G.R. No. 65021. November 21, 1991
BENGUET CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH XCVII, QUEZO…
FERNAN, C.J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction is the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court (RTC) to take cognizance of an action
for annulment of an operations agreement entered into by and between two (2)
mining companies.
The action under consideration was commenced by private
respondent Helen Dizon-Reyes against herein petitioner Benguet Corporation and
Dizon Copper-Silver Mines, Inc.[1] on
June 20, 1980 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In her complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-30171, private respondent alleged that she is the claimowner of 11 mining
claims all located in the
province of Zambales. On January 15,
1967, she executed a Special Power of Attorney constituting her father,
Celestino M. Dizon, as her attorney-in-fact with full powers to “transfer,
assign and dispose of her 11 mining claims.”[2]
Soon thereafter on January 21, 1967, Celestino M. Dizon, acting
as such attorney-in-fact for private respondent and other claimowners, entered
into an Agreement,[3]
with Dizon Mines whereby the latter was granted the right to explore, develop,
exploit and operate the 57 mining claims owned by the claimowners including the
11 claims of private respondent.
Seven (7) years later, on December 17, 1974, private respondent
and the other claimowners executed a Deed of Ratification of Assignment,[4]
confirming the assignment, transfer and conveyance unto Dizon Mines and its
assigns and successors of the rights to possess, occupy, explore, develop and
operate all the aforesaid mining claims.
On March 1, 1975, or almost three (3) months after the Deed of
Ratification was executed, private respondent revoked the Special Power of
Attorney of January 15, 1967, stating that “while there is no question
that I still have complete and full trust and confidence in the judgment and wisdom of my
father, it is not my wish to add any more to his already many and mounting
problems.”[5]
Notice of the revocation was served on Dizon Mines on March 20, 1975 and on
Benguet on August 26, 1975.
However, in spite of said notice, on September 6, 1975, Dizon
Mines and Benguet entered into an Operations Agreement[6]
whereby the former transferred to the latter the possession of the 57 mining
claims for the purpose of exploring,
developing and operating them for production and marketing of marketable
products under the terms and conditions specified therein.
Claiming that the Operations Agreement lacked legal basis by
reason of the revocation of Celestino Dizon’s special power of attorney; the
obligation imposed by the Agreement of January 21, 1967 on Dizon Mines to
itself operate the mines after raising the capital needed therefor, without
authority to engage another corporation for this purpose; and the inefficacy of
the Deed of Ratification arising from the physiological incapacity of Celestino
Dizon to give his consent thereto, private respondent prayed that the Operations Agreement be declared null
and void and inoperative insofar as it covers her eleven (11) lode mining
claims. In the alternative, private
respondent prayed that should the validity of the Operations Agreement be
upheld, defendants therein be ordered to observe and comply with the sharing
of profits stipulated in the Agreement of January 21, 1967. She further prayed for the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation as may be proved during the trial.
On August 12, 1980, Benguet
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
following grounds: 1) the court is
without jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the action; 2) the
action is barred by prior judgment and laches; 3) the action to declare invalid
the Deed of Ratification has prescribed; and 4) the venue of the action was
improperly laid. Dizon Mines filed its
own motion to dismiss.
After private respondent has filed her consolidated opposition to
the motions to dismiss and Benguet, its reply to said consolidated opposition,
the trial court issued an Order dated March 26, 1982, denying the motions to
dismiss for lack of merit.[7]
Its motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied in an
Order dated June 20, 1983,[8]
petitioner Benguet is now before this Court, reiterating the four (4) grounds
stated in its motion to dismiss.
Invoking Section 7 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1281 and the
ruling in Twin Peak Mining Association vs. Navarro
and Philex Mining Corp.,[9]
petitioner contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 30171
as jurisdiction over actions to cancel
mining contracts is vested exclusively
in the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. It likewise adverts to the decision of the Secretary of Natural
Resources dated March 17, 1976 on the private respondent’s opposition to the
registration of the subject Operations Agreement. It claims that that decision, which had become final upon private
respondent’s failure to appeal to the Office of the President, constitutes res judicata to the question of the validity of the
Operations Agreement. Besides, by
failing to take seasonable action, private respondent is guilty of laches in
that she has led petitioner Benguet to believe
that she was amenable to the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources and
to incur huge expenses in connection with the development of the mining claims.
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the action to annul the Deed
of Ratification upon which private respondent thinks the validity of the
Operations Agreement necessarily depends, should have been brought within four
(4) years from its execution on December 12, 1974. Thus, the complaint filed on June 20, 1980 came too late.
