PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MIGUEL LASAC, DEPENDANT-APPELLANT.

Miguel Lasac was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then Court of
First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Eighth Judicial District, Branch II*, of the
crime of parricide committed against his wife, Maria Consolacion Garcia,
sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.^[1] His appeal, erroneously transmitted to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, is now before Us.

He seeks a reversal
of the judgment on the following assignment of errors:

I

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF PARRICIDE ON THE BASIS OF HIS AFFIDAVIT [EXHIBIT B]
BECAUSE:

[a].-THE AFFIDAVIT WAS MADE WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF ANY
COUNSEL;

[b].-THE ADMINISTERING OFFICER (JUDGE ZACARIAS GARCIA) DID NOT
APPRISE HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;

[c].-THE AFFIDAVIT WAS SECURED
THROUGH MALTREATMENT, FORCE, DURESS AND INTIMIDATION; AND,

[d].-THE
SIGNATURE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN THE AFFIDAVIT WAS SECURED THROUGH THREAT
SPECIALLY BY THE POKING OF A GUN.

II

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF PARRICIDE ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IN SENTENCING HIM TO
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED IN THE SUM OF
P12,000.00.^[2]

In the Manifestation and Motion dated November 7, 1986 filed in lieu of an
appellee’s brief, the Solicitor General joined appellant’s prayer for acquittal
based on reasonable doubt.^[3]

The
antecedent facts are as follows:

Braulio Dipasupil and the deceased Maria
Consolacion Garcia lived together as common-law husband and wife for about six
^[6] months.  Six ^[6] months after they separated, or on January
19, 1980, Consolacion married accused-appellant Miguel Lasac.

On March
15, 1980, Consolacion was found dead atop a big stone in the middle of a creek
about 70-150 meters away from the conjugal dwelling.  An autopsy conducted by
Dr. Edgardo Hernandez, a private practising physician, disclosed that she
suffered sixteen ^[16] stabbed, incised
and hacked wounds in different parts of her body.^[4]

No one witnessed the killing, but
suspicion fell on accused-appellant in view of a number of circumstantial
evidence which were later testified to by the prosecution witnesses,
thus:

Flaviano Mauro, a 53-year-old farmer, testified that a week before
the incident at bar, accused-appellant told him that if Consolacion did not
change her ways, something would happen to her.^[5]

Rufo Garcia, the 70-year-old father
of the victim, testified that at around 8 o’clock in the morning of March 15,
1980, he went to the house of the accused and the victim to request the latter
to tend his store as he wanted to attend a ball game.  Accused-appellant refused
for Consolacion, stating that they were going to gather vegetables.  Rufo then
left the spouses’ house to tether his carabao as he had nevertheless decided to
attend said ball game.  After he had done this, he saw accused-appellant going
to the scene of the crime.

At around 1 o’clock in the afternoon, Rufo
went to the ball game, where accused-appellant followed him to report that
Consolacion could not be found.  He advised accused-appellant to look for her. 
At twilight, he proceeded to his store where accused-appellant informed him that
Consolacion had not been found despite the search conducted by the barrio
captain and other residents of the barrio.  Rufo requested several
barriomates to help look for Consolacion.  When the group suggested that they
search by the creek and its surroundings, accused allegedly told them not to
pass there as they had already gone to said place before.  Notwithstanding, the
search team, separated into two ^[2]
groups, passed by the creek and found the corpse.  When the body was brought to
the couple’s house, accused-appellant was observed to be restless, going up and
down the house and consuming a large amount of water.  Because of this behavior,
Rufo suggested that the barrio captain detain the accused-appellant.  On this
suggestion, the barrio captain requested somebody to fetch the police.  After
the police had arrived, Dr. Hernandez was called in for the autopsy.  A
one-night wake was held, during which time the police started their
investigation.

Accused-appellant was asked by the police to produce his
bolo and was invited for questioning in the police headquarters.

The
following morning, the police asked Rufo and his wife to look for the clothes
accused-appellant was wearing at the time of the incident in question.  Rufo’s
wife found a T-shirt and short pants hanging between the “aparador” and
the wall.  These pieces of wearing apparel were “malumigmig” [a bit
wet].

