PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FIDEL MATEO, RENE AMBROCIO, EDWIN AGLUGOB, FLORANTE MARTINEZ AND ELMER DAJUGAR, ACCUSED, ELMER DAJUGAR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is a murder case. In the early morning of October 9, 1981, the dead
body of Manuel Pascual, 34, a tricycle driver, was found by the police
near the bridge or creek east of the Mariano Marcos State University
Compound (Normal School) in Laoag City (Exh. M). It had thirteen
incised and stab wounds (Exh. A). The victim was killed the night before
(Exh. P).

His tricycle was found on the shoulder of the road south of the Barit
Elementary School of the city (Exh. F-1). A bolo was found a few meters
from the tricycle in the field planted to kangkong (Exh. E).

About two weeks later, or on October 23, 1981, five suspects, Fidel
Mateo, 20, Elmer Dajugar, 18, Rene Ambrocio, 15, Florante Martinez, 15,
and Edwin Aglugob, 15, were arrested. Their confessions were taken
(Exhs. H to L).

According to their extrajudicial confessions, the five accused boarded
the tricycle of Pascual at about five o’clock in the afternoon of
October 8, 1981 at the bus terminal. They went to Juman’s Eatery at
Pasiocan, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. They invited Pascual to drink gin with
them. They got drunk.

They returned to the city with Pascual driving his tricycle. Mateo
allegedly concocted the idea of killing Pascual because the latter had
boxed him sometime in July, 1981. They stopped the tricycle in Barangay
Barit on the street leading to the city mayor’s residence.

Dajugar boxed Pascual while Martinez stabbed him. To avoid further
assault, Pascual ran and shouted for help. They caught up with him and
stabbed him until he fell on the concrete road. Dajugar and Martinez
loaded him in his tricycle and dumped his body east of the Don Mariano
Marcos State University (Exh. H to L-4 and M).

The trial court said that what precipitated the assault was the refusal
of Pascual to enter the road leading to the city mayor’s residence. He
feared that they would harm him. As Pascual was good in karate and was
armed and as he was reminded that he had previously boxed Mateo, Pascual
attacked the accused. They retaliated by killing him.

Aside from the confessions, the prosecution offered the eyewitness
testimony of Froilan Ramirez, 16. He testified that he knows accused
Mateo. He knows also Aglugob who was his classmate in the elementary
grades. At around nine o’clock in the evening of October 8, 1981, while
he was in front of his parents’ house at Barrio Pandan, Laoag City, near
the highway leading to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, he saw Pascual running,
pursued by Mateo, Aglugob and a third person. The scene was illuminated
by a light from the office of the National Power Corporation (See sketch
prepared by Ramirez, Exh. N, p. 119, Record).

A tricycle with a driver and a passenger was following them. He did not
recognize the driver and passenger of the tricycle. The three pursuers
were able to overtake Pascual. They repeatedly stabbed and hacked him.
Then, they loaded him in the tricycle. The sidecar number of the
tricycle was 640.

The five accused were charged on November 12, 1981 with murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with “the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength (and) nighttime and the alternative aggravating circumstance of drunkenness” (p. 1, Record).

After the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had presented
the testimonies of Mateo and Dajugar about their alibis, or at the
hearing on July 20, 1983, the three accused, Ambrocio, Aglugob and
Martinez, all fifteen-year olds at the time of the commission of the
crime, changed their plea of not guilty to guilty.

They were rearraigned. The trial judge interrogated them. In answer to
the judge’s questions, Aglugob answered that he was one of the killers
of Pascual, that the killing was the offshoot of his drunkenness and
that he felt in his conscience that he was guilty (184 tsn).

Ambrocio admitted that he was one of the killers of Pascual and he
informed his parents of that fact. He was ready to suffer the
consequences of his act (184-5, tsn).

But Martinez changed his mind. He told the court that he had no
participation in the killing of Pascual. So, although he had changed his
plea to guilty, this was withdrawn and his former plea of not guilty
was restored (186 tsn).

On the same day, July 20, 1983, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Ambrocio and Aglugob guilty but suspended sentence on the two
and committed them to the custody of the Laoag City branch of the
Ministry of Social Services and Development.

Trial was continued as to Mateo, Dajugar and Martinez. In its decision
of July 29, 1983, the trial court found them guilty of murder, sentenced
Mateo and Dajugar to reclusion perpetua and ordered the three
accused to pay solidarily an indemnity of P43,496 to the heirs of the
victim, Manuel Pascual (Criminal Case No. 1751).

