RAMON C. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BOIX AND ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, RESPONDENTS.

The instant petition for certiorari seeks a reversal of
the decision* of herein public respondent
Court of Appeals dated October 24,
1977 in CA-G.R. No. 47063-R and its resolution dated January 14, 1983 denying herein
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

The record shows that on November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio Camino as Deputy Sheriff of Camarines
Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale
of a parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by plaintiff and his former
wife Teodora B. Ong,
awarded in favor of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted on October 10, 1958 by
the Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte, herein
defendant Camino, pursuant to a writ of execution dated August 8, 1958
(Exhibits “C”, “2-A) issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch IV, to enforce its decision in Civil Case No. 33396, entitled,
“Francisco Boix, Plaintiff vs. Teodora B. Ong and Ramon C. Ong, Defendants” wherein judgment was rendered to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff,
ordering the defendant Teodora B. Ong
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,827.83, with interest of 8% per annum on the sum of P1,000.00 from September 5,
1955, on the sum of P1,000.00 from October 30, 1955; and on the sum of P827.83
from December 30, 1955 plus 15% on the total amount of P2,827.83 as attorney’s
fees; and the further amount of P2,503 with interest at 6% per annum from date
of the filing of the complaint, and the costs of the suit.” (Exhibit
“1”)

The title to the property, in favor of the execution-creditor Boix was duly registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Norte (Exhibit “4”).

It is not disputed that plaintiff’s wife, Teodora
B. Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur.  In furtherance of her business operation, on August 18, 1955, she secured from
Francisco Boix a loan in the amount of
P2,827.83.  Unfortunately, because of
mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her obligation.  This prompted Boix
to file a complaint, based on the
promissory notes executed by Teodora, to
collect the sum legally due plus interest against Teodora
and Ramon Ong, the latter being joined as husband of
the former.  Defendant-spouses were
declared in default and judgment was rendered, as aforesaid, in favor of Boix.

After the aforementioned decision became final and executory, Boix moved to execute
the judgment.  The motion was granted and a corresponding writ of execution,
dated August 8, 1958
(Exhibits “C”, “2-A”), was issued.  Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land
situated at Diego Linan St., Daet,
Camarines Norte, declared under Tax No. 05378 in the
sole name of Teodora B. Ong,
subject-parcel of herein suit.  In a notice of levy on Execution dated
August 22, 1958 (Exhibit “2-B”) and notice of Public Auction sale
dated September 10, 1958 (Exhibit “2-C”), auction sales was held on
October 10, 1958 and as already
mentioned, defendant Boix was adjudged highest bidder.  A writ of possession was issued to place the execution-creditor
in possession of the property levied upon and sold on execution.  A corresponding Certificate of Sale (Exhibit
“H”) was also issued in favor of Boix.

Subsequently, thereafter, Ramon C. Ong
filed an Omnibus motion dated October
2, 1961 (Exhibit “D”) with the same Court of First
Instance of Manila asking to quash the writ of possession, which was denied in
an order dated December 6, 1961.  A motion for reconsideration dated December 29, 1961 (Exhibit
“F”) was likewise denied in an order dated February 10, 1962 (Exhibit “G”).  (PP. 1-4, Decision; pp. 11-14, Rollo)

Consequently, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals
to annul the auction sale allegedly irregularly executed on the following
grounds, namely, that the property was conjugal and thus could not be held
liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that there was no valid
publication thus making the auction sale void.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.  Said motion was denied on January 15, 1983; hence, the present
petition.

Petitioner contends that the auction sale of the property in
dispute is null and void, having been made on a date different from that
reflected in the advertisement thereof, aside from having been published in a
newspaper which is not of general circulation in the province where the property
is situated.  According to the
petitioner, respondent court’s failure to touch on such a jurisdictional issue constitutes grave abuse of
discretion which justifies a reversal of its decision affirming the finding of
the trial court which in itself constitutes a misappreciation
of facts.

The other argument advanced by the petitioner is that the subject
property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally
bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only,
the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned
jointly with the husband is improper.

Against petitioner’s argument that the auction sale is null and
void is the trial court’s assessment of the validity thereof, that is, that the
notice of public auction sale was published in accordance with law.  Such a factual finding of the trial court is
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal. “Factual
questions should be resolved by the lower courts and the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction as a rule to reverse the findings of the lower courts except in a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion” (Korean Air Lines vs. CA,
154 SCRA 211).  In the instant case,
petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower
court in appreciating private respondent’s allegation that petitioner was
previously notified of the supposed transfer of the date of public auction from
September 25, 1958 to October 10, 1958.

Petitioner’s other argument is also based on factual
considerations.  Against the Court of
Appeals’ finding that the subject property is paraphernal
property, in view of the fact that it was “declared, under Tax No. 05378,
in the name of Teodora B. Ong
while the house erected thereon was declared under Tax No. 06022 in the name of
Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B.
Ong (Exhibits “B”, “H”,
“2-B”, “2-C”, “4”) (Decision, p. 4) is petitioner’s claim that the
subject property is conjugal.  Petitioner
stresses heavily on the fact that since the surname “Ong”
(which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong)
was carried by Teodora in the aforesaid tax
declaration, that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the
marriage.  By reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned
jointly by both spouses.

We disagree.  The mere use
of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is
not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is
therefore conjugal.  It is undisputed
that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife’s name, but the house
built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses.  Under
such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of
the present case, We hold that the lot in question is paraphernal,
and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.

Thus, it was held in the case of Maramba
vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474, that

“The presumption that property is
conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the marriage.  When there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse’s name is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse.”

As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who
invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. 
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. 
(Cobb-Perez, et al. vs. Lantin, et al., 23
SCRA 637; Jose Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 36 SCRA
289).  In the same manner, the recent
case of PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms that:

“When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse,
this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.  And this presumption under Art. 160 of the
Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and
the rights of innocent third parties are involved.”

Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the
debts of the wife in this case.  Under
Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the
husband may object (but subject to certain conditions).  It is clear from the records that the wife
was engaged in the logging business with the husband’s knowledge and apparently
without any objection on his part.  The
acts of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife’s engagement
in business.  According to Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) in her concurring opinion, the rule that should govern in that case is
that the wife’s paraphernal properties, as well as
those of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations
incurred by the wife in the course of her business (Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203,
and 236, Civil Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited in Commentaries on Phil.
Commercial Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised Edition, pp. 14-15).  After all, whatever profits are earned by the
wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership.  It would only be just and equitable that the
obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be
chargeable not only against her paraphernal property
but also against the conjugal property of the spouses.

Let it be noted that due to the length of time that this case has
remained pending, private respondents Francisco Boix
and Arsenio Camino have allegedly already died in the
process.  No proper substitution of
parties have apparently been made. 
Nevertheless, despite such supervening events, for failure on the part
of petitioner to show any grave abuse of discretion or reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court, We deem it wise to affirm the said
court’s decision.  Besides, the decision
of the trial court is in accordance with law and the evidence presented.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), J., no part, concurred in the Court of Appeals Decision
under review.

* Penned by the then Associate
Justice (now deceased) Simeon M. Gopengco and
concurred in by Associate Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta.