THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., PETITIONER, VS. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, BRANCH II, SHERIFF OF MANILA AN…

The instant petition prays for the issuance of the extraordinary
writs of –

(a)            certiorari
directed against respondent court,^[1]
for having allegedly acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
on July 17, 1981 a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 939 awarding in favor of
herein private respondent Sastre the amount, among
other sums, of P624,042.23,^[2]
a substantial portion of which
was the supposed overpayment by said private respondent to petitioner Shell;

(b)            prohibition
and mandamus to enjoin respondent sheriff or any of his deputies from
further proceeding with the implementation of the aforementioned writ of
execution and to require them to accept the tender of payment offered by
petitioner in the amount of P92,607.93 in satisfaction of the judgment rendered
by respondent court in said civil case.

The records show that way back on July 31, 1963 an amended complaint, entitled “Go See Gawa and Eustaquia Sastre vs. The Shell Company of the Philippines
Limited,” was filed with respondent court and docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 939 for collection of private respondent.  Sastre’s alleged
commission from the sale of petitioner’s products and commodities in Butuan City
and in the province of Agusan del Norte.^[3]

On June 2, 1969,
respondent court^[4]
rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, with the following decretal portion:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
renders judgment:

1.  ORDERING defendant SHELL to reimburse
plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre
the sum of SIX HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND FORTY TWO PESOS and TWENTY THREE
CENTAVOS (P624,042.23), with legal rate of interest from the filing of this
case up to the final payment of the same;

2.  ORDERING defendant SHELL to pay plaintiff
EUSTAQUIA SASTRE the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for actual and
moral damages suffered by the latter, with legal rate of interest from the time
of the filing of this case up to
its final payment;

3.  ORDERING defendant SHELL to pay plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent for defendant SHELL not to juggle with its
figures next time to serve unjustly its purpose at the expense of others, with legal rate of interest from the filing of
this case up to its final payment;

4.  ORDERING defendant SHELL to pay plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees
for forcing her to file this case in Court with aid of counsel just to collect
what is due her from defendant SHELL;

5.  ORDERING defendant SHELL to reimburse
plaintiffs the sum of EIGHTY TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and
NINETY SEVEN CENTAVOS (P82,785.97) plus interest thereon and attorney’s fees
adjudged by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against plaintiffs herein in Civil Case No. R-­7666, PROVIDED that said
judgment shall not have been already
paid by and/or executed against said plaintiffs; and

6.  TAXING defendant SHELL the costs of this
suit.

SO ORDERED.”^[5]

From the aforesaid decision petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals questioning, inter alia, the award of P624,042.23
representing the supposed overpayment by private respondent to petitioner.  In its decision in CA-G.R. No. 50233-R^[6]
dated July 14, 1980, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court with the modification that the awards for moral and exemplary damages
were reduced to P25,000.00 each and the attorney’s fees to P5,000.00.

The award of P624,042.23 was justified by respondent Court of
Appeals as follows:

“The pivotal issue posed for our determination is whether the
lower court erred in finding that appellant SHELL is indebted to plaintiffs in
the sum of P624,024.23 (sic, P624,042.23), with legal interests from the filing
of the complaint.

“In this connection, we propose to discuss first appellant’s third,
fourth and fifth assigned errors which we cannot sustain for lack of
merit.  The trial court found that SHELL
is indebted to plaintiffs in the following amount:

‘x x x plaintiff Eustaquia
Sastre has paid SHELL thru Exhs.
K, K-1 to K­101, inclusive, the sum of P642,028.20.  And (sic) to this amount her uncollected
commission or discount of P64,800.00 from defendant SHELL will give us a total
of P706,828.20.  Deduct the acknowledged
debt of plaintiffs in the sum of P82,785.97, which the Court hereby holds as
true, will leave us the amount of P624,024.23 (sic. P624,042.23) in plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre’s favor.”
(p. 28, Record of Appeal)

“SHELL assails the above findings as erroneous because:

(1) Exhs. K, K-1 to K-101, with the total sum of P642,028.20,
were offered by plaintiffs in evidence to show that they have no more
indebtedness to SHELL;

(2) The Court a
quo should have given credence to the Statement of Account (Exh. 15) prepared by its witness, Mr. Maximo
Villarin, 
Credit Control Head of SHELL, showing a total of 22,047 drums of
gasoline sold by Sastre for the period from 1955 to
1962, instead of believing the testimony of Mr. Jose Tan, SHELL’s
sales representative, who testified from memory that Sastre
sold 64,800 drums of gasoline from 1954 to 1962; and,

(3) The trial court
should not have ordered SHELL to reimburse plaintiffs the amount of P82,785.97,
which was awarded to it in the CFI of Cebu because,
in effect, that would amount to a review of a final Decision of a co-equal
Court.

