G.R. No. 62408. August 24, 1984
LUIS TAN AND ESPERANZA ANG, IN THE LATTER’S CAPACITY AS OWNER AND SOLE PROPRIETOR OF THE UNITED BAZAAR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND HORACIO YAPTINCHAY, R…
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Luis Tan, et al.”, which modified the judgment of the former Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Branch XXV, in a damage suit for
malicious prosecution by reducing the award of moral damages from
P100,000.00 to P20,000.00, but affirming the appealed judgment in all
other respects.
Sometime between 8 and 10 December 1969, petitioner Luis TAN, the
General Manager of the United Bazaar, a business enterprise in Baguio
City, owned by and under the sole proprietorship of his co-petitioner,
Esperanza ANG, purchased goods in Manila worth P2,712.00. The
merchandise was delivered to Highway Express, Inc., a common carrier,
for transport to Baguio City. The President of Highway Express is
private respondent Horacio YAPTINCHAY.
On 12 December 1969, the expected date of arrival of the goods, TAN
inquired from the Highway Express Branch Office in Baguio City about the
goods, but he was informed that the truck loading the merchandise had
not yet arrived. The following day, TAN left for Manila and inquired
from the traders from whom he bought the goods whether they had made
shipment. The reply was in the affirmative, as shown by bills of lading
(Exhibits “5”, “6”, “7” & “8”). Upon further inquiry from Highway
Express, a receiving clerk told him that the goods had already been
shipped to Baguio City. Verification in Baguio City, however, revealed
that the goods had not arrived. After shuttling back and forth between
Baguio and Manila, and failing to see respondent YAPTINCHAY and to
obtain definite information regarding the fate of the merchandise, TAN
sought the assistance of the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce in
Baguio City, which addressed a letter, dated 21 December 1969, to the
Highway Express Manager (Exhibit “A”) demanding the recovery or refund
of the cost of the undelivered cargo or their substitution with the same
or identical articles. No reply having been received, petitioners
wrote a demand letter dated 5 January 1970 (Exhibit “B”). On 14 January
1970, Highway Express replied asking for sufficient time to investigate
the cause of the alleged loss of the goods (Exhibit “10”).
On 26 February 1970, TAN filed a criminal complaint for Estafa before
the City Fiscal’s Office in Baguio City (I.S. No. 9711) against
YAPTINCHAY. After preliminary investigation, the complaint was amended
to include Juan Estacio (Assistant Manager), Primo Visperas (Dispatcher)
and Manuel Labayne (Receiving Clerk) all of Highway Express.
On 16 November 1970, the criminal accusation was dismissed as against
YAPTINCHAY and Juan Estacio for lack of probable cause, but an
Information for Estafa was filed against the dispatcher, Visperas, and
the receiving clerk, Labayne. They were eventually acquitted by the
City Court of Baguio, which found the element of misappropriation or
conversion wanting, it appearing that the goods were robbed or hijacked
while in transit.
About a year after the dismissal of the criminal case, or on 20 February
1971, YAPTINCHAY commenced a damage suit (Civil Case No. 14430) in the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII (later transferred to
Branch XXV) against petitioners, Luis TAN and Esperanza ANG, for having
lodged an allegedly malicious criminal charge.
Petitioners, as defendants below, traversed the Complaint alleging, in
essence, that YAPTINCHAY’s imputation of malicious prosecution was
without basis considering that petitioners had no personal knowledge of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss of the goods while in
transit prior to the filing of their complaint for estafa because
neither YAPTINCHAY nor his representative bothered to apprise them of
the true cause of the loss of the goods while in transit. They then
counterclaimed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.
In a Decision rendered on 5 July 1972, the Trial Court awarded damages to YAPTINCHAY, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of:
“1. P100,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
“2. P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
“3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED”[2]
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on 11
August 1982, modified the appealed judgment by reducing the award of
moral damages to P20,000.00 but affirmed it in all other respects.
Reconsideration of the judgment sought by petitioners was denied by that
Court.
Hence, petitioners’ availment of this Petition to which we gave due course.
The issues raised by the petitioners may be compressed into the primary
question of whether or not petitioners had imputed the estafa against
YAPTINCHAY before the prosecuting officer maliciously, and without
probable cause, thereby rendering them liable for damages.
We find in the negative.
In a damage suit based on malicious prosecution, there are essential elements that must be proven:
“To support an action for malicious prosecution under American law
the plaintiff must prove, in the first place, the fact of the
prosecution and the fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor,
or that he instigated its commencement, and that it finally terminated
in his acquittal; that, in bringing it, the prosecutor had acted without
probable cause, and that he was actuated by legal malice, i.e., by
improper or sinister motives. These three elements must concur; and
there is no distinction between actions for criminal prosecution and
civil suits. Both classes require substantially the sane essentials.
Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious
prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary damages. But
malice alone does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, where
probable cause is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought
for the mere purpose of vexing, harassing and injuring his adversary.
In other words, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in
order to justify the action.”[3]
In pronouncing the petitioners liable for damages, respondent Appellate
Court sustained the lower Court’s finding that petitioner-defendant TAN
had instituted the estafa charge against YAPTINCHAY without probable
cause as evidenced by its dismissal by the Fiscal, and with malice, as
TAN had prior knowledge of the loss of his goods while in transit by
robbery-hijacking before he filed the estafa charge.
The existence of malice is negated by the facts. Clear and preponderant
evidence is wanting to prove that petitioners had knowledge that the
criminal charge was false, that they had acted in bad faith[4] , and that they were actuated by improper and sinister motives.[5]
The evidence discloses, contrary to the Trial Court’s deductions, that
TAN had not been informed of the cause of the loss of his merchandise
while he was making repeated inquiries regarding the same. In its reply
letter to petitioners’ demand to make good the loss, Highway Express
merely asked for time to investigate without advancing any cause for the
disappearance of the goods. TAN learned for the first time about the
robbery-hijacking at the preliminary investigation of the complaint for
estafa at the Fiscal’s Office when the police report on the
robbery-hijacking was presented by the accused. The inclusion of
YAPTINCHAY in the criminal complaint must have been prompted by TAN’s
reasonable belief that, as President of the company in whose custody the
goods were lost, he was responsible for such loss. Moreover, the
evidence shows that TAN had, in fact, sought the advice of his friend
Fiscal Salvador Valdes, Jr., after narrating to the latter the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loss of his goods. Relying upon said
advice TAN signed the Affidavit prepared by the said prosecuting
officer. Such advice of counsel negates malice and is a complete
defense to an action for malicious prosecution.
“It is the general rule, in the absence of any statutory provision
to the contrary, that advice of counsel is a complete defense to an
action for malicious prosecution where it appears that the prosecution
was instituted in reliance in good faith on such advice, given after a
full and fair statement of all the facts to the attorney. This is true
whether the advice was sought in respect of a civil action or a criminal
prosecution. Moreover, it is immaterial that the attorney’s advice was
unsound or erroneous; if the defense is worth anything to a party it
must be available when through error of law, as well as of fact, his
action has failed; the lawyer’s error will not deprive his client of the
defense.”[6]
The dismissal by the Fiscal of the complaint for estafa as against
YAPTINCHAY neither rules out probable cause in so far as TAN was
concerned. The circumstances surrounding the loss of the merchandise,
as they appeared to TAN, were such as to excite reasonable belief in his
mind that YAPTINCHAY was guilty of the crime for which he (TAN) had
charged him (YAPTINCHAY). This is the essence of probable cause which
further eliminates herein the element of malice essential in making out a
case of malicious prosecution.[7]
Moreover, the action of the Fiscal in filing the Information for
estafa against the other employees of Highway Express shows that he
believed in the existence of probable cause for TAN’s charge
notwithstanding the defense of robbery-hijacking.
Overall, paramount is the consideration that free resort to Courts for
redress of wrongs is a matter of public policy. The law recognizes the
right of everyone to sue for that which he honestly believes to be his
right without fear of standing trial for damages.
“While Courts must look upon the plight of hapless victims of
unfounded and malicious prosecution with tolerance and sympathy, sound
principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have
free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their
rights without fear of later on standing trial for damages where by
lack of sufficient evidence, legal technicalities or a different
interpretation of the laws on the matter, the case would lose ground and
therein defendants are acquitted. Proof and motive that the
prosecution or institution of the action was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace
must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to
damages and other rights granted by law; otherwise, there would always
be a civil action for damages after every prosecution’s failure to prove
its cause resulting in the consequent acquittal of the accused
therein.”[8]
WHEREFORE, respondent Appellate Court’s judgment is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the suit for damages (Civil Case No. 14430) is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. Petitioners’ counterclaims are likewise DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
De la Fuente, J., took no part.
[1] Division of Five composed
of J. Milagros A. German, ponente; concurred in by JJ. B.S. de la
Fuente, Mariano A. Zosa and Jose C. Colayco; J. Carolina C.
Griño-Aquino, dissenting.
[2] Record on Appeal, pp. 25-26.
[3] Rehabilitation Finance Corporation vs. Koh, et als., 4 SCRA 535, cited in Martinez vs. United Finance Corporation, 34 SCRA 527, 528 (1970).
[4] Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60 (1961).
[5] Buchanan vs. Vda. De Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915).
[6] Rehabilitation Finance Corp. vs. Koh, et als., supra.
[7] Almendra vs. Alvero, 15 SCRA 63 (1965).
[8] Buenaventura, et al vs. Sto. Domingo, et al, 103 Phil. 239 (1958).