CORAZON R. PAGDONSALAN, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GILMART INDUSTRIES, PHIL., RESPONDENTS.

We set aside the questioned resolution of respondent NLRC which
dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the sole ground that the latter
failed to furnish respondent employer with a copy of her appeal
memorandum. We also reverse the appealed decision rendered by Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, dated April 27, 1981.

Petitioner was employed by respondent Gilmart Industries Phil. as
machine operator from April 4, 1956 up to 1958 when a union strike was
declared causing the temporary closure of the company. Upon resumption
of the company’s operations sometime in 1959, petitioner was employed
anew as a “separator”. In May 1975, she was transferred to the yarn
section of the company’s plant and made to perform the work of a
security guard. However, she was not extended any formal appointment as
security guard or watchwoman.

Sometime in 1980, after having worked with respondent company for
twenty-three (23) years, petitioner’s health began to fail. On October
2, 1980, she filed an application for retirement benefits under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the company and the
Union of its employees, Section 1, Article XXIV thereof reads as
follows:

“Section 1. Permanent employees and workers covered by this
agreement shall be retired at the option of the company upon reaching
the age of fifty (50) years or after ten (10) years to fifteen (15)
years service to the company and shall be entitled to retire­ment
benefits equivalent to twenty-two (22) days pay for every year of
service.”

The company disapproved her application on the ground that under Section
2, Article I of the CBA, “all security personnel” are excluded from the
agree­ment. Thus,

“Section 2. Exemptions. The following shall be specifically ex­cluded from the agreement:

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) x x x

(d) all security personnel

(e) x x x.”

The company offered to pay petitioner’s full separation pay on the basis
of thirteen (13) days per year of service, but the same was rejected by
the latter.

On December 19, 1980, the company terminated her employment, without
prior notice of dismissal or clearance from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.

Hence, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent company for
retirement benefits provided for by the CBA. After due hearing, Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision dated April 27, 1981
dismissing petitioner’s complaint “for being devoid of merit.”

On May 25, 1981, petitioner appealed said decision with the respondent
NLRC, but the same was dismissed on the ground that petitioner failed to
furnish respondent employer with copy of her memorandum of appeal, as
required by Article 223 of the New Labor Code and Section 9, Rule XIII
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Reconsideration thereof having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.

The issues to be resolved are: ^[1]
Whether or not petitioner’s failure to furnish respondent employer
with copy of her appeal memorandum justifies dismissal of the appeal;
and ^[2] Whether petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits under the aforecited Section 1, Article XXIV of the CBA.

The Solicitor General in his comment argued against the dismissal of
petitioner’s appeal on mere technicality, and recommended that –

“x x x the petition be given due course and that thereafter
judgment be rendered declaring that petitioner is entitled to the
retirement benefits provided in Section 1, Article XXIV of the CBA x x
x.”

The Solicitor General suggested that “since this recommendation is
contrary to the position of the NLRC, x x x the NLRC be given the
opportunity to submit its own comment on the petition if it to desires.”^[1]

Respondent NLRC, thru the chief of its Legal and Research Services,
subsequently filed its comment, stating its position on the issues as
follows:

“Public respondent NLRC committed no error in dismissing the
appeal for the simple reason that appellant Corazon R. Pagdonsalan
failed to observe the provision of the Labor Code for appeal that no
copy thereof was served to the other party as required by law.

“x x x she is not covered by the agreement and hence not
entitled to the retirement benefits covenanted therein.” (Section 2,
Article I of the CBA)

The first issue raised herein is not of first impression. In J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage v. NLRC,^[2]
this Court ruled that the appellant’s failure to furnish copy of his
memorandum appeal to respondent is not a jurisdictional defect, and does
not justify dismissal of the appeal. Thus,

“The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was
a mere formal lapse, an excusable neglect. Time and again We have
acted on petitions to review decisions of the Court of Appeals even in
the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Apppeals as requited by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on
the petitions and simply require the petitioners to comply with the
rule.

“Jurisprudential support is not absent to sustain Our action. In
Estrada vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. 57735, March 19,
1982, 112 SCRA 688, this Court set aside the order of the NLRC which
dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that the appellant had not
furnished the appellee a memorandum of appeal contrary to the
requirements of Article 223 of the New Labor Code and Section 9, Rule
XIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.”

The same rule was reiterated in Carnation Phil. Employees Labor Union-FFW v. NLRC.^[3]

Moreover, the dismissal of an employee’s appeal on a purely technical
ground is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to
labor. As this Court said in Estrada v. NLRC:^[4]

“In Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., the Court through Mr. Justice Makasiar stressed the
dominance and superiority of constitutional rights over statutes and
subordinate implementing rules and regulations, thus: ‘(D)oes the mere
fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late
defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and
concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated
pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional
rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited
cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic.”

In fine, the appeal interposed by petitioner from the decision of the
labor arbiter should be given due course. However, instead of remanding
the case to the respondent NLRC, an exercise that would only delay the
final adjudication of the litigation, We now proceed to resolve the
merits of said appeal. The sole question involved therein – whether or
not petitioner is entitled to retire­ment benefits provided in Section
I, Article XXIV of the CBA – can readily be determined from the
uncontroverted facts on record. Besides, this legal issue is well
within the province of this Court to consider in view of “its exclusive
jurisdiction to review and determine all such cases involving only
errors or questions of law.”^[5]

Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano ruled that petitioner is not entitled
to the benefits provided for by the CBA for the reason that she was
performing the job of a security guard or watchwoman at the time she
applied for retirement. The Labor Arbiter relied on Section 3, Rule I
of the CBA which expressly excludes “security personnel” from its
coverage. The conclusion however fails to take into account the fact
that when respondent employer assigned petitioner to work as security
guard sometime in May 1979, the latter had already rendered nineteen
(19) years of service with the company. There is thus no question that
petitioner had already acquired a vested right to such retirement
benefits when she was ordered to perform the work of security guard
since under Section I, Article XXIV of the CBA, only ten (10) to fifteen
(15) years service is required to entitle an employee to the benefits
provided for therein. This vested right is property within the
contemplation of the due process clause; and needless to add, the
company may not arbitrarily deprive petitioner of such right by the
simple expedient of assigning her to the job of security guard.

What is more, petitioner was never extended any formal appointment as a
security guard or watchwoman. Thus, for all intents and purposes, she
should be considered as still holding the position of “separator” at the
time she applied for retirement.

WHEREFORE, the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano is hereby
set aside. Accordingly, the respondent company is ordered to pay
petitioner’s retirement benefits in accordance with the provisions of
Section 1, Article XXIV of the CBA. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

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^[1] p. 75, Rollo.

^[2] 118 SCRA 646.

^[3] G.R. No. 64397, promulgated October 11, 1983.

^[4] 112 SCRA 688, 692-693.

^[5] People vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 162,167.