“In our desire to ascertain whether the assigned errors were
committed by the lower court, which had the advantageous point of assessing the
documentary and testimonial evidence upon their presentation, we carefully
reviewed the evidence and we find no compelling reason to disturb His Honor’s
findings that:

‘Now, the question is asked: 
Did Plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre
issue really Exhibits K to K-101, inclusive? 
And if so, to whom?  Were they
negotiated and/or cashed by the endorsee thereon?

The answers to all the three foregoing questions are best supplied
by PNB Cashier Florentino Valenzuela who admitted
during the trial that said checks covered by Exhibits K to K-101, inclusive,
were

‘x
x x issued by Mrs. Sastre in
favor of the Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., and these checks were
negotiated with our PNB Cebu Branch and the
endorsement is endorsed by the Shell Company of the Philippines and the
endorsements are duly guaranteed by the PNB Cebu
Branch.’ (tsn, p. 352, Florentino
Valenzuela)

The foregoing is also corroborated by no
less than Atty. Nicholas Deen, counsel for defendant
SHELL who admitted in open Court during the hearing that

‘x
x x we admit that the signatures of Eustaquia Sastre are appearing
there.’

and that

‘x
x x this witness (Eustaquia
Sastre) has already sufficiently established that the
checks have been paid to the Shell Co. thru the PNB, so that there will be no
need to identify these checks x x x.’ (tsn, p. 272, Atty. Nicholas Deen)

x x                                         x
x                                            x
x

‘As to how many drums of gasoline and diesoline Eustaguia
Sastre has sold from 1954 to 1962 inclusive, we have
it from Jose Tan, defendant SHELL’S Sales Supervisor then, that Plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre sold on the
average 300 drums of gasoline a month. 
For nine years, therefor, (sic) said plaintiff
sold 32,400 drums of gasoline and 32,400 drums of diesoline, or a grand total
of 64,800 drums.  At the agreed discount or commission of one (P1.00) pesos
(sic) per dum (sic), plaintiff Eustaquia
Sastre is entitled to receive P64,800 (See:  tsn, p. 402, Jose Tan).’ (pp. 26-28, Record on Appeal).

“In justifying the award granted, His Honor rationalized in
this wise:

‘The Court is aware that a party can no more succeed upon a case
proved but not alleged than upon a case alleged but not proved.’ (Obispo Catolico Romano de Zamboanga vs.
Reyes, TA-R.A. Num. 20321-R, Enero 18, 1964, citing
Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co., and Fernandez, 38 Phil.
647).

‘But it is equally aware that this Court is not only a Court of
law, but also a Court of equity.  For
here we have defendant SHELL, through its counsel, admitting a blatant,
complete and crassly obvious overpayment, as aforesaid, that need not be proved
anymore by plaintiff Eustaquia Sastre.  For the Court to just close its eyes to it
would make it a party to such a manifest injustice, where, as in the instant
case, the records do not disclose that such admission by defendant SHELL’S
counsel as above-said was previously shown during the trial as to have been
made through palpable mistake (Section 2, Rule 129, Revised Rules of
Court).  And under the principle of NEMO
CUM ALTERIUS DETRIMENTO POTEST
‘(Art. 22, New Civil Code; see also:  Escudero vs. Flores, 51 O.G. 3444), it is but fair, just
and equitable that defendant SHELL shall never for a moment be allowed to
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of plaintiffs.’ (pp. 28-29, Record on
Appeal)

“Plaintiffs point out that if the contention of appellant that
Eustaquia Sastre has not
overpaid SHELL is correct, why did it refuse the motion of plaintiffs to
produce the original records of SHELL in court? 
If appellant had nothing to hide, why its unjustified refusal to produce
documents the existence of which is not denied? 
The reason that the documents are in Cebu City
is flimsy and elusive of the truth.

