G.R. No. 65673. January 30, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ABELARDO PENILLOS Y LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO “BILLY” PENILLOS, MARIANO MARAÑO Y MENDEZ, JOSE NUYDA Y MARMEDA AND ROMEO NUYDA Y PEDROSA, ACCUS…
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City in
Criminal Case No. 2144 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Abelardo
Penillos, et al.”, promulgated on 28 September 1983, convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Attempted
Homicide pursuant to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of “reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.”
The information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal charges the
above-named accused with the crime of “Robbery with Homicide and
Attempted Homicide” committed as follows:
x x x
“That on or about the 31st day of July, 1981, in the City of
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another for a common purpose, with intent of gain (sic) and by means
of violence against or intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the spouses APRONIANO
LLADONES and EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES and once inside, forcibly take the
amount of P1,000.00 from the said spouses and by reason of or on
occasion of the robbery and with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted,
hogtied and stabbed APRONIANO LLADONES inflicting injuries upon the
latter which directly caused his untimely death; while EPIFANIA LOPEZ
LLADONES was hacked on her shoulder, thus accused commenced the
commission of the crime directly by overt acts but did not perform all
the acts of execution which could produce the crime of Homicide upon
said EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES by reason of causes other than their
spontaneous desistance.”[2]x x x
Only accused-appellant Abelardo Penillos was apprehended. The others
remain at large.[3]Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and
was given a separate trial.The court a quo summarized the evidence for the
prosecution, upon which it based its conviction of appellant, as
follows:x x x
“Four defendants are charged with the offense of ‘Robbery
with
Homicide and Attempted Homicide.’ Among them, only one was apprehended
and a separate trial was held. On June 18, 1982, defendant Abelardo
Penillos pleaded ‘Not Guilty.’The following facts are not disputed. On July 31, 1981, in
the
early hours of the evening or thereabouts (sic), at Sitio Naontogan,
Bariis, Legazpi (sic) City, Aproniano Lladones and spouse Epifania Lopez
were awakened as four (4) persons suddenly entered their house. The
intruders demanded money from the couple and when Aproniano Lladones
refused to accede he was carried outside his dwelling by the four
persons. He was later on found hogtied and lifeless suffering (sic) from
multiple stab wounds. His wife, Epifania Lladones Lopez was also hacked
with a bolo by one of the entrants (sic) as she tried to follow to find
out where her husband was being taken. The following morning Abelardo
Penillos was apprehended and after giving an extra-judicial confession,
the present complaint was filed against him and his co-conspirators,
Mariano Maraño, Romeo Nuyda and Jose Nuyda. The last three defendants
remained at large hence Abelardo Penillos was afforded a separate trial.Testifying for the prosecution, Epifania Lopez Lladones narrated
that on the night in question while she and her husband were asleep
inside their house they were awakened by the entry of four persons who
demanded money from them; that one of the intruders even sat on the
belly of her husband who was caught still lying down and at that moment
she was able to recognize one of them as Abelardo Penillos because of
the illumination coming from a kerosene lamp in the kitchen adjoining
the sala; that Abelardo Penillos was one of the four persons who brought
her husband outside the house and as she tried to follow she was hacked
by one of them whose identity she cannot tell; that she suffered a hack
wound and later on she came to know that her husband, hogtied, was
found dead from stab wounds; that she crawled in the dark to the house
of her neighbor Celerino Nudo who reported the incident to the barangay
captain who in turn lost no time in notifying the police authorities;
that recollecting the robbery she discovered the loss of P1,000.00 kept
in a bamboo basket and during the time she was confined at the hospital
she recognized Abelardo Penillos as one of the perpetrators when brought
to her for confrontation.Celerino Nudo also testifying recalls that in the evening of
July
31, 1981 Epifania Lopez then seriously injured from a hack wound arrived
at his house to seek his help regarding an incident in their house;
that she mentioned a certain Billy Penillos as one of the men who
forcibly entered their dwelling while they were asleep; that he at once
reported the matter to the barangay captain and rushed Epifania Lladones
to the hospital.”[4]x x x
Upon the other hand, appellant relied on alibi as his defense, which is
summarized by the trial court as follows:
“x x x Penillos testified that on July 31, 1981, he was in
the
house of his grandmother at Barangay Esperanza, Putiao, Sorsogon, in the
morning until six o’clock in the evening; that he left Barangay
