SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES VICTOR GO AND FLORA C. GO AND HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRA…

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is called upon to
determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 1508,^[1]
otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay
Law. This law requires the compulsory process of arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court. Petitioners contend that said
legislation is so broad and all-embracing
as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts,
now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also
by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other
hand, respondents would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial
courts.

The antecedent facts are
not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed
in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu,
presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for
recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No.
R-22154.

On the basis of the
allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing, as grounds therefor, the failure of
the complaint to allege prior availment by the
plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process
required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.
The motion was opposed by private respondents.

On September
2, 1982, respondent
judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated October
3, 1982, as follows:

“Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal
Courts in the provisions of Section 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts
to which the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat,
shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for exe­cution of the same,
and considering that from the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the
pre-condition to the filing of a complaint as provided for in Section 6
thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered opinion of this
Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.

“In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration
filed by the defendants, of the order of September
2, 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied.” [Annex ‘G’, p. 36, Rollo].

From this order,
petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December
2, 1982, We required
respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining
order enjoin­ing respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their
answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.

We find the petition
impressed with merit.

Section
6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:

“SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of com­plaint.
– No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Sec­tion 2
hereof shall be filed or instituted in Court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confronta­tion of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no con­ciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon
or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following
cases:

[1]   Where
the accused is under detention;

[2]   Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;

[3]   Actions coupled with provi­sional remedies
such as pre­liminary injunction, attach­ment, delivery of personal property and
support pendente lite; and

[4]   Where the action may otherwise be barred by
the Statute of Limitations.”

Section 2 of the law
defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:

“SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. – The Lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

“[1]   Where one party is the govern­ment, or any
subdivision or instrument­ality thereof;

“[2]   Where one party is a public officer or
employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

“[3]   Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding
30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

“[4]   Offenses where there is no private offended
party;

“[5]   Such other classes of disputes which the
Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice
and the Minister of Local Government.”

Thus, except in the
instances enumerated in Sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon
has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties
who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes
of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay
level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority
over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon’s
authority, Sec­tion 2 of said
law employed the universal and comprehen­sive term “all”, to which
usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary
precept in statutory construction that “where the
law does not dis­tinguish, We should not distinguish.”^[2]

By compelling the
disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected
members of the barangay, the animosity generated by
protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a
disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in
mind that the conciliation process at the barangay
level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in
court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and,
in the process, enhance the qua­lity of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to
cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this
objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would
stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating
up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the
inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And
why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in
inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases
is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half?measure and self-defeating
legislation.

The objectives of the law
are set forth in its preamble thus:

“WHEREAS, the
perpetuation and official recognition of the time?honored tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial resources would promote the
speedy administration of justice
and implement the constitutional mandate to preserve and develop Filipino
culture and to strengthen the family as a basic social institution;

“WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the Courts of
justice contributes heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court
dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice;

“WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket
congestion and thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to formally organize and
institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.”

There can be no question
that when the law conferred upon the Lupon “the
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, x x x,” its obvious intendment
was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive
an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the
aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily
thwarted if the Lupon’s authority is exercised only
in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.

Moreover, if it is the
intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the
inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3
thereof the following rule on venue, to wit:

“Section 3. Venue. x x x However, all disputes which in volve real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated.”

for
it should be noted that, traditionally and his­torically, jurisdiction over
cases involving real property or
any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in
the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].

But it is pointed out by
the respondent judge that Sections 11,^[3] 12,^[4] and 14^[5]
of the law speak of the city and/or
Municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the set­tlement or arbitration awards issued
by the Lupon.
We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope
of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the
authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by res­pondent
judge, deal with the nullification or execu­tion of the settlement or
arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level.
These sections conferred upon he city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or
actions for nulli­fication or enforcement of settlement/arbitration wards
issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original
dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the
thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies
exclusively to said inferior courts.

Any doubt on the issue
before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando,^[6] the full text of which is quoted as follows:

“TO                     :  ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
CIR­CUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JU­VENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT

“SUBJECT         :     Implementation
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

“Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the
Minister of Local Government and Community Deve­lopment that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have
organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, other­wise
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of dis­putes, you are hereby
directed to de­sist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.

“Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro is to that extent mo­dified.

“This Circular takes effect imme­diately.”

It is significant that
the above-quoted circular embodying the directive “to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within
the authority of said Lupons,” has been
addressed not only to judges of city and Municipal courts, but also to all the
judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now
known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos
in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of
which reads as follows: “with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases
and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices
involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby
ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and
offices concerned of the system of amicably settling dis­putes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No.
1508].”

Therefore, for the
guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation process
at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a
pre-condi­tion for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and Municipal
trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial Courts as well.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of
respondent judge denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss is hereby set aside.
Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., reserved their votes.

Aquino, J., see concurrence.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

^[1]
Promulgated June 11, 1978.

^[2]
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Gimenez, 1 SCRA 267.

^[3]
SECTION 11. Effect of amicable settlement and arbitration award.-The amicable
settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days after the date thereof
unless repudia­tion of the settlement has been made or a petition for
nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

^[4]
SECTION 12. Execution.-The amicable settle­ment or arbitration award may be
enforced by execution within one (1) year from the date of settlement. After
the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the
appropriate city/municipal court.

^[5]
SECTION 14. Transmittal of settlement and arbitration award to court.-The
Secretary of the Lupon shall transmit the settlement
or the arbitration award to the local city or municipal court within five (5)
days from the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day period for
repudiating the settlement and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the
parties to the settlement and the Barangay Captain.

^[6]
Dated November 9, 1979.

150
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