G.R. No. 64935. July 19, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CHARLIE REPE Y REVECENCIO ALIAS FELICIANO RECAFORTE, JOVENCIO RONTALE ALIAS HERNAN RONTALE Y REPE, ROMEO RONTALE Y REPE, R…
PADILLA, J.:
This case is before the Court on automatic review of the decision* of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XLVII, in Criminal Case No. 2021, finding all
the four (4) accused, namely: Charlie Repe, Alfredo Dagumboy, Jorge Signo and Joel Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to suffer the maximum
penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of Sofronio Parangue
and Margarita Parangue in the sum of P5,450.00, the
amount stolen, and in the further sum of P24,000.00 for the death of said
spouses, and to pay costs.
Under an information dated 10 October 1977,[1]
filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
the following accused, namely: Charlie Repe y Revencio alias Feliciano Recaforte, Jovencio Rontale alias Hernan Rontale y Repe, Romeo Rontale y Repe, Rogelio Dagumboy y Balicol, Alfredo Dagumboy y Balicol, Jorge Signo y Balicol and Joel Domingo
y Silverio were charged with the crime of Robbery in
Band with Double Homicide. The
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2021 alleged:
“That on or about the 9th day of June, 1976, in Sitio Marilao, Barrio of Dipla, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Palawan Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, and armed with guns
and other deadly weapons and with the use of a motor banca,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force,
violence and intimidation on the persons, and with intent of gain and against
the consent of the owners thereof SOFRONIO and MARGARITA PARANGUE, took (sic)
and carried (sic) away the following pieces of personal property, to wit: two (2) sacks of rice, one (1) fish net and
cash money amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency
to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total sum of THIRTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling
them to take steal and carry away the articles above-mentioned the above-named
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation and taking advantage
of their superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously
attack, assault, stab and use personal violence upon Margarita and Sofronio Parangue thereby
inflicting upon them multiple wounds on different vital parts of their bodies
which caused their instantaneous death.
“CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating circumstances of alevosia, evident premeditation, night-time, use of
motorized water craft, use of superior number and strength and penalized under
Article 294 in relation with (sic) Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code.”
Upon arraignment on 11
November 1977, the four (4) accused who were arrested, namely: Charlie Repe,
Alfredo Dagumboy, Jorge Signo
and Joel Domingo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The trial proceeded against said four (4)
accused, while the other three (3) accused, namely: Jovencio Rontale, Romeo Rontale and
Rogelio Dagumboy have remained at large to this day.
The evidence for the prosecution, as seen by the court a quo,
is as follows:
“In the evening of June 8, 1976, the accused Charlie Repe y Revecencio alias Feliciano
Recaforte, Alfredo Dagumboy
y Balicol, Jorge Signo y Balicol, Joel Domingo y Silverio,
Jovencio Rontale alias
Herman Rontale y Repe,
Romeo Rontale y Repe,
Rogelio Dagumboy y Balicol,
had a drinking spree (“inuman“) in the
house of Jovencio (alias Herman) Rontale in Barrio Sandoval, Taytay, Palawan, where they planned
the robbery in question, that is to rob the spouses Sofronio
and Margarita Parangue of Barrio Dipla, same municipality of Taytay, Palawan, Alfredo Dagumboy was to operate (makinista)
the motorized banca (pumpboat)
they will use in going to the house of the aforesaid spouses, which Jovencio borrowed from its owner, Pablo Repe.
“As previously planned, they proceeded to the house of the Parangues, boarding the motorized banca
(pumpboat) at Binyangan,
Alfredo being the makinista. On reaching Barrio Dipla,
Taytay, Palawan,
Romeo Rontale, Jovencio
(alias Herman) Rontale, Jorge Signo,
Joel Domingo and Alfredo Dagumboy got down from the pumpboat leaving Charlie Repe and
Rogelio Dagumboy behind in the pumpboat. Jovencio
had a sack with him. Along the way, Jovencio got from inside of the sack a .22 caliber gun
which he gave to Alfredo. Romeo was
armed with a .25 caliber gun and Joel with an air gun. When they reached the house of the spouses,
Joel stayed below and Alfredo near the door upstairs,
both to act as “lookouts”, while Jovencio, Jorge, and Romeo entered the house.