Esperanza thereafter riding on a carabao sledge loaded with coconuts and
arrived at Barangay Imalnod, Legaspi City, a distance of about 4
kilometers at past eight o’clock in the evening; that he proceeded to
the house of his father-in-law where he spent the night because he was
already tired; that he was able to surmise the time of his arrival
because he overheard from the radio that the drama serial Zimatar had
just been concluded.”[5]
After trial, the lower court rendered the challenged decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x
“All the foregoing and EVIDENCE considered, and finding the
guilt
of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt, Abelardo ‘Billy’ Penillos @
Guillermo Penillos is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua or life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Aproniano
Lladones in the amount of P20,000; further, defendant to pay Epifania
Lopez Lladones the amount of P1,000.00, cash stolen, in both instances
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.Credit the defendant the full time of any preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with
law.”[6]x x x
Appellant immediately filed a Notice of Appeal[7]
wherein he manifested that he is appealing the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal
should have been made to this Court. The records of the case were
erroneously transmitted to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) which properly forwarded the same to this Court on 24
November 1983.[8]
On 20 December 1983, We required the appellant to file his
Brief,[9] which
he complied with on 16 July 1984[10] after being granted several extensions. The
appellee, on the other hand, submitted its Brief on 15 November
1984.[11]
Appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
“I
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY THE COMPLAINANT.II
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING
THE STATEMENT OF
APPELLANT GREAT WEIGHT WHEN SAID STATEMENT WAS TAKEN IN DEROGATION OF
APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF PROCEDURE
ESTABLISHED BY JURISPRUDENCE.”
In support of the first assigned error, appellant insists that Epifania
Lladones could not have made a proper identification of the offenders
because: (1) The only illumination at the scene of the incident was a
gas lamp which was placed in the kitchen. There were partitions between
both the kitchen and the sala and the sala and the bedroom where she and
her deceased husband were sleeping. There could not have been enough
light for her to properly recognize the accused. (2) Having just been
roused from sleep by one of the perpetrators who sat on the deceased’s
belly, she was most probably “in a state of shock or terror” and thus
positive identification of the accused is highly improbable. Besides,
she testified that the very reason for her rushing to the kitchen upon
waking up was to get the gas lamp in order to see who her husband’s
attacker was. (3) Even when Epifania was overtaken by the accused and
pinned under a table, visibility was still not sufficient as both were
still some distance from the kitchen, the only source of illumination.
(4) Finally, her claim that she had known the accused prior to the
incident should have compelled the latter to have at least worn a mask
so he would not be recognized.
Appellant also takes exception to the procedure undertaken by the police
authorities on the day after the incident when he was brought to the
hospital to be identified by Epifania Lladones. He laments that:
“The evidence for the prosecution also pointed out that on
the
following morning of the incident (August 1, 1981), Abelardo was made to
face Epifania while the latter was still confined at the Albay
Provincial Hospital for medical treatment of the hack wound she
sustained and that Epifania pointed to Abelardo as one of the
perpetrators of the offense charged. The defense submits that this
particular procedure undertaken by the police in showing the victim,
Epifania, a single person and asking her whether or not that man is one
of those who perpetrated the offense, is most unfair and violative of
the constitutional rights of the accused. The proper procedure should
have been an identification in a line-up, whereby the suspect is made to
line up with other persons who are not suspects at all, and then the
victim is asked to point to whoever he or she recognizes as the
perpetrator of the offense.”[12]
Anent the second assigned error, appellant claims that his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to be entitled to counsel and to
be informed of such rights “had no longer any meaning or purpose.” This
is because before giving his confession to the police investigator, he
was interviewed by other policemen. The prosecution failed to show that
in the said interview, the accused was apprised of his constitutional
rights. He further avers that he initially disclaimed any responsibility
for the crime but when manhandled, boxed and struck with a piece of
wood on the head, he was forced to confess. Thus, the confession he
prepared on 1 August 1981 (Exh. “B”) is a mere formality in spite of his
having been informed by the police investigator during the formal
investigation of his constitutional rights.
