JOB QUIAL, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

The Court has resolved to grant partial due course to this
petition as regards petitioner’s claim to the mitiga­ting circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Job Quial, while intoxicated, hit a certain Edmundo Sebido with a
single fist blow on the face, causing the latter to fall with his head hitting
the asphalted road, resulting in head injuries which eventually cause his
death. Indicted, Quial was convicted of
homicide by the Court of First Instance of Palawan, from which an appeal was
taken to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The latter court affirmed the
appealed decision with modifica­tions, prompting the appellant to file the
instant petition for review praying for a reduced penalty in view of the
alleged presence of two additional mitiga­ting circumstances: lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and voluntary surrender.

Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must be appreciated
in favor of the petitioner. Barring ex­ceptional
circumstances indicating otherwise, such as clear physical capability to
inflict a fatal blow, an intention to kill cannot be deduced from a single fist
blow, especially when the assailant, as in the case at bar, was intoxicated
when the attack took place.

On the other hand, the petitioner is not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. While he did not hide
from the authorities after the box­ing incident, he did not voluntarily
surrender either. It was only when he
was served the warrant for his arrest on July 17, 1975 that he gave himself up to the police.

Voluntary surrender does
not simply mean non-flight. As a matter
of law, it does not matter if the accused never avoided arrest and never hid or
fled. What the law considers as
mitigating is the voluntary surrender of an accused before his arrest, showing
either acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities
from the trouble and expense that his search and capture would require.

There being two
mitigating circumstances in favor of the petitioner, intoxication as
found by the Inter­mediate Appellate Court and lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, and no aggravating circumstance, he is entitled to the penalty
one degree lower than that provided by law for homicide.

WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is hereby
reduced to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimun, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories
provided for by law. The appealed
decision is affirmed in all other respects. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.