PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGON, PETITIONER,   VS. ROSA E. VDA. DE VILLAROYA, ET AL., GODOFREDO VILLAROYA, ET. AL., AURORA VILLAROYA, ET. AL., AND NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JU…

The main issue in this
petition centers on the manner of
execution of the final judgment
of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 50 for
recovery of real property.

The subject matter of
Civil Case No. 50 was a 16,500 square meter lot occupied by the Gubat High
School and developed as its athletic ground.

On March 28, 1974, the
lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real property case in
favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors, the private respondents herein, and
against the defendant, the petitioner herein. 
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:  (a) declaring the plaintiffs and the two sets
of intervenors, the owners of the land in litigation indicated in the sketch
plan (Exhibits “A” and “A-I”); (b) ordering the Province of
Sorsogon to pay to the plaintiffs and intervenors the sum of Forty-Nine
Thousand Five Hundred (P49,500.00) Pesos representing the value of the land at
P3.30 per square meter, within one (1) year from receipt of this Decision, or
in alternative, if the said defendant fails to pay, the plaintiffs and
intervenors within the period granted, then the defendant Province of Sorsogon
is hereby ordered to vacate the land in litigation and deliver the same to the
plaintiffs and intervenors; (c) ordering the plaintiffs and intervenors to
execute a conveyance in favor of the defendant Province of Sorsogon over the
land in litigation upon payment of the value of the land; (d) ordering a
division of the amount of P49,500.00 representing
the value of the land on a two?to-one (2 to 1) basis, or two shares each for the acknowledged natural children, or if the
defendant shall fail to pay to the plaintiffs and intervenors the amount
representing the value of the land on the same ratio of two-to-one (2 to 1), and each heir entitled to take
possession of his/her share – should the heirs so desire, they may avail of the
services of a surveyor for purposes of an accurate partition of the land on a
proportionate sharing of the survey expenses; and (e) dismissing the complaint
as to the defendant Municipality of Gubat. 
With costs against the
defendant Province of Sorsogon.” (Rollo, p. 2)

The decision became final
and executory.

Shortly afterwards, the
petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to the private respondents the
value of the subject parcels of land as mandated in the court’s
decision.  On September 13, 1974, the
Provincial Board of Sorsogon enacted Resolution No. 340 appropriating the
amount of P49,500.00 for the payment of the subject parcel of land.  (p. 44, Rollo)

In turn, the writs of
execution issued by the lower court ordered the petitioner to pay P49,500.00 to
the private respondents.  However, the
writ of execution issued on July 27, 1975 and the alias writ of execution issued
on November 24, 1975 were returned unsatisfied.

The delay in the payment
was caused by the requirements prescribed by the Provincial Auditor before
payment could be effected.  The private
respondents questioned the requirements prompting the Provincial Auditor to refer
the matter to the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA).

In a 1st indorsement
dated October 14, 1975, the Acting Chairman of COA through Raul C. Ferrer, Assistant
Manager, Local Government Audit Office wrote the Provincial Auditor stating
that the following requirements should be complied with:

“1.  Submission of competent documentation to show
ownership of the properties including the covering tax declarations of the same
issued in the name of the vendors;

“2.  Submission of evidence that taxes on the
properties have been fully paid or that the properties are free from any lien
or encumbrance;

“3.  Submission of the corresponding Deed of Sale
Of subject properties in favor of the Province of Sorsogon executed by the
claimants as basis for payment thereof;

“4.  Submission of the corresponding sketch plan of the portions, being sold, which should be attached to and made an
integral part of the Deed of Sale;

“5.  Submission
of a copy of the Provin­cial Board resolution appropriating the amount of
P49,500.00 for payment of the land; and

“6.  Submission of the certificate as to the
availability of funds to cover the total consideration.” (Rollo, p. 137).

In an order dated August 24, 1977, the lower court through then
Presiding Judge Aquilino Bonto ordered the private respondents to comply with
the requirements set up by the COA.  The
lower court stated that the requirements were made purely in consonance with
auditing rules and regulations and were not a whim or caprice designed to case
a protracted delay in the actual payment. 
Moreover, the lower court stated that the requirements were not beyond
compliance considering that some of the required documents were available in
the records of the case.

Notwithstanding the
private respondents’ compliance with the stated requirements, no payment was
effected by the petitioner.

