PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NOEL SEVILLA AND MELQUIADES ALFONSO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to set aside the decision of the respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1982 in NLRC Case No.
AB-6-7104-80 which affirmed on appeal the decision of Labor Arbiter
Porfirio E. Villanueva, ordering the petitioner to reinstate private
respondents Melquiades Alfonso and Noel Sevilla with full backwages plus
other benefits.

This petition involves two separate applications for clearance to terminate employment.

The first, filed on January 22, 1980, is the application for clearance
to terminate the employment of private respondent Melquiades Alfonso on
the ground of misappropriation of company properties.

The second, filed on May 23, 1980, concerns the application for
clearance to terminate the services of private respondent Noel Sevilla
on the ground of commission of fraudulent acts.

Private respondents Noel Sevilla and Melquiades Alfonso were employed by
petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company as Cable Splicer
Headcrews (SJ-5). Their job involved principally fieldwork. They
worked on aerial platforms and in manholes or basements of large
buildings connecting lines within the cables to keep the circuit
continuous. They changed lines, wrapped insulations around wires, and
sealed or closed joints. They were also charged with the responsibility
of securing from the warehouses of petitioner company the necessary
materials for the work which their team was assigned to perform. They
were authorized for this purpose to requisition whatever materials were
necessary for the work assigned to them. They also prepared the Plant
and Daily Work Reports which are submitted at the end of each working
day.

On August 8, 1983, we issued a resolution giving partial due course to
the petition as to respondent Noel Sevilla and dismissing the petition
as to respondent Melquiades Alfonso for lack of merit. The decision
ordering Alfonso’s reinstatement with full backwages plus other benefits
is final and partial entry of judgment in his favor was made on October
7, 1983.

Private respondent Noel Sevilla was arrested and detained on March 8,
1980 by virtue of the same Arrest, Search and Seizure Order No. 4764
which formed the basis of Melquiades Alfonso’s arrest. After the arrest
the petitioner company conducted its own investigation and found the
following anomalies committed by private respondent Sevilla –

“1. Requisition Slip No. 93388 dated February 28, 1980 –

“Under this Requisition Slip, respondent Sevilla requisitioned
materials from the petitioner for a fictitious and non-existing work
order, a copy of the requisition slip is attached hereto as Annex ‘O’.

“For the information of this Honorable Tribunal work assignments
of cable splicers are designated by the number assigned to the
particular telephone cables to be worked on. For purposes of
identifying the telephone cables of the petitioner, each cable has been
assigned numbers and work on any of than is identified by designating
the number of cable. In the requisitioning of materials, the cable
number representing the work order to where the materials are to be used
are required to be stated at the right side of the requisition slip.
For example, in the subject requisition slip the cable number is written
on the right side thereof as follows: ‘602-02-MTCE: 1038 A-R. To be
used in closing (1) one 909 pairs (trouble splice) along Lakandula near
corner A. Luna’. The figures ‘602-02’ represents the account number of
the department to which respondent Sevilla as cable splicer belongs.
‘MTCE-1038-A-R’ refers to the cable number to be worked on, otherwise
referred to as the work order. MTCE simply means that the materials
requisitioned shall be used on cable no. 1038-A-R for purposes of
closing one 909 pairs splice along Lakandula Street near corner A. Luna
Street.

“The number of the cable actually worked on is also required to
be indicated in the Plant and Daily Work Report (PDWR) submitted by each
headcrew at the closing of each work day. The PDWRs serve as the basis
of the time records of cable splicers whenever they are on field work
and as such it is important that they indicate therein the work done for
the day, the description of materials used and the hours spent working.
All work to be done or performed by each team is pre-determined and
assigned by their respective foremen. Accordingly, what should appear
in the PDWR should be that work assignment made by the respective
foremen. Through the PDWRs, the respective foremen of each team are
able to determine if the work done pertains to the work order properly
assigned to them.

