G.R. No. 64296. July 20, 1984
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DEPUTY MINISTER VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., ACTING FOR AND IN BEHALF AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND A…
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
respondent Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment Vicente Leogardo,
Jr., who affirmed Acting District Officer Saturnino P. Orate’s order
insofar as it declared the dismissal of private respondent Alberto
Angeles illegal for lack of justifiable cause and ordered his
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights.
The respondent Deputy Minister modified the award of back-wages such
that it should be computed from September 12, 1977 up to his actual
reinstatement but limited the same to three years without qualification
or deduction.
The facts of the case are summarized by Acting District Officer Saturnino Orate as follows:
“The records of the case reveal that Alberto Angeles had been
employed on May 17, 1976 as a security guard by the respondent and his
last assignment was at the PNB Lingayen, Pangasinan. On August 16,
1977, he was arrested by police authorities for creating trouble inside
the Bankside Restaurant and for assault to person in authority on same
date. On August 22, 1977 a criminal complaint No. 6730 was filed
against him for the crime of assault upon an agent of person in
authority and on August 24, 1977 another criminal case No. 6735 was
filed against him for the crime of alarm and scandal. Both were filed
in the Municipal Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and are still pending up
to the present. While the complainant Alberto Angeles filed an
Administrative Case No. 41-77 with the Police Commission on August 31,
1977 against four (4) policemen namely Jaime Guarin, Aning Bravo,
Berting Sison and Rudy Estrada for mauling him inside the Bankside
Restaurant in Lingayen, Pangasinan on August 16, 1977 at 8:00 p.m. and
on October 10, 1977 filed a criminal case against the four policemen
mentioned above for slight physical injuries as a result of the said
mauling incident. On September 15, 1977 a memorandum was issued by Col.
Ernesto Tigno to Mr. N. N. Pale, Manager, PNB Lingayen Branch to advise
NASECO guard Angeles, that he is on preventive suspension effective
September 12, 1977 until further notice from his employer and on same
memorandum and in line with the instruction of Col. Ernesto Tigno, the
Branch Manager N. N. Pale advised Alberto Angeles to cease reporting for
duty as he was under preventive suspension until further notice. The
respondent filed an application for clearance to terminate the services
of Alberto Angeles on the ground of violation of NASECO code of
Discipline, letter D, No. 10, effective December 19, 1977 with the
Regional Office No. IV, Manila, furnishing him a copy of said
application for clearance evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 43224”
On May 11, 1978, the application to terminate was approved by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
On April 17, 1978, a case for illegal dismissal was, in turn, filed by
private respondent Angeles before the Regional Office of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at Dagupan City against petitioner corporation.
On June 16, 1978, Acting District Officer Saturnino P. Orate issued an
order declaring Angeles’ complaint for illegal dismissal as having
become moot and academic and his preventive suspension illegal there
being no application for clearance filed in this matter. He ordered
petitioner NASECO to pay backwages from September 12, 1977 up to
December 6, 1977.
The private respondent appealed to the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
On May 30, 1980, the Ministry of Labor and Employment set aside the
order of the District Officer declaring Angeles’ complaint for illegal
dismissal moot and academic and remanded the case to the District
Officer for further hearing and resolution.
On October 11, 1980, District Officer Saturnino Orate rendered a
decision declaring the dismissal of private respondent Alberto Angeles
illegal and ordered petitioner NASECO to reinstate Angeles to his former
position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from June
1, 1980 up to his actual reinstatement. The dispositive portion of his
order reads:
“In the light of the foregoing, the dismissal of Alberto Angeles
is hereby declared illegal for lack of justifiable ground, therefore,
Alberto Angeles should be, as it is hereby ordered reinstated back to
his former position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages
from June 1, 1980 up to his actual reinstatement.”
On October 23, 1980, petitioner corporation filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal.
On April 27, 1983, respondent Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment
Vicente Leogardo, Jr. modified the order of the Acting District Officer
in that backwages should be computed from the time respondent Angeles
was placed on preventive suspension on September 12, 1977 and that it
should be limited to three (3) years without qualification or deduction.
The dispositive portion of the order reads:
“WHEREFORE, subject to the modification stated above, the Order
dated October 1, 1980 is hereby affirmed and the instant appeal is
dismissed, for lack of merit.”
On June 20, 1983, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.
On June 27, 1983, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the order dated April 27, 1983.
Petitioner submits that private respondent Alberto Angeles was guilty of
the offenses charged as evidenced by Annexes “A” to “D”, to wit:
“”A” – report covering memorandum for various offenses committed
by private respondent ranging from sporting long haircut to laxity in
the performance of his duties.“B” and “B-1” – criminal complaints filed against the private
respondent and the corresponding supporting documents and affidavits.“C” – evidence of the investigation and recommendation made by the
Personnel Board of petitioner NASECO (the NASECO Board which is
incharge of deliberation of Administrative cases of NASECO Personnel),
recommending the termination of the services of the private respondent,
for violation of the NASECO Code of Discipline.”
