PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND LUCIANO TAN, RESPONDENTS.

In an Amended Information dated 10 February 1977, Ngo Sin, Luciano
Tan, and three others were charged with the crime of Theft of 300 pieces of
second-hand rail valued at P243,750.00, belonging to
the Philippine National Railways, before the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City,
Branch III (Criminal Case No. 719-SP).

On 10 July 1981, after the prosecution had already presented one
witness, upon notion of the prosecution, and after the parties were duly heard,
the Trial Court ordered discharge from the information of Ngo Sin to be
utilized as a State witness after satisfying itself that his testimony could be
substantially corroborated in its material points and that the other conditions
for discharge as set forth in Rule 119, Sec. 9 of the Rules of Court were
present.

A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano
Tan was denied by the Trial Court in its Order of 11 February, 1982, reasoning inter alia:

“x x x it
is pointed out that the prosecuting Fiscal has failed to show the absolute
necessity for the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin. As pointed out by the
prosecuting Fiscal, Ngo Sin is the only person who can directly identify Luciano Tan as the person who instructed him to get the
rails in San Pablo City, who gave him a certain amount of money to be used in
the hiring of trailers and to be given to certain persons in San Pablo City, as
the person who gave to him the necessary papers he presented in San Pablo City
to effect the taking of the rails in question, this as previously stated in the
Motion to Discharge filed by the City Fiscal dated February 20, 1981 particularly
pars. 2 and 3 of said motion, and also Annex ‘A’ of said motion. As contended
by the City Fiscal without the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin the prosecution
cannot prove the participation of the accused Luciano Tan who appears to be the mastermind in the unlaw­ful
taking of the rails from the PNR Compound at San
Pablo City.

Next, it is contended that lacking is the requirement that there is
no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin. As correctly pointed out
by the City Fiscal, except for the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin there is no
other direct evidence available for the prosecution to show the positive and
direct participation of Luciano Tan as narrated in
Ngo Sin’s affidavit attached to the Motion to Discharge. Next, it is contended
by defendant-movant that the next condition, to wit,
that the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin can be substantially corroborated in
its material point has not been met in the discharge of the accused Ngo Sin. As
pointed out by the City Fiscal, this is not true. The testimony of Ngo Sin will
be corroborated by Leonides Manalo
whose affidavit is submitted as Exh. ‘A’-motion (at
p. 382, rec.) who saw Luciano Tan deliver to Ngo Sin
a certain sum of money and cer­tain papers. The testimony of Ngo Sin is also
corroborated by the waybills or delivery receipts mark­ed Exhs.
‘M’ and ‘N’ made out to the name of Luciano Tan. As
also stated in the City Fiscal’s Opposition to the
motion for reconsidera­tion, he has earlier pointed out in the Petition for
Discharge, particularly par. 8 thereof, that defendant Ngo Sin appears to be
merely an instrument in carrying out the asportation,
with the bulk of responsibility resting on the accused Luciano
Tan. The City Fiscal in his Opposition to the motion for reconsideration has
discussed this at page 3 of the opposition.

Defendant-movant next argument is that
the body of the crime was taken from the possession of Ngo Sin (p. 4, Motion
for Reconsideration). As contended by the City Fiscal, while it is true that
the physical possession of the subject rails was taken from the accused Ngo Sin
the latter explained that he was in possession of the rails upon instruction by
defendant Luciano Tan; that the papers were given to
him. It is not true as alleged in the motion for reconsideration that the
accused Ngo Sin did not point to defendant Luciano
Tan until he was interrogated by the San Pablo City Police (p. 4, Motion for
Reconsideration). Lt. Octavio Mabilangan
of the PNR Security Force testified (Sess. Sept. 4,
1979) that upon apprehension of Ngo Sin, the latter protested that he was
merely ‘utusan lamang ako‘ ni Luciano
Tan and was simply told to go to San Pablo City; that Ngo Sin told him that the
delivery receipts and other papers were given to him by Luciano
Tan.

The defendant-movant has reproduced in
whole the testimony of Ngo Sin before the Fiscal’s Office
(p. 4-12, Motion). As pointed out by the City Fiscal, a reading of his entire
testimony would readily show that defendant-movant Luciano Tan was his principal who directed the accused Ngo
Sin to go to San Pablo City
to get the rails.

Next, defendant-movant
points out that the information alleges conspiracy and cites Sec. 27 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As pointed out by the City Fiscal,
the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to the testimony of the discharged witness in the person of
defendant Ngo Sin to be given in open Court.

It is next argued that since the rails in question have already
been sold to one Jose Chan, the accused Luciano Tan
has nothing more to do with the papers found in the possession of the accused
Ngo Sin (p. 14, Motion for Reconsideration). As pointed out by the City Fiscal,
this matter is immaterial for the purpose of present motion; it is a matter of
defense.”