Mateo did not appeal. Martinez was also committed to the Laoag City branch of the Ministry of Social Services and Development. Only Dajugar appealed.

Dajugar contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in admitting
his confession, considering that he was maltreated and that he was not
informed by the investigator that if he could not get a lawyer he would
be provided with one to assist him. The Solicitor General recommends
Dajugar’s acquittal on that ground (People vs. Pascual, G. R. No. 53403,
November 12, 1981, 109 SCRA 197, 205). Without his confession, there is
allegedly no evidence as to his complicity in the killing.

Article IV of the Constitution provides:

“SEC. 20. – No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in
evidence.”

Section 20 on its face requires that the accused under custody should be
advised that he has the right to remain silent and the right to be
assisted by counsel. It should be noted that article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, provides that “in every case, the person
detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with
his attorney or counsel.” (See sec. 11, Rule 112, Rules of Court.)

However, in Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 16 L. ed. 694 (a
five-to-four decision, said to be an “earthquake in the world of law
enforcement” and a “handcuff on the police”), it was held that “in order
fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights
under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has
the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.” (p. 723, Syllabus No. 33.)

In this case, in the confession of appellant Dajugar, he was merely
informed of his right “to remain silent and to hire a lawyer to assist”
him. (Preliminary Question, Exh. K-4.) Dajugar was 18 years old, who
finished third year high school. He said in his confession that he “used
a scout knife in stabbing” Pascual. (No. 5, Exh. K-4.)

Appellant’s contention might be tenable if only his confession would be taken into account. However, there are five (5) extrajudicial confessions in this case.
In the three (3) confessions of Ambrocio, Aglugob and Mateo, all taken
by Patrolman R. A. Ventura, the following admonition is found (Exh. H, I
and J):

“6. Q – If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, we can hire one
so that he will assist you during your investigation? A – No more, sir,
as I will be telling the truth.”

In the case of Dajugar, the investigator apprised him of his right to
remain silent and to have counsel and then gave him this warning:

“Question: I am also informing you that your statement may be used
as evidence in favor or against you in any Court, do you still want to
continue giving your statement without a lawyer to assist you? – Answer:
Yes, sir.” (Exh. K-4.)

The rule is that “extrajudicial confessions, independently made without
collusion, which are identical with each other in their essential
details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible
as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the
probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of
the crime” (People vs. Condemena, L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910,
919).

“While confessions of a co-conspirator are not ordinarily
admissible as evidence against another co-conspirator, the fact that
they implicate the latter and were made soon after the commission of the
crime, is circumstantial evidence to show the probability of their
co-conspirator having actually participated therein.” (People vs.
Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084.)

The admissibility of the four confessions of Dajugar’s co-accused is not in question in this appeal.
The recitals therein as to Dajugar’s involvement in the case, which are
partly corroborated by Ramirez’ testimony, are evidence against
Dajugar.

His counsel contends that the lower court erred in convicting Dajugar on
the basis of his confession, that he is not guilty of murder, that
treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity, abuse of superior strength
and drunkenness were not aggravating and that he is entitled to a
one-degree reduction of his penalty because he was less than eighteen at
the time of the killing. He was born on October 11, 1963 (60 tsn August
12, 1982).

We hold that there is sufficient evidence proving that appellant Dajugar
was a co-principal in the killing. It was qualified by abuse of
superiority. The fiscal was mistaken in characterizing it as generic
aggravating. The five accused ganged up on Pascual. The latter as a
tricycle driver had imprudently joined the five accused in the drinking
spree.

The circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, which were
alleged in the information as qualifying, were not proven. Intoxication,
which was nonhabitual and unintentional, is mitigating.

At the time of the commission of the crime, Dajugar was below eighteen.
He was exactly 17 years, 11 months and 28 days old. Therefore, he is
entitled to a one-degree reduction of his penalty (Art. 68, Re­vised
Penal Code). The maximum of his indeterminate sentence should be taken
from prision mayor maximum; the minimum, from prision correccional maximum.

Considering all the circumstances of this case, particularly that
Dajugar’s participation in the assassination was due to camaraderie (barkada),
drunkenness and teenage indiscretion, he may be paroled after serving
his minimum sentence, if he satisfies the other legal requirements.

WHEREFORE, appellant Dajugar is sentenced to four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. In other respects, the lower court’s judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., (Chairman), dissent on the grounds stated by the Solicitor General.

Abad Santos, J., in the result.