PLACIDO MANALO AND ARMANDO MANALO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SPOUSES GEMINIANO DE OCAMPO AND AMPARO DE OCAMPO, AND SPOUSES PEDRO SANTOS AND CRISANTA SA…

This petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal
of the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) which affirmed the cancellation of the petitioners’ Free Patents and
Original Certificates of Titles (OCTs) and upheld the titles of the private respondents as the true, valid and legal titles to
the parcels of land in question.

On October 18, 1973,
the private respondents instituted an action for the cancellation of the
petitioners’ titles over certain parcels of land.  The respondents prayed that their titles over
the said parcels of land be declared as the true and valid ones.

According to the private respondents, they are the co-owners of
two parcels of land containing an area of 33.6344 hectares, more or less, and
presently embraced within Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCTs)
Nos. T-44205 and T-43298 respectively, both of the Registry of Bataan; that the TCTs were
acquired by the respondents by virtue of Sales Patents Nos. 5339 and 5387
issued on November 17, 1972 and February 3, 1973, respectively, by the Director
of Lands under Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Law; that the petitioners Placido Manalo
and  Armando Manalo
with malice and evident bad faith misrepresented that they have been in
possession of the parcels of land in dispute since the year 1944 by themselves
and/or through their predecessors-in-interest; and that in view of the said
misrepresentations, the Director of Lands issued Free Patents Nos. 522897 and
502977 on October 2, 1971 by virtue of Free Patent Applications Nos. (III-4)
508  and (III-4) 519 filed with the
Bureau of Lands under the provisions of Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public
Land Law, and by virtue of which OCTs Nos. 296 and
297 were respectively issued in the names of the petitioners covering the
disputed parcels of land.

In their answer, the petitioners alleged, among others, they have
been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open possession of the parcels of land
in Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan since 1944 as evidenced by their documents duly
filed with the Bureau of Forestry and of Lands, although the same were still
then part of the U.S. Military Reservation; that the lots are already covered
by Torrens Certificates of Titles since 1971 and, therefore, its decree of
registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error, or lack
of notice, as more than one year had already elapsed from the issuance and
entry of the titles; and that the private respondents have no legal capacity to institute the
action for cancellation,  the proper
party to question their titles being the Director of Lands through the office
of the Solicitor General.

After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondents and ordered the
cancellation of the petitioners’ titles over the lots in dispute.  On appeal, the appellate court sustained the
trial court’s decision.  Hence,
petitioners filed this petition raising the following reasons or issues why the
petition should be allowed, to wit:

A

RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
DECIDED THIS CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AS WELL AS APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.

B

RESPONDENT COURT HAS
GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 274.

C

RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT DECLARING THE SALES
PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS NULL AND VOID AB-INITIO. (p. 12, Rollo)

In their first ground, the petitioners contend that only the Government,
represented by the Director of Lands, can bring an action to cancel their titles since the
disputed parcels of land were originally part of the public domain.  Therefore, the private respondents have no
legal personality to file and prosecute the case below.

This contention is without merit.

When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were
issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lot
ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands
lost jurisdiction over them.  Since the
lots were no longer part of the public domain, the private respondents, as
holders of the titles based on free patents acquired subsequent to the
declaration of alienability and disposability, have the personality to file the
case against persons whom they alleged were in possession of void titles.  As we have held in the case of Heirs of Tanak
Pangawaran Patiwayan
v. Martinez, (142 SCRA 252, 258-260 [1986]):

“The petitioner’s main purpose in bringing the action is to
recover their rightful share of inheritance and this fact was even admitted by
the trial court when it stated that: ‘A reading of the afore-quoted argument of
plaintiff Tanak would reveal that the primary
objective of the suit is for plaintiff Tanak to have
her rightful share in the property and in the process to have the certificate
of title cancelled.’ However, said court was of the opinion that ‘Plaintiff Tanak cannot get her rightful share in the property unless
and until the title issued has been cancelled.’ And that ‘once the title is
cancelled then the land automatically reverts to the public domain.’

“This is error on the part of the respondent-court
because when the patent was issued, the property in question ceased to become
part of the public domain and, therefore, even if respondent Tagwalan eventually is proven to have procured the patent
and the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would not
revert back to the state but will be partitioned
among the rightful heirs which also include Tagwalan
and his co-respondents.

xxx                                        xxx                                           xxx

“In the case at bar, as stated earlier, because of Pangawaran’s cultivation of the land throughout his
lifetime, he became entitled to the free patent and such entitlement benefitted his heirs after he died.  Therefore, in the event that the petitioners
are able to prove that they are
entitled to a share in the land, there is no need for the land to first revert
back to the public domain before they could acquire their share.  By virtue of the free patent issued thereon,
the land ceased to be public.  This was
our decision in the Sumail case wherein we
ruled:

xxx                                        xxx                                           xxx

“As already stated,
free patent No. V-459 was issued in the name of Gepuliano
on September 26, 1949, while Civil Case No. 420 was filed in
court only on July 21, 1952,
or almost three years after the issuance of the free patent.  It is therefore, clear that the trial court
no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in Civil Case No. 420 for
the reason already stated, but not as contended by the Director of Lands that
it involved public land, over which he had exclusive and executive control,
because once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title
was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction.”

