🎧 Case Brief Lecture

TOMAS AVERIA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, IN HER CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH LVII, LUCENA CITY, AND…

G.R. No. 65129. December 29, 1986 December 29, 1986

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Averia versus Caguioa

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Tomas Averia, Junior against Judge Milagros Caguioa, in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, and against the private respondent who sought registration of a deed of sale. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul the trial court's order directing registration of the deed of sale over a parcel of land, on the ground that the trial court, acting as a cadastral court, had no jurisdiction to act because the registration was seriously opposed by an antecedent contract to sell. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between the old, limited jurisdiction of courts acting as cadastral courts under the Land Registration Act and the expanded jurisdiction conferred by the Property Registration Decree, and because it reminds every litigant and every judge that a party may not be denied the opportunity to be heard on a question of jurisdiction he has timely raised.

Procedural History

The private respondent filed a registration proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Lucena City, acting as a cadastral court. The petitioner, as oppositor, refused to participate in the hearing, claiming that the court had no competence to act under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act absent unanimity among the parties. The trial court proceeded to hear the case ex parte and rendered a decision dated September 23, 1983, ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, raising a pure question of law. The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition and issued a temporary restraining order on October 5, 1983.

Facts

The private respondent sought the registration of a deed of sale covering a parcel of land. The petitioner opposed the registration, invoking an antecedent contract to sell, and took the position that the serious objection converted the matter into a contentious controversy that could not be resolved in a summary registration proceeding.

On that ground, the petitioner refused to take part in the hearing before the trial court, manifesting his intention to bring the question of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. The trial court nevertheless proceeded with the hearing ex parte, received only the evidence of the private respondent, and rendered its decision ordering registration.

The petitioner came to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court had no competence to act because of the absence of unanimity among the parties, relying on the doctrine laid down in Fojas versus Grey. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had already been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which took effect on June 11, 1979.

Issues

  • Whether or not the trial court, acting as a cadastral court, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the registration of a deed of sale that was opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.
  • Whether or not the trial court acted with due process in deciding the case ex parte after the petitioner had manifested his intention to elevate the question of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Presidential Decree Number 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceeding; jurisdiction of courts. - Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

This provision is the decisive text: it confers on the regional trial courts jurisdiction not only over original registration but over all petitions filed after original registration, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions, and thereby removes the old limitation that confined cadastral courts to uncontested matters.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did have jurisdiction. The doctrine in Fojas versus Grey, that summary relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act may be granted only where there is unanimity among the parties or no adverse claim or serious objection, was a correct interpretation of the old law but was not applicable, because the case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Registration Decree. The Court explained that the new provision eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction it formerly held when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change simplified registration proceedings by conferring authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 108 of the Property Registration Decree, the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction. Under the amended law, the court is authorized to hear and decide not only non-controversial cases but even contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in proceeding ex parte. It appeared that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case notwithstanding the petitioner's manifestation of his intention to elevate the question of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. The trial court should have given him the opportunity to do so in the interest of due process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As it happened, the trial court arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.

Doctrine

Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title and over all petitions filed after original registration, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The limited jurisdiction of a cadastral court under the Land Registration Act, which allowed relief only where there was unanimity among the parties or no adverse claim or serious objection, has been eliminated. A court may now hear and decide contentious and substantial issues in registration proceedings, and the Fojas versus Grey rule no longer confines it. Separately, due process requires that a party who has manifested his intention to elevate a question of jurisdiction to a higher court be given the opportunity to do so, pending a categorical ruling on the issue, and a decision rendered ex parte without regard to his evidence cannot stand.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered a new trial at which the petitioner and other interested parties shall be given the opportunity to be heard, lifting the temporary restraining order except as to the registration of the questioned deed of sale, which shall depend on the outcome of the case.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the Property Registration Decree eliminated the limited jurisdiction of cadastral courts, so regional trial courts may now hear and decide even contentious and substantial issues in registration proceedings. Examiners use this case to test the shift from the Land Registration Act to the Property Registration Decree and to test due process where a party is denied the chance to pursue a jurisdictional objection.