THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. YAM TUNG WAY, ALIAS NAM SING, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

United States versus Yam Tung Way

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the Government of the United States, as plaintiff, sought to appeal a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila that dismissed a criminal information against Yam Tung Way, also known as Nam Sing, and discharged him. The charge was defraudacion de propiedad literaria, that is, fraud upon literary property or copyright infringement, as defined and penalized in Article 539 of the Penal Code. The case matters to every bar candidate because the Supreme Court did not reach the copyright question at all. It decided a threshold and constitutional point: the Government has no right to appeal from a judgment discharging an accused after he has already been placed in jeopardy. It is, in short, the leading early statement in this jurisdiction of the rule against double jeopardy as a bar to a Government appeal.

Procedural History

The defendant was arraigned in one of the divisions of the Court of First Instance of Manila and pleaded not guilty. After certain further proceedings, the case was transferred to the division presided over by Judge A. S. Crossfield, before whom it was tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, and after the Government rested its case, the defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that the evidence did not establish the commission of the offense charged, or of any offense defined and penalized by law. The court reserved judgment on the motion at the request of both counsel, who wished to submit briefs. Pending that judgment, the defendant submitted his own evidence. The trial court then sustained the motion and discharged the defendant, holding that no copyright law existed in the Philippine Islands and that the complaining witness could have no exclusive right in the pamphlet capable of being violated under Article 539 of the Penal Code. The court made no finding on the alleged facts of reproduction. The Government then brought the case to the Supreme Court by appeal, asking that the judgment be reversed and a new trial granted.

Facts

The information alleged that the defendant, with intent to defraud and to the prejudice of the complaining witness, who owned a certain literary work called a Reduction Table, feloniously, fraudulently, and without authority copied, printed, and reproduced that Reduction Table, and sold and distributed fraudulent copies of it, to the damage and prejudice of the complaining witness in the sum of 3,000 pesos.

The work in question was a pamphlet or booklet containing tables of comparative values of weights and measures in the metric system and in the system commonly known as the English system. The prosecution presented witnesses whose testimony tended to support the allegations of unauthorized reproduction and sale. It also presented a certificate, signed and sealed by the chief of the division of archives, patents, copyrights and trade-marks and dated May 10, 1909, showing that Manuel Castell of the City of Manila had, on May 8, 1909, deposited in that division for registration a book entitled Tabla de Reduccion, and that protection would remain in force from that date in accordance with the Spanish Law of January 10, 1879, and the royal decrees of September 3, 1880, and May 5, 1887.

After the Government closed its case, the defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion on a pure question of law, that there being no copyright law in force in the Islands, the acts alleged did not constitute a crime. The Government then appealed, and the Supreme Court was asked to reverse and remand for a new trial.

Issues

• Whether or not the Government may appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing a criminal information and discharging the accused after he has been arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and been placed on trial with the Government's witnesses testifying against him.
• Whether or not the allowance of such an appeal would place the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
• Whether or not the absence of an express finding by the trial court on the facts alleged in the information affects the accused's protection against a second trial.

Applicable Provisions

The decision invokes the guarantee against double jeopardy as set out in the Philippine Bill of Rights, contained in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kepner versus United States. The Court quotes the operative holding of that case:

It follows that Military Order Number 58, as amended by Act of the Philippine Commission, Number 194, in so far as it undertakes to permit an appeal by the Government after acquittal, was repealed by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense.

This quotation is the doctrinal core of the ruling: any statutory permission for a Government appeal after acquittal cannot stand against the constitutional guarantee.

The Court also adopts the summary of the rule by Mr. Bishop in his work on Criminal Law:

When, therefore, a defendant has been once in jeopardy, the jeopardy can not be repeated without his consent, whatever statute may exist on the subject. Such a statute will be interpreted with the Constitution, and be held to apply only to cases where it constitutionally may. And if it undertakes to give to the State the right of appeal, to retry the party charged, after acquittal, it is invalid. And so the writ of error, or the like, allowed to the State, can authorize the State to procure the reversal of erroneous proceedings and commence anew, only in those cases in which the first proceeding did not create legal jeopardy.

This passage supplies the distinction the Court applies: a Government appeal may lie only where the first proceeding never created legal jeopardy, as where a discharge comes upon a motion to quash or a demurrer sustained before jeopardy attached.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Government had no right of appeal from the judgment dismissing the information and discharging the defendant. It expressly declined to pass on the correctness of the trial judge's conclusion that no copyright law was in force, saying that without going into that question, the Court was agreed that the appeal could not be entertained.

On the second issue, the Court held that allowing the appeal would place the defendant twice in jeopardy, in violation of the Philippine Bill of Rights as construed in Kepner versus United States. The Court explained that the protection is not merely against the peril of a second punishment, but against being tried a second time for the same offense. It recalled its own settled rule that legal jeopardy attaches after arraignment and plea in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the moment the first witness is called to the stand and interrogated. Here the defendant had been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty, and all the Government's witnesses had testified. He was therefore entitled to protection against being tried again, whether or not the trial judge's rulings were erroneous.

On the third issue, the Court held that the absence of an express finding on the facts made no difference. The discharge need not rest on a formal acquittal on the merits. Whether the accused was acquitted on the merits, or discharged because the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the trial had failed to establish guilt as charged, the result is the same: the Government cannot appeal. The Court drew the line at cases where the first proceeding did not create legal jeopardy at all, such as a discharge upon a motion to quash or a demurrer sustained before jeopardy attached.

Doctrine

First, legal jeopardy attaches in a criminal proceeding after arraignment and plea in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the moment the first witness is called to the stand and interrogated. Second, once jeopardy attaches, the accused cannot be tried again for the same offense without his consent, and a Government appeal from a judgment of discharge is barred, whether the discharge rests on a formal acquittal on the merits or on the trial court's ruling upon a question of law arising at the trial. Third, the guarantee protects not only against a second punishment but against the peril of being tried a second time. Fourth, the exception is narrow: a Government appeal may be allowed only where the first proceeding did not create legal jeopardy, as where the discharge comes upon a motion to quash or a demurrer sustained before trial. Any statute purporting to allow a Government appeal after acquittal is read together with the Constitution and upheld only so far as it constitutionally may be.

Disposition

The appeal entered on behalf of the Government was dismissed, with costs against the appellant, and the judgment discharging the defendant stood.

Remember This

Memorize the trigger: jeopardy attaches after arraignment and plea, at the moment the first prosecution witness is called and interrogated, and from that point the Government cannot appeal a discharge, whether it be an acquittal on the merits or a ruling on a question of law. Examiners use this case to test the double jeopardy bar on Government appeals and the distinction between a discharge before jeopardy attaches, which may be appealed, and a discharge after trial has begun, which may not.