ENRIQUE T. JOCSON, BIENVENIDA JOCSON-LAGNITON, PERLA T. JOCSON, CARLOS T. JOCSON, JESUS T. JOCSON, RODOLFO T. JOCSON, AND CONRADO T. JOCSON, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE ALFONSO …

Presented for resolution are three consolidated petitions, all
relating to petitioners’ effort to recover one-half (1/2) interest in five lots
which they claim belonged to their late father, Agustin Jocson,
and now to them as the latter’s heirs, but which respondents hold adversely.

Their claim is embodied in a complaint for “rescission, reconveyance, and/or partition with damages” filed
with the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City
and docketed as Civil Case No. 16374 (now 680), entitled “Bienvenida Jocson-Lagniton, et
al. v. Sps. Ester Jocson
Vinson, et al.” This complaint was dismissed by the trial court on motion
of the defendant, herein respondent Norma N. Vda. de Jocson, on the ground that
petitioners’ claim is unenforceable, barred by prior judgment, had prescribed,
and that petitioners were guilty of laches.  One of the plaintiffs, Enrique Jocson, questioned the order directly to this Court and
whose petition for review was docketed as G.R. No. 74757.  The other plaintiffs filed an amended notice
of appeal with the trial court signifying their intention to appeal to the
Court of Appeals.  Their notice of appeal
remains up to the present unacted upon.  They come to this Court by way of petition
for mandamus to compel respondent Judge Quirico
Calasara “to act on their notice of appeal”
and to cause the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 680 to the Court
of Appeals.  Their petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 79555.  On February 1, 1988, this Court gave due
course to both petitions.

Meantime, subsequent to the filing of the complaint, petitioners
also filed a “Motion in Intervention” in the testate estate
proceeding of the deceased Ramiro Jocson of which a
portion of the land they are claiming ostensibly forms a part.  On January
4, 1982, the probate court issued an order denying petitioners’
motion to intervene on the ground that their claimed right is already fully
protected considering that they had already filed Civil Case No. 680.  Reconsideration of the above order having
been denied they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 61466 which was given due course on January 7, 1983.

In G.R. No. 79555, petitioners argue that upon the trial court’s
receipt of their amended notice of appeal, it was its ministerial duty
to forward the records of Civil Case No. 680 to the Court of Appeals, and its
failure to do so is correctible by mandamus.

While the principle invoked is correct, this Court finds the same
inapplicable to petitioners’ situation. 
As pointed out by respondents the amended notice of appeal was
filed out of time.  The records show that
the order (G.R. No. 79555, pp. 53-55, Rollo)
of respondent judge, dated April 22,
1986, dismissing Civil Case No. 680 was received by petitioners on May 6, 1986.  On May
15, 1986, they filed with the trial court their notice of appeal
(p. 59, Ibid) signifying their intention to elevate the questioned order
to this Court “on the ground that said Order is contrary to law and
jurisprudence.” On May 28, 1986, they filed an amended notice of appeal
(p. 60, Ibid) where they informed the trial court that they would be
appealing instead to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, again on the same
ground above quoted.

It is true that the notice of appeal to this Court was filed on
time.  This, however, has no significance
and did not suspend the running of the 15-day period to appeal (Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, No. L-65439, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 311; Santos, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378).  It
is to be remembered that the correct mode of appeal from decisions or decrees
of Regional Trial Courts to this Court on pure questions of law is by petition
for review.  Briefly, under the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law, a litigant who invokes the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court (Sec. 2, R.A. No. 5440) to review
decisions or decrees of inferior courts, in cases in which only errors or
questions of law are involved, must do so by filing a petition for review by certiorari
in the form and in the manner required for petitions for review by certiorari
of decisions of the Court of Appeals (Sec. 3, Ibid), outlined in Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (Sec. 25, Interim Rules and Guidelines), and not by
ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

Under the present set up, no notice of appeal is required.  Instead, within 15 days^[1]
from receipt of the decision or decree assailed, a petition for review shall be
filed directly with this Court, paying within the same period of time docketing
fees.  The petition, however, shall not
be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof on the trial court
(Sec. 1, Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court).  Review of the decision or decree is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special or important reasons therefor
(Sec. 4, Ibid).