Romeo held the hair of the old woman Margarita who opened the door and
pointed his gun at her with Jovencio and Jorge
following behind them. Inside the house,
Jovencio held the old man, tied his hands and asked
him where their money was. Margarita got
their money and gave it to Jovencio who asked where
their other money was. Margarita told
him that it was with their grandchild.
On hearing this, Jovencio told Alfredo and
Romeo to bring the old man to their pumpboat and they
will proceed to the house of the grandchild of the spouses. Upon reaching the pumpboat,
Alfredo who carried the sack containing the money handed the same to Jovencio while Romeo who brought the old man along, turned
him over to Rogelio who placed the old man at one end of the pumpboat.
“Alfredo and Romeo returned to the house of the spouses and
joined their companions who all proceeded to the house of the mentioned
grandchild of the spouses about half a kilometer away, the same barrio of Dipla. It turned out
that the spouses had no money there.
This enraged Romeo, who right then and there, stabbed the old woman who
died as a result thereof. They went back
to the house of the spouses and ransacked the place and were able to get a bambo piggy bank full with loose change and two (2) sacks
of rice which Jovencio and Romeo carried (a sack
each) to the pumpboat.
“When they reached the pumpboat. Rogelio who learned
that the old woman was already dead, stabbed the old man Sofronio
several times and then he threw him overboard.”[2]
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized by
the appellants, reads:
“x x x the
evidence for the accused-appellants, Domingo and Signo
showed that on 9 June 1976, the day the alleged crime was committed, Domingo
and Signo were not at Sto. Marilao, Barrio Dipla, Taytay, Palawan
the place where the crime was committed, but were at Sitio Topacao. Barrio Silangga, Taytay, Palawan making charcoal
together with Anecito de la Cruz and Placido Gregorio.
This was testified to by Anecito de la Cruz
and Placido Gregorio and corroborated by the testimonies
of accused appellants Domingo and Signo. Subsequently, the two accused were later
arrested and jailed. While in jail, accused-appellants Domingo and
Signo were repeatedly mauled by one Patrolman Adolfo Jaymis who, against their will, forced them to sign
separate extra-judicial confessions which they later swore to before Municipal
Trial Court Judge Cosme Martinez.
“As to accused-appellant Alfredo Dagumboy,
evidence shows that he was not at Barrio Dipla when
the alleged crime took place, as he was then residing at the house of Prudencio Bering at Barrio Topacao,
where he was working as a fisherman. The latter place was several hours away by boat from the former. Furthermore, the records show that when
Alfredo Dagumboy was arrested and jailed, he was also
mauled repeatedly by Patrolman Adolfo Jaymis who,
against his will, forced him to sign an extra-judicial confession which was subsequently
sworn to by him before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cosme
Martinez.”[3]
After trial, a decision was
rendered on 27 May 1983
by the court a quo, convicting the herein four (4)
accused-appellants, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding all the four (4) accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the
information and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances stated
above, the Court sentences said accused Charlie Repe
y Revecencio, Alfredo Dagumboy
y Balicol, Jorge Signo y Balicol and Joel Domingo y Silverio
to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of Sofronio Parangue
and Margarita Parangue in the sum of P5,450.00 the
amount stolen, and the sum of P24.000.00 for the death of Sofronio
and Margarita Parangue and to pay cost.”[4]
Subsequently, on motion of accused-appellant Charlie Repe, this Court resolved to grant said Charlie Repe’s withdrawal of appeal.[5]
Consequently, the judgment of conviction as to Charlie Repe
became final and executory.[6]
Hence, this review only as to the remaining three (3) accused-appellants,
namely: Alfredo Dagumboy,
Jorge Signo and
Joel Domingo.
The main argument of the appellants is that their extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence for they were taken without the
appellants having been properly informed of their constitutional rights during
their custodial investigation. They
principally contend that the waiver of their constitutional rights was inadequate
and ineffective for it was made without the assistance of counsel. It is noted that, during the trial, they
already assailed the admissibility of the said confessions on the ground that
they were extracted through force, intimidation and maltreatment. Their assault against said extrajudicial
confessions has persisted in this appeal.