As to the second ground raised in this petition the petitioners
contend that Republic Act (RA) No. 274 is not applicable to the lots in
dispute.  The title of the said Act
states:

“An act authorizing the Director of Lands to Subdivide the
Lands within the Military Reservations belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which are no longer needed for
military purposes and to dispose the same by sale subject to certain
conditions, and for other purposes.”

and Section 1 provides:

“Sec. 1 – The Director of Lands shall cause the subdivision of
lands within military reservations owned by the Republic of the Philippines
which may be declared by the President of the Philippines
as no longer needed for military purposes. 
(Phil. Permanent & General
Statutes, Vol. II p. 698)”

According to the petitioners, the above-quoted law only applies
to lands within military reservations belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and not to military reservations belonging to the United States Government because the parcels of
lands belonging to the latter category upon their release to the Philippine
Government never became part of the military reservations belonging to the
Philippines but became part of the public domain.  Therefore, Republic Act No. 274 is not
applicable to the disputed lots.

This contention is likewise without merit.

As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned
decision:

“Appellants’ contention in their fifth assignment of error is
likewise not well taken.  It is not
correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan,
of which the land in question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine
government, the same automatically became a disposable land of the public
domain.  The ownership and control over
said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature
as a military reservation remained unchanged. 
Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19, 1971, per certification of
the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No. 26-40).  Its disposition only by sale was duly
authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274.  If the land in question became immediately
disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965, then why,
it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971.  This Court is of the conclusion that this
land above referred to continued to be a military reservation land while in the
custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in
1971.” (p. 37, Rollo)

Thus, in the case of Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, (155 SCRA 412, 418-419 [1987]) we held:

“In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to
release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond
their competence and jurisdiction.  The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government and not of the Courts.  In the absence of such classification, the
land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended: Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 123 SCRA 441 [193]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742
[1980].  This should be so under
time-honored Constitutional precepts. 
This is also in consonance
with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10,
Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).”

The petitioners’ third ground actually raises questions of fact, the petitioners
dealing mainly with the appellate court’s appreciation of evidence.

It is not the function of this Court to evaluate each piece of evidence presented before the lower
court.  Suffice it to say that we find the conclusions of
the lower court and appellate courts amply supported by evidence and so we apply the time-honored doctrine
that absent the recognized exceptions, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and the Supreme Court; and that this
Court decides appeals which only involve questions of law.  (See Philippine national
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433, 445 [1988]).  We, thus, quote with approval the following
findings of the appellate court:

“In their fourth assignment of error, appellants would devote
much of their discussion to the proposition that appellees’
Sales Patents are null and void ab-initio, the
land covered therein having been already previously titled in the name of
appellants.  This has to be so according
to the appellants, in view of the fundamental principle that once a patent is
registered and the corresponding title is
issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction.  A fortiorari,
the Director of Lands could not have validly issued Sales Patent Titles in
favor of appellees. 
We disagree, Appellants’ argumentation would be
plausible if we assume that their titles are valid.  Unfortunately, this is not so in the case at
bar.  Their titles to the land in question are null and void, it
(sic) having been obtained in contravention with the requirements provided by
law.  On this score, we have the following
learned observation of the court a quo:

“The big tract of land in Mariveles,
Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the
case belong was formerly a portion of the U.S. Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was
turned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648).  Under
such a situation, the Court seriously doubts whether Placido
Manalo and their predecessors-in-interest could have
been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed:

“’Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no
lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 76 SCRA 146).’

“Thus, the Manalos appeared not to have
satisfied the requirement of possession since July 4, 1945.

“The improvements supposedly constituting of fence, nangka and other fruit-bearing trees and introduction of
cattle in the area involved could have been proven through photographs or the
parties could have sought an ocular inspection by the Court of the site in
question.  It should be noted that one of
the requisites before a free patent could be issued would be an ocular
inspection and nothing was shown that such had been made.

“It should be noted that at the time the Manalos
filed their application on April 1967, the lands were not yet surveyed for the
survey plans (Exhibits 4-A and 5-A Manalos) were
approved only on June 17, 1971.  These survey plans also have the annotation
that the lands became disposable and alienable only on May 19, 1971. 
Before these, the Bureau of Lands has no jurisdiction and could not have
accepted the Manalo application in April 1967.”
(pp. 35-36, Rollo)

We, therefore, find no reversible error in the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.  Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., no part.