Instead, in a 2nd
Indorsement dated January 15, 1980 the COA imposed additional
requirements to wit:

“RE:  Three   (3)
Deeds of Quitclaim and Conveyance of Real Property executed by Rosita, Rosa and
Clemente, all surnamed Villaroya, respectively, in favor of the Province of
Sorsogon.

2nd
Indorsement

January
15, 1980

Respectfully returned to the Regional Director, COA Regional Office
No. V, Legaspi City, requesting that the following requirement be caused to be
complied with:

1.    Consolidation of the
herein three (3) Deeds of Quitclaim and Conveyance by all the claimants into
one (1) agreement in order to facilitate processing thereof and for reasons of
economy; and

2.    Submission of a certificate of availability of funds, duly verified by
the Auditor concerned, indicating the particular source and nature of the funds
to be used in the within
transaction.” (Rollo, p. 119)

Upon representations of the Provincial Auditor and the COA Regional Director, the requirement
regarding the consolidation of quitclaim was abandoned by the COA.  The COA Regional Director, in a 3rd
Indorsement dated October 28, 1980 forwarded the required certificate of
availability of funds duly verified by the Provincial
Auditor.

Despite all these efforts, the private respondents waited in vain for
the payment of the subject parcels of land.

In a 5th Indorsement dated
November 5, 1980, the COA Director informed the Provincial Auditor, of a 4^th
Indorsement dated October 30, 1980 from the COA General Counsel “Allowing
payment thereof, subject to the availability
of funds and the usual audit, provided that the Deed of Conveyance and the
affidavit of quitclaim are registered with the Register of Deeds and that
steps are taken to have the corresponding
title issued in the name of the
Municipality free from all liens and encumbrances.” (p. 122, Rollo, Emphasis
supplied)

The last requirement was
an additional and a new requirement imposed on the private respondents.

This was the last straw. 
The private respondents (plaintiffs)
in the belief that the petitioner was not serious in paying for the
parcel of land it had acquired, took possession of some portions of the land,
using the decision as basis for their action.

When the petitioner tried to disturb the respondents’ possession
of the land they had re-entered, the latter, on July 15, 1982, filed a
“MOTION TO RESTRAIN INTERFERENCE BY DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFFS” before the lower court.

In their Comment to the Motion, the private
respondents-intervenors manifested that the status quo in this case should be
observed, namely, that the parcel of land remains in the possession of the
petitioner but conditioned on the payment by the petitioner of the value of the
land; provided however, that in the event that the petitioner fails to pay, the
definite shares in the property of each heir should first be determined before
the possession is delivered to the plaintiffs and intervenors.

The petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Motion and at the same time filed a “Motion to Order the plaintiffs to file their claim with the office of the
Provincial Auditor.”

In an Order dated October
7, 1982, the lower court through Presiding Judge Nicolas Galing granted the
private respondents’ Motion.  The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:

“WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby restrained from
interfering with the possession of the property in question by the plaintiffs
and the intervenors who are hereby required to cause a partition thereof on a
two-to-one basis as stated in the decision.” (Rollo, p. 69).

The petitioner questions
the jurisdiction of the lower court to act on the motion to restrain filed by
the private respondents.  It cites two
grounds:  (1) by virtue of the finality of judgment, the lower court no longer had jurisdiction to rule on said
motion; and (2) the decision having became final in 1974 and not having been
enforced for almost eight (8) years due to the fault of the private
respondents, it had already become dormant; hence it can no longer be enforced
by a mere motion but requires an independent action pursuant to section 6, Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

These arguments are not
well-taken.

At the time the private
respondents filed the questioned motion, the judgment in Civil Case No. 50 was
yet to be executed.  In fact, the motion
entitled “A MOTION TO RESTRAIN INTERFERENCE BY DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION
OF PLAINTIFFS” was precisely intended to enforce the judgment.  Hence, the lower court at this stage of the proceedings was not yet divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 
In the case of Cabrias v. Adil (135
SCRA 354) we ruled:

“x x x every court having jurisdiction
to render a particular judgement has inherent power and authority to enforce
it, and to exercise equitable control
over such enforcement.  The Court has
authority to inquire whether its judgment has been executed, and will remove obstructions
to the enforcement thereof.  Such
authority extends not only to such orders
and such writs as may be necessary to carry out the judgment into effect and
render it binding and operative, but also to such orders as may be necessary to
prevent an improper enforcement of the judgment.  If a judgment is sought to be perverted and made the medium of consummating a wrong the court on proper
application can prevent it.  (31 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 882, pp. 363-364)”

In the eight (8) years
that elapsed from the time the judgment became final until the filing of
the restraining motion by the private respondents, the judgment never became
dormant.  Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not
apply.