We find merit in the appellants’ contention that the assailed
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
As to appellant Alfredo Dagumboy, his
extrajudicial confession starts in this manner –
“PASUBALI: Ginoong Alfredo Dagumboy, ipinagbibigay alam naming sa
inyo na kayo’y
inuusig tungkol sa isang kasalanan. Pinaaalala namin sa
inyo ang magsawalang kibo at magkaroon ng patnubay
ng manananggol na sarili ninyong
pili. Ito ba ay nauunawaan ninyo?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Pagkatapos na maipabatid
sa inyo ang
inyong karapatan sa ilalim ng
ating bagong Saligang Batas na magsawalang kibo, nais ba ninyong
ipagpatuloy ang imbistigasyong ito?
SAGOT: Opo, hindi
ko po kailangan
ang manananggol sa imbistigasyong ito.
TANONG:
Ipinaaalala rin namin sa inyo na
anumang salaysay and inyong sasabihin sa imbistigasyong ito ay maaaring gamiting ebidensya laban o panig sa
inyo sa alinmang
Hukuman dito sa Pilipinas, ito
ba ay mauunawaan ninyo?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Matapos na maipaalam sa
inyo ang inyong karapatan sa ilalim ng
ating Bagong Saligang Batas, Artikulo 4, Seksyon 20, na magsawalang kibo at magkaroon ng sariling
manananggol, handa ka na bang magbigay ng isang kusangloob
na salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo.”[7]
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the other two (2)
appellants, Joel Domingo and Jorge Signo, the
questions and answers appearing therein in regard to apprisal
of their constitutional rights, and waiver of such rights, are in the same
tenor as that contained in Alfredo Dagomboy’s aforequoted confession.[8]
Each of the appellants signed and subscribed his extrajudicial confession
before the municipal judge at Taytay, Palawan in May 1977.
Looking at said, extrajudicial confessions, it appears that the
appellants were informed of their right to remain silent and right to counsel,
and that they understood such rights. They further affirmed in said confessions
that, although they have been
informed of such rights, they would voluntarily proceed with the custodial
investigation even without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, they affirmed that they were aware that any statement taken from
them could be used against them.
However, after a careful examination of the entire records of the case at bar, the Court regrets to
say that the appellants were not properly apprised of their constitutional
rights before their custodial investigation took place, such that their extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence.
In People vs. Galit,[9]
this Court set forth the requirements for investigating officers to follow before and during custodial investigations. Thus –
“10. This Court, in the
case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making
an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:
‘7. ‘At
the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means – by telephone if possible – or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.'”
The rule, therefore, is that, when an investigation conducted
upon an accused did not conform to the requirements set forth in People vs Galit, the extrajudicial
confession taken therein is inadmissible.[10]
Moreover, it is clear from the records of this case that the way
the investigating officer apprised the appellants of their constitutional
rights, was pro forma and perfunctory. The three (3) extrajudicial statements in
issue appear to have contained the same aforequoted
prefatory statements, which indicate that the “appraisal” made was a
purely mechanical act.
In People vs. Newman and Tolentino,[11]
this Court held –
“It can be gleaned from the record of the case that the advice
as to constitutional rights of the accused, given by the investigating officer, was perfunctory and pro-forma,
intended obviously to pay lip service to the prescribed norms through a
recitation by rote of the sacramental advice.
This stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated, has assumed the nature of a
‘legal form’ or model. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression
of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of
the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained
giving up of a right is
missing. In the case at bar, the two (2)
extrajudicial statements and waivers carry the same quoted prefatory
statement. This, to the mind of the
Court, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the
investigating officers to fully and truly inform the accused of their rights to
remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The ‘informing’ done by the police in the
case at bar was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed
not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law, as to give a
semblance of compliance therewith. The
right of a person under interrogation to be informed of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and
contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of
what is conveyed. Short of this, there
is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been
‘informed’ of his rights.”
While it is true that trial court observed that appellants’
extrajudicial confessions are interlocking and replete with many minor details
that could have been known only to the appellants, and hence indicate that they
were voluntarily given, still, one cannot be unmindful of the equally-settled
rule that even if the confession of the accused is “gospel truth”, if
it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.[12]
The Court, therefore, rules that the conviction of the appellants
cannot be based on the extrajudicial confessions in issue.
Excluded such extrajudicial confessions, the next question is,
did the prosecution establish nonetheless the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt?
It did.