On Certiorari, Luciano Tan
challenged the validity of the aforesaid Orders before respondent Appellate
Court. In a Decision promulgated on 25 June 1982, said Court held that
“there was no despotic exercise of discretion by His Honor in issuing the
challenged orders” finding as justified his rationalizations above-quoted.

Upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano
Tan, respondent Court reversed its prior Decision and nullified the Trial Court
Orders discharging Ngo Sin to be a State witness, rationalizing:

“It appears that accused Ngo Sin can be the most
guilty among the five accused for it was in his possession that the
missing rails in question were found. The contention that this was per
instruction of Luciano Tan is a matter of defense
which could be better ventilated at the trial proper, especially so when in
addition to the rails, papers were likewise found in his possession, in
relation to those rails. The money paid for the hiring of trailers to effect the transfer of the rails to certain persons in San
Pablo City was
given by Ngo Sin, who puts up the defense again that the money came from Luciano Tan. This again being a matter of defense to be
better determined during the trial.

The weakness of the challenged Orders is that it jumps at the
conclusion that Luciano Tan ‘appears to be the
mastermind in the unlawful taking of the rails from the PNR compound at San
Pablo City’, which conclusion is quite premature, prejudges the merit of the
case and makes the pending trial even moot and academic.

Aggravating the situation of the five (5) accused in the case
pending before the respondent court and calling for extreme caution in
excluding any accused is the allegation of the fiscal in the information (Annex
A) that in the commission of the offense accused were equally charged of ‘conspiring,
cooperating and mutually helping one another’, without in any manner
qualifying the degree of conspiracy of any one among the five (5) accused. This means that the exclusion of one accused now at this stage can
result in an act beneficial to his own exclusive interest but prejudicial to
the liberty of his four (4) other co-accused and worse of all even to the
interest of the State.

We are not convinced that there is an absolute necessity for the
State to exclude the particular accused in this case to prosecute successfully
the case. The best interest of justice would require the reconsideration of our
Decision and revoke and nullify the ques­tioned Orders.”

Reconsideration prayed for by petitioner having been denied, they
have elevated the case to us.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner
People of the Philippines
alleges that respondent Court acted arbitrarily and/or committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing itself, submitting that:

“x x x For
no apparently justifiable nor cogent reason, respondent court abruptly executed
an about-face, and against the facts of record, did, in effect, rule, that the
trial court, for all of its observance of the requirements of law (including
due notice, hearing and full consideration of the evidence), had committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the fiscal’s
motion to discharge Ngo Sin to become State witness. This sudden reversal of a
well-reasoned decision is obviously despotic, capricious, and arbitrary, and
totally unjustifiable.”

We resolved to give due course.

It is believed that the record justifies the discharge of Ngo Sin
to be utilized as a State witness considering the absolute necessity of his
testimony for the successful prosecution of the criminal charge if it has to be
established that the accused Luciano Tan had planned
and financed the theft. All conditions for discharge prescribed by Sec. 9, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court have been met. The Rules do not require absolute
certainty in determining those conditions. Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a
large part upon the suggestions and the considerations presented by the
prosecuting officer.

“x x x A
trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed
in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused
in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable
or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. In coming
to his conclusions as to the ‘necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested,’ as to the ‘availability or non-availability of other
direct or corroborative evidence;’ as to which of the accused is the ‘most
guilty’ one; and the like, the judge must rely in a large part upon the
suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer. x x x.'”^[1]

It is also settled that the discharge of a co-defendant is a
matter that lies within the sound discretion of the Trial Court.^[2] The
Court’s is the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed
by the Rules exist.^[3]

We see no compelling reason for respondent Appellate Court to
have substituted its own find­ings for those of the prosecution and the Trial
Judge. We find no contrary evidence to justify a reversal of the Trial Judge’s
conclusions, who was in a position to evaluate the evidence already available,
a like opportunity to assess the same not having been afforded respondent
Appellate Court.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Court’s Resolution, dated 4
November 1982 reversing its own prior Decision of 25 June 1982, as well as its
Resolution of 17 December 1982 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Orders of the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, dated 10 July 1981 and 11 February 1982,
in Criminal Case No. 719-SP, are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court
corresponding to the former Court of First Instance is now directed to proceed
with the trial on the merits accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, and
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Vasquez, J., no part.

Relova, J., in the result.

^[1]
People vs. Canete, 43 SCRA 14 (1972), citing 4
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 324, citing: U.S. vs.
de Guzman, 30 Phil. 416; and People vs. Velasco, 42 Phil. 75.

^[2] People vs. Bautista, et al., 106 Phil. 39 (1959), citing U.S. vs.
Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658; People vs. Bautista,
49 Phil., 389; People vs. Ibanez, 92 Phil. 933).

^[3] People vs. Ibanez, 92 Phil. 933 (1953).