NONITA C. BUENCONSEJO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
seeks the reversal of the decision of Employees’ Compensation Commission in ECC
Case No. 1953 entitled “Nonita Buenconsejo v. G.S.I.S. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) which
affirmed the denial of death benefits under P.D. No. 626 as amended, by the
G.S.I.S. for the demise of petitioner’s husband.

The sole issue presented before Us is
whether or not the disease contracted by the deceased Felix B. Buenconsejo is work-connected.

Felix B. Buenconsejo started his career
in the government on September 24,
1970 when he was extended a casual appointment as accounts clerk in
the Department of Foreign Affairs.

On October 17, 1975
he was promoted to the position of Finance Officer at the Philippine Embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan.  Among his duties were the preparation of cash
vouchers, payrolls and financial reports of the Embassy.  He also performed functions for the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.^[1]

In 1980, Felix Buenconsejo sought
medical treatment at the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Medical Center,
where he was confined prior to his death. 
His attending physician, Lt. Col. Nicanor Paragas, made the following medical findings:

“The present condition started a year prior to admission as
easy fatigability of the right upper extremity and with associated tremors.  This was noted by the patient every time he
types for some time.  He also noted that
there were limitations of movement as when he raises his arm.  The arm has lost strength whenever he handles
objects (which are a little bit heavy) and when the arms are outstretched.  He also noted that there was involuntary
movement of the muscles of the arm.  Six
months later, there was also involvement of the left arm with same manifestations.  It was also 6 months prior to admission that
the patient noted gradual progressive diminution in muscle size of both upper
extremities.  A private physician was
consulted and “negriton” tabs (1 tab TID)
were prescribed.  He took said medication
for a month for which the easy fatigability of the upper extremity was
relieved.  Two weeks prior to admission
patient sought consultation with LTC Pajarillo in
which “neurobion” was prescribed and the
latter advised the patient on hospitalization. 
Thus, patient came in for further evaluation and management”.

Lamentably, hospitalization proved futile.  On January
8, 1981, just a few weeks after his discharge from the hospital,
Felix Buenconsejo succumbed to his illness diagnosed
as Progressive Muscular Dystrophy, limb-girdle type.  He was 55 years of age.

Petitioner Nonita Buenconsejo,
decedent’s surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS for brevity) impleaded
as a respondent herein.  On the basis of
the recommendation given by its medical evaluation and underwriting group (Rec.)
GSIS denied said claim on the ground that decedent’s ailment was not due to
circumstances of the performance of the duties and responsibilities of his
employment.

After her motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
elevated her case to the respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC for
brevity).  Her appeal likewise proved
inutile.  Hence, this
petition.

Petitioner argues that when decedent entered the public service
in 1970, Felix Buenconsejo was found to be in perfect
health and fit for work; that he was constantly subjected to physical and
mental stress brought about by the rigors of his employment; that being the
lone finance officer at the embassy, he had to spend long hours of overtime
work; that he was exposed to adverse climatic conditions since his place of
work, Islamabad, is known for its extremes of temperature; that these
employment factors must have conspired to reduce the body resistance of the
deceased and played a significant role in the development of his ailment
culminating in his death.^[2]

The decisive factor in this case is whether or not petitioner’s
claim is covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or by P.D. 442 as amended.

Under the law and latest jurisprudence, the Workmen’s
Compensation Act shall apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death
which occurred before January 1, 1975.  For injury, sickness, disability or death
occurring on or after January 1, 1975,
P.D. 442 as amended, shall apply.

Petitioner alleged that in 1974 the deceased’s health began to
deteriorate.  He started to experience
easy fatigability of the right upper extremity with associated tremors
especially whenever he was typing. 
Subsequently, the left upper extremity was also involved and then
atrophy of both upper extremities ensued. 
He sought medical treatment at the AFP
Medical Center
under the professional care of Dr. Paragas who
diagnosed Felix Buenconsejo’s malady as
“progressive muscular dystrophy”.^[3]

Her claim was supported by a medical certificate issued by Dr. Florliza J. Garcia of the AFP Medical Center on December 7,
1982, that the deceased “Felix Buenconsejo was
under the medical care of Major Nicanor Paragas of the Neurology Department of this Medical Center in
1974 for Progressive Muscular Dystrophy which was contracted (sic)
by the deceased while employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.^[4]

It will be noted that neither the G.S.I.S. nor the E.C.C.
questioned the above certification much less rebutted the presumption of
regularity thereof.  On the contrary,
public respondents laid too much stress on the medical evaluation of the
disease as follows:

“The limb-girdle type of progressive muscular dystrophy
involves the shoulder and pelvic girdles. 
It occurs usually in the second and third decade of life and
occasionally late in the first decade or in middle life.  It is transmitted as an autosomol recessive characteristics.

“Primary involvement of the shoulder and girdle is noted with
spread to the other after a variable period. 
Severe disability is usually present 20 years after onset.  Muscular contraction and skeletal deformity
come on late in the course of the disease. 
Most patients become severely disabled in middle life and the life span
is shortened.”^[5]

This served to corroborate petitioner’s
statement that the onset of her husband’s ailment was in 1974, much earlier
than in 1980 when he was confined in the hospital and eventually succumbed to
his ailment.