Petitioner further alleges that even before the Bankside Restaurant
incident which led to private respondent’s dismissal he was already
found guilty of similar behaviour (as contained in the Investigation
Report, Annex “C”) –
“a. sometimes went on duty under the influence of liquor;
“b. untidiness and improper wearing of uniform, sporting long hair with moustache and beard;
“c. entertaining outsiders at night while on duty;
“d. the incident was the second time he has created inside the restaurant.”
Petitioner argues that because of the very nature of the work of a
security guard, such scandalous and unbecoming behaviour of the private
respondent, together with his earlier similar offenses, is sufficient
and valid ground for dismissal.
Respondents on the other hand argue that the above incidents do not constitute proof sufficient to support dismissal –
“– the July 7, 1977 reprimand concerned untidiness and laxity in
work, something unrelated to the cause invoked for the dismissal. That
Angeles was merely reprimanded for these lapses show that a more severe
penalty was not appropriate. x x xxxx xxx xxx
“–There is no evidence, then and now, that Angeles has been found guilty by the court before which the charges were filed.
“– Independently of the copies of the charges of alarm and assault, petitioner company did not present evidence to show that Angeles had committed these offenses.
“– The recommendation of petitioner’s personnel board is
self-serving. That recommendation shows on its face that the board
relied merely on the police complaints and report concerning the
charges of alarm and assault. x x x.xxx xxx xxx
“–Besides, petitioner’s board of personnel did not conduct any
hearing that would have given Angeles the chance to dispute the charges
against him. It took into account only the evidence against him. x x
x”xxx xxx xxx
We agree with the petitioner.
The private respondent was employed by the petitioner corporation as a
security guard. As such, he is expected to conduct himself properly and
with decorum at all times. His main task as a security guard is to
maintain peace and order in the premises of his assigned area of
responsibility. For him to get involved in a fracas, with policemen at
that, and to commit exactly the same infractions which he is supposed
to prevent in others at his place of employment is a breach of the
responsibilities which a security guard is bound to discharge. Thus,
whether the charges of “alarm and scandal” and “assault upon an agent of
a person in authority” were committed while the private respondent was
off duty or were committed outside of his work assignment is immaterial.
Whether or not the incidents eventually resulted in successful
prosecutions is not significant. The records show that the incidents
actually occurred.
A security guard, by the very nature of his job, must possess attributes
of discipline, proper behaviour, courtesy, respect for authority, and
emotional stability. There are altogether too many security guards who
are trigger happy or who get mistaken notions of power simply because
they are armed. Unfortunate incidents have been caused by
indiscriminate resort to firearms resulting from heated arguments over
such trivial items as reserved parking spaces, inspection of brief cases
and bundles, wearing of ID cards, and other matters easily resolved by
more disciplined and reliable persons. The employer cannot wait until a
more serious or fatal incident involving its employees occurs before
taking appropriate action.
While the Bankside Restaurant incident alone is ordinarily not
sufficient ground for termination, the very nature of Angeles’ work as a
security guard together with the allegations of untidiness, laxity in
the performance of his duties, going on duty under the influence of
liquor and entertaining outsiders at night while on duty are more than
sufficient to justify the termination of private respondent’s
employment. The public and private respondents considered these
circumstances singly and separately and arrived at the conclusion that
they are not sufficient to justify private respondent’s termination. We
should consider the different acts of misconduct committed by private
respondent in their totality and not independent from each other.
Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight
little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate
and independent of each other. A series of irregularities when put
together may constitute serious misconduct, which under Article 283 of
the Labor Code, is a just cause for termination. Thus, petitioner’s
Personnel Board made the following recommendation after due
investigation:
“We, the members of the Personnel Board, do hereby certify that we
have examined the evidences presented against Mr. Angeles relative to
his violation of the Code. The Board feels that although Mr. Angeles is
not yet convicted for the crime he had committed, his prolonged stay
with the Corporation as security guard will not only endanger the
security of the client company but may also destroy the corporate image
and goodwill.“We, therefore, recommend that corresponding clearance to
terminate his service be applied with the National Labor Relations
Commission, Department of Labor.
As repeatedly held by this Court:
“An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the
employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance towards his employer and whose continuance in the service of
the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The law, in
protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer.” (San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 115 SCRA 329).
The only exception to this rule is where the suspension or dismissal is whimsical or unjustified (Velayo v. Republic of the Philippines, 97 Phil. 378), and such is not the situation in the present case.
Considering, however, the various circumstances of this case, we apply
equitable considerations. While ruling that the private respondent has
brought by his own conduct a valid reason to justify his separation from
employment, we nonetheless direct the employer to pay the private
respondent the separation pay to which he may be entitled under the law,
any collective bargaining agreement, or company rules or practice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders appealed from are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE without prejudice to the private respondent’s
receiving termination pay to which he may be entitled. The temporary
restraining order issued on June 27, 1983 enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the order dated April 27, 1983 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on official leave.