Rufo surmised that accused-appellant killed his wife out of
jealousy as Consolacion used to tell him and his wife that she was being
maltreated by accused-appellant because she dressed up nicely.^[6]

Sgt. Justino Salagubang, Station
Commander of the Integrated National Police of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro,
testified that in the evening of March 15, 1980, he, together with Sgt. Rudy
Guerra, Pfc. Matibay and Csc. Faltado, went to Barrio Magupit, Bongabong, to
investigate a killing reported in behalf of one Rufo Garcia.  They went to the
house of accused-appellant, then to the creek where the body was.  They searched
the area for evidence, but did not find any.  He ordered the corpse to be
brought to accused-appellant’s house and called in Dr. Hernandez for the
autopsy.  He noted that Lasac did not show any remorse over Consolacion’s death,
neither crying nor embracing the cadaver of his wife.  He likewise observed
Lasac’s going up and down the house and frequent drinking of water.  Because of
this behavior, he suspected Lasac of having killed the deceased.  He therefore
asked Lasac to produce his bolo.  The latter got the bolo from above the cooking
place.  Sgt. Salagubang examined it and found it a little wet.  The blade was
clean but smelled somewhat “malansa” [fishy].  He also asked Lasac to
bring him the clothes Lasac was wearing that morning.  Lasac handed him a
T-shirt and short pants which he observed to be a little bit wet.

He
invited Lasac to the police headquarters for questioning.  Lasac was released
but was re-arrested.  On March 24, 1980, Lasac allegedly executed an
affidavit,^[7] admitting his guilt.^[8]

Sgt. Rudy Guerra of the INP of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, corroborated Salagubang’s testimony as regards
accused-appellant’s behavior at the night of the incident and the observation on
the condition of the bolo and the clothes.  He further testified that Lasac
voluntarily executed the affidavit of admission^[9] after he had informed the latter of his
constitutional rights and that the same was voluntarily signed before Municipal
Judge Zacarias Garcia.^[10]

On the
basis of the affidavit of admission,^[11]
which the trial court found to have been voluntarily executed, together with the
circumstantial evidence consisting of accused-appellant having tried to mislead
the search team from going to the creek, his restlessness during the time the
body was brought to his house as well as during the vigil, the fact that his
bolo smelled “fishy” [malansa] which to the trial court’s mind
indicated the smell of blood and the fact that the apparel worn by the accused
on that fateful day was found to have been recently laundered and still wet,^[12] the trial court rendered the judgment
under review on December 11, 1981.  The lower court likewise observed that
during accused-appellant’s testimony, “he never showed any sign of remorse,
regret or even sorrow for his wife having met her untimely demise.  His demeanor
in the witness chair x x x was of a character emanating from a person who was
satisfied with what he did as a measure or act of revenge.”^[13]

We agree with both
accused-appellant and the Solicitor General that Exhibit B, accused-appellant’s
affidavit of admission, is inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in
violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which
provides:

“Sec. 20.  No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.  No
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him.  Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

The affidavit in question contained the following:

“PAHIWATIG: “lpinaaalam ko saiyo [sic] Mr. Miguel Lasac na ikaw
ay nasa ilalim ng pag-uusig tungkol sa isang kasalanan na iyong kinasasangkutan,
at ipinaalam ko rin sa iyo na sa ilalim ng ating Saligang batas ay may karapatan
ka na magsawalang kibo at magkaroon ng sarili mong piling manananggol tungkol sa
gagawing imbestigasyong ito ang lahat bang ito ay nauunawaan
mo?

However, this “advice” given to accused-appellant did not satisfy the
requirements of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.  While
accused-appellant was informed of his right to remain silent, he was not
accordingly informed that anything he might say could and would be used against
him in court.  Neither was he informed that if he was indigent, a lawyer would
be appointed for him.  Furthermore, accused-appellant was not made to understand
that if, at any time during the interrogation, he would wish to have the
assistance of counsel, the interrogation would cease until an attorney is
present.^[15]

Another factor adding
to Exhibit B’s legal insufficiency is that the waiver by the accused-appellant
of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel.  This fact
was admitted by Sgt. Rudy Guerra himself during his cross-examination, thus:

We have ruled in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, People
v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 and People v. Sison, G.R. No. 70906, May
30, 1986 that:

“The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel.  Any statement obtained in violation
of the procedure herein laid down, whatever exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.“

Having cast aside Exhibit B as inadmissible for the reasons above-stated, We
see no need to further dwell on accused-appellant’s allegation of torture and
maltreatment.

