PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO BANAYO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court,^*
Branch LV, at Lucena City which convicted Alejandro Banayo of the crime
of Murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos.

Alejandro Banayo was charged together with Donato Banayo and Rosendo
Villanueva, Jr., alias “Chito” of the crime of MURDER in an information
which reads:

“That on or about the 13th day of September 1980, at Barangay Bungoy,
Munici­pality of Dolores, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
knife, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab several
times with the said deadly weapon one Armando Abel, thereby inflicting
upon the latter stab wounds on the different parts of the body which
directly caused his death.”

Only defendant-appellant Banayo was arrested and tried. His co-accused
Rosendo Villanueva and Donato Alvero have remained at large.

After a careful consideration of the evidence for the prosecution and
the defense, we find the facts of the case correctly summarized by the
appellee as follows:

“At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of September 13, 1980,
Romualdo Cabrera and his cousin, Isidoro Cartena, were on their way home
to Bungoy, Dolores, Quezon, when they encoun­tered the group of Rosendo
Villanueva alias ‘Chito’, Donato Alvero and appellant Alejandro Banayo,
who were playing mahjong in front of the house of Hermilando
Ventocilla. The two groups threw stones and bottles at each other (tsn.,
pp. 8-10, November 4, 1981; tsn., pp. 8-11, May 26, 1982; tsn., pp.
7-9, August 5, 1082). Romualdo Cabrera and Isidoro Cartena retreated.
Cabrera was chased by Villanueva with a knife but was able to take
refuge in the house of his uncle Peting Ventocilla.

“While Cabrera was in the house of Peting Ventocilla, the deceased
Armando Abel passed by and went to the scene of the incident (tsn., pp.
13-15, November 4, 1981; tsn., pp. 14-20, May 26, 1982; tsn., pp. 9-12,
August 5, 1981). Upon reaching the place of the incident, Armando Abel
talked with Chito Villanueva. Suddenly, Villanueva stabbed Armando Abel
from behind while appellant Alejandro Banayo and Donato Alvero held him
by his two hands (tsn., pp. 16-21, November 4, 1981; tsn., pp. 20-27,
September 9, 1981).

“Minutes later, Barangay Captain Godofredo Valle arrived. Chito
Villanueva, Donato Alvero and appellant Alejandro Banayo ran away
leaving Armando Abel bleeding at the side of the road (tsn., p. 14,
August 12, 1981; tsn., p. 5, September 16, 1981). With the help of
Alfredo Esguerra, Godofredo Valle loaded the victim in a jeep and
brought him to a hospital in San Pablo (tsn., pp. 15-16, August 12,
1981). Thereafter, Armandel Abel expired (tsn., p. 26, August 12, 1981).

“The autopsy conducted on the body of Armando Abel revealed that
the victim died of internal hemorrhage due to several fatal wounds
inflicted in different parts of the body (Exh. ‘A’, p. 112, Rec.; tsn.,
pp. 19-23, March 10, 1982).”

Defendant-appellant interposes the defense of alibi. He claims that more
or less three minutes after the stone and bottle throwing incident
between his group and Romualdo Cabrera, his uncle Rogelio Aurelio
fetched him because his mother was sick at that time. He insists that he
was no longer at the scene of the crime when Rosendo Villanueva, his
co-accused, stabbed Armando Abel. As earlier stated, Villanueva is at
large and was not tried.

On appeal, the defendant-appellant raises the following assignments of errors:

I

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROMUALDO CABRERA WHICH IS COMPLETELY FALSE, BIAS AND UNFOUNDED.

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALFREDO
ESGUERRA WHICH IS TOTALLY UNCORROBORATED AS REGARDS TO THE ACTUAL
STABBING DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF SO MANY WITNESSES IN THE PLACE WHERE
THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE.

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF
GODOFREDO VALLE WHICH IS TOTALLY FALSE, UNCORROBORATED AND AGAINST
COMMON EXPERIENCE.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
DEFENSE WITNESSES FELICISIMO VENTOCILLA, ARNEL VENTOCILLA, ROSAURO PALMA
AND THE ACCUSED ALEJANDRO BANAYO.