Lastly, petitioner theorizes that since the action to annul the
mining contract necessarily involves the recovery of possession of the mining
claims which are located in Zambales, venue of the action should have been laid
in Zambales.
Private respondent in her Comment, later adopted as her
Memorandum,[10]
confined her discussion to the issues of jurisdiction and venue, because in her
opinion, the other grounds involve questions of facts entailing the presentation
of evidence, which is premature and improper in a petition for certiorari.[11]
While admitting that the contract sought to be annulled is a
mining contract, private respondent nonetheless opines that the action for its
annulment does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines. The reason given is that Section 7 (c) of P.
D. 1281 contemplates a mining contract, valid and binding in all respects, but
either the claimowner or operator refuses to comply with its terms and
conditions. In the case at bar, the contract is null and void
because of the mental incapacity of the late Celestino Dizon to execute the
Deed of Ratification on the validity of
which the validity of the Operations Agreement is in turn dependent. Thus, the principal issue in this case is not
whether or not the claimowner or operator refuses to comply with the contract’s
terms and conditions, but rather the mental capacity of the attorney-in-fact
to execute a prior agreement upon which the Operations Agreement is based. It is claimed that the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences is not equipped to determine the question of mental capacity.
Anent the issue of venue, private respondent contends that the
case does not affect title to or possession of real property, end therefore, is
not a real action but an action in personam, for
which venue is laid in the residence of the plaintiff.
We grant the
petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281
which took effect on January 16, 1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional
supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for
and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof,
including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are
concerned.[12]
To effectively discharge its task as the Government’s arm in the administration
and disposition of mineral resources, Section 7 of P. D. No. 1281 confers upon
the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:
“SEC. 7. In addition
to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or
persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau
of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving:
“x x x x
x x x
x x
“(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining
contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms
and conditions thereof.”
Analyzing the objectives of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section
7 thereof, the Court in Twin Peaks Mining Association,[13]
the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to make the
adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This observation was reiterated in the more
recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining Development
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.[14]
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject agreement
is a mining contract and private respondent, in seeking a judicial declaration
of its nullity, does not wish to abide by its terms and conditions. These elements alone bring the action within
the ambit of Section 7 of P. D. 1281. Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract’s terms and
conditions, the basic issue remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely
what P. D. No. 1281 places within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Bureau.
The reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter
insofar as jurisdictional competence is concerned, for to make jurisdiction dependent
thereon would not only be “ratifying two judicial bodies exercising
jurisdiction over an essentially the same subject matter — a situation
analogous to split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice”[15] but
also clearly ignoring the object of P.D. 1281 to make the adjudication of
mining cases a purely
administrative matter.
And if, perchance the law did intend to split jurisdiction, it
could have done so by providing exceptions to par. (c), Section 7 of P. D. No.
1281. Not having done so, there can be
no justification for restricting or limiting the Bureau’s jurisdiction over
“actions for cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to
the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions
thereof.”
In the light of our ruling that the jurisdiction over private
respondent’s action to annul the Operations Agreement pertains to the Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences rather than the regional trial court, the question of
venue becomes immaterial.
Considering further that the other issues raised by petitioner, namely res judicata, laches and
prescription are factual matters which are not only improper in a petition for certiorari
but which, more importantly, petitioner failed to substantiate, no ruling on
these issues need be made.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of March 26, 1982 and
June 20, 1983 are set aside and Civil Case No. Q-30171 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, branch XCVII, is ordered DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Hereinafter Benguet and Dizon Mines, for brevity.
[2]
Rollo, p. 43.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 46-60.
[4]
Ibid., pp. 61-66.
[5]
Ibid., p. 67.
[6]
Annex “E”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 68-118.
[7]
Annex “A”, Petition, Rollo, p. 34.
[8]
Annex “B”, Petition, Rollo, p. 35.
[9]
G. R. No. L-49835, December 18, 1979, 94 SCRA 768.
[10]
Manifestation re Memorandum, Rollo, p. 210.
[11]
Comment, Rollo, p. 184.
[12]
Section 6, P. D. 1281.
[13]
Supra.
[14]
G. R. No. 54305, February 14, 1990, 182 SCRA 166.
[15]
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Dev’t. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, Ibid.,
citing Gonzales vs. Province of Iloilo, 38 SCRA 209 (1971).