G.R. No. 65072. January 31, 1984
APOLINAR R. ROYALES AND PRESENTACION GREGORIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE PLANAS, HON. J. CESAR SANGCO, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
ESCOLIN, J.:
executory judgment rendered by the City Court [now Metropolitan Trial
Court] of Manila in Civil Case No. 057662-CV on ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Jose Planas,
plaintiff therein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process before
the filing of the case in court, as required by P.D. 1508, otherwise
known as the “Katarungang Pambarangay Law.”
The facts upon which this issue rests are the following: The spouses
Apolinar R. Royales and Presentacion Gregorio, petitioners herein, are
the lessees of a residential house owned by respondent Jose Planas
located at No. 1866 Int. I, Oroquieta St., Manila. On August 25, 1980,
Planas instituted before the then City Court of Manila an ejectment suit
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 057662-CV and assigned
to the sala of Judge J. Cesar Sangco.
Issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. Respondent
Planas testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined by
petitioners’ counsel.
On November 10, 1981, when neither petitioners nor their counsel
appeared at the hearing despite due notice, the case, on motion of
respondent Planas, was considered submitted for decision. On November
26, 1981, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby accordingly rendered ordering
defendants and all persons holding or claiming under them to immediately
vacate the house located at No. 1866 Int. I Oroquieta Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, subject of this action and restore possession thereof to
the plaintiff and to pay the latter;“1. The sum of P1,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
“2. The costs of suit.”
After the decision had become final and executory, Planas filed a motion
for execution and the same was granted by the court. Execution of the
judgment was however restrained by the Regional Trial Court of Manila
upon the filing by petitioners of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, wherein they assailed the said
decision on ground of lack of jurisdiction, allegedly arising from
failure of respondent Planas to submit the dispute to the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation as required by P.D. 1508.
After due hearing, the Regional Trial Court handed down a decision
declaring the judgment of the trial court null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. Having found that “the parties in the
case are residents not only of the same city, but of the same barangay,
i.e., Bgy. 336, Zone 34, District 2, City of Manila,” the Court ruled:
“Like the court of origin, this court is equally barren of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the subject controversy which was
prematurely filed with the city court, even before it could be referred
to the barangay authorities for conciliation, as explicitly required
under P.D. 1508, something the private respondent admittedly failed to
do. The failure to allow the LUPON to act on the controversy at bar
prior to the institution of the instant ejectment case did render the
city court, and even this court, devoid of competence and jurisdiction
to pass upon the present complaint of private respondent. There is,
therefore, no recourse left but to dismiss it, without prejudice to
refiling it after due observance of the formalities prescribed by law on
the matter.”
Reconsideration of the decision having been denied, respondent Planas
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which on July 12, 1982
promulgated a decision vacating the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, thus confirming the decision of the City Court of Manila. Unable
to obtain a reconsideration thereof, petitioners filed the instant
petition before this Court.
The petition is devoid of merit.
In disputes covered by P.D. 1508, as in the case at bar, the barangay
conciliation process is a pre-condition for the filing of an action in
court. This is so provided by Section 6 of the said law:
“Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. –
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter with
in the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in Court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
had been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman or unless the
settlement has been repudiated. x x x.”
There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the complaint, the case
was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. In fact,
respondent Planas failed to allege in his complaint compliance with this
condition precedent. But is this omission fatal?
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by
P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack
of cause of action or prematurity[1]
; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the
defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they
instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and
seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in
the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which
they had submitted themselves voluntarily. As this Court ruled in
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:[2]
“. . . . . . a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86, A.L.R. 79).“In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.“Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits,
it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court …. And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said
that ‘it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. -SP-00342 is hereby
affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., see separate concurrence.
[1] Johnston Lumber Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeal, 101 Phil. 151; De Guzman vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 30 SCRA 857.
[2] 23 SCRA 29.
CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
A simple ejectment case has gone all the way to this Court and assigned
not to a Division thereof but to the Banc on what appears to be a legal
question of some novelty but which to me does not deserve the treatment
accorded to it. I think it is enough that the case has gone before the
City Court, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals. But
having reached this Court and for this Court only to affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals, a simple denial of the petition instead of the
full treatment given to it would have been sufficient and more
appropriate.