V

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MURDER WHICH
IS TOTALLY WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW OR IN FACT ON WHICH THE DECISION MAY
STAND.

VI

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTED CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE ACCUSED THERE BEING NO BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW ON WHICH IT MAY
STAND.

At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently
indifferent attitude displayed by the trial court towards a murder case
it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the body of which
contains only 63 Lines spread out over less than three typewritten
pages, double spaced and wide margined. While brevity should
characterize a court’s decisions and the length of a decision is not
necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding
this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more
satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both prosecution and
defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on
record and the jurisprudence and authorities supporting the court’s
conclusions.

This, the trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of
authority in the decision. The issues raised by the appellant include
allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying declaration,
premeditation, conspiracy, treachery, and superior strength. The issues
raised are quite serious and they deserved better treatment from the
trial court.

Fortunately, while the decision is compressed, the records are quite
ample. To his credit, the trial judge allowed the prosecution and
defense to fully develop their respective cases. Going over the records
care­fully, we find sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment of
conviction.

The main thrust of appellant’s first, second, and third assignments of
errors is against the credibility of the prosecution witnesses Romualdo
Cabrera, Alfredo Esguerra, and Godofredo Valle.

Romualdo Cabrera testified categorically that he saw Chito Villanueva
stab Armando Abel while the latter was being held by Donato Alvero and
the defendant-appellant. This was fully corroborated by Alfredo Esguerra
who was near the scene of the stabbing incident. On the other hand,
Barangay Captain Godofredo Valle, who brought the victim to the
hospital, asked the victim what happened to him. The victim who was
dying answered that the group of Chito Villanueva ganged up on him.

Inspite of the gruelling cross-examination conducted by the defense
counsel, Romualdo Cabrera and Alfredo Esguerra stuck firmly to their
testimonies. While there may have been inconsistencies in their
testimonies, these were only on minor details and are of the same nature
as those which have been held to be badges of truth for only the
testimonies of rehearsed witnesses will tally on every point. (People v.
Paculba, 124 SCRA 383).

The testimony of Godofredo Valle on the dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule. As held in People v. Sagario
(14 SCRA 468) there are four (4) requisites which must concur in order
that a dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it must concern
the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at
the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d)
the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or
parricide in which the declarant was the victim.

The first requisite is present in the ante mortem statement of the
victim, Armando Abel. The statement made by him to Godofredo Valle while
on the jeepney which was rushing him to the hospital concerned the
cause or circumstance of the declarant’s death. The declarant at the
time he was giving the dying declaration was conscious of his impending
death having suffered six (6) stab wounds at various parts of the body.
In fact, he died before he could even reach the hospital. The dead body
of Armando Abel was brought instead to the funeral parlor.

True, the statement of the victim before his death was rather vague and
ambiguous. He referred to the “gang of Chito Villanueva” as the group
that ganged up on him. Barangay Bungoy, Dolores, Quezon, however, is
only a small community. The residents know who the friends of their
neighbors are and the members of a particular group or gang. In this
case, Barangay Captain Godofredo Valle knew who were referred to as the
members of Chito Villanueva’s gang. Valle named specifically, Donato
Alvero and defendant-appellant as among the members of the gang. Taking
Godofredo Valle’s testimony together with those of Romualdo Cabrera and
Alfredo Esguerra, the appellant and Donato Alvero together with Chito
Villanueva were undeniably at the scene during the stabbing incident.

The defense of alibi of defendant-appellant cannot be taken seriously for the following reasons:

1. The defendant-appellant was positively identified by Romualdo
Cabrera and Alfredo Esguerra as one of the two persons who held the
victim while the latter was being stabbed by Chito Villanueva;

2. The defense witnesses admitted that defendant-appellant was at
the scene of the crime. They claim, however, that he was fetched by
Rogelio Aurelio three or four minutes before the stabbing incident
occurred;

3. Defendant-appellant’s house was only a few meters away from the
scene of the crime, a distance which could be traversed within minutes.