“In the subject requisition slip, dated February 28, 1980, the
work order appearing is MTCE 1038-A-R. which means that the purpose of
the requisition was to use the materials in the said work order.
However, in the PDWR submitted by respondent Sevilla on February 27 and
28, 1980, it appears that no such work was existing at the time, a copy
of the PDWR, dated February 27, 1980, is attached hereto as Annex ‘P’
while copy of the PDWR, dated February 28, 1980, is attached hereto as
Annex ‘Q’. For February 27, 1980, the work performed as indicated in
the PDWR for the day was on cable no. 1040 and the materials used
therein were covered by Requisition Slip No. 88131, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex ‘R’, while on February 28, 1980, the work
performed as indicated in the PDWR for the day was on cable No. 1030.

“From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent Sevilla
requisitioned materials for a fictitious work order and which offense
can be properly described as a ‘fictitious requisition’.

“2. Requisition Slip Nos. 78130 and 88141 both dated February 29, 1980 –

“Under these receipts, respondent Sevilla made a double
requisition of materials for the same work order: Cable No. 1030-A-L, a
copy of the Requisition Slip No. 78130 is attached hereto as Annex ‘S’
while a copy of Requisition Slip No. 88141 is attached hereto as Annex
‘T’.

“In the Plant and Daily Work Report (PDWR) of respondent Sevilla
for February 28, 1980, he indicated that the work on cable no. 1030 was
actually done on February 28, 1980 which is one day previous to the
date of requisition and that no materials were used in the completion of
the work. (Please refer to Annex ‘Q’).

“Considering that the subject req uisitions were made on
February 29, 1980, i.e., one day after the supposed work on cable no.
1030 was completed on February 28, 1980, there was deceit on the part of
respondent Sevilla when he made such requisitions inasmuch as no
materials were used in the completion of the work.

“3. Requisition Slip Nos. 78143 and 88147 both dated March 3, 1980 –

“There were two requisitions made by respondent Sevilla on this
date (March 3, 1980). Under Requisition Slip No. 78143, the work order
(cable no. 1034) from where the materials requisitioned were indicated
as to be used is fictitious, a copy of the Requisition Slip is attached
hereto as Annex ‘U’. While under Requisition Slip No. 88147, the
materials requisitioned were in excess of what was actually used but the
excess was never returned to the petitioner, a copy of the requisition
slip is attached hereto as Annex ‘V’.

“As indicated under Requisition Slip No. 78143, the work order
from where the materials were to be used was on Cable No. 1034. This
work order (Cable No. 1034) is fictitious for the reason that there was
no such work assignment to respondent Sevilla. Previous to the date of
the subject requisition, that is, on March 1 and 2, 1980, respondent
Sevilla was off-duty and therefore he could not have possibly worked on
Cable No. 1034. On the date of requisition, that is, on March 3, 1980,
the work he perform was on Cable No. 1008 as shown in his Plant and
Daily Work Report (PDWR) for March 3, 1980, a copy of the PDWR is
attached hereto as Annex ‘W’. Clearly, Requisition Slip No. 78143 was
again a fictitious requisition.’

“As to Requisition Slip No. 88147, while the work order from
where the materials were to be used tallies with the work performed
under the PDWR for March 3, 1980 (Annex ‘W’ hereof), the materials
requisitioned were more than what were actually used. In the said
requisition slip, the materials withdrawn from the company bodega were,
among others: C-cement (1 can) and cable support (16″ – 12 pieces). In
the report of the materials used, as stated in Annex ‘W’, no mention
was made on the use of the items which means that the said item were not
used. However, notwithstanding the non-use thereof, respondent
Sevilla never returned the items to the company.”

The total value of the materials covered by Requisition Slips Nos.
93388, 78130, 88141, 78143 and 88147 which were allegedly withdrawn and
misappropriated by private respondent Sevilla is Three Thousand Two
Hundred and Twenty-One Pesos and Thirty Seven Centavos (P3,221.37).

On May 23, 1980, the petitioner company filed an application to
terminate the employment of private respondent Sevilla. On the same
date, Sevilla was placed under preventive suspension leading to his
dismissal.

The applications for clearance to terminate Alfonso and Sevilla were
consolidated and designated as NCR- Case No. AB-7104-80. The two
applications were also heard jointly and submitted for resolution on the
basis of the parties’ position papers.