“We agree with the trial court which found out that in
addition to the ‘commission’, to which appellee is
entitled, the records yield the finding that in actuality, appellee has made an
overpayment to SHELL.  We agree with the
trial court that in the face of such a finding, the court cannot close its eyes
nor fold its arms, and tolerate such injustice over and above the procedural
technicality in substantial justice, especially because the lower court is a
court of law and equity.

“The payment made by plaintiff Sastre
in favor of SHELL were evidenced by checks (Exh. K,
K-1 to K-101) and these were cashed by appellant.  These payments are admitted.  That plaintiffs have paid in full their
obligation to SHELL, pursuant to their Sales Agreement of 1955, was shown by
appellant’s own witness, Mr. Jose Tan, who testified that Sastre
pays her obligation to SHELL monthly by check; that in case she requests for
credit in excess of the ‘Indemnity Agreement’ or ‘Cash Pledge Agreement’, the
same should be made in writing by her to the SHELL management; and that he is
not aware of any written request made by Sastre to
SHELL that she be given an extension beyond the 15-day period, from the
delivery of the sales invoices, within which to pay her obligation to
SHELL.  From the foregoing, the lower
court reached the conclusion, to which we agree, in the absence of a plausible
explanation from appellant, that plaintiff Sastre
indeed made overpayments to SHELL as shown by the above-mentioned checks.

“In disregarding SHELL’s documentary
evidence, the trial court was guided by the following:

(1) The documents
were not original copies and the originals were not produced in court for
comparison in spite of plaintiff’s request; and,

(2) The Statement of
Account (Exh. 15) was prepared by Mr. Maximo Villarin, without the
intervention of plaintiffs and, therefore, self-serving.”^[7]

From the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
56343, but not before filing a motion for extension of time to file said
petition within forty (40) days.^[8]
In our resolution dated April 1, 1981,
we granted the motion but only for thirty (30) days.^[9]

On April 21, 1981,
petitioner filed a second motion for extension praying that it be given another
fifteen (15) days within which to file the aforementioned petition.^[10]
We denied said motion, for having been filed late, in our resolution dated May
18, 198I, as the first extension was granted only for thirty (30) days.^[11]
In the meanwhile, a third motion for extension of ten (10) days was filed by
petitioner on May 4, 1981.^[12]

On May 11, 1981, petitioner finally filed its petition for review
on certiorari which was erroneously entitled as a petition for certiorari.^[13]
On even date, petitioner filed a manifestation praying that our resolution of
April 1, 1981 be reconsidered, that its motions for extension be granted and
that its petition be given due course.^[14]
Further, on June 4, 1981, petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration
of our resolution dated May 18, 1981 and for the admission of its aforesaid
petition.^[15]

On July 6, 1981, the Court issued the following resolution:

“x
x x Acting on the
third-last motion for extension for (10) days filed by petitioner within which
to file the petition for review, the Court Resolved to DENY the same, it being a matter of policy of the Court not
to grant more than thirty days extension for the filing of petition for review. 
(In this case, petitioner would have a total of 65 days) The Court took
no action on the petition for review, except to note that the main issue raised
in the petition is factual, and as to the questions of (1) whether or not the
claim of overpayment by respondents is barred under the rule on compulsory
counterclaims and (2) whether or not the said claim was properly granted by the
trial court on the basis of the evidence strictly limiting the same to the
amount alleged in the pleadings as another cause of action, the Court is not
inclined to disturb the rulings of the Court of Appeals thereon, the error
assigned being technical. 
Correspondingly, the motion of petitioners for the
reconsideration of the Court’s resolution of May 18, 1981 is DENIED, and the
Court of Appeals may proceed to enter final judgment in CA-G.R. No.
50233-R.”^[16]

On July 22, 1981, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above-quoted resolution.^[17]
Thereafter, or on July 24, 1981, petitioner filed another motion for the
issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain
respondent sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution issued by the trial
court in the original case.^[18] Petitioner also filed an urgent ex parte motion
to resolve said motion on July 31, 1981.^[19]

Acting on the motion for the issuance of a TRO, we resolved on
August 10, 1981 to suspend all proceedings and processes in or issued by the
trial court in Civil Case No. 939, until further orders by this Court.^[20]

Thereafter, or on December
16, 1981, we issued another extended resolution which reads:

“x x x Acting on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated
July 22, 1981 of this Court’s resolution of July 6, 1981 denying its motion for
a third extension of time to file a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 50233-R, Go See Gawa,
et al. vs. The Shell Company of the Philippines, LTD., the opposition thereto of
private respondents dated August 7, 1981 and the reply of petitioner of August
14, 1981, the Court Resolved, after mature deliberation on and consideration of
all the pleadings filed by the parties in this case, to DENY, as it hereby
DENIES, petitioner’s subject motion for reconsideration.  Apart from the tardiness already referred to
in Our resolution of July 6, 1981, which in itself is as a rule compelling, the
Court, while very much impressed with the industry and scholarly discussion of
their contentions in their pleadings and motions, (1) is not sufficiently
convinced that the claim of private respondents in Civil Case No. 939 should
have been a compulsory counterclaim to petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No.
R-7666 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the
required identities as to the causes of action in the two cases not being
indisputable and (2) does not deem it beyond the purview of Section 5 of Rule
10 of the Revised Rules of Court for the trial court in Civil Case No. 939 to
pass on the matter of overpayment claimed by private respondent, the contention
that Exhibits K, K-1 to K-101 were presented merely to prove that private
respondents have already paid petitioner P82,785.97, since it appears unusual
if not ridiculous to present such number of exhibits purportedly involving
P600,000 only to prove the
payment of a comparatively much smaller amount, and the trial court as well as
the Court of Appeals were in the best position to determine the purpose of such
evidence and the admission of trial counsel for petitioner in regard thereto,
and apply accordingly the rule that issues ‘tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been
raised in the pleadings’ so much so that even if corresponding amendment of the pleadings to conform with the
evidence is desirable, ‘failure to so amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues.’ (Section 5, Rule 10)”^[21]

On December 28, 1981, petitioner filed a second motion for
reconsideration of our resolutions dated July 6, 1981 and December 16, 1981, reiterating its prayer
that its petition for review on certiorari be given due course.^[22]

On March 8, 1982, we issued a resolution (a) denying petitioner’s
second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit; and (b) lifting
immediately the suspension of all proceedings and processes in or issued by the
trial court in Civil Case No. 939 as ordered in our resolution of August 10,
1981.^[23]

A  third motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner on March 26, 1982,^[24]
but the same was denied by this Court with finality on April 26, 1982.^[25]
The resolution of December 16, 1981 having become final and executory,
entry of judgment was made July 7, 1982.^[26]

Pursuant to the writ of execution previously issued by the trial
court,^[27]
the rights, interests and participations of petitioner over certain real
properties were thereafter levied upon and sold at public auction to private
respondent Sastre as the highest bidder, in full satisfaction of the award in her favor.  It is the aforementioned writ of execution
and its implementation which is now the subject of the instant petition.

Succinctly, it is the contention of herein petitioner that while
the court a quo can
validly award in favor of private respondent the commissions she is claiming
which it found to be only in the amount of P64,800.00, and the actual, moral,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, as reduced by the Court of Appeals, the trial court had no jurisdiction in
awarding the sum of P642,042.23 which included the supposed overpayment, which
claim petitioner insists was neither alleged in the amended complaint nor
proved in evidence during the trial and
thus is irregular, invalid and void. 
Being so, the writ of execution issued for its satisfaction and all other
proceedings pursuant thereto are also void. 
Corollarily, petitioner insists that the
dismissal of its petition for review by this Court did not close the door to
the writs of certiorari herein prayed for.^[28]

Private respondents, on the other hand, counter that the issue of
overpayment was sufficiently alleged in the amended complaint, specifically in
paragraph 7 thereof which states:

“7.  That plaintiffs hereby collect and demand
from the defendant to give and deliver the sum of P160,000.00 to them
and/or such sum of money due to the
plaintiffs, and to render the necessary
and accurate accounting of the amount
of the commission deposited by plaintiffs with the defendant
(underscoring for emphasis).”

Assuming arguendo
that the issue of overpayment was not raised in the pleadings, the same was
heard in evidence during the trial with the consent, express or implied, of the
parties concerned, when respondent Sastre offered in
evidence the checks subject of Exhibits K, K-1 to K-101, with the counsel for
petitioner even admitting the genuineness and due execution of the checks
aforementioned.  In any event, said
private respondent calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the issues raised in the present
petition have already been carefully passed upon by us in our resolution of
December 16, 1981.  As a consequence, the
petition should be dismissed for having been manifestly brought to unduly delay
the full satisfaction of the judgment debt.^[29]

After a careful consideration of the issues raised and the
arguments interposed by the parties in support of their respective positions,
we resolve to reject the instant petition.

