G.R. No. 62270. May 21, 1984
CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, DEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO LEONERO, AND JUNE PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL …
FERNANDO, C.J.:
peaceable assembly and free speech is the grievance alleged by
petitioners, students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, in
this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding.
The principal respondents are Anastacio D. Ramento, Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
and the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.[1]
The nullification of the decision of respondent Ramento affirming the
action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta University Foundation
finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them is
sought in this petition.
The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the
Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00
A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along
with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary
Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated
in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at
the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement
and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30
A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and
continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit.
They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language
severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones
in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes
being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to
explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding
an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed
through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for
their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of
the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a
petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents[2]
and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October
20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital
Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par.
146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding
of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the
permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence
this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution:
“Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion for the immediate issuance of a
temporary mandatory order filed by counsel for petitioners, dated
November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER enjoining all respondents or any person or persons acting in their
place or stead from enforcing the order of the Ministry of Education
and Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the
charges against them and suspending them for one (1) academic year with
a stern warning that a commission of the same or another offense will
be dealt with utmost severity, effective as of this date and continuing
until otherwise ordered by this Court, thus allowing them to enroll, if
so minded.”[3]
Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition “for lack of
factual and legal basis and likewise [prayed] for the lifting of the
temporary restraining order dated November 16, 1982.”[4]
Public respondent Ramento, on the other hand, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on
the following conclusion: “Consequently, it is respectfully submitted
that respondent Director of the MECS did not commit any error, much less
abused his discretion, when he affirmed the decision of respondent
University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the provisions of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Revised
Student’s Code of Discipline and ordering their suspension for one (1)
academic school year. However, since said suspension has not been
enforced except only briefly, thereby enabling petitioners Leonero, Jr.,
Lucas and Malabanan to finish their courses, and allowing petitioners
Lee and Jalos to continue their schooling, if they so desire, this
proceeding is now moot and academic.”[5]
With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public
and private respondents, the case was ready for decision.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from
the fact that by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester,
with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to
do so. Moreover, there is the added circumstance of more than a year
having passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent Ramento issued the
challenged decision suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its
validity having been put in issue, for being violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech,
there is need to pass squarely on the question raised.
This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights
of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the
decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly
severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other
than that specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time
allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the
work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable
consequence could have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the
basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending
them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The petition
must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much
lesser penalty being appropriate.
1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing,[6]
the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries
with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression,
which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment and which “is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing * * * of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the state has a right to prevent.”[7]2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march
and rally from the Luneta public park to the gates of the United States
Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. Necessarily then, the question
of the use of a public park and of the streets leading to the United
States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets and parks
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have
been used for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between
citizens and to discuss public issues.[8]3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held
not in a public place but in private premises, property of respondent
University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this
relevant excerpt: “The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of
the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.”[9]
Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. According to the
petition: “On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to them by
the school administration, the Supreme Student Council where your
petitioners are among the officers, held a General Assembly at the VMAS
basketball court of the respondent university.”[10]
There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent
University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a
student assembly.[11] The
specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as
disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed,
there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its
cognate right of free speech.4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the
citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their
thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in
this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District,[12] “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”[13]
While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there
is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: “The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate
students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among
the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
process. A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field,
or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam,
if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others. * * * But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.”[14]5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the
complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be
in their favor, but subject to qualification, in view of their
continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in
the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones
therein, resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of work
by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the
speeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorous
presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected.
There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move
as it confronted them with a serious problem (“isang malaking suliranin.”)[15] They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents (“isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.”).[16]
If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience
goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student
leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be
assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any
rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full
credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate,
the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of
their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker,
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.”7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners
that they were denied the right to peaceable assembly. In a 1907
decision, United States v. Apurado,[17]
the facts disclosed that shortly before the municipal council of San
Carlos, Occidental Negros, started its session, some five hundred
residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal building,
and, upon the opening of the session, a substantial number of such
persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that the municipal
treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police be
dismissed, submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The
municipal council gave its conformity. Such individuals were wholly
unarmed except that a few carried canes; the crowd was fairly orderly
and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council
chamber during a session of that body could be called disorder and
misbehavior. It turned out that the movement had its origin in
religious differences. The defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other
participants were indicted and convicted of sedition in that they
allegedly prevented the municipal government from freely exercising its
duties. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Carson, who
penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that “if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly
as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the
right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become
a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most
righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all
those who took part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to
the prosecuting authorities.”[18]
The principle to be followed is enunciated thus: “If instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals
should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion
must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.”[19]
A careful reading of this decision is in order before private
respondents attach, as they did in their comments, a subversive
character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of
petitioners.8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally
absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a
violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place
other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the
basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it
was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision
of respondent Ramento, the “concerted activity [referring to such
assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m.”[20]
Private respondents could thus take disciplinary action. On those
facts, however, an admonition, even a censure – certainly not a
suspension – could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents
could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction –
considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took
place – there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of
the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they
did take a much more serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year
period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of both
respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of
reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the
sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.
That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this
constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a
one-week suspension would be punishment enough.9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. That is true, but hardly
decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the
case, especially so where a decision on a question of law is
imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has
invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be
too sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there
was, and very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy
and assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great
importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public.
That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection
in the Bill of Rights.10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing,[21]
for this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school
authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare
or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear
and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the
content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable
character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of
disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be
aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If
the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought
from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such
request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel.
Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982
of respondent Ramento imposing a one-year suspension is nullified and
set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in the
resolution of November 18, 1982 is made permanent. As of that date,
petitioners had been suspended for more than a week. In that sense, the
one-week penalty had been served. No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., no part.
[1] The other respondents
named are Cesar Mijares, in his capacity as the President of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Gonzalo del Rosario, in his
capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation; Tomas B. Mesina, in his capacity as the Dean of
Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Atty.
Leonardo Padilla, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel and Security
Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Atty. Fablita
Ammay, Rosendo Galvante and Eugenio Tayao, in their capacities as
members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation.
[2] After obtaining an order
to allow petitioners to lift temporarily the suspension and allow their
attendance at classes, no further information as to what subsequently
transpired was furnished this Court.
[3] Resolution of this Court dated November 16, 1982.
[4] Comment of Private Respondents, 18.
[5] Comment of Public Respondent, 9-10.
[6] G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.
[7] Ibid, 561. Cf. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 856-857.
[8] Ibid, 563-564.
Reference was made to Municipality of Roxas v. Cavite, 30 Phil. 602
(1915) and Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948). The above
formulation of the immemorial use of public parks comes from the
plurality opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 US 495 (1937).
[9] Ibid, 569.
[10] Petition, par. 2, Annex A.
[11] Comment of Private Respondents, par. 2.
[12] 393 US 503 (1969).
[13] Ibid, 507.
[14] Ibid, 513-514.
[15] Comment of Private Respondents, Annex M.
[16] Ibid.
[17] 7 Phil. 422.
[18] Ibid, 426.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Petition, Annex J.
[21] Cf. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.