And even conceding the absence of coercion during the initial interview,
the signed confession would still be inadmissible as it does not appear
that a valid waiver of the right to counsel was made by the accused.
In the People’s Brief, the Solicitor General asserts the view that the
principal issue to be resolved is whether or not the appellant was
sufficiently identified as one of the culprits responsible for the
offense.
Appellee avers, and We agree, that Epifania was able to sufficiently
identify Abelardo Penillos as the person who sat on her husband’s belly
and demanded money from her. She testified that she was able to
recognize Penillos when the latter pinned her down under the table; such
identification was aided by her having known Penillos long before the
incident, when the latter would go to the Lladones’ house.[13] She was even able to
declare that Penillos was wearing short pants at the time of the
commission of the crime.[14]
Furthermore, the illumination provided by the kerosene lamp was enough
for Epifania to have recognized Penillos. This Court has held in the
past that illumination produced by kerosene (gasera) lamps is sufficient
for the identification of persons.[15] Where conditions of visibility are favorable,
the ability of a witness to identify the malefactor should be
upheld.[16]
The frenetic efforts of the appellant’s counsel to cast doubt on the
positive identification by Epifania, characterized by attempts to
mislead the latter, proved to be a bad gamble for it only provided the
prosecution a rare opportunity to elicit the details for the positive
identification, to wit:
“Q How were you able to say that it was Billy Penillos who
sat on
the stomach of your husband and pointed the knife when you said there
were two persons present inside your bedroom?A I recognized him; he was then wearing short-pant while his other
companions was (sic) wearing long pants.Q And according to you after you ran away to get the lamp in the
kitchen — before you reached the kitchen, Billy Penillos twisted your
arm and pinned you under a table. Is that correct?FISCAL:
No. It is misleading, Your Honor please, because she was already in
the kitchen. Before she could get hold of the lamp, that was the time
when Abelardo Penillos twisted her right arm, she was already in the
kitchen.COURT:
Witness may answer. She is under cross-examination.
A He placed me under the table.
BENDAÑA:
Q And it was under the table that you recognized the face of Billy
Penillos?A While inside, I already recognized him inside. Before I have
(sic) already recognized him.Q Did you not testify a while ago that you ran towards the kitchen
to get a lamp, so that, you can recognize the persons inside the room?A Yes, sir.
Q And do you want to impress the (sic) Court that before you could
get the lamp from the kitchen, you were already able to recognize Billy
Penillos?A Yes, sir.
Q And you were able to recognize Billy Penillos although at that
time you were running towards the kitchen and Billy Penillos was behind
inasmuch as he was sitting on the stomach of your husband?A Yes. I already recognized him.
Q So, your statement a while ago that you prefer (sic) in giving to
the kitchen to get a lamp was to recognize who the persons were inside
your house is not correct?A He was the very first one to get inside the house while his
companions who were wearing long pants followed him. So I tried to
recognize them.Q Is there a partition between the kitchen and your room?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said the lamp is (sic) situated inside the kitchen?
A Yes, sir, because there was (sic) a door leading to that place.
Q How far is the kitchen to your bed?
A Very near.
Q But the direct light of the lamp is (sic) being obstructed by the
partition separating the bedroom and the kitchen?A The gas lamp was situated near the door.
Q Is it the door of the room or near the door of the kitchen?
A Near the door of the sala.
Q So, you are now telling the Court that the lamp is (sic) near the
sala, and not in the kitchen?A It is (sic) inside the kitchen but near the door leading to the
sala.Q But your bedroom is inside a room which has a partition separating
it from the sala. Is there a partition?A Yes, sir.
Q So, you were not able to recognize the companions of Abelardo
Penillos?A No, sir. I was not able to recognize the companions of Abelardo
Penillos because when Abelardo Penillos ran to hold my husband and then
suddenly his companions entered.[17]x x x
Q So, the only moment that you were able to recognize Billy Penillos
was while you were inside the room, and while Abelardo Penillos was
demanding from you some money while you were being pinned under the
table?A Yes, sir.