We have outlined in detail the incidents which transpired from
the issuance of the writ of execution
to the filing by the private respondents of the restraining
motion with the lower court.  The records indicate that the delay in the execution of the judgment, more specifically, in the payments of the land by the petitioner to
the private respondents was due to the piecemeal requirements imposed by the
COA as condition for effecting payment.

When the alias writ of
execution was returned, the accompanying report stated that the parties had chosen to await the opinion of the COA in
connection with the additional requirements questioned by the private
respondents.  In fact, in the return of
service of the writ of execution, the Deputy Sheriff reported that on two occasions in the Office of the Provincial
Auditor, the latter in the presence of a board member and the board secretary
verbally told him to await the opinion of the COA.  This controversy reached the court. 
Upon order of the court, the private respondents complied with the requirements imposed by the COA. 
However, after complying with these requirements, more requirements were
imposed anew by the COA.  This
necessarily prolonged the already delayed payment by the petitioner.  All these delays transpired between November
24, 1975, when the aIias writ of execution was issued, until 1980 when
the COA through the Provincial Auditor imposed another requirement upon the
private respondents before
payments could be released to them.

It
was the new condition
requiring the private respondents “to take steps to have the corresponding title issued in the
municipality, free from all liens and
encumbrances” which impelled them to conclude that the petitioner was not serious in paying
and which led them to take
possession of some portions of the
subject parcel of land pursuant, according to them, to the terms of the judgment.

Was the petitioners’
restraining motion filed within the 5-year period to execute judgment by motion
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court?

We rule that under the circumstances
of this case, the delays occasioned by the controversy over the auditor’s
requirements before payment could be effected should not be included in
computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion.  The delays were through no fault of the
private respondents.

Excluding, therefore the
period between 1975 and 1980, the restraining motion filed by the petitioner on
July 15, 1982 was well within the 5-year period to execute a judgment by
motion.  This conclusion is in consonance
with our ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (137 SCRA 220) citing the earlier cases of Bien
v. Sunga, 117 SCRA 249); Potenciano v. Hon. Mariano,
([96 SCRA 463] and Lanchita v. Magbanua (117 SCRA
39).  We ruled that:

“In computing the time limited for suing out an execution,
although there is authority to the
contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when
execution is stayed, either by agreement of
the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or
writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or
otherwise.  Any interruption or delay occasioned by the
debtor will extend the time
within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.” (at pp. 227-228).

We, however, agree with
the petitioner that the procedure undertaken by the private respondents
(plaintiffs) in executing the judgment which was condoned by the lower court is
not sanctioned by law.

When, on the basis of successive new requirements imposed on
them, the private respondents “lost hope” that the petitioner would
ever pay them, they should have filed a motion to declare the petitioner in
default of payment and asked for an alias writ of execution for the enforcement
of the other alternative found in the judgment. 
The decision states that after the failure of the petitioner to pay
within one (1) year from receipt of the decision, the petitioner is ordered to vacate the
land in litigation and
deliver the same to
the plaintiffs and
intervenors after which the subject land would be
partitioned among them on the ratio of 2 to 1.

Another option which the private respondents could have taken
when the COA issued another new requirement to take steps in titling the
subject parcel of land in the name of the petitioner was to file a motion to
declare such requirement unreasonable. 
It must be noted that the judgment only ordered the respondents to
execute a conveyance in favor of the Province of Sorsogon upon payment of the
value of the land.  It was the problem of
Sorsogon to have the title registered in its name.

Whatever feelings they had against the petitioner in relation to
the shabby treatment accorded them by the COA cannot justify the respondents
taking the law into their hands and taking possession of some portions of the
subject parcel of land, much less allowing third persons to occupy the
property.

Consequently, the lower court’s questioned Order granting the
restraining motion of the private respondents,
the end result of which was the execution of the judgment, appears to be
improper and irregular.

