic on the state of health of appellant Mangulabnan (Ibid., p. 290).

The appeal is devoid of merit.

It is undisputed that Deborah Simon, single and a student, was
kidnapped, as narrated by her in open court, by three (3) armed men from the Polar
Ice Drop Factory at Datu Piang
St., Cotabato City on March 24, 1982 at 7:30 in the
evening and was held captive and transferred to different places until her
rescue on April 18, 1982 where four (4) abductors, namely:  Esmael Unsa @ “Commander Sumakwel”, Ibrahim Dris @ “Guevarra”, Mansabok @ “Boni” and Taha Kamd @ “Bronson” were killed in the rescue operation.

The issue in the case at bar is whether or not the guilt of
appellant Mangulabnan has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

It has been held that it is for the trial court to determine the
existence of the requirements set out in Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court for the discharge of an accused for utilization as a state witness.  If the court is satisfied that the discharge
of one or more co-accused so that they could testify for the prosecution is
proper, that court may issue the order of discharge.  Once a co-accused is discharged and the
released witness actually testifies, any legal deficiency that might have
attended the discharge of the witness from the information does not affect the
admissibility and credibility of the testimony given, provided such testimony
is otherwise admissible and credible (Jariol, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, 188 SCRA 475 [August 13, 1990]).  It is likewise an estabished
rule that the Supreme Court regards with respect and will generally not disturb
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, unless certain
facts of substance and value have been overlooked which if considered, might
affect the result of the case (People vs. Dinola, 183
SCRA 493 [March 22, 1990]).  A careful
review of the records of this case shows no substantial reason to depart from
this established rule.

In finding appellant Mangulabnan
guilty, the trial court held that there was conspiracy.  Thus, it held:

“From the different acts of the accused starting from the meeting
that took place in the house of Pablo Mangulabnan,
first in the morning and secondly on the afternoon of March 22, 1982, attended
to by Arsad Ugalingan, Kadir Solaiman, Commander Sumakwel, Major de Guzman, and Pablo Mangulabnan
wherein Pablo Mangulabnan stated that any of the
children of Dominic Simon was to be kidnapped and they were to demand from the
victim’s parents ransom money in the amount of P500,000.00; the role of the
group of Commander Sumakwel was to execute the
physical kidnapping or snatching of the victim from the house of Dominic Simon;
the role of the group of Pablo Mangulabnan and Major
de Guzman was to act as the negotiators for their demand of the ransom money;
that Arsad and Mimang who
knew many officers and men of the military intelligence units were to act as
guides; that Ting Manabilang was to act as errand boy
to Commander Arsad Ugalingan;
that the actual kidnapping took place on March 24, 1982 per agreement reached
in the house of Pablo Mangulabnan, that on March 28,
1982, Pablo Mangulabnan went to the house of Dominic
Simon telling the latter that Deborah could be released for consideration of
P500,000.00; that per talk with Dominic Simon, Pablo Mangulabnan
decided to reduce said amount to only P300,000.00 and, later to even
P100,000.00; that when Dominic Simon stated he was not agreeable to the payment
of any ransom money for the release of his daughter Deborah but only the amount
of  P10,000.00 not as ransom but a reward
to whoever could release his daughter Deborah; that Pablo Mangulabnan
showed disappointment after hearing Dominic Simon offering only P10,000.00
after a week’s time; that notwithstanding the promise made by Major de Guzman
and Arsad Ugalingan in the
house of Ram Buxani in the presence of Mr. and Mrs.
Dominic Simon, and Assemblyman and Mrs. Doruelo that
Deborah would be released on time for her graduation; that because no ransom
money was paid, Deborah Simon was not released by the kidnappers who have her
in their custody; that all the while there were couriers who communicated with
the kidnappers, then with Ting Manabilang then to Arsad Ugalingan, then to Pablo Mangulabnan,
then to the parents of Deborah Simon communication continued back to Pablo Mangulabnan then to Arsad Ugalingan, then to Ting Manabilang;
then to the courier, then to Commander Sumakwel and
then to Deborah Simon, shows that there was really the presence of conspiracy
among them.” (CFI Decision, Rollo, pp. 166-167).