Q And in these two instances where (sic) according to you, you
recognized the face of Abelardo Penillos, first, when you were in the
room, the room was still dark because the lamp was in the kitchen. Is
that correct?A Yes, sir.
Q And the second time that you recognized Billy Penillos was while
you were being pinned under the table; and under the table it was also
dark at that time. Is that correct?A No, not dark, because the light from the kitchen was illuminating
the place wherein I was being pinned under the table. It was not dark.Q The table where you said you were pinned by Abelardo Penillos, how
far was it from the kitchen?A About two meters.
Q How big is this table?
A It is small, we use it for our eating purposes.”[18]
This Court cannot yield to the postulations of the appellant that
Penillos would have worn a mask during the incident knowing as he did
that Epifania was familiar with him and that the latter was impelled by
evil motives in implicating him in the commission of the offense.
The first theory assumes that the wearing of masks to hide one’s
identity is a universal practice resorted to by criminals who are known
to their prospective victims and who exercise utmost prudence and care
in ensuring that no witness would be able to identify them while
committing a crime. These assumptions are, of course, without any
empirical basis and are, at best, speculative. On the other hand, the
evil motive ascribed to Epifania by reason of an alleged prior verbal
exchange between Penillos and her is a mere figment of the former’s
imagination. Such verbal disagreement allegedly arising from the refusal
by Epifania to allow Penillos to use her yard as a pathway, even if
true, is inconsequential, trivial and insufficient to move one to accuse
another of committing robbery with homicide.
With his positive identification, appellant’s defense of alibi must
fail.
We defer to the conclusion by the court a quo that the protestations of
the appellant “held in contrast with the positive identification made by
Epifania Lopez on his complicity in the commission of the offense could
not provide a justifiable ground to extricate him.”[19]
Appellant testified that between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on 31 July
1981, the day of the incident, he was travelling by carabao from Sitio
Esperanza to Nauntogan, the place of the incident, a distance of about
four (4) kilometers. He was allegedly accompanied by one Victor Maraño.
Arriving at his destination at around 8:00 p.m., he proceeded to the
house of his father-in-law, co-accused Mariano Maraño, which is about
thirty (30) meters away from the residence of the victims. At the house
of Mariano, appellant also encountered his other co-accused, Jose Nuyda
and Romeo Nuyda. While having supper therein, appellant overheard
Mariano and the Nuydas talking about something that they would divide
among themselves.[20]
Appellee easily demolishes this defense by alleging that: Penillos
alleged travel from Esperanza to Nauntogan was not even corroborated by
his supposed companion, Victor Maraño, who was not presented as a
witness; Penillos’ presence at the house of his co-accused, a mere
thirty (30) meters away from the scene of the crime, militates against
his defense in view of the positive identification by Epifania; and that
it was not physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the
place of the incident during the commission of the crime.
Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over a positive
identification made by a prosecution witness.[21]
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere when the crime was committed but that he must also demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime.[22]
Appellant also questions the manner in which he was initially identified
by Epifania Lladones in the hospital while the latter was recuperating
from her injury. The former contends that the procedure for conducting a
police line-up should have been strictly followed. In People vs.
Espiritu,[23] We
ruled that
there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. Clearly then, this argument must also fail.
And now on the second assigned error. In respect to the allegation that
the signed confession (Exh.”B”) was defective and should not have been
admitted in evidence, the appellee practically concedes the irregularity
when it avers thus:
x x x
“From the record, it appears that appellant’s sworn
statement was
executed in a manner not in full accord with his right to the assistance
of counsel. This may be been in the preliminary portion of the sworn
statement, in which appellant was:‘x x x reminded that under the new rules of the Constitution
you
have the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel of your
own choice. You are also reminded that whatever you say here might be
used for or against you in any court proceedings. Is this clearly
understood by you?Answer: Yes sir.
Question: After having been informed of your constitutional rights do
you wish to proceed with this investigation?Answer: Yes sir.
Question: Are you ready to give a free voluntary statement?
Answer: Yes sir. (Folder of Exhibits, p. 2).’