In the case at bar, petitioners allowed
the 15-day period to lapse without having filed a petition for review nor paid
the docketing and legal research fund fee with this Court, which acts are
necessary for perfecting their appeal. 
Instead they filed their amended notice of appeal with the trial
court signifying their intention to appeal to the Court of Appeals beyond the reglementary period. 
This Court has consistently ruled that the perfection of an appeal within
the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement and failure to do so
renders the questioned decision or decree final and executory
and no longer subject to review (Garcia v. Echiverri,
No. L-44455, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 631
citing Acda v. Minister of Labor, No. L-51607,
December 12, 1982, 119
SCRA 309; Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39515, November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 49;
Santos v. Court of Appeals, No. L­-60577, October 11, 1983, 125 SCRA 22).  While
this Court had relaxed this rule in a number of instances where to do so would
serve substantial justice (Director of Lands v. Romamban,
No. L-36948, August 28, 1984, 131 SCRA 431;
Vina v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39498, December 23, 1983, 126 SCRA
782; Castro v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47410, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 782), there appears no
reason to apply the exception to this case.

Firstly, the delay was not excusable.  It was incumbent upon petitioners to utilize
the correct mode of appeal of decisions or decrees of trial courts to this
Court.  In the mistaken choice of
their remedy, they can blame no one but themselves (Yucuanseh
Drug Co. v. NLU, 101 Phil. 409).  They
should have known that the filing with the trial court of a notice of appeal to
the Supreme Court was a useless act which could not arrest the running of the reglementary 15-day period. 
An erroneous application of the law or rules is not an excusable error.

Secondly, there appears no dispute as to the material facts of
the case.  The allegation of facts
contained in respondent Norma N. Vda. de Jocson’s motion to dismiss was
not refuted by petitioners in their opposition thereto.  Instead their attack was focused on the legal
consequences thereof.  Being so, there is
no factual issue which petitioners intend to raise.  In a pleading (G.R. No. 79555, p. 76, Rollo) they filed with this Court, petitioners
manifested that they seek to appeal to the Court of Appeals because they
“believe there are questions of facts to be resolved ultimately, like the
area of the property sought to be recovered, the damages, cost, and attorney’s
fees claimed.” But these questions of facts have no relation at all to the
question of the correctness of the order granting the motion to dismiss on the
ground of unenforceability, bar by prior judgment, prescription or laches.  In view of
the foregoing, it would be superfluous, and indeed erroneous for this Court to
order the records of Civil Case No. 680 to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals
since We have exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari
decisions or decrees of trial courts which involve only errors or questions of
law.

Thirdly, and most importantly, on the merits, We
see no reason to disturb the order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 680.  Clearly, from the given facts petitioners’
cause of action had prescribed.

The complaint (G.R. No. 74757, pp. 23-29, Rollo)
was filed on December 3, 1981.  There they alleged that in 1933, their
father, Agustin Jocson, together with his sister, Natalia Jocson, inherited five
lots pro-indiviso; that Agustin Jocson
entrusted to Natalia Jocson
and her husband, Ramiro Jocson, possession of his
share in the lots for the spouses’ use and enjoyment during their lifetime on
condition that they pay for the taxes thereon; that as a consequence, the
spouses and their successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lots in
dispute since 1933; that it was further agreed that upon the spouses’ demise,
the interest of Agustin in the lots would revert to him or his
successors-in-interest; that Agustin Jocson
predeceased the spouses in 1954, his wife died much earlier in 1931; that with
Agustin’s demise the petitioners, being the only compulsory heirs, became the
owners of the one-half undivided interest of Agustin on the lots; that further,
based on the foregoing, a trust relationship was created between the spouses Natalia Jocson and Ramiro Jocson on the one hand and the petitioners on the other,
the former having the obligation to deliver to the latter Agustin’s share; that
thereafter Natalia Jocson
died; that contrary to the above described arrangement, Ester Jocson (married to Demetrio Vinzon), the adopted daughter of Natalia
Jocson and Ramiro Jocson,
together with the latter, caused the transfer of the tax declaration of the
properties in their names; that it was only at the wake of Ramiro Jocson, who died in July 1981, when petitioners came to
know of the above described circumstances and of the fraud committed against
their father and to them as heirs.