From the foregoing recital of the antecedents of this case and
the particular contentions of the parties, it is easily discernible that the
issues raised by petitioner herein are indeed the same issues it raised in its
petition for review in G.R. No. 56343 and which were duly passed upon in the aforequoted resolution issued by the Court on December 16,
1981.  Significantly, the Court did not
only rule on the issue of the tardiness of the petition in said G.R. No. 56343
but also on the merits of the principal query on overpayment.  That resolution,
as earlier mentioned, became final and executory on April
26, 1982 and the consequent entry of judgment was made on July 7, 1982.

The further implementation of the questioned writ of execution is
in fact only in pursuance of the
judgment in CA?G.R. No. 50233-R
which became final and executory consequent to our
aforesaid resolutions in G.R. No. 56343. 
If a writ cannot be recalled by reason of any defense which could have
been made at the time of the trial of the case, with more reason can it not be
recalled to practically change the terms of a judgment
that had become final.^[30] Execution is the fruit and end of the law,
the life of the law and the end of the suit.^[31]

Verily, there can be no dispute on the well entrenched rule that
every litigation must come to an end. 
Access, to the court is guaranteed. 
But, there must be a limit to it. 
Once the appellant’s right has been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment, as in the case at bar, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try even at the
risk of legal infirmities and errors that the judgment may contain.^[32]

In the same breath, the prevailing party, in this case the
private respondent, ought not to be harassed by subsequent suits.  For, if endless litigations were to be
encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of
the administration of justice.^[33]

While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, suffice it to
state that we find no cogent reason for their application in the case at
bar.  For all intents and purposes, all the
requisites of the principle of res adjudicata are attendant as to leave no doubt that
the dismissal by this Court of
petitioner’s petition for review in G.R. No. 56343 should have written finis
to this seemingly interminable
controversy between the parties which was the subject of the petition therein
and now of the petition at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for the writs herein
prayed for is hereby DISMISSED and
the temporary restraining order of June 13, 1983 is LIFTED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Padilla,
JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

^[1]
Presided over by Judge Fortunato A. Vailoces.

^[2]
Rollo, 103-104.

^[3]
Ibid., 69-72.

^[4]
Then known as the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Butuan City
and presided over by Judge Manuel Lopez Enage.

^[5]
Rollo, 92.

^[6]
Penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison,
with Justices Jorge R. Coquia and Elias B. Asuncion
concurring.

^[7]
Rollo, 97-101.

^[8]
Rollo, G.R. No. 56343, 2-3.

^[9]
Ibid., id., 10.

^[10]
Ibid., id., 12-13.

^[11]
Ibid., id., 13-A.

^[12]
Ibid., id., 14-15.

^[13]
Ibid., id., 25-44.

^[14]
Ibid., id., 60-62.

^[15]
Ibid., id., 69-75.

^[16]
Ibid., id., 76.

^[17]
Ibid., id., 80-102.

^[18]
Ibid., id., 105-109.

^[19]
Ibid., id., 122-126.

^[20]
Ibid., id., 135.

^[21]
Ibid., id., 175-B.

^[22] Ibid., id.,
181-194.

^[23]
Ibid., id., 203-A.

^[24]
Ibid., id., 212-229.

^[25]
Ibid., id., 230.

^[26]
Ibid., id., 231.

^[27]
Footnote 2, ante.

^[28]
Rollo, 26-62.

^[29]
Ibid., 122-138.

^[30]
International School Inc. vs. Minister
of Labor and Employment, et al., 175
SCRA 507 (1989).

^[31]
De Borja vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 153 SCRA 175 (1988); Garcia, et al. vs. Echiverri, et al., 132 SCRA 631 (1984).

^[32]
Ngo Bun Tiong
vs. Sayo, etc., et al., 163 SCRA 237 (1988); Pacquing vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 115 SCRA 117
(1982); Ferinion vs. Sta. Romana,
et al, 16 SCRA 370 (1966).

^[33]
Pacquing vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.