Well settled is the rule that alibi is a weak defense against the
positive identification of the accused (People v. Cervantes, 125 SCRA
187; People v. Elefaño, Jr., 125 SCRA 702). We also find no reason from
the records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their
testimonies and implicate the appellant in such a serious crime.

Moreover, the defense has not satisfactorily shown that it was
impossible for the defendant-appellant to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. The claim of defendant-appellant
that he went home before the stabbing incident took place because his
mother was sick cannot be given any credence. In the first place,
defendant-appellant testified that his mother was no longer feeling well
and had a slight fever at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
September 13, 1980. By 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the fever had
worsened. At past 8:00 o’clock, he nevertheless left home and went to
his uncle, Rogelio Aurelio. Thereafter, he proceeded to Hermilandro
Ventocilla’s house and watched the people there play mahjong. If he was
overly concerned about his mother’s health, he would not have left his
sick mother alone in the first place.

Further in his testimony, the defendant-appellant stated that he went
back home to his mother because he remembered his mother told him that
it was Friday the 13th and that it was dangerous to go out on such date.
He, however, admitted that he was not superstitious. We find the alibi
of defendant-appellant puerile and incredulous.

With regard to the fifth assignment of error, the abbreviated method
employed by the lower court in explaining its conclusions makes it
difficult to ascertain exactly what led the lower court to convict the
defendant-appellant for the crime of murder instead of homicide. A
perusal of the information shows that treachery was alleged as the
qualifying circumstance. No other modifying circumstance was alleged.
The decision of the lower court held, however, that “the treachery
alleged to be attendant to the killing of Armando Abel appears to the
Court to be more of taking advantage by Villanueva and his group of
their superior strength when he stabbed Armando Abel.” (Decision, p. 3)
Assuming that the lower court’s vague statement is interpreted to mean
that there was no treachery, it is difficult to follow the sudden jump
to the dispositive portion defining the crime as murder. The
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength was not alleged in
the information and could not therefore qualify the killing to Murder.
It should have been considered as a mere aggravating circumstance.

But since this is an appeal from a criminal conviction, the entire
records of the case are thrown wide open for review of this Court. In
this regard, we find ample evidence to establish treachery. Treachery
exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms which tend
directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense without
risk to the accused arising from the defense which the offended party
might make (Art. 14, Par. 16, Revised Penal Code). The concurrence of
the two conditions necessary for treachery to exist are present in this
case, namely: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of
execution which would insure the offender’s safety from any defensive or
any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means that
no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) such means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously chosen (People v. Macariola, 120 SCRA 92; People v. Rhoda,
122 SCRA 909).

The holding of the hands of the victim by Donato Alvero and the
defendant-appellant insured the commission of the offense without risk
to the accused. The victim was immobilized and prevented from parrying
the knife thrusts of Chito Villanueva. The victim was in no position to
retaliate.

Contrary to the contention of the defendant-appellant, conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting of the minds among the accused was
proven (People v. Velez, 58 SCRA 21). Proof of publicly observable
mutual agree­ment is not indispensable to establish conspiracy. Hence,
there is conspiracy where two of the accused held the victim’s hands and
the third stabbed the victim from behind (People v. Rhoda, supra).
Each of the offenders performed with such closeness and coordination
indicating a common purpose or design. (People v. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246)

One final point. Time and again, we have reminded lower courts to employ
legal terminology in the imposi­tion of penalties. In this case, the
lower court used the term “life imprisonment”. The correct term is “reclusion perpetua“.
The reason is obvious. The various penalties have their corresponding
legal accessories and effects (People v. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58; See People
v. Sabater, 81 SCRA 564).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED in that the appellant
is found GUILTY of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of
the law; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Armando Abel in the sum
of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos; and to pay the proportionate
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

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^* Judge Fernando A. Santiago, Presiding.