At the same time, we
cannot blame the private respondents for their drastic action.  As aptly summarized by the lower court:

“x x x a writ of execution was issued on July 21, 1975, upon
motion of plaintiffs, but said writ was returned unsatisfied, although with the
report that the parties had chosen to await the opinion of the Commission on
Audit.  Even so, the plaintiffs exerted
efforts to comply with the requirements which were allowed by the court.  Be that as
it may, additional requirements were imposed one after the other to the
extent of asking for absurd, (sic) i.e., ‘to have the corresponding title
issued in the name of the Municipality, free from all liens and encumbrances.’
This was in the later part of 1980, or more than six (6) years after defendant
province’s receipt of the decision by which it was ordered to effect payment
within one (1) year only from said receipt. 
Clearly, we have here an instance of a suitor who, instead of wooing his heartthrob, would rather dictate his
wish to the latter in pursuing his interest. 
He would rather impose upon the object of his concern such terms
and conditions that would suit him, even if in so doing time inexorably marches
on against his favor.  Certainly, this
cannot be allowed to remain unreined.

It should be noted that the last communication the defendant
province admits to have knowledge of relative to this matter is an indorsement to the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit dated October 27, 1980.  Yet, it never bothered to follow this up with
an inquiry as to the action that was taken thereon.  On the contrary, it blames the plaintiffs for
its non-receipt of any reply thereto. 
This supine attitude is hardly in keeping with human experience relative
to the exercise of one’s duty to protect his interest.  Here the defendant province harps on its allegation that the land at issue
involves public interest.  This being so,
it should have helped facilitate the approval of the vouchers, considering that
it has the bounded (sic) duty to uphold and protect public interest.  This the defendant never did, despite the
time element that it had to meet inasmuch as item (b) in the above-qouted
dispositive portion of the
decision expressly states that payment was to be made within one (1) year from receipt, in failure of which
said defendant had to vacate and deliver the land to the prevailing
parties.  This alternative should have
alerted the defendant to take the necessary steps to comply with the decision
if only to preserve its prior right and
thus uphold public interest.  It
opted, on the other hand, to reverse its side of the coin and place the
obligation on the plaintiffs’ shoulders.” (Rollo, pp. 66-67).

The complaint in the
instant case was filed on March 30, 1957. 
It was only on March, 1974 or seventeen years later that a decision was
promulgated.  When the the private
respondents expected the payment of the value of their land occupied by the
Gubat High School, they still were unable to collect such payment eight years
after the promulgation of the decision.

For these reasons and in
the interest of justice, we resolve the remaining issue and facilitate the
execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 50.  Hence, we declare as unreasonable the
additional requirement charging the private respondents with the duty to have
the corresponding title issued in the name of the municipality free from all
liens and encumbrances as a condition before the release of the payment for the
value of the land.  The dispositive
portion of the decision explicitly states that in case the petitioner favors
payment of the value of the
land, the private respondents are ordered to execute a conveyance in
favor of the petitioner.  The respondents
have complied with all the requirements originally imposed by COA.  The petitioner cannot, therefore, deny
payment to the private respondents.

This case is a classic example of a common problem besetting hapless citizens in varying
degrees.  Because of insistent but distorted
application of administrative rules and regulations, persons dealing with
government are often placed in unfair predicaments which require
needless expenditure of their time, money, and patience.

The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to
be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school.  As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all
required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation.  The imposition of unreasonable requirements
and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary
but a rich source of discontent with government.  There should be some kind of swift and
effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level
bureaucrats.

Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of
the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. 
In cases where land is
taken for public use, public interest however, must, be considered.  The children of Gubat, Sorsogon have been using the disputed
land as their high school athletic grounds for thirty years.

In the execution of this
decision, the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay
as directed.  Should any further delays
be encountered, the trial
court is directed to seize any of the patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount necessary
to implement this decision.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the then Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon is SET ASIDE.  The
original judgment dated March 28, 1974 is REINSTATED.  The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is
ordered to immediately execute the final judgment in Civil Case No. 50 and
effect payment of the P49,500.00 with interests at the legal rate from March
27, 1975.  The court is further ordered
to restore possession to the
Gubat High School of any portion of the disputed property which was taken away
from it.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.