ARTEX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NORIEL GONZALES AND CLARITA BENSON, RESPONDENTS.

This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the National Labor
Relations Commission resolution dated August
4, 1982 denying petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated May 7, 1981,
directing the petitioner to reinstate the two (2) private respondents to their former positions in the
company, with full backwages.

On April 2, 1980, the private respondents filed individual
complaints against the Artex Development Co., Inc.
(“the Company” for brevity) for illegal dismissal, docketed as NCR-STF-4-2100-80,
later NCR Case No. AB-4-5446-80.

Noriel Gonzales
who had been employed since 1974 as a doffer in the company’s Spinning
Department, was dismissed on March 14,
1980, for alleged abandonment of duty and gambling, based on
reports from his supervisors, Marciano Ilaya, and a Mr. Escleto without
being given an opportunity to refute those charges.

The other complainant, Clarita Benson, a regular worker of the
company until December 14, 1980, was laid off because of a pre-announced
temporary shut-down of the factory starting December 17, 1979 with assurance
that she would be called back upon the resumption of work but on March 17,
1980, she received a letter from the company informing her of the termination
of her services for abandonment. 
Thereupon she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Notification and summons were issued to the parties by the senior
labor arbitration analyst, informing them of an initial hearing on May 5, 1980 and that their respective
position papers should be filed at least three days prior thereto.  The scheduled hearing did not proceed for failure of the company’s representative to
appear.  Another notice of hearing on May 9,
1980 was sent to the
company by telegram.  Notices by telegram
for subsequent hearings scheduled for May 21, 28 and June 10,
1980 were likewise
sent to the company, as per bailiff’s returns. 
The company’s representative, however, failed to appear at any of the
hearings, prompting the complainants to move that the case be submitted for
decision.  Only the private respondents
submitted their position paper.

On May 7, 1980,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“In view of the foregoing circumstances, complainant’s charge
of illegal dismissal must be sustained in the absence of denial or evidence to the contrary by respondent due
to the failure of its manager and/or representative to appear and submit its position paper and supporting
documents.

“Accordingly, respondent
should reinstate complainants to their respective former positions without loss
of seniority rights and with full backwages.

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, within ten (10) days after
receipt of this Decision, respondent ARTEX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., is hereby
directed to reinstate complainants Noriel Gonzales
and Clarita Benson to their respective former positions with full backwages from the date of their dismissal until such time
that this Decision has been complied with.” (pp. 80-81, Rollo.)

The company filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision,
claiming that its failure to appear at the scheduled hearings was due to the
fact that it did not receive summons nor any notice of
hearing.  The complainants opposed the
company’s motion for reconsideration
and filed a motion for execution of the judgment.

The existing rule (Rule VII, Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Commission Rules) was that
“no motion for reconsideration of the labor arbiter’s decision shall be
entertained unless in the nature of an appeal
to the Commission.” Instead of treating respondent’s motion for
reconsideration as an appeal and elevating it to the Commission, the arbiter
set the case for hearing and thereafter issued an Order dated July 30,
1981, denying the
motion for lack of merit (p. 53, Rollo).

On September 16, 1981,
the company appealed to the Commission, alleging denial of due process.  The NLRC’s third
division dismissed the appeal in a resolution dated August 4, 1982,
stating that:

“The records plainly show that the instant case was set for
hearing on the following dates:  May 5,
9, 21 and 28, 1980 and on June 10,
1980.  Notices of the same
were duly served to the respondent through telegrams, which telegrams were
fully confirmed by the Telegraph Company for the hearings on May 9, 21 and 28,
1980 (pp. 20, 21 and 22, Records).  In
the face of these strongly convincing evidence, there
could be no room for doubt that contrary to its claim, respondent had been
accorded all the opportunities that it needed for it to present evidence in its
defense.  Its refusal to avail of the
same cannot be construed otherwise than a plain waiver of its right to do so.

“Under the given circumstances, We
cannot therefore disturb the decision and order in question.” (p. 84, Rollo.)

After the motions for reconsideration were denied by the National
Labor Relations Commission’s Third Division and by the Commission En Banc,
the company filed this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
labor arbiter and the NLRC for rendering judgment against the petitioner
without due process.

There is no merit in the petition for certiorari.  The confirmation copies of the telegraphed
notices of the various hearings before the Labor Arbiter showed that the
telegrams were properly sent and delivered in the ordinary course of
business.  As the petitioner had not
changed its address, nor did the Telegraphic Communication Office advise the senders (herein respondents) that the
telegrams were undelivered, and as petitioner had in fact received all copies
of the Labor Ministry’s resolutions and decisions sent to its address, the presumption is that it received
the notices of hearing.

Even if the petitioner was not heard at the stage of mediation
and fact-finding, it may not complain of lack of due process for it was given an
opportunity to present its side of the controversy when its motions for
reconsideration and appeal were given due course (Maglasang
v. Ople et al., 63 SCRA 508; Cuerdo
v. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA 657). 
What due process abhors is not lack of previous notice, but absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera et al v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Zoleta v.
Drilon, 166 SCRA 548).

Furthermore, when the decision or order of an administrative agency is not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness, its factual findings are generally
accorded not only respect but also finality. 
The finding of the Commission in
this case that the petitioner had been duly notified of the hearings before the
Labor Arbiter, and that hence it was not denied due process of law, must be
respected since it is supported by substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied.  However, conformably with existing doctrine,* the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby modified
by limiting the private respondents’ backwages to not
more than three (3) years.  Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

* Mercury Drug Co., Inc. vs.
CIR, 56 SCRA 694; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. vs.
Ople, 152 SCRA 219; Mariners Polytechnic School vs.
Hon. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 74271, March 31, 1989.