The three (3) prosecution witnesses, namely, the spouses Rosalyn
and Nemesia Fabrigas and
Rosita Jardin, who is Rosalyn’s sister, positively
identified the herein three (3) appellants as participants in the crime charged. They testified that in that early and fateful
morning of 9 June 1976,
several men with the struggling Margarita Parangue,
who was being held by one of them, came to the said witnesses’ nipa hut, asking for the money which the said men believed
to be owned by Margarita and safekept in the
witnesses’ hut. The same witnesses
testified that it was appellant Alfredo Dagumboy who
was holding Margarita and who lit the lamp that lighted the hut; that they
(witnesses) saw the other two (2) appellants outside of the hut, as there was
moonlight – Jorge Signo was standing and Joel Domingo
was holding an airgun; that thereafter they (the
witnesses) jumped out of the hut, left the old woman and the several men behind
and sought help; and that later in that same early morning, they saw the dead
bloodied body of Margarita Parangue lying on the
ground near the hut.[13]
Thus, these three (3) prosecution witnesses were able to
recognize and positively identified the three (3) appellants as the ones who
came to their nipa hut on 9 June 1976; they declared
that the lamp inside the nipa hut was lit by the
appellant Alfredo himself: that the moon
was then shining bright outside the hut where Jorge Signo
and Joel Domingo were seen by them standing; and that coupled with these circumstances
was the fact that the surrounding area of the nipa
hut was clear, there being no other house nor trees planted or shrubs growing
around the place that could have obstructed the light thrown by the moon.[14]
The defense of the three (3) appellants is alibi. Alfredo Dagumboy
testified that prior to 9 June 1976,
he, as a fisherman, was at Maruyog-ruyog, Linapacan, Palawan
intending to go fishing; that he arrived at Tapacao
from Maruyug-ruyog only on 20 June 1976.[15]
On the other hand, Joel Domingo and Jorge Signo, in
their testimony, stated that the whole day of 9 June 1976, they, as co-workers, were at Tapacao, Silanga, Taytay, Palawan
making charcoal.[16]
It is noted that, as the records show, Marilao, Dipla, Taytay, Palawan, the place where the crime was
committed, is only about seven (7) kilometers from Tapacao.[17]
Alibi is, as a rule, a weak defense. It cannot, in this case, overthrow witnesses Fabrigas‘ and Jardin’s positive identification of the said
appellants as the men who came to their nipa hut on
that fateful early morning of 9 June
1976.
Moreover, it is material to note that the appellants together
with all the other accused in the case at bar are in one way or another related
to each other or at least, known and friends to one another.[18]
They are also residents of barrios/barangays Tapacao and Sandoval, both of which are in the municipality
of Taytay,
Palawan.[19]
The residence of the appellants, together with that of their co-accused in this case, and the place
of the commission of the crime are all found in one municipality, that is Taytay, Province of Palawan.
All told, the Court finds that the participation and the guilt of the appellants in the crime
charged were established by the prosecution with moral certainty and convincing
proof.
The trial court found conspiracy in the case at bar. We agree
that conspiracy among the seven (7) co-accused, including the appellants
herein, has been clearly established by the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and that of co-accused Charlie Repe
himself. Apart from the testimony of the
spouses Fabrigas and Rosita Jardin
as to the arrival at their nipa hut in the early
morning of 9 June 1976, of the three (3) appellants herein, with victim Margarita
being held by the hand by Alfredo, several other prosecution witnesses
testified as to the acts of the other persons charged in the instant case,
before, during and after the commission of the crime. These witnesses testified as follows:
1. Gregorio
Lorena, on separate occasions after the crime occurred, saw Charlie Repe at the “dance” party, with the latter’s
wallet full of money bills.[20]
2. Apolonio Soriano was invited by
Herman Rontale (one of the accused at large) to go to
Barrio Dipla to get “fat” pig, which
invitation Apolonio rejected as he knew that there
was no fat pig in Dipla and that instead, something
bad would be done.[21]
3. Pablo
Repe, the owner of the pumpboat
named “Rosanna”, and uncle of Charlie Repe,
testified that it was Herman Rontale who borrowed the
boat on 8 June 1976 and returned it to him on 9 June
1976 in the morning.[22]
4. Antonio
Hontra saw blood in the middle portion of
“Rosanna” on 13 June 1976.[23]
5. Ernesto
Repe, owner of an airgun
testified that Romeo Rontale (another accused at
large) borrowed the said gun and returned it on 9 June 1976.[24]
As to Charlie Repe, he admitted in his
testimony that before the crime occurred, his three (3) friends, namely,
Rogelio Dagumboy, Herman Rontale
and Romeo Rontale, who are co-accused with the
appellants, came to his house and invited him for a drinking spree: that the said spree lasted until 9:00 o’clock
in the evening, during which his three (3) friends invited him to buy pig that
night at Dipla.[25]
The totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances establish
that conspiracy existed in the case at bar.