Petitioners prayed inter alia
that they be declared the legal owners of one-half of the five lots and
entitled to possession thereof, and that they be awarded rentals for the use of
the property, and damages.

The complaint was directed against the private respondents – the
spouses Ester Jocson and Demetrio
Vinson with Norma N. Vda de Jocson
(the second wife of Ramiro Jocson) representing the
testate estate of Ramiro Jocson, being the named
executrix thereof.  As aforementioned,
defendant executrix filed a Motion to Dismiss (pp. 30-37, Ibid) on the
ground that petitioners’ cause of action being based on express trust (between
Agustin Jocson and Natalia Jocson) is unenforceable under Article 1443 of the Civil
Code; that it is barred by prior judgment because one-third (1/3) of the five
lots which the petitioners are claiming was adjudicated to Ramiro Jocson and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) thereof were
adjudicated to Ester Jocson-Vinzon in the intestate
estate proceeding of Natalia Jocson
(SP No. 6650), where the lots were reported to be the paraphernal
properties of the deceased, and in which proceeding the petitioners themselves
sought to intervene, though unsuccesfully, not as
adverse claimants to the estate but as heirs of Natalia
Jocson; that it is barred by prescription (citing
Article 1141, Civil Code) and laches because the lots
had been registered in the name of Natalia Jocson since 1935 while petitioners’ complaint was filed
only in 1981, and further considering that the properties were “claimed in
absolute registered ownership” by the estate of Natalia
Jocson in 1961 and later by Ramiro Jocson and Ester Jocson Vinzon who partitioned the lots with the intestate court’s
approval.

An opposition (pp. 57-61, Ibid) was filed by petitioners
where they pointed out that there was no express trust alleged by them but
rather implied trust; that their claim is not barred by prior judgment because
Special Proceeding No. 6650 has a different subject matter and cause of action
than Civil Case No. 680; that the registration by Natalia
Jocson of the realties in her name was illegal, and
the defense of laches and prescription is a
confession of wrongdoing or guilt; that trustees are disabled to acquire the
property under trust; and they are not guilty of laches
because they had no previous knowledge of the fraud committed by respondents.

Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the trial court, as
aforementioned, dismissed petitioners’ complaint in an order (pp. 4-5, Ibid),
dated April 22, 1986, the essential part of which reads, to wit:

“Records show that after the death of Natalia Jocson in 1961 an
Intestate proceedings was instituted in court to
settle her estate (S.P. No. 6650).  In
said special proceedings the heirs of Agustin Jocson
attempted to intervene, which was however dis-allowed
because the intervenors were not heirs of Natalia Jocson.  It is worthwhile to note in this proceedings
that Lot Nos. 572, 571, 2215, 410 and 579 (now Lot Nos. 579 A[2214]
and 579 B[2215]) transfer certificates of titles were transferred in the name
of Natalia Jocson way back
in 1933.  The aforesaid real properties
which comprise the bulk of the estate of Natalia Jocson are the same properties subject of this reconveyance suit. 
Further when this case was filed on December 3, 1981 there was a lapse of 46 long years after
Natalia transferred the titles in her name.  Plaintiffs have never been in possession of
the land and the trustee, if any, never recognized the alleged trust
relationship, so that the doctrine in De Buencamino
vs. De Matias (16 SCRA 489) is not applicable.  Besides Express trust concerning an immovable
cannot be proved by parol evidence and action based
on express trust also prescribed [sic] and the property held in trust may be
acquired by adverse possession from the moment the trust is repudiated.  The prescriptibility
of an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust, is now a settled question in this
jurisdiction.  It prescribes in ten years
(Escay vs. CA, 61 SCRA 371).  The filing of this case in 1981 long after
the death of Natalia Jocson
in 1961 and other person involved renders it difficult to determine with
certitude whether plaintiff had really been defrauded.  ‘Fraud or breach of trust, ought not lightly
to be imputed to the living, for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to
the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of
injustice and cruelty to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud is clear, beyond reasonable doubts’ (Prevost vs. Grants, 6 Whest.  (US) 481, 498).