In People vs. Taaca, 178 SCRA 56
(September 29, 1989), this Court held that:

“A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.  The objective then on the part of the
conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law.  What is required is assent to the
perpetration of such a misdeed.  That
must be their intent.  There is need in the language of Justice Mapa in the early leading case of U.S.
vs. Magcomot, a 1909 decision, for ‘concurrence of
wills’ or ‘unity of action and purpose’. 
The usual phraseology employed
in many of the later cases is ‘common and joint purpose and design’.  At times reference is made to ‘previous
concert of criminal design’.  Its
manifestation could be shown by ‘united and concerted action’.  Thus, a conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence; it may be deducted from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated.  The conditions attending its commission and the acts
executed may be indicative of a common design to accomplish a criminal purpose
and objective.  If to use the apt words
of Chief Justice Bengzon, there is a ‘chain of circumstances’
to that effect, the conspiracy has been established.  If such be the case, the act of one is the
act of all the others involved and each is to be held to the same degree of
liability as the others.  So, it has been our constant ruling from the
1905 decision of U.S. vs. Mazu.” (People vs. Pudpud,
39 SCRA 618 [1971].  Quoted in People vs.
Tiongson, 47 SCRA 279 [1972]; People vs. Malilay, 63 SCRA
420 [1975]; People vs. Ogapay, 66 SCRA 209
[1975]).

Appellant faults the lower court in giving full credence to Abdul
Manabilang’s testimony which is “riddled with serious
doubts and improbabilities” and making it the basis of conviction (Appellant’s
Brief, p. 25).  The record shows,
however, that Manabilang’s testimony as to
appellant’s participation in the plot is but corroborative of the individual
testimonies Dominic Simon and Esteban Doruelo and Guiamil Bari’s extrajudicial
confession, all pointing to appellant as the person who masterminded the
victim’s abduction and demanded the payment of ransom for the girl’s release (Appellee’s Brief, p. 24).

Appellant’s defense of alibi that a meeting could not have been
held in his house on March 22, 1982
regarding the plan to kidnap Deborah Simon because he was at that time in the
house of Dr. Magabilen cannot be given credence.  Alibi is a weak defense.  In order to be given full faith and credit,
it must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt as to its
plausibility and verity.  The accused
must show not only that he was not at the place where the crime was committed
but it was impossible for him to be there (People vs. Albarillo,
188 SCRA 113 [July 30, 1990]
reiterating People vs. Tuando, 150 SCRA 3 [May 26, 1987] and People vs. Lucas,
G.R. No. 80102, [January 22, 1990]).  As
found by the trial court, the distance between the house of Dr. Magabilen and appellant’s house is fifty (50) to one
hundred (100) meters and can be negotiated even by walking in a very short
period of five (5) minutes (CFI Decision, Rollo, pp.
161-162).

Appellant’s contention that the court a quo erred
in not granting his motion for new trial is likewise bereft of merit.  As a general rule a motion for new trial will
not be granted if based on an affidavit of recantation of a witness whose
effect, is to free the appellant from participation in the commission of the
crime.  It would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the
witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another,
for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at
the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 
Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has
invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable (de Guzman vs.
IAC, 184 SCRA 128 [April 4, 1990]).

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that of the five appellants,
four have withdrawn their appeal.  It is
only herein appellant Pablo Mangulabnan who has taken
up the appeal.  It has been held that the
withdrawal of appeal by the co-accused shows acquiescence to the judgment of
conviction and an affirmation of the fact of the crime charged or a realization
that the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming, and that of the defense,
weak in the extreme (People vs. Taaca, supra.).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision dated October 14, 1983 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Judge Alejandro R. Leopando

* Later in the resolution of December 22, 1983, the petition in
G.R. No. 62798 was dismissed for lack of merit and set aside and the Temporary
Restraining Order dated February 14,
1982 was lifted.

* Should be reclusion perpetua
(People vs. Sabater, Feb. 28, 1978)