However, we note that the trial court ruled that four (4)
aggravating circumstances – treachery, abuse of superior strength, evident
premeditation and use of motorized water craft – attended the commission of the
crime.
On evident premeditation, we do not agree that it should be
appreciated in the commission of the crime charged. Although conspiracy
existed, it should be observed that this conspiracy was established by
circumstantial evidence only. As
ruled in one case,[26]
when conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration
of the crime, evident premeditation may not be appreciated in the absence of
proof as to now and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched, or what
period of time elapsed before it was carried out.
As regards treachery, we also do not see any reason for
appreciating this aggravating circumstance.
It must be noted that, in the instant case, there is no direct evidence
pointing to the actual commission of the crime charged. Not one of the prosecution witnesses saw who
killed the robbed couple. The settled
rule is that treachery must be established by positive evidence in order to be
appreciated.[27]
No treachery may be said to have attended the commission of the offense, as it
was not clearly proved with convincing and positive evidence.
However, as to the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and use of motorized watercraft, the records of the case clearly show
the presence of these aggravating circumstances. Certainly, the seven (7) persons charged in
this case, including herein three (3) appellants, being armed with weapons,
surely and deliberately used excessive force on the persons of their helpless
victims. Further, all the accused,
including the three (3) appellants, used a motorized banca/watercraft
to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Thus, there being conspiracy and the settled rule being that, in
conspiracy, the guilt of one is the guilt of all,[28]
we find all the three (3) appellants herein guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
use of motorized vehicle.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the
crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being two (2) aggravating circumstances
present, with no mitigating circumstance, applying Article 63 of the said code,
the penalty applicable is death. However, in view of the 1987
Constitution under which the death penalty is not imposable, the appropriate
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
and ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Sofronio
Parangue and Margarita Parangue
in the sum of P5,450.00, the amount stolen, and in the further sum of P60.000.00 for the death of
said spouses, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), with the same observation as JJ. Paras and Sarmiento.
Regalado, J., concur.
* Penned by Judge Jose S. Solidum
[1]
Original records, pp. 126-127
[2]
RTC Decision, Rollo, pp. 36-38
[3]
Rollo, Appellants’ Brief, p. 224
[4]
Original Records, p. 482
[5]
Resolution dated 2
February 1988, Rollo, p. 304
[6]
Entry of Judgment, 64935, Rollo, p. 318–B
[7]
Rollo, p. 40
[8]
Ibid, pp. 46 and 57
[9]
L-51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465
[10]
Olaes v.
People, 78347-49, Nov. 9, 1987,
155 SCRA 486
[11]
L-45354, July 26, 1988
[12]
People v. Pineda, 72400, Jan.
15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71
[13]
Rollo, pp. 15-19
[14]
Tsn, December
15, 1977, pp. 9-11
[15]
Tsn, October
31, 1979, pp. 3-9
[16]
Tsn, September
20, 1978, pp. 214-A, 260; September
25, 1978, pp. 274, 308
[17]
Tsn, June
19, 1978, pp. 508-509
[18]
Tsn, October 31, 1979, pp. 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, and 53; Tsn, September 25, 1978, pp. 277-278, 315-316
[19]
Tsn, October 31, 1979, pp. 3-4, and 68
[20]
Rollo, pp. 19-20
[21]
Ibid., p. 20
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
Ibid., p. 21
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Tsn, December
5, 1980, pp. 422-424
[26]
People vs. Custodio, G.R. No. L-7442, Oct. 24, 1955, 97 Phil. 698
[27]
People vs. Atienza,
G.R. No. 68481, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 147
[28]
People vs. Veloso, L-38551-53, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 60