We now weigh the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
relied upon by the trial court, viz:  that appellant misled the persons
searching for his wife by telling them that he had already looked for his wife
at the creek; that appellant’s bolo smelled of fish [malansa] and a
little bit wet indicating it was washed; that appellant’s wearing apparel was
also a bit wet [malumigmig] indicating it was washed to remove
bloodstains; and that during the wake, appellant appeared restless, drank a
large amount of water and showed no signs of sorrow or remorse over his wife’s
death.

After a thorough study of the testimonial evidence from which the
aforecited circumstantial evidence was drawn by the trial court, it is our
holding that standing alone, said circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to
support a judgment of conviction since they consist primarily of unsubstantiated
suspicions on the part of the witnesses for the prosecution.

The tests of
sufficiency for circumstantial evidence to support conviction under Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., that there is more than
one circumstance; that the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and that the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, have not been ably met.

On the
prosecution’s charge that appellant intentionally misled the persons searching
for his wife by claiming he had already looked for her at the creek but did not
find her there, there is nothing in the record to support such allegation nor
any other indication that would totally negate the veracity of appellants’ claim
that he, indeed, looked for his wife in said area.

Appellant explained
that his bolo was a little bit wet because its scabbard was wet.  He did not
testify that his bolo was wet because he kept it near the faucet of the water
jar.  His testimony^[17] is to the effect
that he usually tucked his bolo in its scabbard on the post near the faucet of
the water jar.  It is not beyond the natural course of events that by the
proximity of the water jar to the post where appellant usually tucked his bolo
in its scabbard, if the water jar’s faucet is opened, water could be splashed in
a manner as to wet the bolo’s scabbard, and thus, the bolo itself.  Also, since
the appellant used the bolo to cut bamboo, the bolo’s wetness could have been
caused by his perspiration.

Appellant has, likewise, explained why his
wearing apparel were “a bit wet” [malumigmig].  He said they were wet
of perspiration because he wore them when he cut bamboo.^[18]

Besides, even if, as the
prosecution sought to prove, that the appellant’s bolo and wearing apparel were
indeed washed, such fact does not warrant the conclusion nor are they proof that
appellant killed his wife.

As to the appellant’s alleged queer behavior
during the wake, it must be realized that people react differently to death. 
Appellant’s behavior on that fateful day may have been caused by the trauma of
his wife’s sudden and brutal death.

We agree with the Solicitor General
that appellant’s explanations have indubitably cast a reasonable doubt as to the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to convict him beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of killing his wife.

As held in People vs.
Tolentino, G.R. No. 50103, November 24, 1986, it facts or circumstances
apparently inculpatory, may equally be explained showing innocence, the evidence
does not fulfill the moral certainty to support conviction.

In an earlier
case, US vs. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 493, this Court had occasion to rule that
“since circumstantial evidence is as strong as its weakest link, if the same
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty sufficiently strong to offset the
presumption of innocence, the accused has the right to be acquitted even if his
innocence be doubtful.  [Underscoring supplied]

That the
circumstantial evidence upon which the prosecution anchored its case fails to
meet the standard of moral certainty is underscored by said evidence’s inability
to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the single one of guilt.

“Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to but one
fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant to the exclusion of
all others as the guilty person.”^[19]

“No general rule can be laid
down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will
suffice.  All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”^[20]

“It is indispensable that the
evidence be derived from interrelated facts and duly proven in a manner that
will lead to the logical and rational conclusion, beyond all reasonable doubt
that the accused is the author of the crime; because if his guilt is not
satisfactorily established, there always arises a presumption of his innocence
until the contrary is proved and in such a case, he is unquestionably entitled
to be acquitted.^[21]

Under the premises, the circumstantial evidence cited by the trial court is
not sufficient to produce a moral certainty as to the guilt of the appellant for
the crime charged.

Moreover, as the affidavit of admission executed by
the appellant, being the prosecution’s basic evidence, is not admissible against
him because he was not assisted by counsel, all other evidence which tend to
support this basic evidence become useless.

“Where the principal basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests its
case fails, all evidence intended to support or corroborate it must likewise
fail.”^[22]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction appealed from is
hereby reversed, and accused-appellant Miguel Lasac is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.