As stated in the above-cited medical evaluation, the disease
“occurs usually in the second and third decade of life and occasionally
late in the first decade or in middle life.” The deceased died at the age
of 55 years, giving credence to petitioner’s claim that her husband’s early
symptoms were noticed in 1974.  By the
very nature of the ailment, it could not have been instantly acquired in
1980.  When the deceased was
hospitalized, severe disability had already set in, the last stages of the
disease which by the very findings of the G.S.I.S and ECC is usually present 20
years after onset.  Clearly then, subject
illness occurred prior to January 1,
1975, before the effectivity of the Labor
Code.

It is a settled principle that the governing law in the
prosecution of a cause of action which has accrued prior to the effectivity of a new law shall be the law enforced at the
time of the accrual of said cause of action.^[6]
Since the Workmen’s Compensation Law was in full force and effect then, it
should govern the present case based on the principle that “rights accrued
and vested while a statute was in force ordinarily survive its repeal.”^[7]

Under the WCA, when there is a showing that the ailment was
contracted and/or aggravated in the course of one’s employment, presumption of
compensability arises and the burden of destroying this presumption is upon the
employer.^[8]

There is no showing that respondent employer complied with
Sections 37 and 45 of the WCA, as amended, by filing with the WCC or later with
the ECC a notice of the deceased’s initial illness and subsequent death.  Neither is it alleged that respondent controverted the right to compensation within the
prescribed period.

We have repeatedly ruled that failure to comply with said
sections constitutes a renunciation of the employer’s right to controvert the
claim resulting in the waiver of all its non-jurisdictional defenses, such as
the non-compensability of the claim.^[9]

Finally, petitioner invokes the ruling of the ECC in Supnet v. GSIS; ECC Case No. 1964, where said Commission,
taking note of the contributory causes of progressive muscular atrophy as to
include fatigue, exposure to cold, infection, lead poisoning and
exposure to gasoline fumes, decided in favor of a deceased teacher afflicted
with the same ailment.

Public respondents in opposing the application of the aforesaid
ruling to the case at bar, cited the fact that the Supnet
case involved physical activity aside from the regular work of a teacher in the
classroom.  They claim that no analogy
can be drawn to the work of a Finance Officer of the Philippine Embassy in Islamabad
since the same did not necessarily require exposure to the climatic changes in
his place of work.

Verily, such argument appears untenable.  Both deceased performed multifarious
functions which generated stress and fatigue. 
In the case at bar, while the deceased was generally confined in the
office and was not directly exposed to the elements, the extremes of
temperature in Islamabad which are undisputed, and incomparable to the climate
of our country, cannot but affect Buenconsejo who
obviously had also to go out, in going to and returning from work and in
attending to his duties, which cannot be reasonably presumed to be done
exclusively within the four walls of the building.

In any event, the Solicitor General admits that under the
previous law on workmen’s compensation, the circumstance that the illness
supervened during the period of employment may be considered as basis for the
legal presumption of compensability.^[10]

Finally, in consonance with the spirit of social justice and the
humane character of the law, We ruled that the exact cause of the ailment
suffered by the claimant is not significant, and the possibility that factors
other than the employment may have contributed to the development of the
ailment, is not a drawback; for what is material and decisive is that the
employment contributed even in a small degree in aggravating the ailment.^[11]

Thus, while it is well-established in this jurisdiction that
findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality;^[12]
one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule is that, when such
findings and the conclusions derived therefrom are
not supported by substantial evidence.^[13]

WHEREFORE, the decision sought to be reviewed is reversed
and set aside and respondent ECC is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner the
benefits allowed by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the
result.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 16.

^[2]
Petition, pp. 8-11, Rollo.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 9.

^[4]
Records, underscoring supplied.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.

^[6]
Cenabre v.
ECC, 97 SCRA 338, April 28, 1980, L-46802;
Article 294, Labor Code of the Philippines.

^[7]
Balatero v. ECC, et al., L-46634, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 608; De los Angeles
v. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308 [1979]; Villones v.
ECC, et al., 92 SCRA 320 [1979]; Corrales v. ECC, et al., 88 SCRA 548
[1979]).

^[8]
De los
Angeles v. GSIS, supra.

^[9]
Villones v.
ECC, supra; Paraiso v. Castelo-Sotto, 85 SCRA 419 [1978]; Republic v. ECC,
85 SCRA 107 [978]; Lamco v. WCC, 84 SCRA 401
[1978]; and Canonero v. WCC, 81 SCRA 712
[1978].

^[10]
Rollo, p. 33.

^[11]
Balatero v.
ECC, supra, pp. 609-610.

^[12]
Rosario Bros. Inc. v. Ople,
131 SCRA 74 [1984]; Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San Miguel
Corp., 122 SCRA 557 [1983].

^[13]
Franklin Baker Company of the Phil. v. Trajano 157 SCRA 423 [1988]; Baby Bus Inc. v.
Minister of Labor 158 SCRA 225 [1988]).