“x x x.

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, and finding the
motion to dismiss well-taken the same is hereby granted.  The other issues raised in this case being
too technical are brushed aside.  This
case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost.”

It is not necessary to discuss the propriety of each and every
basis of the trial court in dismissing petitioners’ complaint, it being
sufficient to focus attention on the matter of prescription.

In G.R. No. 74757, petitioner Enrique Jocson
argued that there could be no prescription in this case because respondents’
predecessors-in-interest had kept from him and his co-plaintiffs knowledge that
they have a participation in the five lots and that it was only during the wake
of Ramiro Jocson, who died in 1981, that petitioners
came to know of the fraud committed against them as described in their
complaint.  Further, petitioner pointed
out that by filing a motion to dismiss, respondents, in effect, admitted
“wrong-doing and fraud” on their part.

We find this argument unavailing. 
Hypothetically admitting that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest,
Agustin Jocson, inherited the herein disputed five
lots together with Natalia Jocson,
the accepted fact is that the latter registered the lots in 1935 as her
exclusive properties.  By that
registration, Natalia announced to the whole world
that the five lots were hers alone and effectively renounced whatever claim
Agustin might have over the properties (Lopez v. Gonzaga,
No. L-18788, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 167;
See also Pangan v. CA, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988).  The fact of repudiation is not here
contested.  Petitioners called the act of
Natalia as illegal and in violation of the will of
her father.  This may be so, and
petitioners may call Natalia’s registration of the
lots by any other name but from that time, she held the property adverse to
Agustin Jocson. 
Any trust relationship, either express or resulting trust, which Natalia and Agustin intended to bind themselves with
respect to the lots was renounced.  And
any constructive trust which might have arisen by Natalia’s
fraudulent act cannot anymore be enforced considering that before the present
Civil Code, the longest period of prescription is 10 years (Diaz v. Gorrido, 103 Phil. 261 [1958]), and Agustin Jocson never filed an action for reconveyance.  Whatever right he might have had over the
five lots was extinguished 10 years after 1935, either because Natalia had acquired the properties by acquisitive
prescription or Agustin’s cause of action had prescribed.  For these reasons, petitioners clearly have
no claim over the disputed lands. 
Whatever claim they might have had, they derived as heirs of Agustin but
as Agustin’s right over the lots was extinguished way back in 1945 so was
petitioners’.

In view of the foregoing, petitioners clearly have no claim
against the estate of Ramiro Jocson, and, therefore,
have no reason to intervene in the testate estate proceeding of the deceased. G.R. No. 61466, thus, has become moot and academic.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition in 1) G.R. No. 61466 is DENIED
for having become moot and academic; 2) G.R. No. 74757 is DENIED for lack of
merit and the order of the respondent court, dated April 22, 1986, dismissing
civil case no. 16374 (now civil case no. 680) is AFFIRMED; and 3) G.R. No.
79555 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco,
and Griño-Aquino,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Section 3 of Republic Act 5440 provides that the petition shall be filed within
the period fixed in the rules of court for appeals in criminal or civil cases
or special civil actions or special proceedings, depending upon the nature of
the case, which period has been uniformly fixed under section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129 at 15 days (See Mania v. Vda. de Segarra, No. L-48257, August 24, 1984, 131 SCRA 330)