G.R. No. 64250. September 30, 1983
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. AND ERLITO LORCA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, JUDGE PRESIDING OVER BRANCH XVI OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAVITE; TIMOTEA T. MOR…
ESCOLIN, J.:
A petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court CA-G.R. No. SP-00708 entitled “Superlines
Transportation Co., Inc., et al. versus Hon. Luis L. Victor, et al.,”
which affirmed the orders dated March 28 and April 27, 1983 of herein
respondent Judge Luis L. Victor in Civil Case No. N-4338 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, entitled “Timotea T. Moralde, et al. versus Pantranco
South Express, Inc., et al.”
On December 19, 1982, Bus No. 3008 of the Pantranco South
Express, Inc., Pantranco for short, driven by Rogelio Dillomas, collided with
Bus No. 331 of the Superlines Transportation Co., Inc., Superlines for short,
then driven by Erlito Lorca along the highway at Lumilang, Calauag, Quezon,
resulting in the instantaneous death of Cayetano P. Moralde, passenger in the
Pantranco bus.
On January 4, 1983, Superlines instituted an action for damages
before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, against
Pantranco and Rogelio Dillomas, driver of said Pantranco Bus No. 3008. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
1671-G, Superlines alleged that the recklessness and negligence of the
Pantranco bus driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that there was
want of diligence on the part of Pantranco in the selection and supervision of
its driver.
On February 11, 1983, private respondents Timotea T. Moralde,
widow of the deceased Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., and her children, Cayetano,
Jr., Alexander, Ramon, Emmanuel, all surnamed Moralde, and Jocelyn M. Abellana,
filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. N-4338 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, against Superlines and its driver, Erlito
Lorca, as well as Pantranco and its driver, Rogelio Dillomas. The cause of action pleaded against Superlines
was based on quasi-delict, while that against Pantranco, on culpa-contractual.
On February 28, 1983, herein petitioners Superlines and its
driver Erlito Lorca filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. N-4338 on the
ground of pendency of another action, obviously referring to Civil Case No. 1671-G
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca Branch.
Finding that the two cases (Civil Cases No. 1671-G and No.
N-4338) involved different parties as well as different causes of action,
respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss in the challenged
order of March 28, 1983. Superlines
moved for a reconsideration, but the same was denied on April 27, 1983.
Dissatisfied, Superlines filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, which petition, however, was denied due course. Hence, this present recourse.
It is suggested by petitioners that private respondents Moraldes
should pursue their claim for damages by intervening in the Gumaca action, pursuant
to Sec. 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court and in the light of Municipality of
Hagonoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources [73 SCRA 507] and
Orellano v. Alvestir [76 SCRA 536]. It
is contended that since the right of private respondents to claim damages is
founded on the same facts involved in the Gumaca action, any judgment rendered
therein will amount to res judicata in the Cavite case, for
whatever adjudication is made in the former case between Pantranco and
Superlines as regards either of the parties’ culpability would set said issue
at rest. Furthermore, such intervention
would prevent multiplicity of suits and avoid confusion that may arise should
the trial courts render conflicting decisions.
Petitioners’ stand is consistent with our ruling in the case of
Marapao v. Mendoza, 119 SCRA 97, where We held that:
“While respondent Castillo has not been impleaded in the Bohol
case, she has similar interests as Hotel de Mercedes, the defendant therein
which is her employer. Petitioner and
private respondent both claim damages based on the same incident. A decision, whether in favor of petitioner or
private respondent in the Bohol case would amount to res judicata
in the Cebu case. Damages in favor of
one party would preclude damages in favor of the other.
“There is an additional reason for dismissal, and that is, to
avoid multiplicity of suits. (Ago
Timber Co. v. Hon. Ruiz, et al., 21 SCRA 138 (1967); Erlanger v. Villamor, 98
Phil. 1003 (1956); Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956).
“To protect the interests of respondent employee, she may
intervene as a party in the Bohol case and file a counterclaim for damages
against petitioner.”
There is, however, a more pragmatic solution to the controversy
at bar; and that is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case. Considerations of judicial economy and
administration, as well as the convenience of the parties for which the rules
on procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court,
rather than the Gumaca court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties concerned.
As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to require
private respondents who are all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their claims
in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose them to considerable
expenses. On the other hand, no like
prejudice would befall the defendants transportation companies if they were
required to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not
expose them to expenses which they are not already liable to incur in
connection with the Gumaca case. The
objection interposed by Superlines that it has its offices in Atimonan,
Quezon, should not detract from the overall convenience affored by the
consolidation of cases in the Cavite Court.
For apart from the fact that petitioner and its driver are represented
by the same counsel with offices located in Manila, defendants transportation
companies can readily avail of their facilities for conveying their witnesses
to the place of trial.
The ordered consolidation of cases, to our mind, crystallizes
into reality the thinking of our predecessors that:
“x x x The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make
the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised
is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of
the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives
the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute
themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to
restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it
effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be
urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the
court’s powers by technicalities that that part of its authority effective for
justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the
whole. The purpose of procedure is not
to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to
obtain that thing. In other words, it
is a means to an end. It is the means by
which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and
takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.” (Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. Civil Case No. 1671-G of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon is hereby ordered consolidated with Civil Case No. N-4338
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca
Branch, is directed to transfer, without unnecessary delay, the records of
Civil Case No. 1671-G to the Regional Court of Cavite, Branch XVI.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Relova, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
De Castro, J., on sick leave.