On June 29, 1981, labor arbiter Porfirio E. Villanueva dismissed the
applications for clearance to terminate the employment of respondents
Alfonso and Sevilla and ordered the petitioner to reinstate them to
their former positions with full backwages plus other benefits from the
time they were illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the dismissal of applicant’s clearance to terminate oppositors’
employment for devoid of merit.

“Applicant is also ordered to reinstate oppositors Noel Sevilla
and Melquiades Alfonso to their former positions with full backwages
plus other benefits from the time they were illegally dismissed on May
23, 1980 and January 22, 1980, respectively, to be reckoned from their
latest salaries up to actual reinstatement.”

The petitioner appealed to the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission. On December 29, 1982, the respondent commission affirmed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is, as it is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, applicant-appellant is, as
it is hereby directed to show proof of immediate compliance to the
mandate of the AFFIRMED DECISION after ten (10) days from receipt of
this Decision.”

On February 14, 1983, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assigns the following errors in pleading for the grant of the petition:

“1. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission erred in
treating the two cases as one and the same, and applying only a part of
petitioner’s evidence in the formulation of the decision. By its
failure to fully appreciate the distinct and separate causes of action
against the two respondents, the National Labor Relations Commission
miserably failed to properly appreciate the evidence submitted in the
case.

“2. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission erred in
utilizing and using as the basis for the decision the alleged testimony
of a certain Ruben Reyes which was not even a part of the records of the
case and therefore non-existent.

“3. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission erred in
completely ignoring the other evidence submitted by the petitioner.

“4. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission erred in
ordering the reinstatement of the individual respondents notwithstanding
clear and convincing evidence as to the offense of both respondents;
and

“5. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission erred in
using as a basis for the denial of the application for clearance to
dismiss respondent-employees the dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal of the criminal case, for qualified theft filed
against respondent-employees by the Military Authorities in connection
with their arrest and detention by virtue of ASSO No. 4764 dated
December 13, 1979.”

On February 18, 1983, we issued a restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the decision of the respondent Commission
dated December 12, 1982.

As earlier stated, in giving only partial due course to the petition we
dismissed the case as to respondent Melquiades Alfonso and the decision
of the Commission as to him is now final and executory. We now deal
with the case against Noel Sevilla.

According to the petitioner, it is clear from the records that the
respondent Commission’s decision actually covers two cases which are
separate and distinct from each other with different causes of action
occurring on different occasions.

We agree with the petitioner. A perusal of the records shows that the
application for clearance to terminate the services of respondent
Alfonso was for misappropriation of company properties. On the other
hand, the case against respondent Sevilla was for termination of
employment on the ground that he committed fraudulent acts resulting in
the loss of the petitioner’s trust and confidence in him. Furthermore,
the application for clearance to terminate the services of Alfonso was
filed on January 22, 1980 or less than two (2) months before his arrest
on March 8, 1980, while the application for clearance to terminate the
employment of respondent Sevilla was filed only on May 23, 1980 or more
than two and a half (2-1/2) months after his arrest on March 8, 1980.
Respondent Alfonso was placed under preventive suspension on January 24,
1980 by the petitioner company while respondent Sevilla was placed
under preventive suspension only on May 23, 1980 or four (4) months
after respondent Alfonso was placed under preventive suspension.

Petitioner contends that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the dismissal of private respondent Sevilla.

The Solicitor General finds that just cause for the dismissal of Sevilla
exists and disagrees with the decision of the labor arbiter and the
respondent commission ordering his reinstatement with full backwages and
benefits. The Solicitor General states that the records convincingly
show that respondent Sevilla is guilty of acts inimical to the interests
of his employer company.

Respondent commission on the other hand, through Atty. Linda P. Ilagan,
its Chief Legal and Research Services, argues that the company conducted
its investigation only after the arrest of respondent Sevilla, and that
the military had no evidence against him when he was suddenly arrested.
Respondent commission further submits that since the application for
clearance to terminate the services of Sevilla was filed only two (2)
months after his arrest, this indicates that petitioner company did not
suspect Sevilla of any irregularity.