Neither the preliminary portion aforecited nor the testimony of the
investigating officer showed an affirmative offer to provide appellant
with counsel de oficio if he could not retain counsel of his choice.
Consequently, the sworn statement may very well be inadmissible and may
not be utilized against appellant.”[24]
Indeed it does not appear that constitutional safeguards afforded an
accused under investigation for the commission of an offense were
complied with. Aside from the Solicitor General’s observations, it is
clear that waiver of the right to counsel was not made in the presence
of counsel. On cross?examination, police investigator Demosthenes
Martillano testified:
x x x
“COURT:
Q Why did you not place in the investigation that the witness is
waiving his right to a (sic) counsel?A That is my error.
BENDAÑA:
Q Why? What do you mean by that answer of yours that it was your
error? Will you please explain to us that answer of yours?A All I know is that if the suspect does not need a counsel, I
think, it was (sic) also suffice.Q Tell the court whether or not during the investigation Billy
Penillos did not waive his right to a (sic) counsel?FISCAL:
It is already stated, Your Honor please, in his statement that when
the affiant chose to proceed with the investigation, to answer all
questions, he in effect is waiving his right to a (sic) counsel after
having been informed of all his rights.x x x
COURT:
The witness had already admitted that he did not place specifically that
portion of waiver. But it does not mean that he did not ask the
suspect. It is a matter of interpretation how you are going to interpret
that portion of your question. The court under that respect will
sustain the objection of the Fiscal.”[25]
x x x
Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.[26] The
same would necessarily apply to a waiver of the right to counsel not
made in the presence of counsel.
In Morales vs. Enrile, et al.,[27] this Court, applying and
interpreting Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which
provides as follows:
“SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence.”
laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial interrogation
and ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel, thus:
“7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of
the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.”
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit,[28] People vs. Lumayok,[29] People vs.
Albofera[30] and
People vs. Marquez.[31]
In view therefore of the law and jurisprudence, the sworn statement of
appellant, Exhibit “B”, is hereby declared inadmissible in evidence and
should have been rejected by the trial court even if it is not in fact a
confession for, as correctly observed by the People, it is exculpatory
in nature. Just the same, since it was taken in violation of appellant’s
constitutional right to counsel, its exculpatory character did not cure
the fatal defect.
We wish to underscore that Section 12(1) of Article III of the present
Constitution has gone further to protect, promote and enhance the right
to counsel of any person under investigation by expressly providing that
such is a right “to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice” and that it “cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.”
Be that as it may, We affirm the judgment of conviction by the trial
court on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Concluded the lower court: “The truth and as clearly borne
by the evidence is: the defendant was among the perpetrators of the
heinous offense. The robbery, left in its wake the death of Aproniano
Lladones and the wounding of his wife Epifania Lopez Lladones.”[32]
A trial court’s findings of facts carry great weight for it has the
privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and,
therefore, can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or
not.[33]
In the light of the evidence presented in the proceedings below, We do
not see any reason to disturb the lower court’s factual conclusions.
We, however, modify the designation of the offense the appellant was
convicted for on the basis of the information prepared by the then
assistant city fiscal. The information should have charged the appellant
simply with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has consistently held
that this offense is denominated as such regardless of the number of the
homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely serve
as generic aggravating circumstances which can be offset by other
mitigating circumstances.[34] There is no crime of robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide[35] or robbery with homicide and attempted
homicide.[36]
The term “homicide” in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code is to be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and
slight physical injuries committed during the robbery which crimes are
merged in the crime of robbery with homicide.[37]
The trial court, however, should have taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery
with homicide because this type of robbery could be committed without
the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home.[38]
It is indisputably clear from the pleadings and the decision of the
trial court that although the homicide was committed outside the house
of the deceased, the principal offense of robbery was perpetrated
inside; the killing thus occurred as a result of the initial evil design
to steal.
The penalty for robbery with homicide and physical injuries defined
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, the greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied.[39]
However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty, the appellant
is entitled to the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the
trial court imposed the penalty of “reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.” Evidently, it considered the latter as the English
translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and
distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio,[40] this Court held:
“The Code[41] does not
prescribe the penalty of ‘life imprisonment’ for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious
offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws.
Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years
after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries
with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification,
etc. It is not the same as ‘life imprisonment’ which, for one thing,
does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not
appear to have any definite extent or duration.”
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe,[42] reiterated in People vs. Pilones[43] and in the
concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic,[44]
this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the
same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge should
take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no
trial judge should mistake one for the other.
Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court, the award of
civil indemnity in the amount of P20,000.00 is increased to
P50,000.00.[45]
WHEREFORE, except as modified in its
dispositive portion to specify that appellant Abelardo Penillo’s penalty
is to be reclusion perpetua,
to remove the alternative reference therein to “life imprisonment” and
to increase the indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones to be paid
by him to the heirs of said deceased, the judgment of the trial court
in Criminal Case No. 2144 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. The
attempted homicide aspect of the charge is likewise deemed absorbed in
one special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and the civil
indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and
Romero, JJ., concur.
[1] Original
Records, 124-129; Rollo, 8-13. The decision is dated 15 September 1983.
[2] Original
Records, 1-2; Rollo, 6-7.
[3] Id.,124.
[4] Decision of
trial court, 1-3; Original Records, 124-126.
[5] Rollo,10-11.
[6] Rollo, 129.
[7] Id., 132.
[8] Id., 3.
[9] Id., 26.
[10] Id., 39.
[11] Id., 68.
[12] Rollo, 46.
[13] TSN, 6
October 1982, 8.
[14] Id., 17.
[15] People vs.
Almenario, 172 SCRA 268; People vs. Reana, 120 SCRA 583.
[16] People vs.
Espejo, 186 SCRA 627.
[17] TSN, 6
October 1982, 17-20.
[18] Id., 23-24.
[19] Rollo, 12.
[20] TSN, 23 June
1983, 3-6.
[21] People vs.
Clores, 184
SCRA 638; People vs. Arceo, 187 SCRA 265 People vs. Esparcia, 187 SCRA
282; People vs. Ampo-an, 187 SCRA 173; People vs. Cagalingan, 188 SCRA
313; People vs. Marapao, 188 SCRA 243; People vs. Mandal, 188 SCRA 526;
People vs. Tenebro, 191 SCRA 363; People vs. Tasarra, 192 SCRA 266.
[22] People vs.
Arceo,
supra.; People vs. Paringit, 189 SCRA 478; People vs. Gupo, 190 SCRA 7;
People vs. Yeban, 190 SCRA 409; People vs. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754; People
vs. Mañago, 191 SCRA 552.
[23] 191 SCRA
503.
[24] Appellee’s
Brief, 12-13.
[25] TSN, 17
December 1982, 21-23.
[26] People vs.
Repe, 175 SCRA 422.
[27] 121 SCRA 538
(1983).
[28] 135 SCRA 465
(1985).
[29] 139 SCRA 1
(1985).
[30] 152 SCRA 123
(1987).
[31] 153 SCRA 700
[32] Rollo, 12.
[33] People vs.
Rehejane, 158
SCRA 258; People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401; People vs. Capulong, 160
SCRA 533; People vs. Caboverde 160 SCRA 550; People vs. Temblor, 161
SCRA 623.
[34] People vs.
Nunag, 196
SCRA 206. See also People vs. Pedroso, 115 SCRA 599; People vs. Mateo,
Jr., 179 SCRA 303; People vs. Repuela, 183 SCRA 244.
[35] People vs.
Ga y Esplanada, 186 SCRA 790.
[36] GREGORIO,
Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., 523.
[37] People vs.
Ga y EspIanada, supra.
[38] People vs.
Gapasin, 145
SCRA 178, citing People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Cabato, 160
SCRA 98; People vs. Dajaresco, 129 SCRA 576.
[39] Article
63(1), Revised Penal Code
[40] 196 SCRA 459
(1991).
[41] The Revised
Penal Code.
[42] 81 Phil. 58.
[43] 84 SCRA 167.
[44] 113 SCRA 689
[45] People vs.
Bison, 189 SCRA 643; People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700; People v. Baguio,
supra.