DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

NARVASA, J.:

This appeal, which was certified to the Court by the Court of
Appeals as involving only questions of law,^[1] relates to a claim for loss and/or damage
to a shipment of machine parts sought to be enforced by the consignee, appellant
Dole Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter called Dole) against the carrier, Maritime
Company of the Philippines (hereinafter called Maritime), under the provisions
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.^[2]

The basic facts are succinctly
stated in the order of the Trial Court ^[3] dated March 16, 1977, the relevant portion
of which reads:

Before the plaintiff started presenting evidence at today’s trial, at the
instance of the Court the lawyers entered into the following stipulation of
facts:

1. The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the
   custody of the consignee on December 18, 1971;

2. The corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the
   cargo was filed by the plaintiff with the defendant vessel on May 4,
   1972;

3. On June 11, 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court
   of First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 91043, embodying
   three (3) causes of action involving three (3) separate and different
   shipments.  The third cause of action therein involved the cargo now subject of
   this present litigation;”

4. On December 11, 1974, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order in
   Civil Case No. 91043 dismissing the first two causes of action in the aforesaid
   case with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs because the parties
   had settled or compromised the claims involved therein.  The third cause of
   action which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise dismissed
   but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement.  The dismissal of
   that complaint containing the three causes of action was upon a joint motion to
   dismiss filed by the parties;

5. Because of the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No.
   91043 with respect to the third cause of action without prejudice, plaintiff
   instituted this present complaint on January 6, 1975.

      

   ***

   ***

   ***.”[4]

To the complaint in the subsequent action Maritime filed an
answer pleading inter alia the affirmative defense of prescription
under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,^[5] and following pre-trial, moved for a
preliminary hearing on said defense.^[6]
The Trial Court granted the motion, scheduling the preliminary hearing on April
27, 1977.^[7] The record before the Court
does not show whether or not that hearing was held, but under date of May 6,
1977, Maritime filed a formal motion to dismiss invoking once more the ground of
prescription.^[8] The motion was opposed
by Dole^[9] and the Trial Court, after due
consideration, resolved the matter in favor of Maritime and dismissed the
complaint.^[10] Dole sought a
reconsideration, which was denied,^[11]
and thereafter took the present appeal from the order of dismissal.

The
pivotal issue is whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code providing that
the prescription of actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial
written demand by the creditor is applicable to actions brought under the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which, in its Section 3, paragraph 6, provides
that:

Dole concedes that its action is subject to the one-year period
of limitation prescribed in the above-cited provision.^[12] The substance of its argument is that
since the provisions of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said Code,
suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in matters
governed by the latter,^[13] and there
being “*** a patent deficiency *** with respect to the tolling of the
prescriptive period ***” provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,^[14] prescription under said Act is subject to
the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling; and because Dole’s
claim for loss or damage made on May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial
demand which would toll or interrupt prescription under Article 1155, it
operated to toll prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act.  To much the same effect is the further argument based on Article 1176 of
the Civil Code which provides that the rights and obligations of common carriers
shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws in all matters not
regulated by the Civil Code.

These arguments might merit weightier
consideration were it not for the fact that the question has already received a
definitive answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong
Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines,
Inc.^[15] There, in a parallel
factual situation, where suit to recover for damage to cargo shipped by vessel
from Tokyo to Manila was filed more than two years after the consignee’s receipt
of the cargo, this Court rejected the contention that an extrajudicial demand
tolled the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
viz:

“In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant argues
that it was error for the court a quo not to have considered the action
of plaintiff-appellant suspended by the extrajudicial demand which took place,
according to defendant’s own motion to dismiss, on August 22, 1952.  We notice
that while plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods arrived in Manila,
it relies upon the allegation made in the motion to dismiss that a protest was
filed on August 22, 1952 — which goes to show that plaintiff-appellant’s
counsel has not been laying the facts squarely before the court for the
consideration of the merits of the case.  We have already decided that in a case
governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made to apply.  (Chua Kuy
vs. Everett Steamship Corp., G.R. No. L-5554, May 27, 1953.) Similarly, we
now hold that in such a case the general provisions of the new Civil Code (Art.
1155) cannot be made to apply, as such application would have the effect of
extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in the law.  It is desirable
that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a
time as possible; the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the new
Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the
settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary to the clear intent
and purpose of the law.  ***”

Moreover, no different result would obtain even if the Court
were to accept the proposition that a written extrajudicial demand does toll
prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.  The demand in this
instance would be the claim for damage filed by Dole with Maritime on May 4,
1972.  The effect of that demand would have been to renew the one-year
prescriptive period from the date of its making.  Stated otherwise, under Dole’s
theory, when its claim was received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive
period was interrupted — “tolled” would be the more precise term — and began to
run anew from May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one (1) year counted
from that date within which to institute action on its claim for damage. 
Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without filing action.  It
instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on June 11, 1973, more than one month after
that period had expired and its right of action had prescribed.

Dole’s
contention that the prescriptive period “*** remained tolled as of May 4, 1972
*** (and that) in legal contemplation *** (the) case (Civil Case No. 96353) was
filed on January 6, 1975 *** well within the one-year prescriptive period in
Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,”^[16] equates tolling with indefinite
suspension.  It is clearly fallacious and merits no
consideration.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Dole Philippines,
Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco,
and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.