PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JESUS ARLEGUI, JUDGE – COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, BRANCH VII, AND WILLIAM ESPAÑOLA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII, dismissing on a motion to quash
Criminal Case No. 2170 entitled “People of the Philippines v. William
Espanola” on the ground that from the language used in the information
in relation to the Presidential Decrees punishing the alleged offense,
it is not clear that an offense was committed and that the supposed
penal statutes “are not prohibitive but rather permissive and preceptive
statutes.”

Respondent Española was charged in an information which reads:

“The undersigned Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses William
Espanola of the violation of Presidential Decree No. 381 in relation to
Section 4-B of Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, committed as
follows:

“That during the month of May 1979 and continuously up to the
present, at Sitio Putat, Barangay Papaya, Municipality of Nasugbu,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law, establish,
construct, manage and operate development projects for tourism purposes
on a land under the administration and supervision of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, a government corporate body charged with the planning
and development of tourism projects, and situated in Putat, Nasugbu,
Batangas, containing an area of 30,000 square meters, more or less,
otherwise known as the Peco de Loro Beach Resort, without the prior
approval of the said Authority.”

Respondent Española moved to quash the information on the following grounds:

“The accusation against the accused is not a penal
offense, but, more of administrative in nature, because Sec. 4 of P.D.
No. 381 as well as P.D. No. 189, Sec. 4-B do not impose Criminal
liability against the offender. The accused did not commit any offense
in the development of the beach resort because his application, granting
that the area is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, was duly given due course by the said body as stated in Annex ‘A’.
Instead of charging the accused, he ought to be commended for
assisting the government in the promotion of tourism. In fact, the
beach resort has become so famous that foreigners have been continuously
and regularly patronizing the place.

“The land covered by the beach resort was also given due course by
the Bureau of Lands and covered by a Foreshore Lease Application as
clearly reflected in Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’.”

The grounds in the Fiscal’s opposition to the motion to quash are:

“1. That the accused has overlooked the fact that Presidential
Decree No. 381 which was made principally as the basis of the charge
against the herein accused provides under Section 1 thereof ‘that no development project for tourism purposes shall be undertaken by any person without prior approval of the Philippine Tourism Authority, in accordance with the provisions and guidelines prescribed by the Department of Tourism.’
As a corollary thereto, Section 4 provides ‘that any person violating
or causing another to violate any provision of this decree or the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Philippine Tourism Authority pursuant
to the next preceding section will suffer the penalties provided for
under Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189, as amended. Presidential Decree No.
259 which took effect on August 1, 1973 which among others provides the
penalties for the violation of any provision of the said decree or of
the rules and regulations or circulars of the Department of Tourism is
now known as Section 4-B of PD No. 189. Section 4-b has been misquoted
because Section 4 of PD No. 189 was the one quoted by the accused.
Section 4-b as we have stated is an amendment to Section 4 of PD No. 189
which section is now included under PD 259 as an amendatory act to PD
No. 189.

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“2. That it is not true that the Philippine Tourism Authority
gave due course to the application of the accused for the undertaking of
a particular development project at Sitio Putat, Barangay Papaya,
Nasugbu, Batangas, for tourism purposes because the letter itself dated
February 14, 1979 does not indicate approval of the authority of his
application in the sense that the implications of the phrase ‘we may give due course to your proposal‘ do not altogether give a guarantee and assurance to the accused that his application will be approved. x x x”

Complainant Philippine Tourism Authority likewise interposed an opposition to the motion to quash and argued:

“The charge against the accused is an offense punishable by Special Law, P.D. 381, the penalty of which is provided in Section 4-B
of P.D. 189, as amended by P.D. 259. It should be noted that P.D. 189
has been amended by P.D. 259 in which Section 4-B was specifically
incorporated providing for the penalty of any violation of P.D. 381.
The citation of the accused of Sec. 4-b (not capitalized) of P.D. 189,
as supposed to be providing the penalty as mentioned by P.D. 381 is an
error because P.D. 381 mentions Sec. 4-B (capitalized letter) of P.D.
189 as amended particularly by P.D. No. 259. x x x

“The allegation of the accused that he did not commit the offense
because his application for beach resort was duly given due course by
the Authority, is a matter of defense which, at this stage, is
misleading and definitely not a ground for a Motion to Quash. x x x”

The respondent court, in a twelve-page order resolved to dismiss the
case. The prosecution, through the Provincial Fiscal and the
Philippine Tourism Authority, raised the matter to this Court in this
petition and made the following assignments of errors:

(i)

Respondent Lower Court erred in resorting to interpretation and
construction of the information and the law subject of violation despite
the unambiguous provisions thereof.

(ii)

Respondent Lower Court erred in declaring P.D. 381 as a permissive
statute despite the mandatory nature of the provisions and the penalty
provided for violation thereof.

(iii)

Respondent Lower Court erred in dismissing Criminal Case No. 2170.

Asked to comment on the case at bar, the Solicitor General stated that
the respondent judge did not properly apply the correct provisions of
the law allegedly violated by the private respondent and agreed with the
prosecution that P.D. No. 381 is not a permissive statute and violation
of its provisions constitutes a criminal offense.

The pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 381 (Requiring the Approval of the
Philippine Tourism Authority on Certain Development Projects and Loans
Applied for to Finance their Construction, etc.) are –

Section 1. Any provision of existing laws, decrees, or rules to the
contrary notwithstanding, no development project for tourism purposes
shall be undertaken by any person without the prior approval of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, in accordance with the policies and
guidelines prescribed by the Department of Tourism.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 4. Any person violating or causing another to violate any
provision of this decree or of the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Philippine Tourism Authority pursuant to the next preceding section
shall suffer the penalties provided under Section 4-B of Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended. (Italics supplied).

Section 4-b (not capitalized) of P.D. No. 189 (Amending Part IX Of The
Integrated Reorganization Plan by Renaming the Department of Trade and
Tourism as the Department of Trade, and Creating the Department of
Tourism with a Philippine Tourism Authority attached to it in lieu of
Philippine Tourism Commission) provides:

Section 4. Functions. – The Department shall be responsible for the following functions:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

b. Effect the removal of unnecessary barriers to travel; the
integration and simplification of travel regulations; as well as their
efficient, fair and courteous enforcement to assure expeditious and
hospitable reception of all visitors;

xxx                xxx                   xxx

P.D. No. 189 was later amended by P.D. No. 259 (Amending Certain
Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 189 dated May 11, 1973). Section 2
of the latter decree provides that:

SECTION 2. To provide penalties for the violation of any provision of
the said Decree or of the rules and regulations or circulars of the
Department of Tourism, a new section to be known as Section 4-B is hereby added, which shall read as follows: (Italics supplied)

SEC. 4-B. Any person violating or causing another to violate any
provision of this Decree, or of the rules and regulations or circulars
promulgated by the Department of Tourism pursuant to its power and
authority to license, classify, regulate and/or supervise the operation
of all persons, businesses, establishments, facilities and services that
cater to, or have anything to do with travelers and tourists, both
international and domestic shall, upon conviction by a court of
competent jurisdiction, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than two (2) years nor more than five (5) years or a fine of not less
than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or both, at
the discretion of the Court. In addition thereto, such violation shall
ipso facto, constitute a valid ground for the revocation of all
privileges, permits and authorization granted to such person or entity
under this Decree by the Department of Tourism. Provided, however, That
if the offender is a corporation, firm, partnership or association, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers, as the
case may be, of the corporation, firm or association, and if such guilty
officer or officers is an alien, in addition to the penalties herein
prescribed, he or they shall be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.”

We purposely emphasize that there are two sections numbered almost
identically, one with a capitalized “B” and the other with a
non-capitalized “b”, (“Section 4-B” and “Section 4-b”) since these
sections caused the confusion encountered by the respondent court and
the misreading and misapplication of the law. The two sections must be
distinguished from each other. Under “Section 4-b” of P.D. No. 189, the
Department of Tourism was empowered to “effect the removal of
unnecessary barriers to travel; the integration and simplification of
travel regulations; as well as their efficient, fair, and courteous
enforcement to assure expeditious and hospitable reception of all
visitors.” It does not provide for any penalty, much more impose any
criminal liability. To that extent respondent Española was correct when
he said that the provision was not a penal offense but that it was more
administrative in nature. The respondent court citing Section 4-b (not
capitalized) of P.D. No. 189, arrived at the same conclusion.

However, P.D. No. 189 has been amended by P.D. No. 259 and a new
provision, Section 4-B, added. Moreover, the information clearly and
expressly accuses respondent Española for the violation of P.D. No. 381
in relation to Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189, as amended, not Section 4-b of P.D. No. 189 before it was amended.
This means that “Upon conviction of a court of competent jurisdiction”
the “penalty of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more
than five (5) years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor
more than five thousand pesos, or both, at the discretion of the court’
shall be imposed.

In dismissing the case, the respondent court relied on rules of statutory construction and held that:

“It is basic that if the writing is plain, certain and free from
ambiguity, a bare reading suffices and interpretation is unnecessary or
stated conversely, if the writing is ambiguous, or its meaning
uncertain, interpretation is required in order to ascertain what the
writer meant. But interpretation may be required and justified by
various factors. Besides the doubt created by doubtful meaning of words
used do not express the Prosecutor’s Information intent
perfectly, in which case interpretation is needed. Such is the case at
bar, the Court honestly believe that the language used exceeds or falls
short of expressing the meaning intended.”

An examination of the information shows on its face that it does not
suffer from any material or substantial defect or any so-called
ambiguity or double meaning as to warrant the dismissal of the case.
Contrary to the respondents’ claim, the information appears sufficiently
explicit. It does not suffer from the obscurity, unintelligibility, or
vagueness alleged by the respondents. Respondent Española created
ambiguity where there was none. Resort to statutory construction or
interpretation was, therefore, unnecessary.