We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Sevilla is guilty
of acts inimical to the interests of his employer. The records show
that Sevilla took advantage of his position as Cable Splicer Headcrew
(SJ-5) to withdraw company properties which should never have been
issued to him on the strength of double and/or fictitious requisition
slips. By means of Requisition Slip No. 93388 dated February 28, 1980
respondent Sevilla was able to withdraw company materials for a
fictitious and non-existing work order. Requisition Slips Nos. 78130
and 88141, both dated February 29, 1980 are double requisitions for the
same work order. Requisition Slip No. 78143 dated March 3, 1980 was for
a fictitious and non-existing work order while under Requisition Slip
No. 88147, also dated March 3, 1980, the materials requisitioned
exceeded what was actually needed, and despite non-use of the excess
materials, respondent Sevilla never returned the same to the petitioner
company.

These evidences of double or fictitious requisitions were not
successfully controverted by respondent Sevilla. The fact that evidence
against him was gathered only after his arrest does not mean that he
was not guilty of wrongdoing. The petitioner had valid and legitimate
reasons to lose its confidence in respondent Sevilla and to order his
dismissal.

Relative to the fifth assignment of error, the petitioner argues that
the dismissal of the criminal case filed against both respondents does
not ipso facto mean that the basis of their dismissal has similarly lost
its meaning and effect. It states that the applications for clearance
to dismiss the respondents stand separate and independent from the
criminal case filed against them.

On the other hand, the respondent commission, represented by the Chief
of its Legal and Research Services, argues that if an employee is being
terminated from the service for acts constituting a crime, the evidence
against him must not only be substantial but should be evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. It must be positive and concrete.

The arguments of the public respondent have, in the past, been rejected
by this Court. Acquittal from criminal charges does not necessarily
mean that loss of confidence is automatically eliminated as a basis for
administrative action.

Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee (Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205). In San Miguel Corporation v. The Deputy Minister of Labor an Employment, et al., G. R. Nos. 61232-33, December 29, 1983, which quoted with approval the ruling in Reyes v. Zamora (90 SCRA 92), we held that:

“Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee,
and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct —
apparently demanded by the Minister of Labor — is not required to
dismiss him on this charge. (See National Organization of Laborers and
Employs v. Roldan, 95 Phil. 727; Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia, 18 SCRA
107; Gatmaitan v. MRR, 21 SCRA 191) It is sufficient if there is ‘some
basis’ for such loss of confidence; (Galsim v. PNB, 29 SCRA 293) or if
the employer has reasonable grounds to believe, if not to entertain the
moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the
misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him
absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. (Nevans v. CIR, 23 SCRA 1321)”

In cases where the acts of misconduct amount to a crime, a dismissal may
still be properly ordered notwithstanding that the employee is not
criminally prosecuted or is acquitted after a criminal prosecution.

The fiscal’s dismissal of the charge of qualified theft against Sevilla
does not justify his reinstatement to his employment. We find from the
records adequate evidence that Sevilla committed fraud or breach of
trust which is a statutory ground for his dismissal.

We held in Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (117 SCRA 692) that:

“‘The conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not
indispensable to warrant his dismissal by his employer.’ If there is
sufficient evidence to show that the employee has been guilty of a
breach of trust, or that his employer has ample reason to distrust him,
the labor tribunal ‘cannot justly deny to the employer the authority to
dismiss such an employee.’ The fact that a criminal complaint for theft
against an employee was dropped by the fiscal is not binding and
conclusive on the labor tribunal (National Labor Union, Inc. v. Standard
Vacuum Oil Company, 73 Phil. 279).”

Again in Dole Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
(123 SCRA 673) we held that the acquittal of an employee in the
criminal case filed against him does not guarantee his reinstatement if
the employer has validly lost confidence in him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Commission is hereby MODIFIED.
The petition is granted insofar as private respondent Noel Sevilla is
concerned. The termination of his employment is sustained. The
restraining order issued on February 18, 1983 enjoining the respondents
from enforcing the Decision dated December 29, 1982 is made permanent as
to respondent Sevilla.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.