PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, ACCUSED-APPELLEE.

This appeal from an order quashing an information furnishes occasion to
reiterate the ambits of the well-established doctrine of privileged
communications. The appeal was certified to us by the Court of Appeals
on a finding that it involves a pure question of law.

In an Information filed on March 4, 1981, the City Fiscal’s Office of
Cebu City accused Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno of the crime of libel based on
alleged defamatory statements found in a pleading entitled “PLAINTIFF’S
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION DATED MARCH ‘9th” dated March 11, 1980
filed in Civil Case No. R-18181 entitled “HEIRS OF ROBERTO CENIZA, ET
AL. V. DANIELA CENIZA UROT” now pending litigation before Branch IV of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial District.

On March 5, 1981, the accused filed a MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION. The
main thrust of the motion is that on the face itself of the information,
it is obvious that the allegedly libelous statements imputing that
Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is an irresponsible person, cannot be trusted,
like Judas, a liar and irresponsible childish prankster are contained in
a pleading filed in court and, therefore, covered by the DOCTRINE OF
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; hence, no civil or criminal
liability can arise therefrom.

A decision was rendered by the court a quo quashing the information and
dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals certified the same to us.

The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the
course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are
absolutely privileged has been expressed in a long line of cases (Us v.
Salera, 32 Phil. 365; Us v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 732; Giler v. Hilliard, 43
Phil. 180; Santiago v. Calvo, 47 Phil. 919; People v. Flores, G. R. No.
7528, Dec. 18, 1957; Tupas v. Parreño, 105 Phil. 1304; Unrep., April 30,
1959; Smith Bell and Co. v. Ellis, 48 Phil. 475; People v. Valerio
Andres, 107 Phil. 1046; Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60; Tolentino v.
Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555; Cuenco v. Cuenco,
70 SCRA 235; Elizalde v. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448; PCIB v. Philnabank
Employees’ Association, July 2, 1981, 105 SCRA 314). The doctrine of
privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the
free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental
result it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil- disposed
and malignant slanderer (People v. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947). While the
doctrine is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great
hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would give rise
to greater hardships. (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in
the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as
for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members
of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may
speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions
without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for
the recovery of damages (Deles v. Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633). Lawyers,
most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment
in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of
their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language (Deles
v. Aragona, supra).

The doctrine of privileged communication, moreover, is explicitly
provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to the general
principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it is true, in the absence of “good intention” and “justifiable
motive” (Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).

However, this doctrine is not without qualification. Statements made in
the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged — that
is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of
malice — if the same are relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause
in hand or subject of inquiry (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra;
People v. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555). A
pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being considered
libelous (Armovit v. Purisima, 118 SCRA 247).

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged
defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal
(People v. Alvarez, supra; Malit v. People, 114 SCRA 348). The
matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety (Malit v.
People, supra). In order that a matter alleged in a pleading
may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues
presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related
thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may
become the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial (Tolentino
v. Baylosis, supra; People v. Alvarez, supra).

It appears that in connection with the initial formal hearing of Civil
Case No. R-18181 on February 7, 1980, appellant Atty. Ceniza as counsel
for the defendant, filed an Urgent Motion to Transfer Hearing, receipt
of notice of which was denied by herein appellee Atty. Sesbreno, counsel
for the plaintiff. Upon the latter’s representation, the court a quo
granted the motion for postponement, ordering Atty. Ceniza, however, to
reimburse Atty. Sesbreno’s clients for expenses incurred in attending
the supposed hearing slated that day. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by Atty. Ceniza showing evidence of receipt of notice of hearing
by Atty. Sesbreno’s office. The same was granted. The court ordered
Atty. Sesbreno to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt
for misrepresentation. Against said order, Atty. Sesbreno filed a
motion seeking reconsideration with a counter-motion for contempt
against the appellant for reneging on his commitment to reimburse
appellee’s clients and for resorting to dilatory tactics. To that,
Atty. Ceniza, filed his “Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Etc.”
charging Sesbreno with misrepresentation, prevarication, and “telling a
barefaced and documented lie.” Replying to these remarks, Sesbreno then
filed his “REPLY” subject matter of Ceniza’s libel suit.

Applying the liberal rule to the case at bar and considering the
incidents which preceded it, we find appellee’s alleged slanderous
statements pertinent to the motion to cite appellant Ceniza in contempt.
Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the pleading in
question was undoubtedly strong, since it was made in legitimate defense
of his own and of his client’s interest, such remarks must be deemed
absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of an action for libel
(Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra).

However, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that, at
times, zeal in the defense of one’s client may be carried to the point
of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel,
the spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering
and recrimination is far from edifying (Narido v. Linsangan, 58 SCRA
85). Mutual bickerings and recriminations between brother attorneys
detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive
any sympathy from this Court (Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293).

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the
ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or
toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel should be
scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude
to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and idiosyncracies
of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel
which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be
carefully avoided (Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics). Lawyers
owe respect not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other
members of the Bar.

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language
should likewise be dignified (In re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 121). Choice
of language is a very important requirement in the preparation of
pleadings (Rule 8, Sec. 1; Rule 9, Sec. 5; Rule 7, Sec. 5, Revised
Rules of Court). Appropriately, in the assertion of their client’s
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers. Greater care and circumspection must
be exercised in the prepara­tion of their pleadings and to refrain from
using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68 SCRA
42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of practising
attorneys (Festin v. Faderanga, 111 SCRA 1).

Time and again we have rebuked and punished lawyers for conduct showing
them unfit to practice law. The Supreme Court as guardian of the legal
profession has ultimate powers over attorneys. Its authority to
discipline lawyers stems from its constitutional prerogative to regulate
the practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage therein
(Section 5(5), Article X, The 1973 Philippine Constitution; In Re
Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 1954). Apart from the constitutional mandate,
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over attorneys is an
inherent power incidental to its proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions (Tejan v.
Cusi, 57 SCRA 154; In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil.
573; In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Edillon,
G.R. No. AC-1928 [IBP Adm. Case No. DD-1] August 3, 1978). Furthermore,
attorneys are the court’s constituency — to aid in the administration
of justice (Doge S. State, 39 NE 745). A lawyer occupies what may be
termed a quasijudicial office since he is in fact an officer of the
court, and like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice (Kerlin v. Culkin, 60 ALR 851). Thus, only those
complying with the strict standards of legal practice are maintained in
the roll of attorneys and those falling short thereof may be disbarred.

Thus, both attorneys are advised accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Atty. Raul
Sesbreno is reprimanded and admonished to refrain from employing
language unbecoming of a member of the Bar and to extend courtesy and
respect to his brothers in the profession with a warning that any future
infraction of a nature similar to that found in this case shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., on official leave.