Assuming the information to have been vague and ambiguous, alternative
courses of action could have been taken. Respondent Española could have
filed a motion for a bill of particulars if he did not feel like
researching into a Presidential Decree with a Section 4-b and a Section
4-B. A bill of particulars while provided for under Section 6 of Rule
116 is not a popular procedure among lawyers for the accused in criminal
cases. For one thing, it may invite an amended information which is
not only clearer but may also be stronger and more incriminating.
However, it would have clarified and corrected at an early stage the
kind of doubt which the accused in this particular case alleged to have
entertained. Section 6 of Rule 116 provides:

SEC. 6. Bill of Particulars. – Defendant may, at the time
of or before arraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement
or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to plead
or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired.

The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have been
an order from the court directing the Fiscal to amend the information
because the defect, if there ever was one, was curable by the simplest
of amendments or clarifications. There was no basis to grant the motion
to quash and dismiss the case.

This Court stated in People v. Plaza (117 Phil. 627), where we
found that the real defect of the information was not that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute a punishable offense but that its
allegations were vague, that:

“But even assuming that the lower court was right in holding that
the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a punishable
offense, as far as defendant Plaza was concerned, the case should not
have been dismissed with respect to him. Instead, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 7, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the lower court
should have given the prosecution an opportunity to amend the
information. That under the provisions of said rule the trial court may
order the filing of another information or simply the amendment of the
one already filed is clearly in accordance with the settled rule in this
jurisdiction (U.S. v. Muyo, 2 Phil. 177; People v. Tan, 48 Phil. 877,
880).”

But the ruling of this Court was not followed. Instead, after
respondent Española filed a motion to quash to which the Fiscal together
with the complainant Philippine Tourism Authority interposed an
opposition, the same was granted. To make matters worse, the case had
to be brought to this Court on certiorari. The filing of this petition
and the resultant unnecessary addition to the heavy docket of this Court
could have been avoided by the simple expedient of ordering the filing
of an amended information.

Respondent Española contends that the phrase “as amended” found in the
information cannot be the subject of guessing by the accused. He argues
that –

“x x x the purpose of the designation of the offense ‘is to
secure a clear specification of the offense charged. And, inasmuch as
in criminal cases, not only the liberty but even the life of the
defendants may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that they
should be fully apprised of the charges against them, and thus avoid any
and all possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights
and interests.’ (People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744) It would be
unwise to change the battleground in criminal cases from issues to
guesses and from facts to fancy.”

The respondent was not caught in a speculative guessing game. He knew
very well or should have known what law amended P.D. No. 189. And even
if the respondent was sincerely confused at the start, he was properly
apprised of the present status and applicable provision of the decree
when the Fiscal and the complainant Philippine Tourism Authority filed
their separate oppositions to the motion to quash. The respondent court
quoted P.D. No. 259, the amendatory decree in its order. The correct
action to take on the motion to quash was obvious.

We have held that an error which specifies the wrong provision of
applicable law does not necessarily vitiate the information (People v.
Arnault, 92 Phil. 252). A fortiori should an imagined ambiguity not
vitiate the information. For it is a well-settled rule that the real
nature of the crime charged in an information or complaint is determined
not by the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts alleged
in the complaint or information (People v. Oliveria, 67 Phil. 427).

What is important is not the designation of the offense charged in the
caption of the information but the facts alleged therein (People V.
Agito, 103 Phil. 526). The designation by name of the crime in the
caption of the information constitutes a conclusion of law on the part
of the fiscal. It is not necessarily essential, for the protection of
the substantial rights of the accused or for the effective preparation
of his defense, that he be informed of the technical name of the crime
of which he stands charged (People v. Cosare, 95 Phil. 656).

The respondent court further erred in holding that P.D. No. 381 in
relation to Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189, as amended is not prohibitive
but rather is a permissive and preceptive provision of law. A perusal
of the decrees involved shows the contrary. Section 1 of P.D. No. 381
is worded in the negative, i.e., “. . . no development project for
tourism purposes. . . “. Moreover, it uses the word “shall” instead of
“may” evincing the mandatory nature of the provision itself. In
addition, it contains a “no-exemption clause”, i.e., “any provision of
existing laws, decrees or rules to the contrary notwithstanding…” Most
important, the decree carries a penalty of imprisonment or fine or both
for a violation of its provisions. It would be incongruous for
permissive provision of law to be sanctioned by stiff criminal
penalties. When all these are combined, the effect is to clearly
express the prohibitive intent of the law.

Respondent Española adamantly insists that he has not violated P.D. No.
381 since the Philippine Tourism Authority gave due course to his
application. This is a matter of defense on the part of the accused and
should be properly ventilated during the full-dressed trial on the
merits of the case below.

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The questioned order of
the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appropriate
Regional Trial Court is directed to proceed with the arraignment of the
private respondent and, thereafter, to proceed with the trial of the
case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Acting Chairman), Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., on official leave.